ican711nm wrote:
That's a fairy tale. A negotiated peace is not a possible solution among the waring factions in Iraq. The war (civil or otherwise) will end when one side forces the other into submission. That will take a while. It will be a shorter while, if the USA stays in Iraq until the al-Qaeda in Iraq are exterminated.
Wow! Here is ican -- about whom we know nothing -- arguing with full professors, with doctorates in political science, at prestigious universities and with government officials who have real jobs within the Dept. of State, all of whom have been recognized by The News Hour, CBS and Boston's WGBH to speak with authority on Iraq.
Perhaps, ican is a person of knowledge and position!
ican711nm wrote:
Yes, the USA did have the right to invade Iraq.
There you go! A person of knowledge and position! What an authority on international law! I guess it's the use of super-sized blue type that gives him his presence!
Well, that mean that Iraq has the right to invade us.
anton -- Gee! I am so impressed that this character, who uses a fake name and silly logo, types the word malarkey, in bright blue, over and over, and dares to tell people with doctorates in political science and years of experience in government that all of their work and knowledge amount to fairy tales. Aren't you impressed?
plainoldme wrote :
Quote:arguing with full professors, with doctorates in political science, at prestigious universities and with government officials who have real jobs within the Dept. of State, all of whom have been recognized by The News Hour, CBS and Boston's WGBH to speak with authority on Iraq.
it is hereby stated that these people are "know-nothings" !
approved , signed and sealed in my presence (i don't need anyone else around here - i am in charge here - anyone remember those "famous" words ?)
hbg
hamburger -- Alexander Haig! Right! His authority was based on the fact that he looked like Jack Palance! Do those push-ups!
Police Yield to Sunni Insurgents' Ultimatum
In Town North of Baghdad, Five of Eight Stations Are Destroyed
By Karin Brulliard
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, March 20, 2007; A14
BAGHDAD, March 19 -- Dozens of insurgents wielding machine guns surrounded the police station before dawn Monday in Duluiyah, a majority Sunni town about 45 miles north of Baghdad. The five officers on duty walked out, hands to the dark sky, and waited to be executed.
But instead of firing, the insurgents' leader spoke: Repent, he commanded, or die.
"So we swore to quit the police and support the Islamic State of Iraq," recalled Mohammad Hashmawi, one of the police officers, referring to a militant Sunni organization active in many parts of the country.
Apparently content, the insurgents stole the officers' decrepit weapons and the station's communications equipment, blew up the building and released the officers. A similar scene played out simultaneously at another police station in the town, said police Capt. Hussein al-Jaburi. It was the fifth police station in the town to be destroyed by Sunni extremists in two weeks, he said, leaving just three standing.
Later, Hashmawi said he would keep his vow. "I have seen death with my own eyes, and I don't want to see it again. I will return to being a farmer. I tell you that the decisions and control of the city are in the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/19/AR2007031901083_pf.html
Cycloptichorn wrote:Ican -
how about the story about Turkish intervention? What do we do if they start taking action - and if we allow them to invade and attack supposed rebels, can we stop Iran from doing the same thing, as they've been threatening?
The Kurdish region has long been seen as a fall-back for the US; I hate seeing this development...
Cycloptichorn
Cycloptichorn wrote:emphasis added
Quote:The Turkish army units have entered the Nothern Iraq, planning a large-scale operation against PKK gorillas, an Iraqi internet website related to head of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Jalal Talabani reported Thursday.
The website reads that the army with large forces occupied Haftanin, Sineht and Pirbila settlements in Northern Iraq, and deployed heavy armored vehicles and commandos.
Turkish Air Forces' base in Diyarbakir made intelligence flights over the bordering territories of Iraq. Turkish Army Staff made no comment while it is reported that security zone has been created to prevent PKK terrorist gang from leaking to the territory of Turkey. The number of military forces and equipment has been reinforced in the mountainous territory near the border.
According to the intelligence, there are more than 3,500 PKK terrorists in the Northern Iraq. /APA/
My natural skepticism prevents me from concluding it true that the Turks are about to attack the Kurds. If true, it could prove very distructive to attaining peace in Iraq.
When some cannot rebut an argument, they vilify the arguer. Some others who do not have the evidence to rebut the argument, try to get some.
Fair enough. Here's the only other article I could find at this time -
Quote:Turkey readying for spring offensive against PKK
The leaves of military personnel have been canceled and additional forces have been deployed to the border with Iraq as the military apparently prepares for an operation against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
The measures come amid frustration with US inactivity against the PKK and the expected infiltration of PKK militants from their mountain bases in northern Iraq with the arrival of spring.
The military put all troops on alert at the Iraqi border after receiving intelligence reports that the PKK would carry out attacks as the snow melts in mountain passes, thus easing passage from Iraq to Turkey.
On March 10 Land Forces Commander Gen. İlker Başbuğ visited Diyarbakır in southeastern Anatolia and said that he went to the area to evaluate the current state of affairs with respect to internal security operations under way in the region as well as developments that were likely to arise in spring and summer. He added that they would also make an assessment as to what measures could be taken in the face of emerging conditions.
One week after Başbuğ's visit, the 2nd and 3rd Armies deployed in the border region were put on alert while Turkish troops were sent to the border and were significantly reinforced. The leaves of military personnel of Turkish troops in Hakkari, Şırnak, Batman and Diyarbakır have been canceled for a period of three months, whicle heavy restrictions have been imposed on the leaves of troops located to the west of these provinces. Flights across the border by aircraft and helicopters of the Land Aviation Command in Diyarbakır have been stepped up. Alpine Commando Brigades in Şırnak and Hakkari were deployed to the border. All of the 7th Corps military equipment in Diyarbakır, particularly that of the 23rd Division Command and 21st Border Division Command, was renewed, and new weapons have been supplied.
The Office of the Chief of General Staff acknowledges extraordinary military activity in this region but adds that they are not evaluating a cross-border operation, a measure that is also opposed by the United States. However, Turkey's decision will be shaped according to the steps the US soon takes.
This activity in the region should not be considered a cross-border operation but as preliminary preparations for a cross-border operation, the intelligence sources say.
The real reason for the deployment of Turkish troops to the border is, they say, to curb the infiltration of the PKK militants from northern Iraq to Turkey. After PKK weapons and ammunition were found in northern Iraq's Makhmour camp, the US realized that the PKK was receiving significant support from the locals, they explain, arguing that the camp might be closed down in the near future. A delegation of the US Department of State will reportedly pay a visit to Turkey in next week to conduct talks before any cross-border operation.
20.03.2007
ERCAN YAVUZ ANKARA
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=105912
Cycloptichorn
Cycloptichorn wrote:Quote:
...
The real reason for the deployment of Turkish troops to the border is, they say, to curb the infiltration of the PKK militants from northern Iraq to Turkey. After PKK weapons and ammunition were found in northern Iraq’s Makhmour camp, the US realized that the PKK was receiving significant support from the locals, they explain, arguing that the camp might be closed down in the near future. A delegation of the US Department of State will reportedly pay a visit to Turkey in next week to conduct talks before any cross-border operation.
20.03.2007
ERCAN YAVUZ ANKARA
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=105912
Cycloptichorn
Let's hope that it truly is "the real reason for the deployment of Turkish troops to the border."
Lessons of War
The fighting in Iraq enters its fifth year.
Washington Post
Sunday, March 18, 2007; Page B06
TOMORROW MARKS the fourth anniversary of the start of the Iraq war, as appropriate a moment as any to take stock. What matters most is finding the best policy now -- doing whatever can be done to help Iraq and safeguard U.S. interests in a vital region. But looking back also is essential, particularly for those of us who supported the war.
We will never know what might have happened had Saddam Hussein and his sons been left in power. Nor do we know how Iraq will evolve; history's judgment in five years or 10 may look very different than today's. But the picture today is dire, and very different from what we would have hoped or predicted four years ago. The cost in lives, injuries and dislocations, to Americans and Iraqis, has been tragic; the opportunity costs for U.S. leadership globally have been immense. So there is an obligation to reassess. What have we learned?
The easy way out is to blame President Bush, Vice President Cheney or former defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld: The decision was right, the execution wrong. There's no question that the execution was disastrous. Having rolled the dice on what everyone understood to be an enormous gamble, Mr. Bush and his team followed up with breathtaking and infuriating arrogance, ignorance and insouciance. Read Post reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran's account of the first year of occupation, "Imperial Life in the Emerald City," and weep at the tales of White House operatives sending political hacks to overhaul Baghdad's stock exchange and tinker with its traffic rules as a deadly insurgency gathered strength.
But the war might have spun out of control even under wiser leadership. Decisions that seem so obviously wrongheaded now, such as disbanding the Iraqi army or deploying too few troops, had smart people arguing both sides at the time. Even a larger force might not have stopped the looting; total forgiveness of Baathist officers might not have forestalled Sunni insurgency or might have spurred the Shiites into rebellion. Wars unleash unpredictable and ugly forces, even short and "successful" wars. The United States is still paying a price for the betrayal of Shiites and Kurds after the Persian Gulf War; U.S. forces remain bogged down in Afghanistan after dislodging the Taliban regime in that brilliant, brief campaign of 2001.
An overarching lesson is that the failure of diplomacy is not a sufficient argument for war. It seems as evident today as it was four years ago that sanctions on Saddam Hussein's regime were eroding and that the U.N. Security Council had no appetite to prolong "containment" in any meaningful form. David Kay's postwar report suggests that Saddam Hussein would have used the resulting loosening of bonds to build a dangerous arsenal. Yet we should have considered that not as an argument for war but only as a predicate for beginning to weigh war's risks and benefits.
Such weighing must include a far more aggressive challenge to prevailing wisdom than we offered. We were not wrong that Iraqis, like all human beings, crave freedom. But people also crave security. Their loyalties to country may jockey with loyalties to tribe and sect. We may have underestimated the impoverishment brought about by misrule and sanctions and the brutalization born of totalitarian cruelty. We underestimated, too, the regime's determination to fight back and its resourcefulness in doing so.
Clearly we were insufficiently skeptical of intelligence reports. It would almost be comforting if Mr. Bush had "lied the nation into war," as is frequently charged. The best postwar journalism instead suggests that the president and his administration exaggerated, cherry-picked and simplified but fundamentally believed -- as did the CIA -- the catastrophically wrong case that then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell presented to the United Nations.
The question that Gen. David H. Petraeus posed (as recounted in Rick Atkinson's history, "In the Company of Soldiers") as he led the troops of his 101st Airborne Division from Kuwait across the Iraq border, "Tell me how this ends?" -- that question must be the first to be asked, not the last. The answer won't always be knowable. But the discussion must never lose sight of the inevitable horrors of war. It must not be left to the generals in the field. And it must assume, based on experience from Germany to Korea to Afghanistan, that a U.S. commitment, once embarked upon, will not soon be over.
We raised such issues in our prewar editorials but with insufficient force. In February 2003, for example, we wrote that "the president [must] finally address, squarely and in public, the question of how Iraq will be secured and governed after a war that removes Saddam Hussein, and what the U.S. commitment to that effort will be. . . . Who will rule Iraq, and how? Who will provide security? How long will U.S. troops remain? . . . Many of these questions appear not to have been answered even inside the administration. . . ." They were still unanswered when the war, which we nevertheless supported, began. That should never happen again.
Even now, though, many of the lessons that others draw from Iraq do not strike us as obvious.
Unquestionably, for example, the experience has shown the risks of preemptive war. Yet it remains true in an era of ruthless, suicidal terrorists and easily smuggled weapons of unimaginable destructive power that not acting also can be dangerous. The risks of war with North Korea or Iran are evident; but the cost of leaving nuclear weapons in the hands of a Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or a Kim Jong Il may not become evident until the price has been paid. And while Iraq illustrates the importance of challenging intelligence estimates, there will also be risks in waiting for certainty that may never be achievable.
Similarly, Iraq has shown the disadvantages of acting without full allied support. Multilateralism and U.N. authorization are force multipliers, morally and literally; unilateralism should be a last resort. But ask the victims of genocide in Darfur whether international law and multinational organizations can always be counted upon. And, yes, the past four years have demonstrated the difficulty of seeding democracy in unaccustomed soil. But no American foreign policy will be supported at home or abroad if it does not include as one ambition the spread of freedom.
Unfortunately, none of this provides bright guidelines to make the next decisions easier -- not even those facing the nation right now in Iraq. It's tempting to say that if it was wrong to go in, it must be wrong to stay in. But how Iraq evolves will fundamentally shape the region and deeply affect U.S. security. Walking away is likely to make a bad situation worse. A patient, sustained U.S. commitment, with gradually diminishing military forces, could still help Iraq to move in the right direction.
one question that should not be impossible to answer for military planners would be :
what will be the dollar cost to the united states for each additional year the troops stay in iraq - for sake of simplicity , let's assume there are no major changes in the committment .
using that as a base , forcasts could be made about the cost of the war for another 3 , 5 or 10 years .
against those costs one might want to compare other costs that would benefit the american taxpayers and citizens .
this would allow citizens to make a choice as to how they want their tax-dollars spent .
just a suggestion .
hbg
hamburger wrote:one question that should not be impossible to answer for military planners would be :
what will be the dollar cost to the united states for each additional year the troops stay in iraq - for sake of simplicity , let's assume there are no major changes in the committment .
using that as a base , forcasts could be made about the cost of the war for another 3 , 5 or 10 years .
against those costs one might want to compare other costs that would benefit the american taxpayers and citizens .
this would allow citizens to make a choice as to how they want their tax-dollars spent .
just a suggestion .
hbg
There are two separate classes of costs that must be considered:
(1) The $cost of
staying in Iraq until the Iraqi people are able to defend themselves without America's help?
(2) The $cost of
leaving Iraq before the Iraqi people are able to defend themselves without America's help?
Boldface numbers are for example only.
The cost of (1):
If cost of remaining per day =
$100 million;
If we stay
10 years, then =
10 x 365 x 100 million = $365 billion.
The cost of (2):
If America's infrastructure destruction cost per day=
$100 million;
If destruction lasts
20 years, then =
20 x 365 x 100 million = $730 billion.
What do you recommend?
ican711nm wrote:hamburger wrote:one question that should not be impossible to answer for military planners would be :
what will be the dollar cost to the united states for each additional year the troops stay in iraq - for sake of simplicity , let's assume there are no major changes in the committment .
using that as a base , forcasts could be made about the cost of the war for another 3 , 5 or 10 years .
against those costs one might want to compare other costs that would benefit the american taxpayers and citizens .
this would allow citizens to make a choice as to how they want their tax-dollars spent .
just a suggestion .
hbg
There are two separate classes of costs that must be considered:
(1) The $cost of
staying in Iraq until the Iraqi people are able to defend themselves without America's help?
(2) The $cost of
leaving Iraq before the Iraqi people are able to defend themselves without America's help?
Boldface numbers are for example only.
The cost of (1):
If cost of remaining per day =
$100 million;
If we stay
10 years, then =
10 x 365 x 100 million = $365 billion.
The cost of (2):
If America's infrastructure destruction cost per day=
$100 million;
If destruction lasts
20 years, then =
20 x 365 x 100 million = $730 billion.
What do you recommend?
Not discounting the fact that your numbers are totally made up,
The cost of the war in Iraq is far more than 100 million a day. Three times that, actually - close to 10 billion a month.
And you have zero evidence that the terrorists are going to actually be able to deal out that much damage to our infrastructure; this is only a guess on your part, based upon....?
Cycloptichorn
Cycloptichorn wrote:ican711nm wrote:hamburger wrote:one question that should not be impossible to answer for military planners would be :
what will be the dollar cost to the united states for each additional year the troops stay in iraq - for sake of simplicity , let's assume there are no major changes in the committment .
using that as a base , forcasts could be made about the cost of the war for another 3 , 5 or 10 years .
against those costs one might want to compare other costs that would benefit the american taxpayers and citizens .
this would allow citizens to make a choice as to how they want their tax-dollars spent .
just a suggestion .
hbg
There are two separate classes of costs that must be considered:
(1) The $cost of
staying in Iraq until the Iraqi people are able to defend themselves without America's help?
(2) The $cost of
leaving Iraq before the Iraqi people are able to defend themselves without America's help?
Boldface numbers are for example only.
The $cost of (1):
If $cost of remaining per day =
$100 million;
If we stay
10 years, then =
10 x 365 x 100 million = $365 billion.
The $cost of (2):
If America's infrastructure destruction $cost per day=
$100 million;
If destruction lasts
20 years, then =
20 x 365 x 100 million = $730 billion.
What do you recommend?
Not discounting the fact that your numbers are totally made up,
The cost of the war in Iraq is far more than 100 million a day. Three times that, actually - close to 10 billion a month.
And you have zero evidence that the terrorists are going to actually be able to deal out that much damage to our infrastructure; this is only a guess on your part, based upon....?
Cycloptichorn
Yes, my numbers are totally made up. That's what I intended for this sentence to imply: Boldface numbers are for example only.
I don't know what the average daily $cost of the war in Iraq will be over the next 10 years. You do not know either. We both possess zero evidence to support any number.
Yes, I have zero evidence that the terrorists
are going to actually be able to deal out that much damage to our infrastructure. In fact, I have zero evidence that the terrorists
are not going to deal out that much damage to our infrastructure. You have zero evidence that the terrorists
will or
will not deal out that much damage to our infrastructure.
However, we know that al-Qaeda in Iraq has been able to deal out significant damage to Iraq's infrastructure. If they are not exterminated first, once relieved of having to defend themselves in Iraq against us, the al-Qaeda in America and the al-Qaeda in Iraq can join up in America, and be just as able to deal out significant damage to America's infrastructure. Since America possesses so much more infrastructure than did Iraq, it should be easy pickens for al-Qaeda in America.
Also, I have zero evidence that, if we do not destroy them first, al-Qaeda
will, as they have promised, try to kill a significant portion of America's population without destroying a significant portion of America's infrastructure. You have zero evidence that, if we do not destroy them first, al-Qaeda
will not as they have promised try to kill a significant portion of America's population without destroying a significant portion of America's infrastructure.
Finally, the purpose of my post to hamburger was to illustrate by example that a proper estimate of future $costs must include both the estimated future $costs of staying
until the Iraqis can defend themselves without our help, and the estimated future $costs of our leaving Iraq
before the Iraqis can defend themselves without our help.
ican wrote :
Quote:I don't know what the average daily $cost of the war in Iraq will be over the next 10 years. You do not know either. We both possess zero evidence to support any number.
we - that is you and i - might not know what the costs of the war are , but i'm darned sure that there are plenty of planners , economists , corporations expecting to profit from the war have made estimates and forecasts .
not knowing what the precise cost will be is hardly ever a reason not to make estimates and forcasts .
our economy would slowly grind to a halt if those forcasts would not be made .
you said that one would also have to try and figure in the cost of not taking action . i can agree with that , but one would also have to try and estimate/forcast what other things could be done with the money NOT spent on the war .
again , i'm not saying that i know what those cost are , but i am also sure that some have already made those calculations .
it doesn't sound very sexy to calculate the cost of a life , but these calculations are done every day . as an example , aircraft companies do extensive calculations to figure out how much it would cost to make airplanes safer and if it is more economical to have a slightly higher risk covered off by insurance .
anyway , i'm sure we can't solve that puzzle . i just find it interesting to look at problems from different points of view on occasion .
hbg
Quote:However, we know that al-Qaeda in Iraq has been able to deal out significant damage to Iraq's infrastructure. If they are not exterminated first, once relieved of having to defend themselves in Iraq against us, the al-Qaeda in America and the al-Qaeda in Iraq can join up in America, and be just as able to deal out significant damage to America's infrastructure. Since America possesses so much more infrastructure than did Iraq, it should be easy pickens for al-Qaeda in America.
No, we dont' know that al-Qaeda has been able to deal significant damage to Iraq's infrastructure. We know that damage has been done. You have no way to quantify what if any of it was the result of al-Qaeda. Most of it has been the result of sectarian violence having nothing to do with al-Qaeda.
Actually, the US wouldn't be easy "pickens". We have a security structure in place unlike Iraq which had their security structure removed by the US and then not replaced. Most of the violence has been a result of lack of security forces and support from the populace as they conduct what is essentially a civil war.
Don't know if this has been posted or not but its good.
http://www.youtube.com:80/watch?v=KM_MkWgbt3k
