revel wrote:Craven, so you think that the fence is justified because it keeps them from getting more land that they have already illegally gotten?
No, I think the fence is justified because there is a legitimate security concern that it addresses and because there is overwheling evidence that it will do so in more successful a manner than any measure Israel has ever taken to combat Palestinian terrorism.
Furthermore it represents an Israeli attempt at disengagement, an attempt to end occupation.
For many years Israel allowed the occupation to be a millstone around her neck at the behest of its most extreme citizens. It's high time that Israel tells its extremists to shove it and parts company with their expantionist dream.
I go so far as to assert that this fence is better for Palestinians than it is for Israelis, because the Palestinians lose more in every imaginable way from each attack against Israel. The sane Palestinians have no infrastructure to combat their extremists (Israel, under Sharon, made sure to decimate any such structure at any opportunity) and anything that can curb attacks on Israel is better for the Palestinians than for Israel.
Israel saves a handful of lives on their side, Palestinians save a larger handful of lives.
But more importantly, Israel's plan is to cease the invasive incursions into Palestinian territory and without the pretext of retaliation to Palestinian attacks Israel will not be able to employ the systemic destruction of Palestinian Authority infrastructure that they favor.
Said destruction had more to do with setting back the Palestinian self-determination than combating terrorism in my opinion and each terrorist bombing would give the Israelis, to use the word of a Palestinian moderate whose name I have forgotten, a "pretext" to inflict systemic setbacks to the Palestinian people on the whole.
This fence represents a realization that Sharon has reached and that he is trying to pound into the hotheads on his side. That Palestinian statehood is a "fait accompli" (his words as he pounded the desk in a meeting).
As evidenced by the opposition to the fence within Israel it represents a blow to the expationist ideology of Israeli zealots, who oppose any line.
Regardless of where this line is drawn the fact that it is so clearly demarcated is a blow to Israeli settlers and a ideological victory of Israeli moderates over Israeli lunatics.
Israel has always been in the driver's seat, and has always been able to call the shots. And finally, instead of trying to keep the status quo of territorial abiguity Israel is bowing to the recognition of eventual Palestinian statehood.
This marks an Israeli attempt to unilaterally disengage, and this is as good an idea as has come out of the region since the inception of the intifada.
It's about damn time.
And if Israeli security is realized, Palestinian dreams and statehood should follow close on its heels.
The path to termination of this conflict is so simple that it's frustrating to watch, and with each attack from either side the idiotic players in this morbid dance put off settlement of the conflict.
If the fence provides a respite from the blood, the blood will cease to grease each side's backsliding and progression on the peace process can be made.
Quote:I don't see it that way, I think an unbiased (if there is such a thing in existence) decision should be made by an outside body on what land is whose and whoever happens to be living on land that is not theirs will just have to move.
That would be nice, but we are talking about reality and not pipe dreams.
No outside body is willing
and able to impose any such objectivity on the idiots on each side of this conflict.
The global position is 1967ish lines. But with each passing year Israel has "created facts on the ground" that make it unlikely to be true to that line.
This is why it's urgent that the ambiguity start to be addressed, the fence is an impediment to Israeli lunatic settlers just as much as it is to Palestinian murderous bombers.
The final settlement, if done today would be this:
1) 1967ish lines. "Fair and equitable" exchange would need to be made where the "facts on the ground" present a practical impediment to the settlement and would need to be reached through bi-lateral negotiation.
2) "Right of return" is replaced by "fair and equitable" settlement. Simply put, Israel will never accept full right of return and it's unrealistic to expect them to, as they have a legitimate demographical concern.
Arabs have already softened the "right of return" rhetoric and seem willing to explore financial compensation and solutions outside of demographic repatriation inside of Israel.
If I were moderating the negotiations it would be solved by a symbolic real return (a couple of old ladies who have keys to standing houses would get them back) and the majority would be settled by monies and compensation provided by all interested parties (the Quartet can easily fund this and the settlement will be worth it making it interesting to do so, third party funding will be accepted simply because who the money comes from is an idiotic impediment in the grand scheme of things).
3) Jerusalem will be symbolically divided. Both nations will get to call it their capital and the carrot the US has long dangled to Israel of moving the embassy and recognizing Jerusalem (we currently do not) will be realized.
In reality, the Palestinian symbolic piece and control over Jerusalem will be a hell of a lot less than Israel's but if hostilities are reduced accesibility will mitigate against this and Palestinian interests in Jerusalem can be addressed without carving out too much of the residential Israeli interests.
4) Settlements will be taken down in some cases (like the empty ones) and in others exchanged for other land (like in the cases where the settlers have firmly entrenched and pose a practical impediment.
Recognition of the practicalities and the politics is necessary, and both sides have tentatively been on the same page on this at various times.
5) The initial Palestinian state will be demilitarized. This Israeli demand is sourced in legitimate security concerns and is more palatable to Palestinians than you might think because of two reasons: initially any millitary would be Hamas, who would represent an existential threat to Palestine, and also because Israel will be adamant about it and Palestine will not have a military to field anyway.
Specific limitations will be made on a Palestinian security and police force.
6) Lots of wordplay and mutual assurances would be made. Dumb stuff like "yeah, killing you guys isn't in the cards". It will be couched in the vocabulary this conflict has produced like "right to exist" and ****. Obvious stuff.
7) Israel will maintain control over air, sea and water supplies initially. I disagree with this but right now this is what would happen and the Palestinians would be wise to accept it because they do not deal from a position of advantage and need to get their feet on the ground before they can claim their airspace.
There would be a bunch of details, Israel would release a few thousand prisoners for example.
I'd let Arafat out long enough for some photo ops to endorse it and then hide him because there'd be a Palestinian Prime Minister.
Arafat might need some bullshit symbolic title to be coerced into cooperating on the symbolism and not making an ass out of himself as usual.
And that's the outline, any of the big players would negotiate it more or less along those lines at the moment.
Quote:You also said that you think that having the fence up will take the focus off the Palestinians since they can't get over to Israel to bomb them (I am not sure about that point anyway) and focus attention on Israel and their actions.
I didn't say that, but I did say that any success the fence has in reducing Palestinian attacks on Israel benefits the Palestinians more than the Israelis because Israel can't take really bloody or destructive action against the Palestinians without the pretext of retaliation.
Israel has a fine sense of Public Relations (despite appearances to the contrary) and knows its limits insofar as the US is concerned (unlike the Palestinians, who are dumber than rocks with PR).
Quote:If the past is indication, I think that if nothing is happening over there that puts them on the news, the western world will just forget about the palestinians and Israel will be allowed to do whatever it wants.
If that happens, it will put them back in the news.
I too, worry that the pre-Iraq pressure vanished, but both Bush and Sharon have set precedents that are significant.
Bush has made the US endorse Palestinian statehood as a short-term goal. The US has endorded it in the UN.
Sharon has called it a fait accompli and fought hard against his party when it voted to never allow a Palestinian state.
Sharon has called the occupation illegal when merely saying it's occupation is groundbreaking in Israel.
There has been significant progress recently (in years, not months) even though Bush's interest seems to have diminished since Abu's resignation and the Iraq invasion.
Thing is, no Palestinian attacks creates a vaccum for their statehood as that's the only legitimate pretext to prevent their self-determination. So the longer the lull, the closer their statehood gets.
We shall see.