The moral differences between the holocaust and bombing Japan

Do u know whether thay complied with that obligation ?

It's not really a matter of being an "idiot" and I apologize for using that term.

But you don't seem to listen to what others on this thread are trying to sell you.

On this thread you keep on misusing the word "genocide" and insisting that it, somehow, has something to do with the number of casualties,

Really RL, JTT doesn't need a defender, and if he does, I don't think you are up to it.

Really RL, JTT doesn't need a defender

Quote:

Really RL, JTT doesn't need a defender, and if he does, I don't think you are up to it.

You're going to keep posting these threads and I will comment on those that I find of interest. If you don't like what I have to say...so sorry.

Not that it should matter one whit to you, but I no longer have you on Ignore

oralloy wrote:

Japan was not being asked to surrender unconditionally

Walter already quoted point 13 of the Potsdam Declaration:

"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces"

http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html

6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
7. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
10. [...] The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

The Potsdam Declaration makes no mention of the Emperor, but anyone greatly concerned with the survival of the imperial institution could easily see the terms of this declaration as a great threat to it.

Quoting more from the Zuberi article:
On August 9 the Japanese War Council was discussing the terms of surrender they should pursue when it received the news of the Nagasaki bombing, which didn't change the situation much. At the end of the meeting: "Nine voted for acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration with a proviso regarding kokutai,

four wanted the three additional conditions to be fulfilled, and three were undecided"
Note: the three additional conditions were: (a) voluntary withdrawal of Japanese forces overseas under their own commanders; (b) no Allied occupation of Japan; and (c) those responsible for the war to be tried by the Japanese themselves.

After meeting with the Emperor, on August 10, "Togo proposed acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration "with the understanding that it did not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."

The American response:
"Stimson and Leahy said the emperor's help would be needed in obtaining surrender of scattered Japanese troops. It was of vital importance for Stimson to get Japan under American control "before the Russians could put in any substantial claim to occupy and help rule it." Byrnes, however, still feared a backlash. The demand for unconditional surrender was made before the two bombs were dropped and before the Soviet Union was a belligerent. "If any conditions are to be accepted", he insisted, "I want the United States and not Japan to state the conditions."

Stalin's armies were racing across Manchuria; there was no time to lose. Truman asked Byrnes to draft a reply to the Japanese surrender offer. The carefully drafted reply contained the sentence: "From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms." This assurance implied the retention of the emperor."

oralloy wrote:

Nonsense. The condition that Japan asked for was rejected. And there was no ambiguity whatsoever.
Japan asked us to guarantee that Hirohito would retain unlimited dictatorial power as Japan's living deity. And we replied that Hirohito would be subordinate to MacArthur.

I disagree. As I said, the Potsdam Declaration could be seen as a great threat to the existence of the emperor. Now at least he is explicitly mentioned, and stating that his authority will be "subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers" logically implies that it will continue to exist - subordinate as it may be.

His prerogatives may be affected, depending on the outcome of the surrender and the peace talks,

but it's not as if it would be the first time Japan had a sacred ruling emperor with limited effective power.

At least he remains, and Japan could save face, which the emperor apparently managed to do.

oralloy wrote:

Not very likely. Japan was dead set on trying to end the war in a draw with the aid of the Soviets.

What do you mean by "in a draw" ?

They were actively seeking Soviet intercession to manage better surrender terms for themselves.

"Kido was the central figure in the group of Japanese leaders seeking negotiated peace. Foreign Minister Togo was pressing Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow to request the Soviet government to use its good offices to obtain modification of the Allied terms of surrender.

All that was needed was an assurance regarding the retention of the emperor.

It was proposed that Prince Konoye be sent as an envoy to Mosocw. The Togo-Sato messages were quickly decoded because the US navy cryptographers had broken the Japanese codes."

From History professor Dennis Wainstock's The Decision to Drpo the Atomic Bomb (1996):
Conclusion (to the introduction)
"By the end of July 1945, if not before, Japan was militarily defeated. Fire raids had ravaged its major cities; its best troops were killed or missing in East Asia and the South Pacific, and many were still fighting in China. Twenty-two million Japanese were homeless, and the US naval and air blockade had cut off imports of fuel, food and raw materials from Japan's conquests in China, Korea, and Manchuria. US submarines roamed Japanese waters sinking tankers and freighters that tried to run the blockade. Japan's Navy had ceased to exist, and Air Force was severely diminished. US battleships and cruisers were shelling port installations and military compounds within gun range of the Japanese shores. At the same time, carrier-based fighters and bombers flew with near-impunity over the islands, bombing targets of opportunity - railway tracks and trains, motorized troop convoys, factories and air fields.

After April 1945, Japan's leaders sought a diplomatic solution to end the war.

So I don't understand how ending the war in this situation could be considered ending it "on a draw".

oralloy wrote:

But Truman did not in any way know. The author makes it sound like Truman was a reliable psychic or something.

Not at all.
He argues Truman thaught or that even he was sure the Japanese would surrender after hearing about the Soviet declaration of war and advances in Manchuria.
No one in their right mind would argue, much less in a scientific article, that Truman, or anyone for that matter, knew how events would unfold.
And judging from the evidence at hand, from Truman and his advisers, I think it's pretty safe to say that he thaught the Japanese would surrender.

oralloy wrote:

That might be a quote from his first edition, but it's not what his revised edition says.

What does it say?
The authors are quoting: J. Samuel Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update," Diplomatic History, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1990.)
I can't access that article, nor the subsequent edition to which you are referring to (I couldn't even find it).

There is however a very interesting article by the same professor: Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground, in Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 2005).

They are both immoral acts but I personally think when you drop A-bombs and millions of other bombs on a city, you have now brought the war into the homes of many people who would not want anything to do with war.
When you bomb navy ships you chose a military target that was a navy base.

The US has never been a pirate nation.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smedley_Butler

I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested. Looking back on it, I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents.