Craven de Kere wrote:Moisge3rd,
What land did Israel "give back while its enemies continued to attack from that land"? Be specific, as I have every specific tract of land that Israel has occupied in mind when I pose this question and am looking for specific answers.
When you answer, I will have a series of followups. The point you are attempting to make is indicative of far less benevolence on the part of Israel than you are trying to make out.
And BTW, there were some attacks from some Indians, which should qualify if things like the Lebanon withdrawal counts for Israel.
Lastly, Israel has unique negatives too, should we view those negatives as an indictment of Israel's character? Because if your point is to illustrate Israel's unique "goodness" of sorts then this standard for evidence would make it very easy to make a case for "badness" as well.
From:
Strategic Implications of the Israeli Withdrawal from South Lebanon
by Gary C. Gambill
The withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon earlier this month has completely transformed the strategic playing field between Israel and Syria. While Israel has no doubt lost a defensive buffer against Syrian-orchestrated paramilitary attacks, the withdrawal allows Israel to adopt a strategy of military deterrence against Syria that had until now been politically inexpedient.
The Israeli-Lebanese border fence near Metulla (AP Photo/Eyal Warsavsky)
The control of southern Lebanon by Syrian paramilitary forces is a significant asset for Damascus from a military operational standpoint. Hezbollah, whose military wing consists of 600-800 well-trained, experienced guerrillas and around 2,000-4,000 reserve fighters, clearly has the capability to strike more effectively at Israel. In light of the militia's renowned success in launching coordinated assaults on heavily fortified outposts in the former security zone, it should have little difficulty undertaking deadly attacks on the exposed civilian settlements of northern Israel. A correspondent for the Economist who toured the Israeli-Lebanese border earlier this month wrote that "the hills on the Lebanese side rise so steeply above the border that a determined guerrilla could jump the fence without difficulty, or lob grenades into one of the settlements on the other side."1
While the withdrawal has tremendously empowered Syria's surrogate military presence in south Lebanon, the window of justification for unprovoked attacks against Israeli forces has narrowed considerably. Syria's proxy war against Israel encountered little international criticism as long as Israel occupied Lebanese territory--indeed, with the exception of the U.S., most countries tacitly recognized the Syrian-sponsored campaign as an indigenous national liberation movement (which, strangely enough, seemed more intent on preventing an Israeli withdrawal in recent months). If the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory is officially deemed by the United Nations to fulfill the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 425, then the Syrian regime will risk international isolation if it continues to sponsor such attacks.
Not surprisingly, Damascus has desperately sought to preserve a pretext for sponsoring guerrilla war against Israel by attempting to forestall UN recognition that a full Israeli withdrawal has been completed. Lebanese officials have recently advanced a claim to the so-called "Shab'a farms," a 25 square kilometer area of rich agricultural land on the Western slope of Mt. Hermon. According to their position, this enclave, which was seized by Israeli forces during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, is Lebanese territory. The implication of this claim is that the Israeli pullout from Lebanon is incomplete, legitimizing the continuation of attacks against Israel by Syria's Lebanese surrogates. In fact, Hezbollah guerrillas launched an artillery assault on an Israeli military post in the enclave just prior to the Israeli withdrawal (the first time the area has been attacked since 1967).
Most international observers have disputed the Lebanese claim on several grounds. The Shab'a farms were clearly designated as part of Syria by the original 1923 border demarcation. Syrian and Lebanese officials claim that Syria ceded the territory to Lebanon in 1951, but according to UN cartographic expert Miklos Pinter, no official maps of the Syrian-Lebanese border have ever indicated Lebanese sovereignty over the enclave.2 Moreover, the region was continuously occupied by Syrian forces until its capture by the Israelis in 1967. The fact that no Lebanese official had never mentioned this bizarre claim until now further aroused suspicion.
To the chagrin of Syria, Israel is garnering strong international support for its claim to have fully withdrawn from Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. In a report to the UN Security Council, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan avoided an explicit ruling on the Shab'a farms dispute, but stated that that Resolution 425 applies only to territory occupied by Israel since its March 1978 invasion--refuting Syrian and Lebanese allegations that the Israeli withdrawal stipulated by this resolution is incomplete.
"It is our emphatic view that there can be no justification for initiating acts of violence [against Israel] at a time when Israel is in the process of implementing Resolution 425," said the U.S. State Department in a May 23 press release, which added that the Lebanese government now has a "responsibility" to restore its "effective authority in the area." Vice-President Al Gore went a step further, declaring that if Syria allows Hezbollah to continue acts of violence against Israel after the withdrawal, "President Assad will bear a heavy responsibility before the world." American congressional lawmakers introduced a bipartisan resolution explicitly applauding Israel's compliance with UN Resolution 425. Concurrent Resolution 331, passed on May 24 by the Senate and House of Representatives, also called upon the Lebanese government to maintain security in south Lebanon and ensure the disarmament of Hezbollah. The resolution explicitly mentioned the continuing occupation of Lebanon by 30,000 Syrian troops and called for "the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory so that Lebanon may exercise sovereignty throughout its territory."3
In light of this consensus, Syria is likely to face immense international criticism if its Lebanese proxies resume attacks against Israel in the aftermath of this month's withdrawal. The real question, then, concerns the extent to which international public opinion will deter Syria from sponsoring such attacks. As a result of the failed Clinton-Assad summit earlier this year, the Assad regime has come to recognize a harsh reality: Western economic and military support for Syria is, and will always be, contingent upon a final settlement in the Syrian-Israeli track of the peace process. The rapid diminishment of prospects for such a settlement may lead the Assad regime to conclude that nothing more can be gained from its embryonic love affair with the West, in which case international opprobrium will not necessarily prevent Syria from reigniting hostilities.
The Barak administration will ultimately rely first and foremost on a policy of direct military reprisals to deter Syria, in lieu of its previous (and ineffective) policy of indirect deterrence (administered by retaliation against non-Syrian forces and economic installations in Lebanon). "We have a plan for responding to any attack against us, one that includes Syrian targets in Lebanon," said Israel's chief of staff, Lt Gen Shaul Mofaz, just hours after the last Israeli soldier left Lebanon.4 In fact, the Israeli air force has already begun training its pilots to bomb two life-sized replicas of Syrian airfields in the Negev desert.5
In light of the unquestioned military superiority of the Israeli air force, Damascus will try to minimize the risk of retaliation by striving for what terrorism experts call "plausible deniability." This can be achieved by sponsoring attacks ostensibly launched by "lone individuals" or militant groups with no clear connection to Damascus. Hezbollah, which is well-known for its internal discipline and relative subservience to Syria, may not fit the bill, but Syria has ties with dozens of obscure Palestinian groups and splinter factions that have proliferated in the refugee camps of Lebanon in recent years. In order to maximize its plausible deniability, Syria must ensure 1) that its client regime in Beirut continues to exercise no authority over the Palestinian refugee camps and 2) that there is no UN presence in the Israeli-Lebanese border area capable of monitoring or obstructing cross border attacks. The latter may prove difficult for the Syrians to obstruct. American and European officials are strongly pushing for the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in the area. In fact, despite sustained Syrian objections, most major Arab countries have expressed explicit support for UN involvement.6
Nevertheless, Damascus has already begun bolstering the military strength of pro-Syrian military factions in Lebanon. Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), which is based in Damascus, has greatly expanded its military presence in the Syrian-controlled Beqaa Valley of Lebanon. PFLP-GC forces in the Beqaa, reportedly under the command of Jibril's son Jihad, are headquartered at the Dir al-Raza base, three km from the Syrian border with Lebanon. The forces there have been equipped with outdated Soviet-built T-55 tanks and the base is surrounded by Syrian anti-aircraft guns, as well as SA-2 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles.
The Israeli air force attacked Dir al-Raza for the second time in three months on May 20, reportedly destroying ten tanks and killing three guerrillas. Syria is "doing everything in order to push Palestinians into activities against Israel following the withdrawal," an Israeli defense source quoted in Ha'aretz said after the attack. "As far as they are concerned, the advantage is that this will allow them to disclaim responsibility from attacks after they are done . . . We are sending a number of messages to the Syrians, which they understand."7 The attack may be a sign of things to come--a "preemptive" deterrence policy, so to speak, of targeting any buildup of forces by Syria's proxy forces in Lebanon.
From
Eyes Upon The Land:
In 1977, one man captured the attention of the entire world, bringing about a change in the paradigm of Israeli-Arab relations. Anwar Sadat decided to visit Israel.
Until that time, Israeli and Arabs had seen each other face to face only on the battlefield, and now they would talk to each other directly without intermediaries.
Sadat had courage. Realizing that the path of action that he and his predecessors had been following had not brought him success, he was concerned about his country's future. Something new had to be done. So instead of listening to the worn-out tapes of advice he had received from Egyptian advisors, from other Arab leaders, from Washington and from Moscow, he decided to do something different, something which no one had ever dreamed of. He would go to Israel.
What was his intent? He wanted the return of the territory Egypt had lost in the Sinai; he wanted the time to rebuild his army without the threat of war; and he wanted American financial aid for his country.
Did he genuinely want peace with Israel? We can never know. To the other Arab leaders, he explained that he was not surrendering anything. He would receive what he could without fighting. And then, having improved Egypt's position, he said, he would leave the challenge of defeating Israel militarily to the next generation.
Was there nothing more? Were all the overtures of peace merely for show? Again, we cannot know. Twenty years later, the reality is that Israel's sacrifice of its dearly-developed oilfields almost destroyed its economy. There is a very cold peace between Egypt and Israel. There is next to no economic cooperation. At every international diplomatic or commercial event in Egypt, Israel's representatives are demonstratively snubbed. Egyptian tourists almost never come to Israel. In Egyptian media and schools, Israel is still described as "the enemy." The Egyptian army is stockpiling arms, and from time to time, Egyptian leaders speak of war against Israel.
But was that Sadat's intent? Had he have lived, would it have been different? Firstly, that itself is a lesson - that when making a treaty with an enemy, one has to take the worst possible scenario in mind, not merely hope for the best. We can never know what will happen in the future, and we cannot make real sacrifices in the mere hope that everything will work out.
Secondly, for peace to have been achieved, the bold ability to step beyond paradigms which Sadat demonstrated would have had to have been countered by a similar approach on the Israeli side, and unfortunately, that was lacking.
Peace can never be achieved when only one side gives and the other merely receives. This does not nurture an attitude of respect for an adversary. On the contrary, weakness encourages an adversary to try to take greater advantage. When both sides have surrendered something, there is a chance that they will consider an agreement worth honoring, but when one side has made all the sacrifices, the other side has nothing binding it. And that is what happened at Camp David.
Before Camp David, Israel controlled strategic mountain passes that would have made an Egyptian troop advance difficult; she had airfields in the Sinai which gave her advantages in both defensive and offensive movement; and she had oilfields which guaranteed her energy supply in time of war and supported her economy in peace. All these she sacrificed. In addition Begin gave the order to bulldoze the beautiful seaside township of Yamit, together with its surrounding cluster of thriving agricultural settlements on the Israeli side of the Gaza Strip.
In return Israel was handed a piece of paper; Sadat gave nothing of substance.
The Israeli Foreign Ministry maintains that the very fact that he recognized Israel's right to exist was a major breakthrough. But aside from the question of whether he was sincere or not,[21] that very concept is worthy of question. Is it proper to sacrifice major military and economic resources in exchange for such a proclamation?
The fault in the Israeli approach goes deeper. Sadat became a hero in Israel. He was lauded all over the country, and celebrations were held for his arrival. Israelis were overjoyed that an Arab leader had actually acknowledged their existence. So great was the adulation that there were Knesset members who proposed making Arabic a required language in schools.
Now did any such thing ever happen in Egypt? Or, for that matter, did American praise ever wax so eloquent when a Russian leader came to visit? It seemed that Israel was saying, "Well, since Sadat thinks we're important, I guess we are." Self-esteem came not from an inner sense of their own mission and purpose, but from the recognition granted by a foe.
Sadat heard that message, and for that reason he made no concession.
Israel spoke to him as if he was the leader of all the Arab countries. In particular, she made commitments to him with regard to the "West Bank." It was at Camp David that the term "autonomy" was coined.
The Palestinians had stated publicly that they did not see Sadat as their representative. He had no commitment to them, nor they to him. For sure, to try to upgrade his image in the Arab countries he felt it necessary to raise the Palestinian issue. But once it was raised, Israel could and should have answered the truth: "This is no concern of yours. Peace with the Palestinians has to be made with the Palestinians." And he would have left it at that, for his interests really lay only in strengthening his own country.
Nevertheless, the Israelis made commitments to him, acknowledging a limitation of their rights to the "West Bank."
For him, making the requests was almost a caprice. He had nothing to lose, so why not ask? But the Israelis had everything to lose, and nothing to gain by speaking to him about the issue. And yet they spoke - and made concessions.
In general, there was no reason for Israeli concessions. Sadat needed American support and money and could not get that without signing a peace treaty with Israel. He had already burned his bridges with the other Arab countries, and would not restore his image by breaking off negotiations with Israel and coming back emptyhanded. Carter was deeply involved in a reelection campaign and needed an agreement to improve his prestige among the voters.
Begin, by contrast, needed nothing. There was nothing substantial that Sadat was prepared to give, and within Israel, the fact that he was the prime minister who had brought Sadat to Jerusalem had bolstered his position immensely. Unquestionably, Sadat was going to make demands, and the Americans may have supported him initially, but Begin held all these cards in his hand; there was no reason for him to give in. And yet he made concession after concession, giving away (and even volunteering) security and economic assets without getting anything in return. This was unnecessary. He could have come away with a treaty without making any substantial concessions.
Is this mere conjecture? Not at all, because on one of the most sensitive points of all the negotiations, Begin stood his ground, and Sadat conceded. Sadat had demanded that Begin make concessions with regard to Jerusalem. On this point Begin stood firm and said, "No."
Now Jerusalem has sentimental value to the Arabs. A pledge from Begin on an altered status for Jerusalem would have been very flattering to Sadat's image. But when Begin stood firm, the matter was erased from the agenda.
The same motif could have been followed with regard to other matters. Sadat could have made demands, but Begin could have said "no." If he had said "no" firmly, the American pressure that had been placed on him would have shifted to Sadat. And Sadat would have had to concede, for he had more to lose. Indeed, from the time of Sadat's visit onward - significantly, many of the points mentioned above were made by the Rebbe in a public address delivered on the very night Sadat landed in Israel - the Rebbe argued that fortitude and patience were the only path to true peace.
Throughout the entire time, the Rebbe raised a cry of protest against the Israeli approach. Indeed, Camp David marks the beginning of the fifteen years during which the Rebbe repeatedly warned that the proposed autonomy would quickly grow into an armed and belligerent Palestinian state which would displace Israel and destroy the basic security of her Jewish inhabitants.
When Egypt violated the agreements, putting far more military men in the Sinai than the treaty allowed, the Rebbe called for a halt to the Israeli implementation of the remaining clauses. "Why continue withdrawing from land when the Egyptians are not maintaining their commitments?" he repeatedly asked. "Why the stubbornness on the part of the Israelis to observe every minor detail of the agreement, when the Arabs, those who have benefited most from it, violate the few restrictions which they undertook to honor?"
From
'56 War:
In 1955, egyptian president gamal abdel nasser began to import arms from the soviet bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. In the short-term, however, he employed a new tactic to prosecute egypt's war with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955:
egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the Land of Israel....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death.
Terrorist Attacks
These "heroes" were arab terrorists, or fedayeen, trained and equipped by egyptian intelligence to engage in hostile action on the borders and to infiltrate Israel to commit acts of sabotage and murder. The fedayeen operated mainly from bases in jordan, so that jordan would bear the brunt of Israel's retaliation, which inevitably followed. The terrorist attacks violated the armistice agreement provision that prohibited the initiation of hostilities by paramilitary forces; nevertheless, it was Israel that was condemned by the un security council for its counterattacks.
The escalation continued with the egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. On October 14, nasser made clear his intent:
I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations.
Less than two weeks later, on October 25, egypt signed a tripartite agreement with syria and jordan, placing nasser in command of all three armies.
The continued blockade of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of recent arab statements, prompted Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, to attack egypt on October 29, 1956.
Israeli Ambassador to the un, Abba Eban, explained the provocations to the security council on October 30:
During the six years, during which this belligerency has operated in violation of the armistice agreement, there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursion from egyptian controlled territory, and 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by egyptian military units and fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect of egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 wounded.
Ike Forces Israel to Withdraw
The Israeli attack on egypt was successful, with Israeli forces capturing the gaza strip, much of the Sinai, and Sharm el-Sheikh. A total of 231 soldiers died in the fighting.
President Dwight Eisenhower was upset by the fact that Israel, France, and Great Britain had secretly planned the campaign to evict egypt from the Suez Canal. Israel's failure to inform the United States of its intentions, combined with ignoring American entreaties not to go to war, sparked tensions between the countries. The United States subsequently joined the soviet union (ironically, just after the soviets invaded Hungary) in a campaign to force Israel to withdraw. This included a threat to discontinue all U.S. assistance, un sanctions, and expulsion from the un.
U.S. pressure resulted in an Israeli withdrawal from the areas it conquered without obtaining any concessions from the egyptians. This sowed the seeds of the 1967 war.
One reason Israel did give in to Eisenhower was the assurance he gave to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Before evacuating Sharm al-Sheikh, the strategic point guarding the Straits of Tiran, Israel elicited a promise that the United States would maintain the freedom of navigation in the waterway. In addition, Washington sponsored a un resolution creating the united nations emergency force (unef) to supervise the territories vacated by the Israeli forces.
The war temporarily ended the activities of the fedayeen; however, they were renewed a few years later by a loosely knit group of terrorist organizations that became know as the "palestine" "liquidation" organization (plo).
