ican, Do you understand anything about direct answers to very simple questions?
cicerone imposter wrote:ican, Do you understand anything about direct answers to very simple questions?
Next time, "keep your pants on!"
The only war here is your malignant brain that can't comprehend the little you cut and paste from the dictionary. If you ever decide to look at the definition of "civil" and relate that word to "war," you might catch on, but I don't give it much hope.
Your brain is too far gone.
cicerone imposter wrote:... your ... brain that can't comprehend the little you cut and paste from the dictionary. If you ever decide to look at the definition of "civil" and relate that word to "war," you might catch on ... .
Quote:Main Entry:
civ·il
Pronunciation: 'si-v&l
Function: adjective
Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French, from Latin civilis, from civis
1 a : of or relating to citizens b : of or relating to the state or its citizenry
2 a : CIVILIZED <civil society> b : adequate in courtesy and politeness : MANNERLY
3 a : of, relating to, or based on civil law b : relating to private rights and to remedies sought by action or suit distinct from criminal proceedings c : established by law
4 : of, relating to, or involving the general public, their activities, needs, or ways, or civic affairs as distinguished from special (as military or religious) affairs
5 of time : based on the mean sun and legally recognized for use in ordinary affairs
synonyms CIVIL, POLITE, COURTEOUS, GALLANT, CHIVALROUS mean observant of the forms required by good breeding. CIVIL often suggests little more than the avoidance of overt rudeness <owed the questioner a civil reply>. POLITE commonly implies polish of speech and manners and sometimes suggests an absence of cordiality <if you can't be pleasant, at least be polite>. COURTEOUS implies more actively considerate or dignified politeness <clerks who were unfailingly courteous to customers>. GALLANT and CHIVALROUS imply courteous attentiveness especially to women. GALLANT suggests spirited and dashing behavior and ornate expressions of courtesy <a gallant suitor of the old school>. CHIVALROUS suggests high-minded and self-sacrificing behavior <a chivalrous display of duty>.
Main Entry: 1
war
Pronunciation: 'wor
Function: noun
Usage: often attributive
Etymology: Middle English werre, from Old North French, of Germanic origin; akin to Old High German werra strife; akin to Old High German werran to confuse
1 a (1) : a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations (2) : a period of such armed conflict (3) : STATE OF WAR b : the art or science of warfare c (1) obsolete : weapons and equipment for war (2) archaic : soldiers armed and equipped for war
2 a : a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism b : a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a particular end <a class war> <
a war against disease> c : VARIANCE, ODDS 3
- war·less /-l&s/ adjective
Main Entry:
civil war
Function: noun
: a war between opposing groups of
citizens of the same country
It's said, "You can bring a horse to water, but you can't make it drink."
I bet it's also true, "You can bring a horse's ass to facts, but you can't make it think."
I bet you don't even know what you posted. Your malignant brain won't allow it.
You have defined "civil war" perfectly, but it just doesn't register in your brain because it's malignant.
cicerone imposter wrote:I bet you don't even know what you posted.
...
You have defined "civil war" perfectly
...
www.m-w.com
Quote:Main Entry: civil war
Function: noun
: a war between opposing groups of citizens of the same country
Many of the members of the malignancy forces in Iraq are citizens of countries other than Iraq.
Many of the members of the anti-malignancy forces in Iraq are citizens of countries other than Iraq.
emphasizing the key phrase in the definition
: a war between opposing groups of
citizens of the same country
: a war between opposing groups of
citizens of the same country
: a war between opposing groups of
citizens of the same country
: a war between opposing groups of
citizens of the same country
: a war between opposing groups of
citizens of the same country
ican wrote:
Many of the members of the malignancy forces in Iraq are citizens of countries other than Iraq.
You are in a very sorry state of denial. Amost everybody on this planet that knows anything about the on-going civil war in Iraq is between the the Sunni and Shia.
You need to go see a doctor that specializes in a Malignant Brain.
cicerone imposter wrote:
...
Amost everybody on this planet that knows anything about the on-going civil war in Iraq is between the the Sunni and Shia.
...
Many members of the malignancy are members of al-Qaeda.
Zarqawi is a citizen of Jordan.
bin Laden is a citizen of Saudi Arabia.
Zawahiri is a citizen of Egypt.
Many of the malignancy forces are citizens of Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
Many of the malignancy forces are citizens of Iraq.
Some Sunni are members of the malignancy forces .
Some Sunni are members of the anti-malignancy forces.
Some Shia are members of the anti-malignancy forces.
You are obviously not anybody who knows much of anything about the on-going war in Iraq.
ican711nm wrote:The war in Iraq is a war on a malignancy.
The malignancy forces in Iraq are mass murdering civilians in Iraq. Evil!
The anti-malignancy forces in Iraq are mass murdering malignancy forces in Iraq. Good!
Brought to you by the American Committees on Foreign Relations ACFR NewsGroup No. 686, Friday, March 24, 2006.
Quote:Why Iraq Is Still Worth the Effort
By Fareed Zakaria
Washington Post
Wednesday, March 22, 2006; Page A21
Three years ago this week, I watched the invasion of Iraq apprehensively. I had supported military intervention to rid the country of Saddam Hussein's tyranny, but I had also been appalled by the crude and unilateral manner in which the Bush administration handled the issue. In the first weeks after the invasion, I was critical of several of the administration's decisions -- crucially, invading with a light force and dismantling the governing structures of Iraq (including the bureaucracy and army). My criticisms grew over the first 18 months of the invasion, a period that offered a depressing display of American weakness and incompetence. And yet, for all my misgivings about the way the administration has handled this policy, I've never been able to join the antiwar crowd. Nor am I convinced that Iraq is a hopeless cause that should be abandoned.
Let's remember that in 2002 and early 2003, U.S. policy toward Iraq was collapsing. The sanctions regime was becoming ineffective against Saddam Hussein -- he had gotten quite good at cheating and smuggling -- and it was simultaneously impoverishing the Iraqi people. Regular reconnaissance and bombing missions over Iraq were done through "no-fly" zones, which required a large U.S. and British presence in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. These circumstances were fueling a poisonous anti-Americanism in the Muslim world.
In his fatwa of 1998, Osama bin Laden's first two charges against the United States were that it was "occupying" Saudi Arabia and starving Iraqi women and children. The Palestinian cause was a distant third. Meanwhile, Hussein had a 30-year history of attempting to build nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
The other reality by 2003 was that the United States and the international community had developed a reasonably effective process for military interventions like Iraq. The Rand Corp. released a thorough study just before the invasion pointing out that the central lesson of the 1990s was that if you went in with few troops (Haiti, Somalia), chaos prevailed, but if you went in with robust forces (Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor), it was possible to succeed.
Consider what the administration did in Afghanistan. It allied with local forces on the ground so that order would be maintained. It upheld the traditional structure of power and governance in the country -- that is, it accepted the reality of the warlords while working slowly and quietly to weaken them. To deflect anti-Americanism, the military turned over the political process to the United Nations right after Kabul fell. (Most people forget that it was the United Nations that created the assembly that picked Hamid Karzai as president.) The United States gave NATO and the European Union starring roles in the country -- and real power -- which led them to accept real burden-sharing. The European Union actually spends more in Afghanistan than the United States does.
But Iraq turned out to be a playground for all kinds of ideological theories that the Bush administration had about the Middle East, democracy, the United Nations and the Clinton administration. It also became a playground for a series of all-consuming turf wars and policy battles between various departments and policymakers in the administration. A good part of the chaos and confusion in Washington has abated, but the chaos in Iraq has proved much harder to reverse. It is far easier to undo a long-standing social and political order than it is to put it back together again.
So why have I not given up hope? Partly it's because I have been to Iraq, met the people who are engaged in the struggle to build their country and cannot bring myself to abandon them. Iraq has no Nelson Mandelas, but many of its leaders have shown remarkable patience, courage and statesmanship. Consider the wisdom and authority of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, or the fair-minded and effective role of the Kurds, or the persistent pleas for secularism and tolerance from men such as Ayad Allawi. You see lots of rough politics and jockeying for power in Baghdad. But when the stakes get high, when the violence escalates, when facing the abyss, you also see glimpses of leadership.
There is no doubt that the costs of the invasion have far outweighed the benefits. But in the long view of history, will that always be true? If, after all this chaos, a new and different kind of Iraqi politics emerges, it will make a difference in the region. Even now, amid the violence, one can see that. The old order in Iraq was built on fear and terror. One group dominated the land, oppressing the others. Now representatives of all three communities -- Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds -- are sitting down at the table, trying to construct a workable bargain they can all live with.
These sectarian power struggles can get extremely messy, and violent parties have taken advantage of every crack and cleavage. But this may be inevitable in a country coming to terms with very real divisions and disagreements. Iraq may be stumbling toward nation-building by consent, not brutality. And that is a model for the Middle East.
[email protected]
Brought to you by the American Committees on Foreign Relations ACFR NewsGroup No. 686, Friday, March 24, 2006.
Quote:What if We Lose?
The consequences of U.S. defeat in Iraq.
WSJ
Wednesday, March 22, 2006 12:01 a.m.
The third anniversary of U.S. military action to liberate Iraq has brought with it a relentless stream of media and political pessimism that is unwarranted by the facts and threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophesy if it goes unchallenged.
Yes, sectarian tensions are running high and the politicians of Iraq's newly elected parliament are taking a long time forming a government. But the attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra several weeks back has not provoked the spiral into "civil war" that so many keep predicting. U.S. casualties are down over the past month, in part because Iraqi security forces are performing better all the time.
More fundamentally, the coalition remains solidly allied with the majority of Iraqis who want neither Saddam's Hussein's return nor the country's descent into a Taliban-like hellhole. There is no widespread agitation for U.S. troops to depart, and if anything the Iraqi fear is that we'll leave too soon.
Yet there's no denying the polls showing that most Americans are increasingly weary of the daily news of car bombs and Iraqi squabbling and are wishing it would all just go away. Their pessimism is fed by elites who should know better but can't restrain their domestic political calculations long enough to consider the damage that would accompany U.S. failure. A conventional military defeat is inconceivable in Iraq, but a premature U.S. withdrawal is becoming all too possible.
------------
With that in mind, it's worth thinking through what would happen if the U.S. does fail in Iraq. By fail, we mean cut and run before giving Iraqis the time and support to establish a stable, democratic government that can stand on its own. Beyond almost certain chaos in Iraq, here are some other likely consequences:
• The U.S. would lose all credibility on weapons proliferation. One doesn't have to be a dreamy-eyed optimist about democracy to recognize that toppling Saddam Hussein was a milestone in slowing the spread of WMD. Watching the Saddam example, Libya's Moammar Gadhafi decided he didn't want to be next. Gadhafi's "voluntary" disarmament in turn helped uncover the nuclear network run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan and Iran's two decades of deception.
Now Iran is dangerously close to acquiring nuclear weapons, a prospect that might yet be headed off by the use or threat of force. But if the U.S. retreats from Iraq, Iran's mullahs will know that we have no stomach to confront them and coercive diplomacy will have no credibility. An Iranian bomb, in turn, would inspire nuclear efforts in other Mideast countries and around the world.
• Broader Mideast instability. No one should underestimate America's deterrent effect in that unstable region, a benefit that would vanish if we left Iraq precipitously. Iran would feel free to begin unfettered meddling in southern Iraq with the aim of helping young radicals like Moqtada al-Sadr overwhelm moderate clerics like the Grand Ayatollah Sistani.
Syria would feel free to return to its predations in Lebanon and to unleash Hezbollah on Israel. Even allies like Turkey might feel compelled to take unilateral, albeit counterproductive steps, such as intervening in northern Iraq to protect their interests. Every country in the Middle East would make its own new calculation of how much it could afford to support U.S. interests. Some would make their own private deals with al Qaeda, or at a minimum stop aiding us in our pursuit of Islamists.
• We would lose all credibility with Muslim reformers. The Mideast is now undergoing a political evolution in which the clear majority, even if skeptical of U.S. motives, agrees with the goal of more democracy and accountable government. They have watched as millions of Iraqis have literally risked their lives to vote and otherwise support the project. Having seen those Iraqis later betrayed, other would-be reformers would not gamble their futures on American support. Nothing could be worse in the battle for Muslim "hearts and minds" than to betray our most natural allies.
• We would invite more terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Osama bin Laden said many times that he saw the weak U.S. response to Somalia and the Khobar Towers and USS Cole bombings as evidence that we lacked the will for a long fight. The forceful response after 9/11 taught al Qaeda otherwise, but a retreat in Iraq would revive that reputation for American weakness. While Western liberals may deny any connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, bin Laden and the rest of the Arab world see it clearly and would advertise a U.S. withdrawal as his victory. Far from leaving us alone, bin Laden would be more emboldened to strike the U.S. homeland with a goal of driving the U.S. entirely out of the Mideast.
We could go on, but our point is that far more is at stake in Iraq than President Bush's approval rating or the influence of this or that foreign-policy faction. U.S. credibility and safety are at risk in the most direct way imaginable, far more than they were in Vietnam. In that fight, we could establish a new anti-Communist perimeter elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The poison of radical Islam will spread far and wide across borders if it can make even a plausible claim to being on the ascendancy, and nothing would show that more than the retreat of America from Iraq.
------------
We still believe victory in Iraq is possible, indeed likely, notwithstanding its costs and difficulties. But the desire among so many of our political elites to repudiate Mr. Bush and his foreign policy is creating a dangerous public pessimism that could yet lead to defeat--a defeat whose price would be paid by all Americans, and for years to come.
Copyright © 2006 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
The two countries Bush is trying to establish "democracy" in the Middle East doesn't look too promising.
ican, For every pro-Iraq war article you can post, there are con-Iraq war articles to be found in search land. You have proved nothing. Those are biased opinions by people that have sacrificed nothing but their mouths. Have them send their loves ones to Iraq and Afghanistan; then they might have some credibility.
Houston, we have a problem [size=7]with the democracy in Iraq.[/[/size]
Quote:But the desire among so many of our political elites to repudiate Mr. Bush and his foreign policy is creating a dangerous public pessimism that could yet lead to defeat--a defeat whose price would be paid by all Americans, and for years to come.
Blaming the media for the failures of Iraq is just another strategy for Bush administration and right wing bloggers and pundits. It's bunk of course, but not surprising. It's just another way to deflect blame by the Bush administration and it's many failures, something they are very good at having so much practice.
The righties are so desperate they blame the media in the US for all the wrongs in Iraq. Then they have the gall to pay the media in Iraq for their own propoganda. They just don't understand anything about what they speak. Hypocrites comes to mind.
Nixon blamed the media for Watergate, Lyndon Johnson for Vietnam, Reagan for Irangate. Enough said.
I very much doubt that righties are capable of understanding the Enlgish language, but this article from the Washington Post tells it like it is in Iraq.
But more importantly the message this president keeps telling the American People about the "progress."
An Iraq Success Story's Sad New Chapter
Bush's Struggle in Reassuring U.S. Is Illustrated by City's Renewed Strife
By Peter Baker
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, March 21, 2006; Page A01
CLEVELAND, March 20 -- As President Bush tells the tale, the battle for Tall Afar offers a case study in how U.S. and Iraqi forces working together can root out insurgents and restore stability. "The example of Tall Afar," he told an audience here Monday, "gives me confidence in our strategy."
Reports from the streets of Tall Afar, half a world away, offer a more complex story. U.S. forces last fall did drive out radicals who had brutalized the mid-size city near the Syrian border. But lately, residents say, the city has taken another dark turn. "The armed men are fewer," Nassir Sebti, 42, an air-conditioning mechanic, told a Washington Post interviewer Monday, "but the assassinations between Sunni and Shiites have increased."
VIDEO | In a speech at the City Club of Cleveland on Monday, President Bush uses historical references to defend the war in Iraq and the spread of democracy. (AP)
The twists of Tall Afar underline the difficulties Bush has had in reassuring a doubtful American public that progress is being made in Iraq. The president and his aides say that the positive developments in Iraq get overwhelmed by the grim pictures of mayhem and massacre that dominate the evening news. If Americans knew about the success stories, the White House maintains, they would understand Bush's confidence of victory.
Yet even the success stories seem to come with asterisks. The administration hailed the election of a new democratic parliament last year, but the new body has so far proved incapable of forming a government for more than three months. U.S. forces have trained more Iraqi security troops, but the only unit judged capable of acting fully independently of U.S. assistance no longer can.
The cycle has taken a new spin with the latest evolution of Iraq from violent insurgency against foreign occupiers to sectarian strife bordering on civil war. Since the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra last month, hundreds of Iraqis have been killed in reprisals in a bloody spate of violence that has eclipsed most periods during the three years since the U.S.-led invasion.
All this has taken its toll on Bush's credibility, Republican strategists say, making it hard for him to make people see what he sees in Iraq. Continuing his latest drive to rebuild public support for the war, Bush flew to this Midwestern city on Monday to empathize with the pessimism many Americans feel as the war heads into its fourth year, while trying to explain the basis for his own optimism.
"In the face of continued reports about killings and reprisals, I understand how some Americans have had their confidence shaken," he told the City Club of Cleveland. "Others look at the violence they see each night on their television screens and they wonder how I can remain so optimistic about the prospects of success in Iraq. They wonder what I see that they don't."
To illustrate, he devoted his talk to Tall Afar, hoping to use the progress there as a symbol of hope for the rest of the country. The city of 290,000 in northern Iraq was at one point awash in violence, a haven for insurgents and foreign extremists. An initial U.S. military offensive in the fall of 2004 dislodged them only temporarily. When the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment returned last year, it set about trying a new, more patient strategy that focused more on winning over the local population, building cooperation with Iraqis, surrounding the city with a wall and ultimately flooding Tall Afar with patrols.
As Bush noted, the military heralded the offensive as a model for counterinsurgency. "The strategy that worked so well in Tall Afar did not emerge overnight -- it came only after much trial and error," the president said. "It took time to understand and adjust to the brutality of the enemy in Iraq. Yet the strategy is working."
Bush acknowledged that this offensive stood out. "I wish I could tell you that the progress made in Tall Afar is the same in every single part of Iraq. It's not," he said. But, he added, "the progress made in bringing more Iraqi security forces online is helping to bring peace and stability to Iraqi cities."
The Tall Afar strategy may not apply easily to other areas, particularly Baghdad -- a far larger and more populous city where it would take enormous numbers of U.S. troops to replicate the strategy, military analysts say.
The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment "did a wonderful thing" in retaking Tall Afar, said Ahmed Hashim, a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College who advised the regiment on counterinsurgency and cultural tactics. But Hashim, who wrote a book on the Iraqi insurgency that is being published next week, said he doubts that the example is readily transferable to the rest of Iraq, in part because of the weakness of the central government in Baghdad.
