What point (s) are you implying within the context of the same, repetitive postings from your clipboard of the same citations (with dates), and statistics about cumulative and average killings?
There are those within this administration who obviously are adherents of the position that if you say something with conviction often enough, then you can make a great number of people believe that it is true. Or worse, then you can actually make it true in reality.
Is that your position?
...
There are still some decision left to make and it remains to be seen what effect having a formed government will have on stemming the killings carried out among the factions. I am hopeful that at some point these differences can be worked out for the good of Iraqis. Personally I think the divisions among the Kurds, Sunnis and the Shiite's is too strong to be able to really work together.
...
Brought to you by the American Committees on Foreign Relations ACFR NewsGroup No. 708, Wednesday, May 10, 2006.
May 05, 2006, 7:15 a.m.
For Better or Worse?
Is the U.S. better off with the Middle East as it is now than as it was
before 2001?
By Victor Davis Hanson
After September 11, there were only seven sovereign countries in the Middle
East that posed a real danger to the policies and, in some cases, the
security of the United States-Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Ignoring the hysteria about the Sunni Triangle in
Iraq, if we look at these states empirically, have they become more or less
a threat in the last five years?
The Taliban in Afghanistan was actively harboring bin Laden and al Qaeda.
Without their support, the mass murder on September 11 would have been
difficult to pull off.
Iran was the chief sponsor of Hezbollah, which had killed more Americans
than any other Islamist terror organization and was rumored to be at work on
obtaining nuclear weapons.
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's agents were involved in the first World Trade
Center bombing. They were also meeting with al Qaeda operatives throughout
the 1990s and offering sanctuary both to al Qaeda offshoots in Kurdistan
and, later, to veterans from Afghanistan. As the U.S. Senate observed in
2002, this was in addition to the general problems of no-fly zones,
oil-for-food, violations of U.N. and 1991-armistice accords, and periodic
retaliatory American bombing.
Libya was a de facto belligerent of the United States, provoking past U.S.
air strikes on Tripolis. Among other things, it was involved in the Pan Am
Lockerbie bombing and had a clandestine WMD program.
Pakistan had violated both U.N. and U.S. non-proliferation protocols. Its
intelligence services were infiltrated by radical Islamists who were
responsible for killing American diplomatic personnel and supplying the
Taliban with support, as well as directly aiding al Qaeda operatives along
the border.
Saudi Arabia, whose 15 subjects comprised the majority of the killers on
9/11, was stealthily giving blackmail money to Islamic terrorists to deflect
their anti-Royal Family anger toward the United States. The kingdom's vast
financial clout subsidized radical "charities" and madrassas that offered at
a global level the religious and ideological underpinnings for radical and
violent Islamic extremism.
Syria had long swallowed most of Lebanon, and was a haven for anti-Western
terrorists from Hamas to Hezbollah.
Four-and-a-half years after September 11, how has the United States fared in
neutralizing these seven threats?
The Taliban is gone. In its place is the unthinkable-a parliamentary
democracy that welcomes an open economy and foreign investment. Afghanistan
is plagued still by drug-lords and resurgent terrorists, but after a
successful war that removed the Taliban, the country hardly resembles the
nightmare that existed before September 11.
Iran is closer to the bomb than ever, but there is at least worldwide
scrutiny of its machinations, in a manner lacking in the past. Tehran is in
a death struggle with the new Iraqi government, trying to undermine the
democracy by transplanting its radical Shiite ganglia before a
constitutional, diverse Iraqi culture energizes its own restive population
that supposedly tires of the theocracy.
The thousands who died yearly under Saddam's killing apparatus in Iraq have
been followed by thousands killed in sectarian strife. Yet Saddam and his
Baathist nightmare are gone from Iraq, offering hope where there was none.
After three elections, a democratic government has emerged. Despite a
terrible cost in American lives and wealth, so far elections have not been
derailed, open civil war has not followed from the daily terror, and
Americans are looking to reduce, not enlarge, their presence.
Libya is perhaps the strangest development of all. The United States is
slowly exploring reestablishing diplomatic relations. Moammar Khadafy is
giving up his WMD arsenal. And the country is suddenly open to cell phones,
the Internet, satellite television, and is no longer a global financial
conduit for international terrorism.
Pakistan is still run by a military dictator. But as a result of American
bullying and financial enticement, it is slowly weeding out al Qaeda
sympathizers from its government, which on rare occasions attacks terrorists
residing in its borderlands. Indeed, al Qaeda seems to hate the present
Pakistani government as much as it does the United States.
Saudi Arabia has gained enormous leverage as oil skyrocketed from $30 to
over $70 a barrel. Yet under American pressure it has cracked down on al
Qaeda terrorists and has cleaned up (somewhat) its overseas financial
offices-perhaps evidenced by a wave of reactive terrorist attacks against
the Riyadh government. American efforts to urge liberalization have met a
tepid response-given Saudi reliance on the oil card, and its sophistic
argument that for the present an autocratic monarchy is the only alternative
to a terrorist-supporting theocracy.
Syria is out of Lebanon by popular pressure. It still supports terrorists
against Israel-and now Iraq too-but judging from its rhetoric it must be
feeling squeezed by a democratic Turkey, Iraq, and Israel on its borders,
and a new tough stance from the United States.
So where does all this leave us? In every case, I think, far messier-but far
better-than before September 11. Few argue that Afghanistan or Iraq is worse
off than when under the Taliban or Saddam. Nor is Syria in a stronger
position. Despite their respective nuclear and petroleum deterrence, both
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are ever more sensitive to the dangers of Islamic
radicalism. Libya no longer poses the threat of using WMD against its
neighbors and is less likely to fund international terror. Iran is the wild
card-closer to success in obtaining the bomb, but closer as well to becoming
isolated by international pressure and the events that it cannot quite
control across the border in Iraq.
Where do we go from here? The United States has its own paradoxes. These
positive developments-themselves the result of a radical departure from the
old appeasement that either used the cruise missile as an impotent gesture
of retaliation or accepted realpolitik as a means of playing odious
dictators against each other-have proved as controversial as they are
costly.
A new strain of what we might call punitive isolationism is back ("more
rubble, less trouble"), in which we should simply unleash bombers when
evidence is produced of complicity in attacks against Americans, but under
no circumstance put a single soldier on the ground to "help" such people who
are "incapable" of liberal civilized society.
The hard Right is candid in its pessimistic dismissal of American idealism
and worries that a new muscular Wilsonianism will lose the ascendant
Republican majority and betray conservative values.
The Left buys into the neo-isolationism since it means less of an "imperial"
footprint abroad and more funds released for entitlements at home-as well as
a way of tarring George Bush and regaining Congress.
What is lacking has been a consistently spirited defense, both unapologetic
and humble at the same time, of our efforts since September 11.
First, the United States was not cynical in its efforts: no oil was stolen;
no hegemony was established; and democrats, not dictators, were promoted. We
were appealing directly to the people of the Middle East, not negotiating
with Mullah Omar or Saddam Hussein about their futures. No other
oil-importing country in the world would have tried to pressure the Saudis
to reform at a time of global petroleum shortages-not France, not China, not
India.
Second, there were never good choices after September 11. The old
appeasement had only emboldened the terrorists, from 1993 in Manhattan to
the bombing in Yemen of the U.S.S. Cole. Saddam's Iraq was unstable. It was
only a matter of time before Saddam, energized with fresh petroleum profits,
would renew his ambitions, once 12 years of no-fly-zones and controversial,
but leaky, embargoes wore the West out. Given the premise that dictators
promoted terrorists in an unholy alliance of convenience, and themselves
often had oil and access to weapons, there were no good choices, whether we
let them be or removed the worst.
Three, by the standard of Grenada, Panama, and the Balkans, our losses were
costly. But the Middle East is a struggle of a different sort; it is an
existential one in which defeat means more attacks on the United States
homeland, while victory in changing the landscape of the region presages an
end to the nexus of Islamic terror. In that regard, so far we have been
fortunate, four-and-a-half years later, in avoiding the level of costs
incurred on the first day of the war that took 3,000 American lives and
resulted in a trillion dollars in economic damage.
Four, the strategy was not wholly military or political, much less
characterized by preemption or unilateralism. Iraq was not the blueprint for
endless military action to come, but the high-stakes gambit that offered
real hope of bringing about associated change from Pakistan to Tripolis once
Saddam was gone and a constitutional government established in its place.
Five, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. As we approach year five,
there has been no subsequent attack on the United States. An entire
intellectual industry has emerged to educate the West about radical Islamic
fascism, something mostly lacking prior to September 11. Our enemies in al
Qaeda are either dead, arrested, in hiding, or losing in Iraq, and the
embrace of radical Islam through the Middle East at least now carries the
consequence of fear of an unpredictable reaction on the part of the United
States.
We are still in a race of sorts, hoping that Afghanistan and Iraq will enter
a period of democratic stability and the violence halts before the American
public tires of the daily visuals to the point of demanding a premature end
to our efforts at birthing democracy. And while we do the unpopular work of
trying to restore hope to the Middle East, the aloof Europeans pose as the
moderate alternative, the Chinese make ever more trade, the Russians ever
more trouble, and the Arab sheikdoms ever more money.
-Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the
author, most recently, of A War Like No Other. How the Athenians and
Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War.
National Review Online -
sumac wrote:
What point (s) are you implying within the context of the same, repetitive postings from your clipboard of the same citations (with dates), and statistics about cumulative and average killings?
1. The central flaw in American foreign policy up to 9/11/2001 was a failure to timely and properly assess the degree of threat to the security of the American people presented by the growing terrorist malignancy.
2. The central flaw in American foreign policy after 9/11/2001 was a failure to timely and properly assess the degree of threat to the security of the people of Afghanistan and Iraq presented by the growing terrorist malignancy.
Had the post 9/11 flaws not occurred, we probably would have a self-securing Iraqi government established by now.
However, we cannot correct those pre-2001 flaws, but we can correct the post 9/11 flaws. Correcting the post 9/11 flaws deserves our attention now. The way to do that is consider and evaluate alternatives for what we can do, and not waste our thinking on criticizing what we cannot undo.
sumac wrote:
There are those within this administration who obviously are adherents of the position that if you say something with conviction often enough, then you can make a great number of people believe that it is true. Or worse, then you can actually make it true in reality.
Is that your position?
No! It is not what the administration is doing. The administration is merely repeating its responses to the repeated Democratic leadership's accusations.
No! It is not what I am doing. I am merely repeating my responses to the
Ican often quotes, or reprints, reports from the American Committees on Foreign Relations. In case anyone has any doubts, this is not a non-partisan, analytical organization, but a conservative front.
Ican often quotes, or reprints, reports from the American Committees on Foreign Relations. In case anyone has any doubts, this is not a non-partisan, analytical organization, but a conservative front.
...
...
ican711nm wrote:...
No! It is not what the administration is doing. The administration is merely repeating its responses to the repeated Democratic leadership's accusations.
No! It is not what I am doing. I am merely repeating my responses to ... [repeated falsities].
No one is merely doing anything. It is always calculated for a desired outcome.
It's intriguing to continually hear the rhetoric of this administration about the "progress in Iraq." How people are able to reconcile the increased killings and translate that as "progress" is the idiocy.
...
http://www.m-w.com/
Main Entry: in·sur·gen·cy
Pronunciation: -j&n(t)-sE
Function: noun
Inflected Form(s): plural -cies
1 : the quality or state of being insurgent; specifically : a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency
2 : INSURGENCE
Main Entry: bel·lig·er·en·cy
Pronunciation: -r&n(t)-sE
Function: noun
1 : the state of being at war or in conflict; specifically : the status of a legally recognized belligerent state or nation
2 : BELLIGERENCE
Main Entry: 1 in·sur·gent
Pronunciation: -j&nt
Function: noun
Etymology: Latin insurgent-, insurgens, present participle of insurgere to rise up, from in- + surgere to rise -- more at SURGE
1 : a person who revolts against civil authority or an established government; especially : a rebel not recognized as a belligerent
2 : one who acts contrary to the policies and decisions of one's own political party
Main Entry: ter·ror
Pronunciation: 'ter-&r
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French terreur, from Latin terror, from terrEre to frighten; akin to Greek trein to be afraid, flee, tremein to tremble -- more at TREMBLE
1 : a state of intense fear
2 a : one that inspires fear : SCOURGE b : a frightening aspect <the> c : a cause of anxiety : WORRY d : an appalling person or thing; especially : BRAT
3 : REIGN OF TERROR
4 : violence (as bombing) committed by groups in order to intimidate a population or government into granting their demands <insurrection>
synonym see FEAR
- ter·ror·less /-l&s/ adjective
Main Entry: ter·ror·ism
Pronunciation: 'ter-&r-"i-z&m
Function: noun
: the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion
- ter·ror·ist /-&r-ist/ adjective or noun
- ter·ror·is·tic /"ter-&r-'is-tik/ adjective
