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THE US, THE UN AND IRAQ, ELEVENTH THREAD

 
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Sat 27 Oct, 2007 10:45 pm
Thousands call for swift end to Iraq war

By JASON DEAREN, Associated Press Writer 15 minutes ago

Thousands of people called for a swift end to the war in Iraq as they marched through downtown on Saturday, chanting and carrying signs that read: "Wall Street Gets Rich, Iraqis and GIs Die" or "Drop Tuition Not Bombs."

The streets were filled with thousands as labor union members, anti-war activists, clergy and others rallied near City Hall before marching to Dolores Park.

As part of the demonstration, protesters fell on Market Street as part of a "die in" to commemorate the thousands of American soldiers and Iraqi citizens who have died since the conflict began in March 2003.

The protest was the largest in a series of war protests taking place in New York, Los Angeles and other U.S. cities, organizers said.

No official head count was available. Organizers of the event estimated about 30,000 people participated in San Francisco. It appeared that more than 10,000 people attended the march.

"I got the sense that many people were at a demonstration for the first time," said Sarah Sloan, one of the event's organizers. "That's something that's really changed. People have realized the right thing to do is to take to the streets."

In the shadow of the National Constitution Center and Independence Hall in Philadelphia, a few hundred protesters ranging from grade school-aged children to senior citizens called on President Bush to end funding for the war and bring troops home.
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Sun 28 Oct, 2007 12:39 pm
US: Al-Qaida presence in Baghdad reduced

By KIM GAMEL, Associated Press Writer Sun Oct 28, 11:08 AM ET

CAMP SPEICHER, Iraq - The threat from al-Qaida in several former strongholds in Baghdad has been significantly reduced, but criminals who have established "almost mafia-like presence" in some areas pose a new threat, the top U.S. commander in Iraq said Sunday.
0 Replies
 
xingu
 
  1  
Reply Sun 28 Oct, 2007 03:26 pm
Explosive charge blows up in US's face
By Gareth Porter
Oct 27, 2007

WASHINGTON - When the United States military command accused the Iranian Quds Force in January of providing the armor-piercing EFPs (explosively formed penetrators) that were killing US troops, it knew that Iraqi machine shops had been producing their own EFPs for years, a review of the historical record of evidence on EFPs in Iraq shows.

The record also shows that the US command had considerable evidence that the Mahdi Army of Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr had received the technology and the training on how to use it from Hezbollah, rather than Iran.

The command, operating under close White House supervision, chose to deny these facts in making the dramatic accusation that became the main rationale for the present aggressive US stance toward Iran. Although the George W Bush administration initially limited the accusation to the Quds Force, it has recently begun to assert that top officials of the Iranian regime are responsible for arms that are killing US troops.

British and US officials observed from the beginning that the EFPs being used in Iraq closely resembled the ones used by Hezbollah against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, both in their design and the techniques for using them.

Hezbollah was known as the world's most knowledgeable specialists in EFP manufacture and use, having perfected this during the 1990s in the military struggle with Israeli forces in Lebanon. It was widely recognized that it was Hezbollah that had passed on the expertise to Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups after the second Intifada began in 2000.

US intelligence also knew that Hezbollah was conducting the training of Mahdi Army militants on EFPs. In August 2005, Newsday published a report from correspondent Mohammed Bazzi that Shi'ite fighters had begun in early 2005 to copy Hezbollah techniques for building the bombs, as well as for carrying out roadside ambushes, citing both Iraqi and Lebanese officials.

In late November 2006, a senior intelligence official told both CNN and the New York Times that Hezbollah troops had trained as many as 2,000 Mahdi Army fighters in Lebanon.

The fact that the Mahdi Army's major military connection has always been with Hezbollah rather than Iran would also explain the presence in Iraq of the PRG-29, a shoulder-fired anti-armor weapon. Although US military briefers identified it last February as being Iranian-made, the RPG-29 is not manufactured by Iran but by the Russian Federation.

According to the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, RPG-29s were imported from Russia by Syria, then passed on to Hezbollah, which used them with devastating effectiveness against Israeli forces in the 2006 war. According to a June 2004 report on the well-informed military website Strategypage.com, RPG-29s were already turning up in Iraq, "apparently smuggled across the Syrian border".

The earliest EFPs appearing in Iraq in 2004 were so professionally made that they were probably constructed by Hezbollah specialists, according to a detailed account by British expert Michael Knights in Jane's Intelligence Review last year.

By late 2005, however, the British command had already found clear evidence that the Iraqi Shi'ites themselves were manufacturing their own EFPs. British Army Major General J B Dutton told reporters in November 2005 that the bombs were of varying degrees of sophistication.

Some of the EFPs required a "reasonably sophisticated factory", he said, while others required only a simple workshop, which he observed, could only mean that some of them were being made inside Iraq.

After British convoys in Maysan province were attacked by a series of EFP bombings in late May 2006, Knights recounts, British forces discovered a factory making them in Majar al-Kabir north of Basra in June.

In addition, the US military also had its own forensic evidence by the autumn of 2006 that EFPs used against its vehicles had been manufactured in Iraq, according to Knights. He cites photographic evidence of EFP strikes on US armored vehicles that "typically shows a mixture of clean penetrations from fully-formed EFP and spattering ..." That pattern reflected the fact that the locally made EFPs were imperfect, some of them forming the required shape to penetrate but some of them failing to do so.

Then US troops began finding EFP factories. Journalist Andrew Cockburn reported in the Los Angeles Times in mid-February that US troops had raided a Baghdad machine shop in November 2006 and discovered "a pile of copper discs, five inches in diameter, stamped out as part of what was clearly an ongoing order".

In a report on February 23, NBC Baghdad correspondent Jane Arraf quoted "senior military officials" as saying that US forces had "been finding an increasing number of the advanced roadside bombs being not just assembled but manufactured in machine shops here".

Nevertheless, the Bush administration decided to put the blame for the EFPs squarely on the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, after Bush agreed in autumn 2006 to target the Quds Force within Iran to make Iranian leaders feel vulnerable to US power. The allegedly exclusive Iranian manufacture of EFPs was the administration's only argument for holding the Quds Force responsible for their use against US forces.

At the February 11 military briefing presenting the case for this claim, one of the US military officials declared, "The explosive charges used by Iranian agents in Iraq need a special manufacturing process, which is available only in Iran." The briefer insisted that there was no evidence that they were being made in Iraq.

That lynchpin of the administration's EFP narrative began to break down almost immediately, however. On February 23, NBC's Arraf confronted Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, who had been out in front in January promoting the new Iranian EFP line, with the information she had obtained from other senior military officials that an increasing number of machine shops manufacturing EFPs had been discovered by US troops.

Odierno began to walk the Iranian EFP story back. He said the EFPs had "started to come from Iran", but he admitted "some of the technologies" were "probably being constructed here".

The following day, US troops found yet another EFP factory near Baqubah, with copper discs that appeared to be made with a high degree of precision, but which could not be said with any certainty to have originated in Iran.

The explosive expert who claimed at the February briefing that EFPs could only be made in Iran was then made available to the New York Times to explain away the new find. Major Marty Weber now backed down from his earlier statement and admitted that there were "copy cat" EFPs being machined in Iraq that looked identical to those allegedly made in Iran to the untrained eye.

Weber insisted that such Iraqi-made EFPs had slight imperfections which made them "much less likely to pierce armor". But NBC's Arraf had reported the previous week that a senor military official had confirmed to her that the EFPs made in Iraqi shops were indeed quite able to penetrate US armor. The impact of those weapons "isn't as clean", the official said, but they are "almost as effective" as the best-made EFPs.

The idea that only Iranian EFPs penetrate armor would be a surprise to Israeli intelligence, which has reported that EFPs manufactured by Hamas guerrillas in their own machine shops during 2006 had penetrated eight inches of Israeli steel armor in four separate incidents in September and November, according to the Intelligence and Terrorism Center in Tel Aviv.

The Arraf story was ignored by the news media, and the Bush administration has continued to assert the Iranian EFP charge as though it had never been questioned.

It soon became such an accepted part of the media narrative on Iran and Iraq that the only issue about which reporters bother to ask questions is whether the top leaders of the Iranian government have approved the alleged Quds Force operation.

Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst. His latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in June 2005.

(Inter Press Service)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IJ27Ak05.html
0 Replies
 
okie
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 09:52 am
Quite an unbiased authority you found there, xingu!
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 10:24 am
It's not a matter of biased or unbiased; it's about facts. If you don't like the message, disprove it.
0 Replies
 
xingu
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 11:49 am
okie wrote:
Quite an unbiased authority you found there, xingu!


Pretty stupid comment coming from someone who's....what....not bias?

You obviously agree with what's said as you can't provide evidence to refute it.
0 Replies
 
xingu
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 11:52 am
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/images/slam3.jpg/slam3.jpeg

Real E.F.P.: Pocket-Sized Tank Killer
The pictures released last week of Iraqi high-tech explosives surprised me. These special 'superbombs' that have caused so many US casualties -- they look like they had been assembled in someone's garage.

These bombs belong to a class known as EFP --'Explosively Formed Projectile' or 'Explosively Formed Penetrator,' depending on who you're talking to. They compress a metal liner into a slug and fire it at the target some distance away.

The picture shows what a real EFP munition looks like. This is M2 Selectable Lightweight Attack Munition (SLAM). It's small enough to put in your pocket and weighs a couple of pounds.

This version has been used by US Special Forces for the last 15 years or so. As GlobalSecurity.org describes it, SLAM is versatile, too:

It will be used to support hit-and-run, ambush, and harassing, and urban warface missions. SLAM will also be employed by Light Combat Engineers and Rangers where missions warrant the use of such a device....SLAM is lightweight, lethal, easily emplaced, and can be carried in the quantity necessary to neutralize a broad range of targets.

Different modes allow SLAM to be triggered by the heat or magnetic signature of a passing vehicle or by a timer -- or it can be set off by a human operator. It can be emplaced in seconds and spits out a lethal slug which can punch through 40mm of steel armor at a range of 25 feet. You can leave it on the ground covered in dirt to attack a vehicle's belly, or conceal it beside a road for side attack.

No doubt the Russians and Chinese have their own versions of SLAM, and these have probably been copied too. So you might expect a rougher, cheaper copy to appear in Iraq if it was supplied from the outside.

But as has been observed here, anyone can make crude and simple EFP munitions in a basic workshop. All you need is a lump of plastic explosive and a piece of copper. Shape the copper into a saucer, put the explosive under it, and you're there. Obviously this will be a lot less efficient, accurate and reliable than something like SLAM (optimal design of the the metal 'lens' is an art requiring a lot of computer power), but you can compensate by making it ten times bigger if you need to.

Maybe the insurgents should be given some credit for being able to build their own gear, or maybe there's more intelligence we don't know. But if EFP mines were being supplied by an outside source, you might expect to see somethng a lot slicker.

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003285.html

Another one of those "bias" sources.
0 Replies
 
xingu
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 12:06 pm
More bias stuff for okie and his unbias Rolling Eyes friends.

From a news report dated April 6, 2007

Quote:
Bleichwehl said troops, facing scattered resistance, discovered a factory that produced "explosively formed penetrators" (EFPs), a particularly deadly type of explosive that can destroy a main battle tank and several weapons caches.

http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/04/06/iraqi_us_forces_sweep_through_iraqi_city/
http://politicsplusstuff.blogspot.com/2007/04/efp-factory-found-in-diwaniya-iraq.html

Quote:
Intelligence officials have long blamed Iran for supplying EFP parts, but this remains in doubt. In any case, as Janes reports, even if the original technology came from Iran,

Quote:
... the knowledge required to manufacture and use EFPs may have become so widespread that Iranian assistance is no longer required.


According to London's Telegraph newspaper,

Quote:
The Ministry of Defence has attempted to play down the effectiveness of the weapons, suggesting that they are "crude" or "improvised" explosive devices which have killed British troops more out of luck than judgement.

However, this newspaper understands that Government scientists have established that the mines are precision-made weapons which have been turned on a lathe by craftsmen trained in the manufacture of munitions.


At least two EFP factories have since been found in Iraq, facilities which produced the thin copper 'lenses' for EFPs. The picture suggests that one man with a lathe can turn out enough to keep the insurgency supplied at the current rate. Several lathes would mean a lot more EFPs; at the current rate each one of those stacks of five or six copper lenses represents one potential death.


http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/08/superbombs-the-.html

Quote:

http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/get_the_facts_straight_on_iran.php
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 01:46 pm
A Month by Month, Daily Average of IBC's Count of Violent Deaths in Iraq, After April 2007:
http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/
_____________________________________________________________________________________

May = 3,755 / 31 = ………………... 121 per day

…………….. Surge fully operational in June ……………..

June = 2,386 / 30 = …………......… 80 per day.
July = 2,077 / 31 = …………......... 67 per day.
August = 2,084 / 31 = ……...….... 67 per day.
September = 1,333 / 30 = ………. 44 per day.
October = 650 / 14 = …………….... 46 per day.*

November = ----? / 30 = ----? per day.**
December = ----? / 31 = ----? per day.**


… *Data currently available for only first 14 days of this month.
… **Data not yet available.


Daily Average Violent Deaths in Iraq--PRE AND POST JANUARY 1, 2003:
PRE = 1/1/1979 - 12/31/2002 = 1,229,210/ 8,766 days = 140 per day;
POST = 1/1/2003 - 10/14/2007 = 82,776/1,748days = ....... 47 per day;
PRE / POST = 140/47 = 2.96.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
We must win and succeed in Iraq, because we Americans will suffer significant losses of our freedoms, if we do not win and succeed in Iraq.
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 02:01 pm
Quote:
PolicyWatch #1297
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Iran Sanctions: Can They Be Effective?
By Matthew Levitt
October 25, 2007

Today, the State and Treasury Departments announced a new package of sweeping unilateral sanctions targeting multiple entities in Iran, including three banks, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Qods Force, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, several IRGC-affiliated companies, and eight individuals. Can such sanctions be effective in halting Iran's nuclear program? If they are used as part of a comprehensive strategy to create diplomatic leverage, absolutely. Absent this leverage, however, policymakers will eventually be left with the unenviable task of deciding between using military force and tolerating a nuclear Iran.

A New Kind of Sanctions

Targeted economic sanctions represent the strongest nonmilitary means of changing Tehran's behavior. But policymakers do not have to choose between sanctions, diplomacy, and military action. By itself, no one tool can fix the problem. Together, though, financial sanctions and international diplomatic censure, backed by various military options (e.g., a strong naval presence in the Persian Gulf), offer the most effective option for dealing with the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program.

Unlike the blanket sanctions applied against Iraq under Saddam Hussein, today's Iranian sanctions are both targeted and graduated. First, they are aimed only at those regime elements specifically engaged in illicit conduct (e.g., banks like Melli, Mellat, Saderat, and Sepah; proliferation front companies; the IRGC and Qods Force). Second, they are applied in phases in order to demonstrate that their purpose is not simply to punish Iran but to encourage a behavior change.

Signs of Success

With continuing signs of domestic discontent in Iran, targeted financial measures can increase the political pressure on the regime. Iran's former chief nuclear negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, recently disparaged the country's growing international isolation and stated that economic sanctions were definitely impacting Iran. Despite high oil prices, he noted, "[W]e don't see a healthy and dynamic economy."

This should come as no surprise. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the nuclear crisis and sanctions are "imposing a heavy opportunity cost on Iran's economic development, slowing down investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors, as well as in critical infrastructure projects, including electricity." Several major banks have halted or curtailed dealings with Iran. This trend is likely to accelerate in the wake of the October 11 warning by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) -- an intergovernmental body that works by consensus -- that Iran's lack of a comprehensive regime to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing "represents a significant vulnerability within the international financial system."

Both Russia and China are members of FATF, giving great significance to the organization's statements. Moreover, Iran is the only country FATF has publicly identified as a significant vulnerability. The task force is studying trends and techniques involved in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and it has already issued new guidelines on potential financial means of preventing Iran from engaging in such activity. Meanwhile, the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has just issued an advisory on the growth of money laundering in Iran.

The FATF and FinCEN advisories should complicate Iranian efforts to find alternative investment opportunities. Recognizing that the regime is actively seeking investment partners to compensate for those it has lost, Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Kimmitt recently warned China, Russia, and several other countries to respect the sanctions regime and not step into this void.

International consensus for multilateral sanctions is difficult to come by. That is one of the reasons why China and Russia's approval of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 (and, more recently, the FATF announcement) were so powerful. Combined with the Treasury Department's parallel efforts to leverage market forces by engaging in direct discussions with private-sector firms, targeted financial measures are already showing signs of success.

The Way Forward

So far, two rounds of targeted sanctions have failed to change the regime's behavior. To be more effective, and to minimize the likelihood of military conflict, subsequent rounds should follow the lead set by today's U.S. designations and target additional Iranian banks and companies affiliated with the IRGC, especially those involved in the critical oil and gas sectors. This is not the first time the United States has led by example; in January 2007, it unilaterally designated Bank Sepah, and the international community followed suit two months later, designating the bank under Security Council Resolution 1747. Nor should the U.S. move come as a surprise -- speaking to The Washington Institute in May 2007, Deputy Secretary Kimmitt stated that if Washington found an Iranian bank engaged in illicit activity, "We'll go after them."

As Iran's recent experience with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has shown, the regime is neither flexible nor forthright when it comes to nuclear negotiations. Washington's European partners correctly insist that direct talks with Tehran, absent Iranian compliance with the Security Council's orders, would only buy the regime more time. At the same time, however, the multilateral UN sanctions process has undeniably bogged down. Action should therefore be taken soon to lay the groundwork for substantive sanctions to follow Iran's report to the International Atomic Energy Agency next month. French officials have already stated that if there are no new UN sanctions by the end of the year, the European Union should "look at more individual kinds of sanctions."

Although multilateral sanctions are preferable, regional and unilateral sanctions are also very effective. In addition to potential European Union sanction, the German and French governments are advising their firms not to invest in Iran. And unilateral U.S. sanctions, such as those under Executive Orders 13224 and 13382, still have multilateral implications; for example, major international financial institutions typically incorporate U.S. Treasury designation lists into their due-diligence databases. In addition, Iran's oil minister was forced to acknowledge the difficulty in financing oil projects only months after the multilateral Organization for Cooperation and Development raised the country's risk rating.

An effective Iran strategy must include carrots as well as sticks, however. The West should clearly communicate the incentives Iran would enjoy in return for full cooperation, even as it continues to sanction the country.

Conclusion

Sanctions do not undermine diplomacy; they create diplomatic leverage. Diplomatic engagement with Iran, whether broad or limited, is severely undermined when Iran is able to pursue its nuclear ambitions, support terrorist groups, and erode security in Iraq and Afghanistan without consequence.

As Washington Post columnist David Ignatius put it, "[T]hese new, targeted financial measures are to traditional sanctions what Super Glue is to Elmer's Glue-All." Periodically reassessing and adjusting the package of targeted financial measures will most likely create enough diplomatic leverage to avoid a military confrontation. Short of creating such leverage, negotiation and diplomacy alone will not convince Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow and director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy at The Washington Institute. Previously, he served as deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the Treasury Department.
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 06:57 pm
A Month by Month, Daily Average of IBC's Count of Violent Deaths in Iraq, After April 2007:
http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/
_____________________________________________________________________________________

May = 3,755 / 31 = ………………... 121 per day

…………….. Surge fully operational in June ……………..

June = 2,386 / 30 = …………......… 80 per day.
July = 2,077 / 31 = …………......... 67 per day.
August = 2,084 / 31 = ……...….... 67 per day.
September = 1,333 / 30 = ………. 44 per day.
October = 650 / 14 = …………….... 46 per day.*

November = ----? / 30 = ----? per day.**
December = ----? / 31 = ----? per day.**


… *Data currently available for only first 14 days of this month.
… **Data not yet available.


Daily Average Violent Deaths in Iraq--PRE AND POST JANUARY 1, 2003:
PRE = 1/1/1979 - 12/31/2002 = 1,229,210/ 8,766 days = 140 per day;
POST = 1/1/2003 - 10/14/2007 = 82,776/1,748days = ....... 47 per day;
PRE / POST = 140/47 = 2.96.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
We must win and succeed in Iraq, because we Americans will suffer significant losses of our freedoms, if we do not win and succeed in Iraq.

The USA wins and succeeds in Iraq when the daily rate of violent deaths in Iraq decreases below 30, remains less than 30, while we are removing our troops, and remains less than 30 for at least a year after we have completed our departure.
0 Replies
 
realjohnboy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 07:32 pm
ican711nm wrote:


The USA wins and succeeds in Iraq when the daily rate of violent deaths in Iraq decreases below 30, remains less than 30, while we are removing our troops, and remains less than 30 for at least a year after we have completed our departure.[


I am beginning to agree with you, Ican. Let's set a goal of so many daily violent deaths (30, why not 50?) and then our troops can come home. All to be determined by a rather dubious accounting by the IRC.

How did you settle on 30? Why not 50? If we go with 50, we can start immediately to declare victory and bring our troops home.
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Mon 29 Oct, 2007 08:47 pm
realjohnboy wrote:
ican711nm wrote:


The USA wins and succeeds in Iraq when the daily rate of violent deaths in Iraq decreases below 30, remains less than 30, while we are removing our troops, and remains less than 30 for at least a year after we have completed our departure.[


I am beginning to agree with you, Ican. Let's set a goal of so many daily violent deaths (30, why not 50?) and then our troops can come home. All to be determined by a rather dubious accounting by the IRC.

How did you settle on 30? Why not 50? If we go with 50, we can start immediately to declare victory and bring our troops home.

It's my judgment call.

I think setting the goal at 30 or more will be too many for the Iraq government to handle by itself. I think setting the goal at 28 or less will require our troops to stay in Iraq longer than required. So I set the goal at less than 30 or equal 29.

I'm open to debate the goal. What's your judgment?
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Tue 30 Oct, 2007 03:54 pm
It's no wonder that congress gets a lower rating than Bush; they're hopeless to make any strong stand on anything.


Democrats consider more money for war

By ANNE FLAHERTY, Associated Press Writer 29 minutes ago

WASHINGTON - Democrats are debating whether to approve $50 billion to $70 billion more for Iraq and Afghanistan, less than half of President Bush's $196 billion request but enough to keep the wars afloat for a few more months.
ADVERTISEMENT

Such a move would satisfy party members who want to spare the Pentagon from a painful budget dance and show support for the troops as Congress considers its next major step on Iraq.

But it also would irritate scores of other Democrats, who want to pay only to bring troops home and who say their leadership is not doing enough to end the war.

"I cannot vote for another dollar that will be used to continue the president's occupation of Iraq," said Rep. Lynn Woolsey, D-Calif.

Democratic leaders caution that no decisions have been made, including whether to approve any money for the wars at all. Also uncertain is which spending bill might contain the war money.

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said Tuesday he didn't think Congress should approve the money and won't deal with it immediately. Delaying the money signals to voters that "the president does not have a blank check," he told reporters.
0 Replies
 
xingu
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Oct, 2007 11:33 am
Iraqi city in the grip of militias
By Ahmed Janabi

Amid warnings that southern Iraq could erupt into civil war when British troops withdraw, Basra's chief of police has publicly admitted that his forces have been unable to clamp down on growing militia warfare in the city.

In recent months, rival Shia factions have been battling for control of the city which is considered the second largest in the country and home to Iraq's only port.

This makes the Basra a vital outlet to the Gulf for marine transportation of oil and fuel products - a lucrative prize for any political faction looking to consolidate its power in Baghdad.

Power struggle
The ensuing power struggle has led to an exodus of Sunni, Shia and Christian families northwards and often out of the country.

Earlier this week, Major-General Jalil Khalaf, commander of the Basra police department, admitted for the first time that the militias have proven too strong for - and often infiltrated - his forces.

Speaking to As-Sabah, the official Iraqi daily, he said: "Most of Basra's ports, especially Um Qasr, are under the control of militia gangs.

"The police force is incapable of executing its duties because its members report to Basra's militias and (political) parties which own those militias.

"Their loyalty is not to the Iraqi state but to their parties."

Khalaf was unavailable for comment.

Power vacuum
Hoping to fill the power vacuum the British troop withdrawal has left in its wake and to diminish militia power, Nur al-Maliki, Iraq's prime minister, has promised that Iraqi forces are ready to take over security in southern Iraq.

But Nadim al-Jabiri, a senior politician from the powerful Shia Fadila Party, which maintains an iron grip over Basra, played down the deployment of any national military force in the south.

He told Al Jazeera: "If the Iraqi forces are really fit to preserve security in Iraq's far south, then it should be capable of doing so in the capital, Baghdad.

"But unfortunately, Iraqi forces are not being able to maintain order in the capital, how will they succeed in Basra?"

Divided loyalties
Abu Abd Allah, an Iraqi official who works closely with British forces in counterterrorism operations in the south, believes the Iraqi army is plagued by the same divided factional loyalties that have weakened the Basra police force.

He told Al Jazeera: "The government is getting ready to fill the gap by sending more troops to Basra. This will prove useless if most of the troops are loyal to certain parties and not to Iraq as a nation."

Basra's security began to deteriorate in 2006 when the Fadila party withdrew from the Unified Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the ruling Shia political bloc, in protest against the nomination of Nuri al-Maliki as a successor to Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the former prime minister.

Both al-Maliki and al-Jaafari are senior members of the Daawa party and Fadila had argued it was time a prime minister from another party be appointed to lead the country.

Power jockeying
Throughout 2007, political infighting between Shia politicians in Baghdad plunged Basra further into chaos as clashes between the most powerful factions intensified.

Some Iraqi politicians are hoping to stave off the Shia infighting.

Fadila's al-Jabiri says his party is not looking for a fight.

"We are definitely not interested in any sort of confrontation, simply because we are the party who is successfully running Basra, and we would not spark things that would jeopardise our achievements in the city," he said.

"However, there are other parties that are interested in creating problems for al-Fadila in Basra."

Al-Jabiri declined to name those parties, but forces loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim maintain a strong presence in Basra.

British buffer
Haroun Mohammad, an independent Iraqi politician and author, believes the British presence is currently the buffer holding back these factions from sparking an all-out Shia-on-Shia militia war in Basra.

He said: "Four representatives of Ali al-Sistani, Shia's highest religious authority, have been assassinated in southern Iraq in the past two months. They were killed in purely Shia dominated areas, where Sunni militias and the Iraqi resistance do not exist.

"All indications suggest that Shia militias killed those representatives." British mismanagement? But Abu Abd Allah faults the British military for failing to curb the activities of militias in Basra.

He said: "The British military's poor performance in curbing the growth of these gangs was the reason behind the militias' upper hand in the city. So, their withdrawal would not have a great impact on the city's already bad security."

Tolerant approach
Major Mike Shearer, spokesman for British troops in southern Iraq, denies that his troops have adopted a tolerant approach to militias in Basra.

Shearer also expresses confidence in Iraqi troop redeployment in the south and the Iraqi army's ability to clamp down on terrorism and restore order in Basra city.

He told Al Jazeera: "Recently, we have noticed that Iraqi troops have been dealing with security breaches, without calling us for help, while in the past we used to be summoned every time a security challenge broke out."

But Iraqi politician Mohammad disagrees with the optimistic assessment of British military commanders.

"Shia on Shia fighting is a serious development," he told Al Jazeera.

"I think it is all about which militia is going to have the upper hand after the British withdrawal and eventually the rest of the southern Shia region."

http://english.aljazeera.net:80/NR/exeres/8E7B6E54-EBE1-4B7B-811D-DB98DE1C4F14.htm
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Oct, 2007 12:48 pm
xingu, You've just described the reality for the whole country of Iraq. They are in a civil war, and our soldiers are trying to quell an internal problem; it can't be done by outsiders.
0 Replies
 
revel
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Oct, 2007 01:06 pm
I take it; Ican, you trust the IBC since you post it so often? Then I also take it you have read their own qualifiers taken from the link you left.

Quote:
Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence. See Recent Events for as yet unpublished incidents, and read About IBC for a better description of the project's scope and limitations.


Taking that in consideration and taking the fact that the Pentagon has become nothing but a mouth piece from various right wing partisan hacks, Iraqi violence statistics is basically unknowable

Mike Allen and Hugh Hewitt on the politicization of the military

Quote:
In the middle of the interview, Allen and Hewitt began discussing Bush/Cheney '04 media strategist Steve Schmidt, a former top aide to Dick Cheney for communications strategy (i.e., media management). Allen and Hewitt both heaped great praise on Schmidt as a brilliant media strategist, and Allen claimed that the current GOP campaign operatives "are schooled in the Bush-Cheney school . . . all of them learned under Schmidt's rules." Allen is very excited about the fact that a whole new generation of GOP media strategists are becoming so well-practiced in "the Bush-Cheney school" of media manipulation: "the great thing of it is he's populated his ideas into these young people who are out there today, Matt David [of the McCain campaign], Kevin Madden [communications Director for Mitt Romney and formerly for Tom DeLay], all these young people are out there. They sort of have the Schmidt credo."

The most significant revelation occurred during the following exchange, when Allen excitedly reported that Schmidt's media management techniques have been adopted not only by the GOP presidential campaigns, but also recently by the U.S. military in Iraq, with one particularly large payoff this week:


Given the history of Bush/Cheney and their willingness to tell any untruths in order to bolster their wars and agenda; who knows really if what we have been hearing is true or part of an effort of WH to step up its propaganda war?

However, I for one am willing to accept it just so we can get out of there sometime soon. I mean if things are going so well; there is no reason we have stay. If we have to stay to keep things going well, then there is really no meaningful success in Iraqis being able to take care of themselves. They are just barricaded behind walls and under guard and the fortunate ones have left. How long do we have stay to keep the violence from getting out of control?

There really will be no meaningful success until there is a political success rather than an occupational military success such as we might have now if all the accounts of a downward trend in violence are truthful. (which I hope the accounts are truthful.)
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Oct, 2007 02:59 pm
revel wrote:
I take it; Ican, you trust the IBC since you post it so often? Then I also take it you have read their own qualifiers taken from the link you left.

Quote:
Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence. See Recent Events for as yet unpublished incidents, and read About IBC for a better description of the project's scope and limitations.


...

However, I for one am willing to accept it just so we can get out of there sometime soon. I mean if things are going so well; there is no reason we have stay. If we have to stay to keep things going well, then there is really no meaningful success in Iraqis being able to take care of themselves. They are just barricaded behind walls and under guard and the fortunate ones have left. How long do we have stay to keep the violence from getting out of control?

There really will be no meaningful success until there is a political success rather than an occupational military success such as we might have now if all the accounts of a downward trend in violence are truthful. (which I hope the accounts are truthful.)

I trust IBC's counts only to the extent that I trust that their monthly errors are uniform. That is, I trust their error percentage is approximately the same each month. So for example, if what they report is uniformly half actual Iraq violent deaths, the trend in Iraq violent deaths, increasing or decreasing, is accurate.

IBC's counts total 60,342 violent deaths in Iraq January 2003 thru December 2006. Perhaps the actual number is twice as high, or = 120,684.

Quote:

http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf
LANCET VIOLENT DEATH ANALYSIS
Iraq total violent deaths March 2003 thru June 2006 = 654,965.


Quote:

http://www.janegalt.net/archives/009519.html
October 17, 2006
From the desk of Jane Galt:

Illegitimate arguments about the Lancet study

I've been catching up on the Iraqi death count commentary. There are a lot of arguments out there on both sides, many of them bad. I thought I'd highlight some of the problems, starting with my own side:

The study doesn't agree with the Iraq Body Count This is not by itself convincing. The Iraq body count is, +/- 50% to allow for reporting errors and double counting, the bottom bound of the number of dead civilians. I, and others, have argued that the ratio of alleged dead in the Lancet study to the number of dead people counted by the IBC is too high. But the number of dead is, in my opinion, almost certainly substantially higher than the number being recorded by the IBC.


From Encyclopedia Britannica Books of the Year, Vital Statistics -- 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 -- the total of all Iraq deaths for January 2003 thru December 2006 = 597,000.

I agree there will be no meaningful success in Iraq until there is "political success." However, I also believe there will be no meaningful "political success" in Iraq until there is "occupational military success" in Iraq. Both kinds of successes are necessary in Iraq for us to win and succeed in Iraq.
0 Replies
 
McTag
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Oct, 2007 03:24 pm
Ican is a silly cnut.
0 Replies
 
McTag
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Oct, 2007 03:29 pm
US diplomats refuse Iraq postings

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7072047.stm
0 Replies
 
 

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