The moral differences between the holocaust and bombing Japan

@Foofie,

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So, I really do not know you, nor want to.

Interesting way to deal with this, Foofie. You said essentially the same thing to RL. You do not do yourself or your arguments much good with that tactic.

In any case, as I said earlier in the thread, there obviously are huge differences in the “holocaust” and the “nuclear bombing of Japan”…but the question as posed leaves room for a reasonable discussion of the morality of mass killings…no matter the differences.

And since it does—and considering your way of dealing with the comments of RL and me…it calls into question the reliability and reasonableness of your arguments.

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Plus, the purpose of the Holocaust was to perform genocide, while the purpose of the bombing of Japan was just to make the Japanese surrender. Apples and oranges.

Yup, most definitely. And the moral question can still exist and reasonably be explored and discussed.

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But, you can split hairs with someone else, since I have no reason to believe you are of my mindset.

Ahhh…you only want to discuss with people of “your mindset.” Lot of that going around, Foofie. You ought really to try to get over it.

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And, much of the canards against Jews has been accepted by many an otherwise rational person.

Not sure what you were attempting to say here, Foofie, but you didn’t succeed whatever it was.

In any case, whenever I am asked why Jews suffer so much rejection in so many places, I ALWAYS offer the opinion that it is primarily due to jealousy on the part of non-Jews for the fact that Jews in general...are such outstanding acheivers.

Which of course brings me back to the first comment of yours that I quoted.

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So, I really do not know you, nor want to.

Why not?

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@Frank Apisa,

Have you seen South Park Frank? The episode where they go to Canada and meet Scott? Substitute Scott for Foofie.

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@JTT,

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President Roosevelt called that "inhuman barbarism." That was before the United States and England began to bomb civilian populations in Hamburg, Frankfurt, Dresden, and then in Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki.

I can't speak to the UK's bombing of Germany, but I strongly suspect that any analysis of the subject would reveal that they were trying to destroy military targets contained within the cities they burned.

Tokyo was burned because of all the aircraft parts factories spread throughout it.

The industrial zone north of Nagasaki was nuked because it contained large weapons factories.

Hiroshima was nuked because it was an important military base filled with tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers.

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So we must now, fifty-five years later, with those bombings still so sacred that a mildly critical Smithsonian exhibit could not be tolerated, insist on questioning those deadly missions of the sixth and ninth of August, 1945.

The Smithsonian exhibit was not tolerated because it was filled with outrageous lies.

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The principal justification for obliterating Hiroshima and Nagasaki is that it "saved lives" because otherwise a planned U.S. invasion of Japan would have been necessary,

The justification for dropping the bombs was the fact that Japan was refusing to surrender.

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resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands. Truman at one point used the figure "a half million lives," and Churchill "a million lives," but these were figures pulled out of the air to calm troubled consciences; even official projections for the number of casualties in an invasion did not go beyond 46,000.

The War Department commissioned a study that estimated that an invasion of the Japanese home islands would result in serious injuries to 1.7 million to 4 million American soldiers, and American fatalities would range from 400,000 to 800,000.

Former President Hoover, who was advising President Truman and had access to fairly high level information (though he was told nothing of the A-bombs), referred to the potential invasion of the Japanese home islands as costing the lives of 500,000 to 1,000,000 American soldiers.

He may have been referring to the previous study, but since the numbers are slightly different, it might also signal a second study with similar estimates.

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In fact, the bombs that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not forestall an invasion of Japan because no invasion was necessary. The Japanese were on the verge of surrender, and American military leaders knew that.

No American military leader knew that. Only one American military leader even thought it (and no one took him seriously about it).

In any case, if Japan really wanted to surrender, they were free to do so. No one was stopping them.

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General Eisenhower, briefed by Secretary of War Henry Stimson on the imminent use of the bomb, told him that "Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary."

Yes. The that was the one time that anyone suggested the bombs were unnecessary. It was a private conversation with just two participants.

That conversation occurred shortly before the bombs were dropped, and at that point there would have been no way to reverse course even had Ike been convincing.

After Stimson told Ike that he was an idiot, Ike decided to wait many decades before voicing his opinion on the matter again.

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After the bombing, Admiral William D. Leary, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the atomic bomb "a barbarous weapon," also noting that: "The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender."

Not just after the bombing, LONG after the bombing -- in a time when there were no longer any worries about what to do if Japan kept refusing to surrender.

And his overall point was a claim that naval power was primarily responsible for winning the war, so post-war defense spending should emphasize the Navy at the expense of the other services. A bit of an axe to grind, in other words.

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The Japanese had begun to move to end the war after the U.S. victory on Okinawa, in May of 1945, in the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War. After the middle of June, six members of the Japanese Supreme War Council authorized Foreign Minister Togo to approach the Soviet Union, which was not at war with Japan, to mediate an end to the war "if possible by September."

Yes. As I said in my previous post, Japan's primary concern in their decision to surrender was the fact that they had no ability to prevent us from invading and occupying them.

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Togo sent Ambassador Sato to Moscow to feel out the possibility of a negotiated surrender.

False. Sato was only instructed to get permission for Prince Konoye to come and talk with the Soviets.

What Prince Konoye was going to propose, had he been allowed to talk to the Soviets, was a scheme where the Soviets would pretend to mediate talks with the US, but would mediate in bad faith, and instead of achieving a Japanese surrender, would push to have the war end in a draw (similar to the draw that later ended the Korean War).

In exchange for the Soviets mediating in bad faith, Japan would agree to become their close ally in the post-war years.

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On July 13, four days before Truman, Churchill, and Stalin met in Potsdam to prepare for the end of the war (Germany had surrendered two months earlier), Togo sent a telegram to Sato: "Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace. It is his Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war."
The United States knew about that telegram because it had broken the Japanese code early in the war.

Those same cables that said "unconditional surrender is not acceptable" also said "surrender, with a guarantee to keep the emperor but no other conditions, is just another form of unconditional surrender".

And don't think the people analyzing the deciphered communications missed that.

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American officials knew also that the Japanese resistance to unconditional surrender was because they had one condition enormously important to them: the retention of the Emperor as symbolic leader. Former Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew and others who knew something about Japanese society had suggested that allowing Japan to keep its Emperor would save countless lives by bringing an early end to the war.

Yes. Mr. Grew was the guy who advised that we tell Japan we would keep Hirohito's dynasty on as a powerless figurehead (leaving us the option of executing Hirohito and making his son the figurehead).

Mr. Grew also advised that Japan's contacts with Russia were probably an attempt to get out of the war without having to surrender.

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Yet Truman would not relent, and the Potsdam conference agreed to insist on "unconditional surrender."

The Potsdam Proclamation abandoned unconditional surrender and provided Japan with a list of generous surrender terms.

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This ensured that the bombs would fall on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

We know from hindsight that Japan was not willing to surrender, under any circumstances whatsoever, until after both A-bombs had been dropped.

(I am of course not counting "ending the war in a draw" as a type of surrender.)

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It seems that the United States government was determined to drop those bombs.
But why?

Because Japan was refusing to surrender.

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Gar Alperovitz, whose research on that question is unmatched

My research on this subject is superior to that of Gar Alperovitz.

(And unlike Gar Alperovitz, who always lies, I always tell the truth.)

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concluded, based on the papers of Truman, his chief adviser James Byrnes, and others, that the bomb was seen as a diplomatic weapon against the Soviet Union.

But in the real world, the bombs were a weapon against Japan.

We really, really needed Japan to surrender.

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Byrnes advised Truman that the bomb "could let us dictate the terms of ending the war."

We did indeed dictate the terms that Japan was required to accept.

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The British scientist P.M.S. Blackett, one of Churchill's advisers, wrote after the war that dropping the atomic bomb was "the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia."

Yes, but he is another known liar.

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@oralloy,

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The Smithsonian exhibit was not tolerated because it was filled with outrageous lies.

Really? What were the lies that they were purposing?

What kind of world do you want to leave your grandchildren A propaganda world?

The Ethical Spectacle, April 1995, http://www.spectacle.org
Two Sides to Every Story: The Smithsonian Hiroshima Exhibit You Won't See

This year is the 50th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945, the only use of atomic weapons in war, and the Smithsonian had planned an exhibition at the National Air and Space Museum. The exhibit would have centered around the fuselage of the Enola Gay, the plane that dropped the bomb on Hiroshima; now, that is all you will see, as the rest of the exhibit has been cut.

Here are some samples of the narrative that would have accompanied the exhibit, provoking thought about whether the U.S. was correct to use atomic weapons against Japan:

Harry Truman inherited a very expensive bomb project that had always aimed at producing a military weapon. Furthermore, he was faced with the prospect of an invasion and he was told the bomb would be useful for impressing the Soviet Union. He therefore saw no reason to avoid using the bomb....

The introduction of nuclear weapons into the world, and their first use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, left powerful legacies....For Japan, the United States and its allies, a horrific war was brought to an abrupt end, although at a cost debated to this day; for the world, a nuclear arms race unfolded that still threatens unimaginable devastation.

First, let's dispose of the substantive issues, so we can get on to the procedural. Personally, I hold with the idea that you don't judge a man until you've walked a mile in his shoes. Most of us, if we pretend for a little while we are Harry Truman, would decide to use the bomb. I know I would. A desperate, violent war is taking place against an aggressor nation-- what considerations would stop me, in 1945, from using the most effective weapon possible to bring it to an early conclusion? I happen to think that Mr. Truman was the most honest, firm and no-nonsense President we have had in this century, and he did the best he could with the bomb decision pretty much like he did with everything else.

That said, why on earth can't the Smithsonian present an exhibit which admits that there are two sides to the story? Though I believe Truman made the best decision he could, it is the job of historians continuously to re-evaluate the decisions of the past and to present new information as it comes to light. All my life, to cite just one example, I have believed, as you probably also have, that the atomic bombing of Japan avoided the necessity of an invasion that would have resulted in one million American deaths. It appears that this number, so frequently quoted, is not based on the military analyses done at the time:

...military staff studies in the spring of 1945 estimated 30,000 to 50,000 casualties--dead and wounded--in "Olympic", the invasion of Kyushu. Based on the Okinawa campaign, that would have meant perhaps 10,000 American dead. Military planners made no firm estimates for...the second invasion, but losses clearly would have been higher.

(That was another quote from the proposed Smithsonian exhibit.) But if the losses for the second invasion were five times higher, that still totals 60,000 dead, not one million. Doesn't a Smithsonian curator have a right to put this information before the public?

Another recent incident involving interpretation of history sheds an interesting sidelight on this issue. After the November elections, Mr. Gingrich fired the House's official historian and, after some discussion as to whether the office was to be eliminated, appointed a college professor acquaintance of his as replacement. This candidate had to withdraw from consideration when her reaction, years ago, to a Holocaust lesson she was reviewing, came to light. Her criticism--she had been on a panel reviewing lesson plans for federal funding--was that it failed to tell the Nazi side of the story. Mr. Gingrich could not defend her against the resulting fuss (and did not even attempt to.)
On a gut level, it feels wrong to censure the Smithsonian curator for covering the other side of the Hiroshima story--but it feels right to force the prospective House historian to withdraw for having claimed that there was another side to the Holocaust story. By holding these two opinions, am I the unwitting purveyor of a double standard, something I detest?

I don't believe so. There are two sides to most stories, not every story. Reducing it to the starkest moral terms, the proposed Smithsonian exhibit questioned our assumption that an act of mass killing was moral and necessary. The candidate for the House historian job criticized the Holocaust lesson plan for assuming that an act of mass killing was immoral and unnecessary. We could easily make a moral rule that questioning killing, or other apparent violations of our fundamental beliefs as embodied in the Judaeo-Christian ethic, is healthy, while questioning the ethic itself is not--or at least is not a fit job for public officials and museums.

I don't think its quite that simple, however. I would only go so far as to say that we can all probably agree that there are certain issues which have only one side. An exhibit of famous rapists, their techniques and beliefs, with a sidebar on whether rape should be legalized for sport, would not be acceptable to anyone. But an exhibit suggesting that there are two ways of thinking about a war, or an act of war, really should be.

The First Amendment protects the free flow of ideas in this country and attempts to guarantee debate. In support of this philosophy, we should draw the circle as wide as possible, so that we recognize that our morality demands that relatively few issues are one-sided. The uproar about the Enola Gay exhibit has had the unfortunate result that only the fuselage of the plane will be exhibited, with no commentary. Five attempts were made to revise the exhibit to everyone's satisfaction before it was abandoned entirely. The Smithsonian was caught in a crossfire between forces such as the American Legion, on the one hand, and historians calling for the re-introduction of some balance into later scripts, on the other. The American Legion:

The hundreds of thousands of American boys whose lives were thus spared....are, by this exhibit, now to be told their lives were purchased at the price of treachery and revenge.

A group of scholars writing to the secretary of the Smithsonian:

Certain irrevocable facts cannot be omitted without so corrupting the exhibit that it is reduced to mere propaganda, thus becoming an affront to "those who gave their lives for freedom".

Once a museum tries to make everyone happy, only the blandest of exhibits becomes possible. The Holocaust museum should be able to mount an exhibit referring to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia as genocide. The Air and Space Museum should be able to discuss the morality of the atomic bomb. We should trust the people we hire to be our curators to range widely within the circles we have drawn for them. If we make their decisions subject to the approval of a particular political faction, or of vocal minorities in general, then we will have only propaganda museums.

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@reasoning logic,

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All my life, to cite just one example, I have believed, as you probably also have, that the atomic bombing of Japan avoided the necessity of an invasion that would have resulted in one million American deaths. It appears that this number, so frequently quoted, is not based on the military analyses done at the time:

That's what the propaganda says so, of course, most Americans believe, want to believe the propaganda. The US forced the issue so that it could use atomic bombs for political purposes. There was so much racism against Japan.

Near the beginning of WWII, some 20% of Americans thought the Japanese should be wiped off the face of the Earth. Soldiers were sending Japanese soldiers skulls home to their girlfriends made in ashtrays.

If the US had a major power looming over it that had people wishing and hoping for America and Americans to be wiped off the face of the Earth, USians would fight to the end too.

But just because there is that rumor, that doesn't allow anyone to use war crimes to make a war end quicker. If that was the rationale, then they should have marched out the chemical weapons right from the get go.

That the US had a serious plan in place to use chemical weapons speaks to how easily the US will do anything to wipe out those it creates a battle situation with.

It has done this same thing in every illegal invasion it has engaged in - some 200 illegal invasions up to the late 80s.

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@JTT,

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More than 100,000 died in Dresden.

No more than 25,000.

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The bombing of Japanese cities continued the strategy of saturation bombing to destroy civilian morale;

The strategy was to destroy Japan's war industry.

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The justification for these atrocities was that this would end the war quickly, making unnecessary an invasion of Japan.

The justification for strikes against Japanese military targets was the fact that Japan had not yet surrendered.

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Such an invasion would cost a huge number of lives, the government said -- a million, according to Secretary of State Byrnes; half a million, Truman claimed was the figure given him by General George Marshall.

Yes. In such an invasion, American soldiers were predicted to suffer millions of casualties, with fatalities ranging from 500,000 to 1,000,000.

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When the papers of the Manhattan Project -- the project to build the atom bomb -- were released years later, they showed that Marshall urged a warning to the Japanese about the bomb, so people could be removed and only military targets hit.

Yes. The US leafleted Japanese cities before our bombing raids arrived, warning civilians to flee.

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These estimates of invasion losses were not realistic,

Yes they were.

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and seem to have been pulled out of the air to justify bombings

They were achieved with scientific and military analysis, and were created to help war planners make the best possible decisions.

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Japan, by August 1945, was in desperate shape and ready to surrender.

No one was stopping Japan from surrendering. If they wanted to surrender, we'd have been pleased to have them do it.

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New York Times military analyst Hanson Baldwin wrote, shortly after the war:
The enemy, in a military sense, was in a hopeless strategic position by the time the Potsdam demand for unconditional surrender was made on July 26.

The Potsdam Proclamation repealed unconditional surrender. It was a list of generous surrender terms.

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Such then, was the situation when we wiped out Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Need we have done it? No one can, of course, be positive, but the answer is almost certainly negative.

Japan was still refusing to surrender.

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The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, set up by the War Department in 1944 to study the results of aerial attacks in the war, interviewed hundreds of Japanese civilian and military leaders after Japan surrendered, and reported just after the war:
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to I November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Being able to comment from hindsight sure is nice.

They had a bit of an axe to grind though. They were trying to argue that conventional air power won the war practically all by itself, and based on that questionable claim, were saying that post-war defense spending should mainly go to the Air Force instead of the other services.

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But could American leaders have known this in August 1945? The answer is, clearly, yes.

Nope. Time machines were not available.

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The Japanese code had been broken, and Japan's messages were being intercepted. It was known the Japanese had instructed their ambassador in Moscow to work on peace negotiations with the Allies.

That was far from what Japan instructed their ambassador to do.

Japan's goal in talking to the Soviets was not clear to us, but Mr. Grew guessed (correctly) that the most likely possibility was that Japan was trying to get out of the war without surrendering.

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Japanese leaders had begun talking of surrender a year before this,

No they hadn't.

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On July 13, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo wired his ambassador in Moscow: "Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace...."

He also wired that "surrender with the sole condition of a guarantee for the Emperor" was just another form of unconditional surrender.

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Martin Sherwin, after an exhaustive study of the relevant historical documents, concludes: "Having broken the Japanese code before the war, American Intelligence was able to -- and did -- relay this message to the President, but it had no effect whatever on efforts to bring the war to a conclusion."

Yes. There was little in the intercepts to indicate that Japan was ready to accept our terms.

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If only the Americans had not insisted on unconditional surrender -- that is, if they were willing to accept one condition to the surrender, that the Emperor, a holy figure to the Japanese, remain in place -- the Japanese would have agreed to stop the war.

America did not insist on unconditional surrender. The Potsdam Proclamation was a list of generous surrender terms.

We weren't looking for Japan to agree to stop the war. We were looking for Japan to surrender.

It was only after both A-bombs had already been dropped that Japan offered to surrender if we granted that condition.

We did not grant that condition when Japan finally asked it of us. They surrendered in short order anyway.

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Why did the United States not take that small step to save both American and Japanese lives?

Unlikely that a large amount of lives were lost between August 10 and August 14.

But there was no way that we would ever agree to Japan's request that Hirohito retain unlimited dictatorial power.

Hirohito was going to be made subordinate to MacArthur and that was the end of it.

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Was it because too much money and effort had been invested in the atomic bomb not to drop it?

When we refused to grant Japan's surrender condition regarding the Emperor, both A-bombs had already been dropped.

The idea that "the cost of developing a weapon" requires it to be used in a particular war, is silly.

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Or was it, as British scientist P. M. S. Blackett suggested (Fear, War, and the Bomb), that the United States was anxious to drop the bomb before the Russians entered the war against Japan?

At the time we refused Japan's request to give them a guarantee for their Emperor, both A-bombs had already been dropped and the Soviets had already entered the war.

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The Russians had secretly agreed (they were officially not at war with Japan) they would come into the war ninety days after the end of the European war.

True, but the cowards were dawdling. They only scurried to join the war in a hurry when they learned that the A-bombs were nearly ready.

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In other words, Blackett says, the dropping of the bomb was "the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia...."

Blackett was a notorious liar.

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@JTT,

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Evidence that has become available since the war shows that the U.S. not only deliberately maneuvered Japan to be the first to attack, but had foreknowledge of Japan's plans.

Nonsense.

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@JTT,

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There are two ways to assess whether President Truman committed crimes against humanity.

Not really. Just one way really.

The only relevant question is: Was he targeting civilians or was he not?

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The first is the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Nuremberg trials which applies to this case. President Truman violated the following clauses in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal:
Article 6
b. War Crimes: namely violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include... murder, ill-treatment.., of civilian population... wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

Nope. There is a very good reason why "War Crimes" are in a separate section from "Crimes Against Humanity".

That reason is: War Crimes are not Crimes Against Humanity.

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c. Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination .... of civilian population...

At least the author managed to find the right section finally. This is the right place to determine whether Crimes Against Humanity were committed.

So, were civilians targeted?

No?

Then the bombings were not Crimes Against Humanity.

Next!

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The other way to evaluate President Truman's culpability is to apply international laws which were created after the end of WW II. He violated the following clauses in the Geneva Conventions:
1. Convention IV, Part 1, Article 3, clause 1,-protection of civilians;
2. Convention IV, Chapter III, article 52-protection of nonmilitary objects:
3. Protocol I, Chapter II, Article 51, clause 4-indiscriminate attacks.

Violating those statutes does not in any way constitute a Crime Against Humanity.

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President Truman lied to the American people about his motives for dropping the two atomic bombs.

No he didn't. He said we dropped the bombs because Japan was refusing to surrender. That was in fact the reason why we dropped the bombs.

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He also misled the public about the nature of the first target. In a radio speech on August 9, 1945, he gave assurances that "The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base."

Hardly misleading. Hiroshima was a huge military base.

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The killing of over 100,000 civilians, the devastation of two cities, the deaths and diseases resulting from radiation poisoning, and the ominous precedent of using nuclear weapons are categorically crimes against humanity.

No they aren't. No civilians were targeted.

For an example of a Crime Against Humanity look at the World Trade Center attack.

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@reasoning logic,

reasoning logic wrote:

I really do appreciate you sharing it with me. Without even fact checking it, it seems to make sense because it seemed to correlate with the times it was relating to.

But once they are fact checked, it becomes clear that the articles are just a bunch of nonsense.

reasoning logic wrote:

I would recommend it to anyone who is seeking truth

I wouldn't. The fact that there is no truth to the articles kind of gets in the way of a search for truth.

reasoning logic wrote:

and to those who would like to prove it wrong.

No question that the articles are good exercise for fact checkers.

reasoning logic wrote:

I will be honest and say that I have enjoyed many of the post that sentanta has shared even though he has behavioral issues he still seem to have a gift for appreciating history. But if he does truly appreciates it he will also appreciate what you have shared if he is sincere.

I don't see how a sincere appreciation of history requires the appreciation of long lists of outright fabrications.

reasoning logic wrote:

This truly does show how sick we are.

Nonsense. Falsified accusations do not reflect on us in any way.

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@reasoning logic,

reasoning logic wrote:

oralloy wrote:
As for legality, we did what needed to be done.

You think it was for legality?

No. I think it was doing what needed to be done.

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@reasoning logic,

reasoning logic wrote:

Do you think that the sword is such an awesome weapon that your enemy will not obtain one?
How about a bow and arrow? How about a gun? How about a tank? How about an airplane? How about an atom bomb? Does logic tell you that this pattern will continue?

We're less than a year away from bombing Iran to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons.

reasoning logic wrote:

Do you actually believe that we can prevent our enemies from obtaining the same weapons that we posses and using them on us?

Having the military kill our enemies is a pretty good way of preventing those enemies from harming us.

reasoning logic wrote:

If not do you think it may be time for us to work together for world peace?

I doubt anyone objects to world peace. Probably the only way to achieve it though is for the military to kill all our enemies.

reasoning logic wrote:

Or should we wait until a few nukes are detonated here in the US?

We should definitely have the military massacre any enemy who seeks to set off nukes in the US, before they are able to set them off.

1 Reply

@oralloy,

oralloy wrote:

We should definitely have the military massacre any enemy who seeks to set off nukes in the US, before they are able to set them off.

The US military won't be able to stop them.

igm wrote:

What might the future hold after the nuclear strike on Japan? It could eventually lead to state sponsored terrorism successfully detonating a nuclear device on the US homeland with no chance of retaliation... so we have a useless deterrent... no country to bomb... just a terrorist cell which can't be nuked... or even destroyed conventionally because they just keep on recruiting.

The world rethought their tactics after the arms race era... all caused by the first strike on Japan.

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@igm,

Oh, bullshit. The "arms race" wasn't started by the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. You should join RL in the invincible ignorance box. The Soviet Union, Germany and Britain all atomic weapons programs before the United States even entered the war. The Soviet Union's NKVD and GRU had already heavinly infiltrated British intelligence services and their atomic weapons research program. They would have developed atomic weapons whether or not we dropped the bombs on Japan. You're parroting the bullshit in that article RL posted, without having fact-checked the claims that journalist (note, journalist, not scholar, not historian) was making. The cold war had already begun when we dropped the bombs on Japan, because the Soviet Union had overrun half of Europe south of the Baltic, and did not intend to withdraw. Another disastrous consequence of invading Japan would have been to set up American and Soviet sectors in Japan as was done in Germany. The Soviets already had plans to invade Japan without having sought American agreement, but simply couldn't carry them out because they didn't have the naval forces to escort, land and support their troops.

You need to do a little research. Read about Klaus Fuchs and the Cambridge Five. Fuchs began working for the British atomic weapons program in 1942, three years before the bombs were dropped. A year before the bombs were dropped, Fuchs went to work at Los Alamos in the theoretical physics section of the bomb project. The Soviets had their own atomic weapons program and were receiving valuable intelligence on the Anglo-American project before the Americans even knew they had a bomb that would work.

Dropping those bmobs in Japan did not lead to an arms race. It was already underway. You've really got a bad case of the atomic boogeyman. According to you, all evil in the modern world derives from that attack. You're just as stuffed full of **** as RL.

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@Setanta,

My point was about what might happen in the future and what could the US military do about it. They can't do anything to stop the inevitable homeland terrorist nuclear attack on the US sponsored by an anonymous foreign government who could be motivated for a whole host of reasons. In the aftermath they won't be able to find an enemy to nuke.

Your comments are an attempt to make something out of nothing. I'm talking about our ability to strike a foreign enemy, not being a deterrent any more because countries have realized they don't need military might just nuclear guerrilla tactics. The Japan bombings could have caused this rethink, eventually, down-the-line.

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@igm,

Amended my above post.

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@Setanta,

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You're just as stuffed full of **** as RL.

You hate skepticism don't you?
It goes against what you think should be the formal education of history. I see much of what you share to be true but when people are ridiculed for questioning some of it, it makes me wonder how much of it is brain washing propaganda.
Why don't you do yourself a favor and allow JTT to formally educate you about some of the lies that you have been taught as facts?

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@Setanta,

Setanta wrote:

I have no idea what "official version" Miguel is referring to

I'm referring to the version offered by the president, which you repeat and defend.

"Those labeled "traditionalist" or "orthodox" echo President Truman's and Secretary of War Henry Stimson's contentions that the bombs were used to force Japan's surrender as quickly as possible and to save American lives.
[...]
That defense rested upon the military necessity and therefore the lesser-of-two-evils morality of the decision. The bomb had been dropped because not to do so risked prolonging the war. By ending the war the bomb saved lives, American and Japanese. The reason for using it was strictly military—to hasten the surrender of Japan. There had been no ulterior political motives: neither domestic, in justifying a very expensive weapons development project, nor international, in regard to any power other than Japan."

Robert Messer, 1995.

Setanta wrote:

i wonder what Miguel alleges was the reaction of world public opinion in 1945.

I don't allege anything on that subject, and I fail to see the connection with the content of my post.

Setanta wrote:

Miguel needs to explain what this reaction of public opinion was, nad what evidence he has.

Why would I need to do that?

Setanta wrote:

I don't consider that Miguel has made any case, and i don't see any evidence provided by him that there was an especial outrage expressed in 1945 about the use of the stomic bombs.

Indeed I made no "case" in my previous post, rather I merely expressed my opinion that I don't think one can consider that anyone suggesting a version different from the official one is a "blithering idiot" participating in "popular online bullshit".

I have no idea where in my post you read that I believe there was "an especial outrage expressed in 1945 about the use of the atomic bombs."

Robert Messer in A HISTORY OF OUR TIME, 1995:

"The recent discovery of this evidence [Truman's private journal and letters written at the time he gave the bombing order] [...] reveals, for example that,contrary to his public justification of the bombings as the only way to end the war without a costly invasion of Japan, Truman had already concluded that Japan was about to capitulate.
[...]
The declassification of government documents and presidential papers, and the release of privately held manuscript sources such as Stimson's
private diary forced a revision if not a total refutation of accepted orthodoxy.
[...]
In the 1970s the work of Martin Sherwin, Barton Bernstein, Gregg Herken, and others revealed the early and continuing connection U.S.
leaders made between the bomb and diplomacy.
[...]
Referring to the Soviet commitment to declare war on Japan three months after the defeat of Germany, Truman noted Stalin's reaffirmation of the agreement he had made with Roosevelt at Yalta: "He'll [Stalin] be in Jap War on August 15th." To this Truman added: "Fini Japs when that comes about." In these two brief sentences Truman set forth his understanding of how the war would end: Soviet entry into the war would finish the Japanese.
[...]
In writing to his wife the following day (July 18), the president underscored the importance of Soviet entry and its impact upon the timing of
the war's end. "I've gotten what I came for—Stalin goes to war on August 15 with no strings on it.... I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That is the important thing."
The implications of these passages from Truman's diary and letters for the orthodox defense of the bomb's use are devastating: if Soviet entry
alone would end the war before an invasion of Japan, the use of atomic bombs cannot be justified as the only alternative to that invasion.
[...]
the issue was no longer when the war would end, but how and on whose terms. If he believed that the war would end with Soviet entry in mid-August, then he must have realized that if the bombs were not used before that date they might well not be used at all. This relationship between the Soviet entry, the bomb, and the end of the war is set forth in Truman's diary account for July 18.
[...]
Truman apparently believed that by using the bomb the war could be ended even before the Soviet entry. The bomb would shorten the war by days rather than months. Its use would not save hundreds of thousands of lives—but it could save victory for the Americans. The race with the Germans had been won. It was now a race with Soviets.
[...]
It is in this light that the new evidence, in both the Potsdam diary and letters to his wife, calls for a reevaluation of the old issue: why were the
only two bombs available used in rapid succession so soon after testing, and on the eve of the planned Soviet entry into the war?

Gar Alperovitz, Robert L. Messer, Barton J. Bernstein in International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3

in the late summer of 1945 President Truman and his top advisers were aware that use of the atomic bomb was no longer necessary to avoid an invasion. In his recent survey of the literature on the bomb decision, J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, concludes:

"Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan. Experts continue to disagree on some issues, but critical questions have been answered. The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan.... It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it."

[...]
The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were merely looking for sufficient pretext to convince the die-hard Army Group that Japan had lost the war and must capitulate to the Allies. The entry of Russia into the war would almost certainly have furnished this pretext, and would have been sufficient to convince all responsible leaders that surrender was unavoidable.
[...]
as Japan's condition worsened American leaders understood in advance-well before use of the atomic bomb was authorized- that an invasion was increasingly unlikely.
[...]
As early as April 18, 1945, the Joint Intelligence Staff put the crucial issue thus: "If at any time the U.S.S.R. should enter the war, practically all Japanese will realize that absolute defeat is inevitable."
[...]
Marshall's advice to the President on June 18, 1945, was presented seven weeks before the bombing of Hiroshima. During the ensuing period, Japan's condition deteriorated even further, with the result that a Soviet attack appeared likely to have even greater shock impact. On July 6, 1945, for instance, the Combined Intelligence Committee offered this assessment to the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "An entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat. "
[...]
It is important to note that these "estimates of the situation" preceded the most important indication that the Japanese recognized their situation was impossible: the direct personal intervention of the Emperor beginning in late June.
[...]
Leon V. Sigal observes that "one point was clear to senior U.S. officials regardless of where they stood on war termination. . . . [They] knew that the critical condition for Japan's surrender was the assurance that the throne would be preserved." As Robert Butow put it in his classic study of Japan's surrender decision: "It was all there, as clear as crystal: Togo to Sato: 'Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace'.''
[...]
In his diary entry for July 18, for instance, Truman set forth his understanding of the latest intercepted Japanese message, referring to it straightforwardly as the "telegram from Jap [sic] Emperor asking for peace. " During their first private meeting, Stalin had assured Truman that the Soviet Union would ignore the emperor's approach and declare war on Japan by August 15. Truman welcomed this news by recording in his diary his interpretation of the meaning of Soviet entry: "Fini Japs when that comes about"
[...]
General Ismay's private summary of the Combined Intelligence Estimate of July 6, 1945, to Churchill, and its conclusion that: "when Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor." In this regard it is also instructive to note that Marshall joined in an extraordinary "end-run" at Potsdam in which the U.S. Chiefs of Staff urged the British Chiefs to get Churchill to press Truman to change the terms.
[...]
Clearly, foremost among the political factors influencing the decision was what Stimson called the "Russian problem." Many scholars now recognize that at least three distinct Soviet-related factors were involved in the decision. These go well beyond the commonly used but oversimplified catch-phrase "intimidating the Russians."
First, although initially American leaders sought Soviet entry into the war, once the atomic bomb was proven their views changed dramatically: The bomb now seemed a way to end the war before the Red Army (and Soviet political influence) got very far into Manchuria. This is precisely the argument Truman used in private the day after the Nagasaki bombing in explaining to the Cabinet his modification of the demand for unconditional surrender. Second, the bomb also meant that the United States would not have to share the victory over Japan with the Russians. Third, Byrnes in particular (but Truman and Stimson as well) saw the bomb as a way to strengthen America's diplomatic hand not only in the Far East but in negotiations over the fate of Europe in general, and Eastern Europe in particular.

5 Replies

@oralloy,

No evidence, no proof, just Oralboy spewing propaganda.

0 Replies

@miguelito21,

Quote:

. Experts continue to disagree on some issues, but critical questions have been answered. The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan.... It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it."

The only questions which might have tempted me to use the bomb would have been the question of allied POWs in Japanese camps, and the question of whether Japan may have been anywhere close to a nuclear weapon. I'd have at least tried something else before using the bomb.

Again in my view, given how badly Japan had been beaten by the summer of 45, the big mistake was letting the Soviets get anywhere near the Pacific rim. Their aid was not needed.

0 Replies

@igm,

You said, and this is a quote:

Quote:

The world rethought their tactics after the arms race era... all caused by the first strike on Japan.

The arms race was not caused by the atomic bombing of Japan. I produced evidence that there was already an atomic arms race, one in which the Soviet Union was heavily invested through their penetration of the intelligence and atomic weapons development organs of the Anglo-American effort. You, as usual, simply babble on in your wonderfully evidence-free way.

2 Replies

The moral differences between the holocaust and bombing Japan

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