1
   

Libertarian Party

 
 
Scrat
 
  1  
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2004 10:24 am
joefromchicago wrote:
Here I think we may have hit on a fundamental difference. Libertarians, it seems, tend to think of "efficiency" as a social good. Their objection to government regulations, for instance, often centers on the inefficiencies of the present system.

Speaking (er, writing) for myself, I can tell you that you are probably dead on here, but it is misleading of you to suggest (as you seem to do) that efficiency itself is the goal. The goal is greater liberty and greater prosperity for all.

Where government regulations (or anything) decrease efficiency they mean less of a desired thing is available, they mean that desired thing costs more, they mean fewer people can afford that desired thing.

"That thing" might be bread or the protection of law enforcement or the individual's drive to achieve and create. So yes, I think you are correct that the libertarian viewpoint does not suffer inefficiency lightly, but I think that is a fundamental strength of the libertarian philosophy, where you seem to see it as a flaw.
0 Replies
 
Thomas
 
  1  
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2004 11:09 am
joefromchicago wrote:
In particular, it is not very good at protecting interests that are not economic interests.

Could you give me an example of what you would call a non-economic interest? I suspect that what you call 'economic' is what I call 'pecuniary', but maybe it's best if you just tell me yourself.

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
In the case of highways, I concede there might be a big enough problem with monopoly power to render competition ineffective. I haven't looked into this issue deeply enough to give you a good answer on that. About the regulation of pharmaceuticals, there is a body of scholarly work, most prominently by the University of Chicago's Sam Peltzman. Based on admittedly indirect evidence, it finds that it has decreased people's access to effective pharmaceuticals, by greatly increasing the cost of developing them. If Peltzman is right -- I am too much of an armchair economist to be sure he is -- the actual net effect of the legislation was the opposite of the intended one.

Assuming that the legislation was intended to promote efficiency.

Assuming that the legislation was intended to give people effective drugs that are unlikely to kill them, which may or may not be the same as your definition of "efficiency".

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
I take your point; it weakens mine, but doesn't refute it entirely. For example, before the civil war, black slaves could purchase their liberty. That sounds like the transfer of an "inalienable" right to me. The moral philosophy about what rights are "inalienable" wasn't too different then from what it is now.

A slave buying his freedom isn't an example of a transfer of an inalienable right. After all, the slave is property, and property is always transferable. A better example would be someone selling himself into slavery -- thus transferring the previously inalienable right to liberty. Would that be permissible in a libertarian society?

As a matter of principle, the question you ask poses a paradox. I don't think libertarians could answer either "yes" or "no" without becoming inonsistent about their libertarianism. As a matter of practice, nobody will want to do that, because once you've given up your self-ownership, you can't collect the payment. Even if you get around this, perhaps by paying in advance, I doubt that allowing the sale of self-ownership would create more indentured servants than, say, the draft did -- and still does in many democratic countries, where it is commonly viewed as fairly unproblematic. The reason I think so is that while indentured servitude is cheap in wages, it's probably quite expensive if you account for the cost of making your unmotivated servants work.

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
Answer #3: In a libertarian society, government would have much, much less pork to hand out. So the votes wouldn't nearly be worth as much to potential buyers as they are today. Moreover, every sold vote would do much less social damage that it does today. I expect the combination of the two dominates any adverse effects from making votes easier to sell. But I admit I have no solid proof for this expectation.

What if I were a judge. Could I sell my decision in a court case to the highest bidder?

Remember that I'm firmly in devil's advocate mode now, defending a much more extreme libertarianism than I actually hold. This said, yes, you can sell your decision to the highest bidder. But people will notice, and they will stop hiring you as a judge.

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
One possible scenario would be that your neighborhood is a propietary community. You and your neighbors would call the proprietor and point out to him that if this slaughterhouse is built, he loses your business to people who'd be willing to pay much less rent than you do. This isn't technically a right, but it gives the proprietor an incentive not to have the slaughterhouse built. In fact, the proprietor has an incentive to attract your business by preempting this situation in the first place. One way to preempt it is to put it in the contract with the inhabitants

And if the owner of the proprietary community is also the person who wants to build the slaughterhouse...?

He will have to decide whether his gain from operating the slaughterhouse is likely to earn him more than the inhabitants' willingness to pay rent to him, which he is losing. In practice, I expect that the slaughterhouse be built more or less in the same place as it would be under a competent and responsible elected mayor.

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
(Aside: I'm not sure what you call the payments proprietary community owners are getting. Taxes? Rent? My English fails me here.)

I imagine it would be called "rent."

Thanks!

joefromchicago wrote:
Let's say, for instance, that each parcel of land in a particular area has both a right to be the site of a slaughterhouse and also the right to be free of neighboring slaughterhouses. Mr. Butcher decides that, on his property, he will build a slaughterhouse, which he is certainly entitled to do. His neighbors, however, refuse to sell their rights to be free of a slaughterhouse, while Mr. Butcher refuses to sell his right to build a slaughterhouse. Who wins?

There will be no trial to begin with; instead there will be an auction -- not necessarily under this name. The butcher will bid up the price of the right to freedom from slaughterhouses. The neighbors will bid up the price of the right to build a slaughterhouse. There will always be some price at which one side will stop refusing, and sell.

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
As you know, "I own this real estate" is really shorthand for "I own a bundle of rights with regard to this real estate". Serious libertarians argue that the bundle could be adapted to solve your slaughterhouse problem.

Are you sure? My slaughterhouse problem can get devilishly complicated.

Property rights can handle a lot of complexity. For example, I hear that the old Egyptian property rights in land near the Nile had to handle extreme complexity, because the bed of the Nile changed significantly with every flood. This leads to extremely tricky questions about what exactly remains persistant about your claim over the years. Apparently Egyptians could handle it. But that's another story.
0 Replies
 
Thomas
 
  1  
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2004 11:12 am
Scrat wrote:
So yes, I think you are correct that the libertarian viewpoint does not suffer inefficiency lightly, but I think that is a fundamental strength of the libertarian philosophy, where you seem to see it as a flaw.

Well said, Scrat!
0 Replies
 
Craven de Kere
 
  1  
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2004 11:23 am
Scrat wrote:

I didn't ask you for a hypothetical, I asked you for an actual, specific liberty advocated by the Libertarian party that you believe would make others "less free". It's a fairly simple, straightforward request. I'm simply trying to get a better understanding of what you mean by "make others less free".


And I gave you one.


Regards
0 Replies
 
joefromchicago
 
  1  
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2004 01:27 pm
Thomas wrote:
Could you give me an example of what you would call a non-economic interest? I suspect that what you call 'economic' is what I call 'pecuniary', but maybe it's best if you just tell me yourself.

One non-economic right might be "the right to be free of slaughterhouses in one's neighborhood." Now, of course, we've already discussed the possibility of selling this right, but the fact that one can put a price on a right doesn't necessarily make it an "economic" right (although, as I mentioned in my previous post, some people would say exactly that). After all, if I can sell my vote in a libertarian society, does that make the right to vote an economic right?

Thomas wrote:
Assuming that the legislation was intended to give people effective drugs that are unlikely to kill them, which may or may not be the same as your definition of "efficiency".

No, that's not the same thing.

Thomas wrote:
As a matter of principle, the question you ask poses a paradox. I don't think libertarians could answer either "yes" or "no" without becoming inonsistent about their libertarianism. As a matter of practice, nobody will want to do that, because once you've given up your self-ownership, you can't collect the payment.

I could always arrange to have the payment given to my family. Certainly, it is not unheard of for a person to sacrifice his life for the benefit of his loved ones: why would it be inconceivable for a person to sacrifice his freedom for the same reason?

Thomas wrote:
Even if you get around this, perhaps by paying in advance, I doubt that allowing the sale of self-ownership would create more indentured servants than, say, the draft did -- and still does in many democratic countries, where it is commonly viewed as fairly unproblematic. The reason I think so is that while indentured servitude is cheap in wages, it's probably quite expensive if you account for the cost of making your unmotivated servants work.

No doubt, but the question wasn't whether it would be a widespread practice, but whether it would be permissible at all.

Thomas wrote:
Remember that I'm firmly in devil's advocate mode now, defending a much more extreme libertarianism than I actually hold. This said, yes, you can sell your decision to the highest bidder. But people will notice, and they will stop hiring you as a judge.

Only if the vote-selling were an open transaction. If it were a private sale, not disclosed to the public, there would, at most, be only a vague suspicion that the judge had sold out.

Thomas wrote:
He will have to decide whether his gain from operating the slaughterhouse is likely to earn him more than the inhabitants' willingness to pay rent to him, which he is losing. In practice, I expect that the slaughterhouse be built more or less in the same place as it would be under a competent and responsible elected mayor.

Why would you expect that? It would seem to me that entirely different considerations would factor into the two decisions.

Thomas wrote:
There will be no trial to begin with; instead there will be an auction -- not necessarily under this name. The butcher will bid up the price of the right to freedom from slaughterhouses. The neighbors will bid up the price of the right to build a slaughterhouse. There will always be some price at which one side will stop refusing, and sell.

Mr. Butcher would be willing to sell his right to build a slaughterhouse for $500,000, and is willing to buy the rights to prevent the slaughterhouse from the neighboring landowners for $100,000.

The neighboring landowners are willing to sell their rights to prevent the slaughterhouse for $500,000, and are willing to buy Mr. Butcher's right to build the slaughterhouse for $100,000.

Result: there is no auction. Neither side is willing to pay the other's reserve price.*

Now, it should be noted that neither side is necessarily acting rationally. After all, if Mr. Butcher truly values his slaughterhouse at $500,000, and the neighbors value a slaughterhouse-free neighborhood at $500,000, then one side should offer the other side $500,000. Yet while they value their own preferred goal at $500,000, they are not willing to pay that much to buy out the other side's preferred goal. Why are they being unreasonable?

Well, largely because they don't have to be reasonable: in a market where there is only one buyer and one seller, both are able to insist on monopolist/monopsonist prices for their bargains. What is missing, then, is a third-party to break the impasse. Today, that would be the government; in a libertarian society, it would have to be some third party that would attempt to broker a deal. But whereas there is always a government in a representative democracy at hand, there is not always a third-party broker in a libertarian society who is readily available.

Thomas wrote:
Property rights can handle a lot of complexity. For example, I hear that the old Egyptian property rights in land near the Nile had to handle extreme complexity, because the bed of the Nile changed significantly with every flood. This leads to extremely tricky questions about what exactly remains persistant about your claim over the years. Apparently Egyptians could handle it. But that's another story.

I would only note that the ancient Egyptians were definitely not libertarians.

* One problem here is that the two items are offered for auction simultaneously, which introduces a complicating element of bargaining into the auction. The key, then, would be in holding the auctions sequentially rather than simultaneously. But then which item goes first, the right to build or the right to prevent?
0 Replies
 
joefromchicago
 
  1  
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2004 01:30 pm
Scrat wrote:
Speaking (er, writing) for myself, I can tell you that you are probably dead on here, but it is misleading of you to suggest (as you seem to do) that efficiency itself is the goal. The goal is greater liberty and greater prosperity for all.

That's a fair point. One of the difficulties is that "efficiency" is an economic good, whereas "liberty"is a political good. Given that libertarianism is an odd amalgam of economics and politics, however, it is sometimes difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins.
0 Replies
 
Thomas
 
  1  
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2004 03:40 pm
joefromchicago wrote:
Now, of course, we've already discussed the possibility of selling this right, but the fact that one can put a price on a right doesn't necessarily make it an "economic" right (although, as I mentioned in my previous post, some people would say exactly that).

Okay. In this case I don't understand why you think one should treat two tradeable rights fundamentally differently, just because one is economic under your definition and the other is not.

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
Assuming that the legislation was intended to give people effective drugs that are unlikely to kill them, which may or may not be the same as your definition of "efficiency".

No, that's not the same thing.

I don't understand your nomenclature then. What, under your definition, would be the efficient solution, if it's not access to drugs which are likely to help and unlikely to hurt?

joefromchicago wrote:
Certainly, it is not unheard of for a person to sacrifice his life for the benefit of his loved ones: why would it be inconceivable for a person to sacrifice his freedom for the same reason?

It's not inconceivable at all, and many people do it. It's called "marriage".

joefromchicago wrote:
No doubt, but the question wasn't whether it [selling yourself into slavery, T.] would be a widespread practice, but whether it would be permissible at all.

As I said, no possible answer can be perfectly consistent with libertarianism. Personally, I am inclined to say "yes".

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
Remember that I'm firmly in devil's advocate mode now, defending a much more extreme libertarianism than I actually hold. This said, yes, you can sell your decision to the highest bidder. But people will notice, and they will stop hiring you as a judge.

Only if the vote-selling were an open transaction. If it were a private sale, not disclosed to the public, there would, at most, be only a vague suspicion that the judge had sold out.

Based on accounts by people who work with private arbitration agencies, but not for them, I doubt this would be a significant factor. These agencies go out of their way to create a reputation for fairness and impartiality. Their business depends on this reputation. Even in the extreme case of anarcho-capitalism, where courts would be private arbitration agencies, their incentives are still basically the same.

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
He will have to decide whether his gain from operating the slaughterhouse is likely to earn him more than the inhabitants' willingness to pay rent to him, which he is losing. In practice, I expect that the slaughterhouse be built more or less in the same place as it would be under a competent and responsible elected mayor.

Why would you expect that? It would seem to me that entirely different considerations would factor into the two decisions.

I disagree. The tradeoffs involved on the ground level -- the butchers benefit from slaughtering cows vs. the neighbors' benefit from the absence of slaughterhouses -- is identical in both cases. The optimal solution -- clustering of disgusting businesses in one part of town, residential areas in other parts of town -- is fundamentally the same as a result. The mechanism of finding the optimum may be different, but given reasonable efficiency, it makes no difference to the outcome.

joefromchicago wrote:
Result: there is no auction. Neither side is willing to pay the other's reserve price.

Only because you have assumed the property rights to be ill-defined. Societies with dysfunctional property rights will always get into trouble, libertarian or not. So I don't think your example tells us much about libertarianism. (Yes, I should have caught this in my last response.) Under better designed property rights -- either all estates come with a tradeable right to build a slaughterhouse, or all estates come with a tradeable right to freedom from slaughterhouses -- your problem doesn't occur. There will be some initial allocation of rights, and if there is no price at which parties volunteer to change the allocation, the initial allocation remains.

joefromchicago wrote:
But whereas there is always a government in a representative democracy at hand, there is not always a third-party broker in a libertarian society who is readily available.

If people prefer the availability of such a broker, they will hire them -- possibly indirectly, by moving into proprietary communities with good arbitration services.

joefromchicago wrote:
I would only note that the ancient Egyptians were definitely not libertarians.

That's true. Credit where credit is due, even when it goes to the competition!
0 Replies
 
joefromchicago
 
  1  
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2004 11:49 pm
Thomas wrote:
Okay. In this case I don't understand why you think one should treat two tradeable rights fundamentally differently, just because one is economic under your definition and the other is not.

An "economic right" would be a right to certain things in the marketplace (such as embodied in the lex mercatoria). For the most part, these are rights based on contracts. If you want to call them "pecuniary rights," I have no problem with that. My point is that just because someone can put a monetary price on a right (such as freedom or voting) doesn't make it an economic right.

Thomas wrote:
I don't understand your nomenclature then. What, under your definition, would be the efficient solution, if it's not access to drugs which are likely to help and unlikely to hurt?

I would imagine that, for a libertarian, an efficient solution would be for a drug manufacturer to introduce pharmaceuticals into the marketplace as soon as it satisfied itself that the drug was safe. Any penalties imposed on the company for introducing an unsafe drug into the market would then be imposed by the market, not the government.

Thomas wrote:
It's not inconceivable at all, and many people do it. It's called "marriage".

Finally, a point upon which we can both agree.

Thomas wrote:
Based on accounts by people who work with private arbitration agencies, but not for them, I doubt this would be a significant factor. These agencies go out of their way to create a reputation for fairness and impartiality. Their business depends on this reputation. Even in the extreme case of anarcho-capitalism, where courts would be private arbitration agencies, their incentives are still basically the same.

It may, indeed, be an insignificant factor in general, but that is small consolation for the party in an individual case where the judge has sold out to the party's opponent.

Thomas wrote:
I disagree. The tradeoffs involved on the ground level -- the butchers benefit from slaughtering cows vs. the neighbors' benefit from the absence of slaughterhouses -- is identical in both cases. The optimal solution -- clustering of disgusting businesses in one part of town, residential areas in other parts of town -- is fundamentally the same as a result. The mechanism of finding the optimum may be different, but given reasonable efficiency, it makes no difference to the outcome.

Again, the average efficiency of the solution is hardly satisfactory in those instances where the people are not being rational economic actors.

Thomas wrote:
Only because you have assumed the property rights to be ill-defined.

Well, I imagine that I defined those property rights as concretely as would be necessary to determine a course of action for a rational economic actor. What else was necessary to complete the hypothetical?

Thomas wrote:
Societies with dysfunctional property rights will always get into trouble, libertarian or not. So I don't think your example tells us much about libertarianism. (Yes, I should have caught this in my last response.) Under better designed property rights -- either all estates come with a tradeable right to build a slaughterhouse, or all estates come with a tradeable right to freedom from slaughterhouses -- your problem doesn't occur. There will be some initial allocation of rights, and if there is no price at which parties volunteer to change the allocation, the initial allocation remains.

Sure, the initial allocation remains, but the initial allocation led to an irresolvable paradox: Mr. Butcher has as much right to build his slaughterhouse as the neighbors have to prevent it. Since neither side has any incentive to sell, how do we resolve the impasse?

Thomas wrote:
If people prefer the availability of such a broker, they will hire them -- possibly indirectly, by moving into proprietary communities with good arbitration services.

Why would anyone agree to arbitration in this situation? Currently, arbitration only works in three situations: (1) where the parties have already contractually obligated themselves to arbitrate disputes; (2) where there is the possibility of a compromise price; or (3) where the law compels the parties to enter into binding arbitration. In my hypothetical, neither the first nor the second case applies, and in a libertarian society I would presume that the third would likewise not apply.
0 Replies
 
Scrat
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2004 12:07 pm
Thomas wrote:
Scrat wrote:
So yes, I think you are correct that the libertarian viewpoint does not suffer inefficiency lightly, but I think that is a fundamental strength of the libertarian philosophy, where you seem to see it as a flaw.

Well said, Scrat!

Hey, I did something right! Wooo-hooo!!!! Very Happy

(Seriously, thanks for the kudos, Thomas.)
0 Replies
 
Scrat
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2004 12:15 pm
Craven de Kere wrote:
Scrat wrote:

I didn't ask you for a hypothetical, I asked you for an actual, specific liberty advocated by the Libertarian party that you believe would make others "less free". It's a fairly simple, straightforward request. I'm simply trying to get a better understanding of what you mean by "make others less free".


And I gave you one.

In fact, you didn't, and actually explained why you weren't going to--which is fine.

You also wrote this:
Quote:
The point was quite a simple one, all freedoms come at the expense of another freedom.

I disagree, but perhaps you have given this more thought than I, or perhaps the freedom you would argue we lose is something trivial by comparison with the thing gained, but let me try one.

Let's consider freedom in its simplest sense: the freedom to come and go as one chooses. Does my freedom to decide where I will go and when come at the expense of another freedom? If so, which freedom, and from whom has it been taken?
0 Replies
 
Craven de Kere
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2004 01:34 pm
Scrat wrote:

In fact, you didn't, and actually explained why you weren't going to--which is fine.


Incorrect. I said I'd give you an intentionally specific (though silly) one and I did:

I wish for the freedom from fear that libertaian ideology (which I consider naive) will substitute current government.

Now Scrat, there is a reason I do not take these questions of yours seriously.

To illustrate freedoms won or lost would be hypotheticals that would first have to settle the viability of each policy and the result.

As you can see from Joe and Thomas' discussion the very viability and result of these policies is disputed and consensus will simply not be reached for some points.

My comment was a very general one about the fallacy of "more freedom" when it's really "freedoms that I value".

Quote:

Let's consider freedom in its simplest sense: the freedom to come and go as one chooses. Does my freedom to decide where I will go and when come at the expense of another freedom? If so, which freedom, and from whom has it been taken?


Your freedom to go where you want can deny the freedom of another to go where he wants. Get out of the doorway and we'll talk about it.
0 Replies
 
Scrat
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2004 01:52 pm
Craven de Kere wrote:
Scrat wrote:

In fact, you didn't, and actually explained why you weren't going to--which is fine.


Incorrect. I said I'd give you an intentionally specific (though silly) one and I did:

I asked for a specific point from the Libertarian Party's platform, and you refused, with a specific reason. And again, that's your choice, but I didn't want to debate a silly hypothetical to prove or disprove the value of libertarian ideals. I think it makes more sense to debate the value of those ideals in the specific. You prefer not to, which is fine, but it doesn't make your argument either compelling or interesting to me, as it seems to boil down to "I'm correct, because I think I'm correct."
0 Replies
 
Craven de Kere
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2004 02:00 pm
Scrat,

I gave you a specific one for the Libertarian party. You choose instead to just keep repeating that I didn't, which is fine with me.
0 Replies
 
Scrat
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2004 03:21 pm
Craven de Kere wrote:
I gave you a specific one for the Libertarian party. You choose instead to just keep repeating that I didn't, which is fine with me.

Yes, I keep repeating that, because it continues to be true. (Sigh)

What I asked was:
Quote:
Can you cite a specific individual liberty advocated by (for simplicity's sake) the Libertarian Party (http://www.lp.org/) that you believe, once secured, would make others "less free"?

What you actually wrote was this:
Quote:
I wish for the freedom from fear that libertaian ideology (which I consider naive) will substitute current government.

So no, you haven't given a substantive response to my request, nor apparently do you intend to. That's your prerogative, of course, but I think I'm going to disengage here and tune into someone else who has a bit more to offer to the discussion than "Did TOO!"
0 Replies
 
Craven de Kere
 
  1  
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2004 04:14 pm
Scrat,

I have no problem if you wish to disengage. I made clear long ago that I'd not be discussing the finer points of libertarian naivete with you.

I've told you this from the beginning. <shrugs>

I too think there are more worthwhile pursuits.
0 Replies
 
billy falcon
 
  1  
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2004 10:19 pm
Libertarianism
L.R.R.Hood wrote:
I always wonder about people who trust the government to do a just and fair job, in any situation.



I wonder about people who philosophicly seem to distrust
people who work for the government, in any situation.
It doesn't hold up in theory and it doesn't work in practice.
This insistence that government be perfect and all other non-governmental efforts that fail are dismissed with "nothiing's perfect." It's not good reasoning.

In case of fire, I'd rather be able to call 911, than try to recruit the neighbors.
0 Replies
 
Foxfyre
 
  1  
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2004 10:38 pm
I have always thought that the government should not do what can be done more efficiently and effectively in the private sector and that federal government should not be doing what can be done as efficiently and effectively by the states. If the federal government would limit itself to its responsibilities as defined in the Constitution, federal government would be shrunk to a tiny percentage of its current size. That would leave billions of dollars in additional resources for the states and/or the private sector to use.

That's the brand of libertarianism I advocate.
0 Replies
 
Centroles
 
  1  
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2004 12:59 am
Where do libertarians stand on law suit caps?

On one hand, the justice system is an extension of the government and idiotically large lawsuit settlements destroy businesses all over the place,.

But on the other hand, the libertarian party is full of lawyers who would probably argue that a lawsuit cap is just another form of government intervention.
0 Replies
 
Centroles
 
  1  
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2004 01:00 am
I tend to lean libertarian on some issues, I think charities and private organizations sometimes do a far better job than the government. But I'm wary of the claim that charities would automatically get more funding if we cut welfare and reduced costs.

I strongly favor cutting bueracratic govt. programs in favor of privately launched ones that compete with each other to do the job efficently. I strongly favor using this money saved to pay off the national debt and cut taxes.

I do believe that sometimes we have far too many stupid regulations that stifle businesses.

I believe that free trade and free competition works as long as the govt. oversees it to stop unscrupulous practices and monopolies.

And most importantly, I believe that republicans are morons when it comes interventing into social issues be it gay marriage, medical marijuana and a host of other situations. But I do agree with some gun regulations such as the assault weapons ban, background check, and a database to track down guns used in a murder back to their owners.

And I support caps on lawusits. I think that large lawsuit settlements over idiotic stuff really hurt and destroy businesses.

So I guess I am a libertarian, sort of.
0 Replies
 
Centroles
 
  1  
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2004 01:02 am
All you libertarians, I think you would be very interested in my proposal.

Please read it here... It'll cut govt involvement tremendously.

http://www.able2know.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=23148
0 Replies
 
 

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