The new Democratic party. What will it look like?

The collusion between the DNC and the Clinton campaign had been widely reported months before the leaks of John Podesta's e mails. That is what caused the earler resignation/dismissal of Wasserman-Schults as DNC Chairman. Johm Podesta is in posessition of all his e mails. If any of the leaked e mails were "doctored" he could very easily release the original so all could see it

On June 27, 2016, The Smoking Gun (TSG) received a series of emails from Guccifer 2.0 (guccifer20@aol[.]fr) with the subject “leaked emails”. Most of the messages were sent from the Russia-based Elite VPN IP address 95.130.15[.]34 (located in France) as previously highlighted in our blog post. Some of the emails were sent from another probable Elite VPN IP address 208.76.52[.]163 (Miami, FL). The messages were not spoofed as they passed Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and Domain Key Identified Mail (DKIM) checks. Within the message thread the Guccifer 2.0 persona offered exclusive access to private Clinton campaign emails.

At the time of this writing, DCLeaks maintains a protected page for Billy Rinehart Jr. – a regional field director for the DNC. Seeing this, The Smoking Gun reached out to Rinehart and obtained a copy of the spearphish used to gain access to his email account. Rinehart was targeted with a spearphish on March 22, 2016 in a timeline and manner matching FANCY BEAR activity initially reported by Secureworks (Secureworks refers to the group as TG-4127). The mid-June 2016 report detailed specific targeting of Google accounts.

The email message was sent from an individual spoofing the legitimate “[email protected]” account and contained the subject “Sоmeоne has your passwоrd.” The spearphish message was actually sent from hi.mymail@yandex[.]com, an email address from the Moscow-based webmail provider Yandex. The message appeared to be a security notification from Google which alerted the user with the following content:

The image of the email shown above was reconstructed from offline content, so not all images and formatting are displayed as in the original online version. The faux message contained a link to a bit.ly shortened URL. According to bit.ly, the link only clicked once during the week of March 20 – the week it was sent.

The bit.ly link would redirect the user to a faux Google URL myaccount.google.com-securitysettingpage[.]ml where the user would then input their credentials into a credential phishing page. The URLs were specifically crafted with encoded strings that were specific to the targeted victim, a technique that was also highlighted within the Secureworks research. Based on this, we assess with high confidence that Rinehart interacted with the malicious link and unknowingly passed his credentials to the attackers.

It is entirely possible, as many have argued, that Hillary Clinton would be the president-elect of the United States if the F.B.I. director, James Comey, had not sent a letter to Congress about her emails in the last weeks of the campaign.

But the electoral trends that put Donald J. Trump within striking distance of victory were clear long before Mr. Comey sent his letter. They were clear before WikiLeaks published hacked emails from the Democratic National Committee. They were even clear back in early July, before Mr. Comey excoriated Mrs. Clinton for using a private email server.

It was clear from the start that Mrs. Clinton was struggling to reassemble the Obama coalition.

At every point of the race, Mr. Trump was doing better among white voters without a college degree than Mitt Romney did in 2012 — by a wide margin. Mrs. Clinton was also not matching Mr. Obama’s support among black voters.

This was the core of the Obama coalition: an alliance between black voters and Northern white voters, from Mr. Obama’s first win in the 2008 Iowa caucuses to his final sprint across the so-called Midwestern Firewall states where he staked his 2012 re-election bid.

In 2016, the Obama coalition crumbled and so did the Midwestern Firewall.

The Obama Coalition Falters

The countryside of Iowa or the industrial belt along Lake Erie is not the sort of place that people envision when they think of the Obama coalition. Yet it was an important component of his victory.
Campaign lore has it that President Obama won thanks to a young, diverse, well-educated and metropolitan “coalition of the ascendant” — an emerging Democratic majority anchored in the new economy. Hispanic voters, in particular, were credited with Mr. Obama’s victory.

But Mr. Obama would have won re-election even if he hadn’t won the Hispanic vote at all. He would have won even if the electorate had been as old and as white as it had been in 2004.

Largely overlooked, his key support often came in the places where you would least expect it. He did better than John Kerry and Al Gore among white voters across the Northern United States, despite exit poll results to the contrary. Over all, 34 percent of Mr. Obama’s voters were whites without a college degree — larger in number than black voters, Hispanic voters or well-educated whites.

He excelled in a nearly continuous swath from the Pacific Coast of Oregon and Washington to the Red River Valley in Minnesota, along the Great Lakes to the coast of Maine. In these places, Mr. Obama often ran as strong or stronger than any Democrat in history.

In 2016, Mr. Trump made huge gains among white working-class voters. It wasn’t just in the places where Democratic strength had been eroding for a long time, like western Pennsylvania. It was often in the places where Democrats had seemed resilient or even strong, like Scranton, Pa., and eastern Iowa.

It was a decisive break from recent trends. White voters without college degrees, for the first time, deviated from the national trend and swung decidedly toward the Republicans. No bastion of white, working-class Democratic strength was immune to the trend.

For the first time in the history of the two parties, the Republican candidate did better among low-income whites than among affluent whites, according to exit poll data and a compilation of New York Times/CBS News surveys.

According to exit polls, Mr. Trump did better than Mr. Romney by 24 points among white voters without a degree making less than $30,000 a year. He won these voters by a margin of 62 to 30 percent, compared with Mr. Romney’s narrow win of 52 percent to 45 percent.

In general, exit poll data should be interpreted with caution — but pre-election polls show a similar swing, and the magnitude of the shifts most likely withstands any failings of the exit polls.

Mrs. Clinton’s profound weakness among Northern white working-class voters was not expected as recently as six months ago. She was thought to be fairly strong among the older white working-class voters who were skeptical of Mr. Obama from the start. Most of Mr. Obama’s strength among white voters without a degree was due to his gains among those under age 45.

But Mr. Trump expanded on Republican gains among older working-class white voters, according to Upshot estimates, while erasing most of Mr. Obama’s gains among younger Northern white voters without a degree.
His gains among younger working-class whites were especially important in the Upper Midwest. Young white working-class voters represent a larger share of the vote there than anywhere else in the country. Mr. Obama’s strength among them — and Mrs. Clinton’s weakness — was evident from the beginning of the 2008 primaries.

It Wasn’t Turnout

Mr. Trump’s gains among white working-class voters weren’t simply caused by Democrats staying home on Election Day.

The Clinton team knew what was wrong from the start, according to a Clinton campaign staffer and other Democrats. Its models, based on survey data, indicated that they were underperforming Mr. Obama in less-educated white areas by a wide margin — perhaps 10 points or more — as early as the summer.

The campaign looked back to respondents who were contacted in 2012, and found a large number of white working-class voters who had backed Mr. Obama were now supporting Mr. Trump.

The same story was obvious in public polls of registered voters. Those polls aren’t affected by changes in turnout.

The best data on the effect of turnout will ultimately come from voter file data, which will include an individual-level account of who voted and who didn’t. Most of this data is only beginning to become available.

But the limited data that’s already available is consistent with the story evident in the pre-election polling: Turnout wasn’t the major factor driving shifts among white voters.

The voter-file data in North Carolina, where nearly all of the state’s jurisdictions have reported their vote, shows that the turnout among white Democrats and Republicans increased by almost the exact amount — about 2.5 percent. The same appears to be true in Florida.

Nationally, there is no relationship between the decline in Democratic strength and the change in turnout. Mr. Trump made gains in white working-class areas, whether turnout surged or dropped.

The exit polls also show all of the signs that Mr. Trump was winning over Obama voters. Perhaps most strikingly, Mr. Trump won 19 percent of white voters without a degree who approved of Mr. Obama’s performance, including 8 percent of those who “strongly” approved of Mr. Obama’s performance and 10 percent of white working-class voters who wanted to continue Mr. Obama’s policies.

Mr. Trump won 20 percent of self-identified liberal white working-class voters, according to the exit polls, and 38 percent of those who wanted policies that were more liberal than Mr. Obama’s.

It strongly suggests that Mr. Trump won over large numbers of white, working-class voters who supported Mr. Obama four years earlier.

Ok, I see my view of the Russians hacks is rejected