Thomas wrote:Could you give me an example of what you would call a non-economic interest? I suspect that what you call 'economic' is what I call 'pecuniary', but maybe it's best if you just tell me yourself.
One non-economic right might be "the right to be free of slaughterhouses in one's neighborhood." Now, of course, we've already discussed the possibility of
selling this right, but the fact that one can put a price on a right doesn't necessarily make it an "economic" right (although, as I mentioned in my previous post, some people would say exactly that). After all, if I can sell my vote in a libertarian society, does that make the right to vote an economic right?
Thomas wrote:Assuming that the legislation was intended to give people effective drugs that are unlikely to kill them, which may or may not be the same as your definition of "efficiency".
No, that's not the same thing.
Thomas wrote:As a matter of principle, the question you ask poses a paradox. I don't think libertarians could answer either "yes" or "no" without becoming inonsistent about their libertarianism. As a matter of practice, nobody will want to do that, because once you've given up your self-ownership, you can't collect the payment.
I could always arrange to have the payment given to my family. Certainly, it is not unheard of for a person to sacrifice his
life for the benefit of his loved ones: why would it be inconceivable for a person to sacrifice his
freedom for the same reason?
Thomas wrote:Even if you get around this, perhaps by paying in advance, I doubt that allowing the sale of self-ownership would create more indentured servants than, say, the draft did -- and still does in many democratic countries, where it is commonly viewed as fairly unproblematic. The reason I think so is that while indentured servitude is cheap in wages, it's probably quite expensive if you account for the cost of making your unmotivated servants work.
No doubt, but the question wasn't whether it would be a widespread practice, but whether it would be permissible at all.
Thomas wrote:Remember that I'm firmly in devil's advocate mode now, defending a much more extreme libertarianism than I actually hold. This said, yes, you can sell your decision to the highest bidder. But people will notice, and they will stop hiring you as a judge.
Only if the vote-selling were an open transaction. If it were a private sale, not disclosed to the public, there would, at most, be only a vague suspicion that the judge had sold out.
Thomas wrote:He will have to decide whether his gain from operating the slaughterhouse is likely to earn him more than the inhabitants' willingness to pay rent to him, which he is losing. In practice, I expect that the slaughterhouse be built more or less in the same place as it would be under a competent and responsible elected mayor.
Why would you expect that? It would seem to me that entirely different considerations would factor into the two decisions.
Thomas wrote:There will be no trial to begin with; instead there will be an auction -- not necessarily under this name. The butcher will bid up the price of the right to freedom from slaughterhouses. The neighbors will bid up the price of the right to build a slaughterhouse. There will always be some price at which one side will stop refusing, and sell.
Mr. Butcher would be willing to sell his right to build a slaughterhouse for $500,000, and is willing to buy the rights to prevent the slaughterhouse from the neighboring landowners for $100,000.
The neighboring landowners are willing to sell their rights to prevent the slaughterhouse for $500,000, and are willing to buy Mr. Butcher's right to build the slaughterhouse for $100,000.
Result: there is no auction. Neither side is willing to pay the other's reserve price.*
Now, it should be noted that neither side is necessarily acting
rationally. After all, if Mr. Butcher truly values his slaughterhouse at $500,000, and the neighbors value a slaughterhouse-free neighborhood at $500,000, then one side should offer the other side $500,000. Yet while they value their own preferred goal at $500,000, they are not willing to pay that much to buy out the other side's preferred goal. Why are they being unreasonable?
Well, largely because they don't have to be reasonable: in a market where there is only one buyer and one seller, both are able to insist on monopolist/monopsonist prices for their bargains. What is missing, then, is a third-party to break the impasse. Today, that would be the government; in a libertarian society, it would have to be some third party that would attempt to broker a deal. But whereas there is always a government in a representative democracy at hand, there is not always a third-party broker in a libertarian society who is readily available.
Thomas wrote:Property rights can handle a lot of complexity. For example, I hear that the old Egyptian property rights in land near the Nile had to handle extreme complexity, because the bed of the Nile changed significantly with every flood. This leads to extremely tricky questions about what exactly remains persistant about your claim over the years. Apparently Egyptians could handle it. But that's another story.
I would only note that the ancient Egyptians were definitely
not libertarians.
* One problem here is that the two items are offered for auction simultaneously, which introduces a complicating element of bargaining into the auction. The key, then, would be in holding the auctions sequentially rather than simultaneously. But then which item goes first, the right to build or the right to prevent?