Mills75 wrote:This is an inaccurate oversimplification. You seem to have a great desire to break things down into their elements and try to make them work individually as the whole does; do you frequently dismantle the engine in your automobile and then wonder why you have trouble starting it?
No. But then neither do I expect an automobile engine to construct a logically defensible argument.
Mills75 wrote:The "reasonable expectation" derives from other already clearly elucidated factors. The "viability of options" and "participation vs. imposition" support and define what makes an expectation reasonable.
No they don't, you introduced them as independent
grounds for decisions.
Mills75 wrote:This isn't a logicalargument at all but a statement of fact. I would have thought you'd have recognized the difference.
Of course I can recognize the difference. I can also recognize when someone takes half of my argument and pretends to criticize it on the mistaken belief that it is the
whole argument.
Mills75 wrote:That our moral code is rooted in religious doctrine-- not rationalism, objectivism, or science--is elementary.
According to whom? I certainly do not accept that our moral code is rooted in religious doctrine.
Mills75 wrote:Favoring the objective over the subjective is at the very heart of fairness and justice. To be subjective is to be biased, to be objective is to be unbiased. Fairness and Justice require a lack of bias and, thus, they require objectivity. I no more failed to explain this than I failed to explain that the sun dawns in the east and sets in the west. It is something every grammar school child understands, and one would not be remiss to expect such knowledge on the part of those with whom he or she converses.
You mistake the objective position of the
judge with the subjective position of the
injured. No doubt we want the judge to be objective, since the judge represents the interests of society in justice, but that doesn't mean that we require the injured person to sacrifice her subjective interests to some standard of objective fairness.
You seem, however, to deal better with hypotheticals than with abstractions, so perhaps this will clear up any confusion on your part (this should also be somewhat familiar to you):
HYPOTHETICAL 2: Suppose Pedestrian is injured by Driver. It is beyond any question that Driver is solely at fault for Pedestrian's injuries, which are life-threatening. Pedestrian has two choices: she can either get an immediate blood transfusion, which will most likely save her life, or she can refuse the transfusion, which will most likely cause her to die. We can, therefore, conclude that the "objectively reasonable" choice for Pedestrian is to authorize the transfusion. Pedestrian, however, belongs to a faith that considers such transfusions to be sinful. Pedestrian, therefore, refuses the potentially life-saving transfusion. Driver protests, saying that he should be liable for no more than the cost of the transfusion, regardless of the actual outcome of Pedestrian's case. If Pedestrian dies, should Driver be held responsible for the damages resulting from Pedestrian's death, or should he only be held responsible for paying for the cost of the transfusion that Pedestrian refused?
Mills75 wrote:joefromchicago wrote: Reason No. 2: Participation vs. Imposition. My guess is that you'd answer that, in the case of the woman deciding whether or not to have a child, she is not a victim.
You don't have to hazard a guess, you just have to read more attentively. I explicitly state this numerous times.
Indeed, yet you nevertheless maintain that "victimhood" is not the single defining criterion in your analysis. That accounts, in large part, for your continued confusion on this point.
Mills75 wrote:Actually, the fact of her willing participation is part of what defines what would be reasonable or unreasonable for her to expect, but this has already discussed.
One's "reasonable expectation" is based upon one's status as a victim or as a participant. That argument, therefore, is subsumed under the "participation vs. imposition" argument.
Mills75 wrote:joefromchicago wrote:The "participation vs. imposition" argument only works if one assumes that the pertinent decision is the woman's decision whether or not to have the child.
There isn't a single "pertinent" decision, but a succession of decisions each giving rise to the possibility of the next. The first decision, for our purpose, is whether or not to have sex. The second is whether to have protected sex or unprotected sex (the protection, however, isn't always effective so this decision is sometimes moot). The last decision, for our purpose, is whether to abort or carry the pregnancy to term should conception occur.
That doesn't address my point.
Mills75 wrote:You seem to have confused yourself again. The debate is about justice and fairness, not what is legally or socially required under the current system. The debate isn't over whether or not either party to coitus can complain about bearing the costs of their decisions (which, of course, they can if they so choose regardless), but rather what those costs should be.
I agree that this debate is about justice and fairness. So far, however, you have failed to offer any coherent notion of "justice" or "fairness" that would justify your position.
Mills75 wrote:The decision to participate in consensual unprotected sex (which isn't really germane to the argument to begin with) is a joint decision, not the man's decision alone. The decision to abort or carry the pregnancy to term is solely the woman's. Science and nature have empowered the woman to make the final decision in procreation, thus the focus is on her. This has, however, been adequately addressed already so you may retain your proffered "second chance" (you really should try to be a more active reader).
We've dealt with this before. You've already acknowledged, in response to my initial hypothetical (we'll call it "Hypothetical 1" for reference), that there are circumstances in which it is perfectly acceptable for one person to choose while the other pays, so it is a little late in the game to be reviving that argument.
Mills75 wrote:I'm beginning to question your sincerity. The above shows a gross level of misunderstanding one wouldn't have thought possible on the part of an adult literate in the English language. Or is this obtuseness feigned and merely a rhetorical strategy?
I can only work with the materials I am provided.
Mills75 wrote:"Participation vs. imposition," as you call it, does not subsume "viable option," but rather it is the exception to "viable option." "Viable option" relates to fairness/justice (even a child understands this concept) while "participation vs. imposition" delineates those instances when what is fair/just change.
That is simply absurd. Even you admit that "participation vs. imposition" is not an exception to "viable option." Rather, it is the
only rule that applies to these situations. "Viable option," on the other hand, isn't a rule -- it isn't even an exception to a rule. It's irrelevant. To see why, consider this hypothetical:
HYPOTHETICAL 3: Suppose Victim has been raped by Rapist, who is a very wealthy man. As a result, Victim becomes pregnant. Victim decides to have the baby and sues Rapist for child support. Rapist objects, contending that he should only be held responsible for half the cost of an abortion. Who wins?
Mills75 wrote:And yet another example of clouding the issue. The baby is neither victim nor participant. The baby is a nonentity in this debate because the baby has no identity or existence separate from that of the mother until well over halfway through the pregnancy. If, however, the woman simply doesn't realize she is pregnant until it's too late to abort (it's fairly rare but does happen), then adoption would take the place of abortion in this argument.
With this response, it is evident that we are quickly reaching the point where we will have to agree to disagree. I think there are extremely persuasive public policy reasons for denying that the child is a "nonentity in this debate," but I don't find public policy arguments to be terribly interesting as a philosophical matter.
Nevertheless, there's a chance that an examination of your position here might be profitable. You note that the baby is a "nonentity" because the baby has no existence until over halfway through the pregnancy. You do not, however, explain why that fact (and I'll assume, for the sake of the present argument, that it is a fact) has any bearing on this case. In other words, why should we care whether the baby existed at any time prior to the time that it actually did come into existence? After all, if its existence is fairly
predictible, its damages are predictible as well. So why is a baby's non-existence relevant to the issue of who pays for its support?
To help illustrate this point, one final hypothetical:
HYPOTHETICAL 4: Builder builds a home for Homeowner. At the time, Homeowner's house is on an isolated plot in a residential district, with no other houses nearby, but it is clear that houses will likely be built on those adjacent lots in the future. Later, Neighbor builds a house next to Homeowner's. As it turns out, Builder was negligent in the construction of Homeowner's house, and it collapses, damaging Neighbor's house. Neighbor sues Builder, claiming that Builder's negligence in constructing the house directly led to Neighbor's damages. Builder objects, saying that he had no duty to Neighbor because Neighbor's house didn't exist at the time Homeowner's house was built. Who wins?