@revelette2,
Cole makes a number of legitimate points, but he also seems to ignore the fact that rather than simply sulking over its being cast as a member of the "Axis of Evil" after the post 9/11 "candle-light vigils" held by Iranian citizens, the Iranian's continued to pursue a "foreign policy" wherein the US was considered an enemy, and they very actively participated in the killing of American soldiers in Iraq either through the direct actions of Iranians or, far more extensively, through providing Iraqi insurgents with IED technology.
While more "moderate" forces were at the helm of Iran on 9/11/01 and some of them issued statements condemning the act of terrorism, soon after they were replaced with hard-liners, and on September 24, 2010, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the UN General Assembly that "there is one theory" that US engineered the 9/11 disaster to prop up Israel, and urged the UN to investigate. President Obama, rightly and forcefully, refuted Ahmadinejad's comments, calling them ""hateful, offensive and inexcusable".
Regardless of whether or not one feels that Iran has legitimate reasons for considering the US its enemy, it is undeniable that it is our enemy and so "working with" them in response to this crisis should not be seen as some no-brainer of an opportunity to forge peaceful relations. It would be short-sighted not to consider that this might offer some opportunity, but it would be foolish to think it will provide anything even remotely like a breakthrough, and my concern with Secretary Kerry is that he is engaged in a constant search to find a major diplomatic "success" that he can attach to his "legacy."
The question of whether or not a neo-conservative strategy to improve and secure US security by promoting democratic ideals (even through direct military intervention) throughout the world and particularly in regions like the Middle East, can be successful was not answered by the Iraq War. The effort was flawed in so many different ways that it can't be seen as a dispositive test case.
Not all of the mistakes were made due to arrogance and ego (although Rumsfeld accounted for a number of those), there was an obvious reason why, initially, the US "sided" (as Cole describes it) with Shia leaders: They, not the Sunni's welcomed the toppling of Saddam. Shia, not Sunni had been oppressed and murdered by Saddam's regime, and they offered the best opportunity for moving Iraq to a democratic nation. Perhaps there was also an underlying or even sub-conscious concern about the fact that it was Sunni Muslims who were responsible for 9/11, but I doubt this had a major influence on the thinking.
Bremer's policy of de-Baathification may, in hindsight, appear to have been a mistake, but it wasn't formed out of caprice, and it's important to note that for the Shia who Bremer had to rely upon, the Baath Party was the source of their miseries. I don't know how well they appreciated the subtle reality that to have any sort of job in the public sector someone had to be a party member.
I completely agree with you that the notion that anyone other than the people who benefited from Saddam's regime is mourning its loss and might wish that it could return is preposterous. The hypothetical that Cole offers (but which he also disagrees with) of how Saddam remaining in power would have been a better state of affairs for Iraq is far-fetched.
Ridding Iraq of Saddam and his government was a good thing, and one of the few outcomes on which most people agree was beneficial, but whether or not it, alone, was worth the deaths of some 5,000 American soldiers and the wounding (often in horrific manner) of some 33,000 more (not to mention of course the high Iraqi civilian casualties), I think it’s clear, in hindsight (at least to me) that it was not.
That he was a monster and a scourge upon his people is unquestionable, but as you have pointed out there are others like him throughout the world. While it would be in many ways satisfying for the US to be a global White Knight ridding the world of such monsters, that is just not going to happen in any way that would be acceptable. As far as him being a threat to the US, I have no doubt that he had evil intentions, but the reality is that the invasion revealed he did not have the capabilities to actually make good on these intentions to the degree to which his removal was essential to our security. Whether or not the belief that he did was simply mistaken or born of lies, is not something I care to address here. Suffice it to say that he didn't have the weapons that were the primary justification for invasion.
That the Bush Administration invested almost everything in these weapons as the justification of the invasion to the American people is something that I disagreed with at the time and which set them up for a monumental perception of failure and suspicion. Clearly there was a strategic reason for the invasion but I suspect the Administration just didn't trust Americans to understand it and preferred to focus on our fears.
American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan is clear proof that nation building is a complex and very difficult endeavor, and the arrogance and ignorance that led officials to believe it would be otherwise was a major cause of what, arguably, has been two failures. I would go further though and say that these two examples are convincing proof that nation building is too complex and difficult for us to attempt again under almost any circumstances. There is little reason to believe that the combination of leadership, enduring political and public will, and an environment on the ground that is conducive, rather than antithetical to the attempt will ever come about.