THE US, THE UN AND IRAQ, ELEVENTH THREAD

Pakistan's al-Qaeda dilemma
M Ilyas Khan
BBC News, Karachi



The head of US spying operations says Pakistan is the base from where al-Qaeda is rebuilding itself. So what is to be made of the Pakistan government's avowed war on militancy?

There can be no two opinions about the fact that Pakistan's decision to support America's war on terror in September 2001 was taken under duress.

This gave rise to a duality in the Pakistani strategy that has defied clear definition and encouraged al-Qaeda and Taleban elements as much as it has curbed them.

Almost overnight, the country faced the prospect of rolling back the entire operational and logistical apparatus it had put in place in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region over the preceding decades.

The role of the Pakistani intelligence agency, ISI, in organising Afghan resistance against the Soviet troops during 1980s is well established.

The country's diplomatic, material and strategic support to the Taleban regime that took the stage in 1990s is well documented by the US state institutions and intelligence services.


Military supplies

To get this huge apparatus and the mindset attached to move in reverse gear has been a slow process, exposing Islamabad to allegations of complicity with the Taleban as early as 2002.

Media reports from that period quote incidents in which the Pakistani intelligence operatives were accused of protecting al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives or sneaking into Afghanistan with military supplies for the Taleban fighters.

Pakistan was also finding it hard to roll back the Islamist insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir, which was an extension of Pakistani strategy in Afghanistan and served the crucial objective of keeping the disputed valley instable.


Top officials in the American administration, aware of the fact that Pakistan was crucial to their engagement in Afghanistan, started making concessions to Islamabad.

They seemed to believe that as long as Pakistan remained resolute, they could afford to be slow in Afghanistan.

This gave the Pakistani government the crucial breathing space needed to handle the issue more tactfully.

But analysts point out that this also renewed the urge among some sections of the establishment to desist from actions that could harm the country's interests in Afghanistan.


Sanctuary

The American shift to the war in Iraq further eased the pressure.

The year 2004 can be considered as a watershed.

During that year, Pakistan started toning down its activity on the Line of Control in Kashmir. This came to a complete halt following the October 2005 earthquake in Kashmir that killed nearly 80,000 people.

In the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan started the year with hyped up military operations but ended it with peace deals in South Waziristan, leaving the district virtually in the hands of pro-Taleban militants known for harbouring Arab as well as Uzbek and Chechen fugitives.

Western observers believe that a similar deal with the militants in the neighbouring North Waziristan district turned a large swathe of Pakistani territory into an extended sanctuary for al-Qaeda and Taleban militants.


To a lesser extent, Islamabad's writ has also withered in the tribal districts north of Waziristan, notably in the northern-most district of Bajaur.

In Pakistan's Balochistan province, while the military has focused on a Baloch nationalist insurgency, a sense of urgency in securing the ethnic Pashtun belt along the Afghan border has been lacking.

Western, as well as some Pakistani media, have described this belt as the largest sanctuary for al-Qaeda and Taleban elements in Pakistan.

On the Kashmir front, the presence of a strong state, India, forced the militants into a tight spot, reducing their room for manoeuvre.

In Afghanistan, the writ of the state runs thin, and the presence of foreign troops helps the militants reinforce their ranks endlessly.

Nato air strikes, or ground actions, that have caused civilian casualties have also fuelled recruitment to the militants by angry survivors of the attacks.

Unsavoury options

Last year has been particularly difficult, with close to 200 Western troops killed in action. Casualties among the Afghan government forces and civilians ran into thousands.

And many fear that the forthcoming spring offensive by Taleban may be even worse, causing unacceptably large Western casualties.

Analysts believe that this will leave the Western coalition forces with two options, both highly unsavoury.

They either carpet-bomb Pakistan's tribal areas and create a political turmoil in the region, or quit Afghanistan, as some of Pakistan's influential former intelligence operatives have been predicting.

But there is a third option as well.

If Nato and Pakistani officials are to be believed, Thursday's attack that killed a large number of Taleban fighters in the Barmal area of Afghanistan was the result of intelligence sharing and operational cooperation between the two sides.

From Nato's viewpoint, this is a tangible piece of action from Pakistan which has hitherto defined its role in the fight against terrorism in terms of the al-Qaeda operatives arrested or the number of troops deployed in the tribal areas.

If such pro-active cooperation extends over the next year, Taleban and al-Qaeda activities may be curtailed.

But if preparations for the forthcoming election in Pakistan divert the attention of the rulers away from its border region with Afghanistan, the al-Qaeda and Taleban are certain to do more damage next spring than they did last year.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/6257029.stm

Published: 2007/01/12 18:23:55 GMT

Al Qaeda's Pakistan Sanctuary
Musharraf appeases the Taliban.
by Bill Roggio
04/02/2007, Volume 012, Issue 28

excerpt from article linked :

Under the leadership of Faqir Muhammad, whom the Pakistani government refuses to arrest, Bajaur has become an al Qaeda command and control center for launching operations into eastern Afghanistan. Kunar, the adjacent Afghan province, is one of the most violent in the country.

None of this will come as a surprise to anyone tracking the situation in northwestern Pakistan. Since the signing of the Waziristan Accord on September 5, 2006, essentially ceding North Waziristan to the Taliban and al Qaeda, attacks in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have skyrocketed. Afghanistan has seen an increase in attacks of more than 300 percent, and battalion-sized groups of Taliban fighters have been hit while crossing the border from Pakistan. Cross-border raids are up more than 200 percent, and NATO forces have repeatedly engaged in hot pursuit across the Pakistani frontier. U.S. artillery has begun to strike at large Taliban formations in Pakistani territory. Suicide bombings in Afghanistan increased fivefold from 2005 to 2006. This year, there have already been more suicide attacks in Afghanistan than in all of 2006.

The situation has gotten so bad that in February, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, outgoing U.S. commander in Afghanistan, called "a steady, direct attack against the command and control in sanctuary areas in Pakistan" essential to preempt the expected Taliban spring offensive. Senator Carl Levin, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, voiced similar concerns last month, saying, "Long-term prospects for eliminating the Taliban threat appear dim so long as the sanctuary remains in Pakistan, and there are no encouraging signs that Pakistan is eliminating it."

...

Ican,

Was it possible to destroy that AQ training camp without invading Iraq and toppling the dictator?

Cycloptichorn

...

Every article I posted was backed up with links proving the statements. Waxmans letter was not an opinion piece by any means but a factual letter backed up with solid proof. Deny all you want.

...

Cycloptichorn wrote:

...

Ican,

Was it possible to destroy that AQ training camp without invading Iraq and toppling the dictator?

Cycloptichorn

Yes! It was possible to destroy those camps without invading and occupying Iraq, and without replacing its government.

Permanent distruction of those camps was/is not possible without invading and occupying Iraq, and replacing its government with a government capable and desirous of permanently preventing al-Qaeda from setting up future training camps in Iraq.

ican stated that the U.S. had to invade/occupy iraq and afghanistan because they both provided sanctuaries for al-qaeda .

my understanding is that the real base for al-qaeda's operations and recruitment is PAKISTAN ! yet - except for the occasional remarks from the U.S. administration , chiding pakistan "for not doing more" - there has not been any military action against al-qaeda bases in pakistan .

...

ican711nm wrote:

Cycloptichorn wrote:

...

Ican,

Was it possible to destroy that AQ training camp without invading Iraq and toppling the dictator?

Cycloptichorn

Yes! It was possible to destroy those camps without invading and occupying Iraq, and without replacing its government.

Permanent distruction of those camps was/is not possible without invading and occupying Iraq, and replacing its government with a government capable and desirous of permanently preventing al-Qaeda from setting up future training camps in Iraq.

I completely disagree. We could permanently deny AQ a place in Northern Iraq without invading the country.

How do you think we could have done that?

You surely are aware that the entirety of Iraq, is a big training camp for AQ now? Some success.

The entirety of Iraq?

I agree that the strategy and tactics the Bush administration used in Iraq after successfully replacing Saddam's government, were unsuccessful and did lead to a buildup rather than a collapse of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Maybe the Bush administration since June is finally employing strategy and tactics which will prove successful. If not, then we must try better alternate strategy and tactics, because we must succeed in Iraq.

Cycloptichorn

Cyclo: I completely disagree. We could permanently deny AQ a place in Northern Iraq without invading the country.

Ican: How do you think we could have done that?

http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2003/3023wmd_fraud.html
This article appears in the June 13, 2003 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.
The Henry Waxman Letter:
Who Knew What, and When?
by Jeffrey Steinberg

U.S. Representative Henry Waxman (Calif.), the ranking Democrat on the House Government Reform Committee, sent a letter to President George W. Bush, demanding a full explanation from the Administration, as to why senior officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and the President himself "cited forged evidence about Iraq's efforts to obtain nuclear materials."

Congressional Intelligence Report 09/08/2006
REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Conclusion 6. Postwar information indicates that the Intelligence Community accurately assessed that al-Qa'ida affiliate group Ansar al-Islam operated in Kurdish-controlled northeastern Iraq, an area that Baghdad had not controlled since 1991.

Quote:

Cyclo: I completely disagree. We could permanently deny AQ a place in Northern Iraq without invading the country.

Ican: How do you think we could have done that?

We send in our bombers and special forces units to destroy the currently existing camp. Saddam would have had zero ability to stop this, as we controlled the airspace completely.

Then, we use our satellite and intelligence resources to monitor the area; if and when a new camp springs up, we use our bombers and special forces units to destroy the new camps.

Not hard to figure out that when you completely control the airspace, you control the ability of terrorists to set up training camps.

Cycloptichorn

However, the question I continue to ask myself is how effective your method would be if al-Qaeda after the first strike migrated to densely populated areas of Iraq instead of remaining in the relatively low population area of northeastern Iraq? I think Saddam would have had an even greater problem trying to clean up the mess that would cause than Bush has had.

.................. Can't

Can't is the worst word that's written or spoken;
... Doing more harm here than slander and lies;
On it many a strong spirit broken,
... And with it many a good purpose dies.
It springs from the lips of the thoughtless each morning
... And robs us of courage we need through the day:
It rings in our ears like a timely sent warning
... And laughs when we falter and fall by the way.

Can't is the father of feeble endeavor,
... The parent of terror and halfhearted work;
It weakons the efforts of artisans clever,
... And makes of the toiler an indolent shirk.
It poisons the soul of the man with a vision,
... It stifles in infancy many a plan;
It greets honest toiling with open derision
... And mocks at the hopes and the dreams of man.

Can't is a word none should speak without blushing;
... To utter it should be a symbol of shame;
Ambition and courage it daily is crushing;
... It blights a man's purpose and shortens his aim.
Despise it with all of your hatred of error;
... Refuse it the lodgment it seeks in your brain;
Arm against it as a creature of terror,
... And all that you dream of you someday shall gain.

Can't is the word that is foe to ambition,
... An enemy ambushed to shatter your will;
It's prey is forever the man with a mission
... And bows but to courage and patience and skill.
Hate it, with hatred that's deep and undying,
... For once it is welcomed 'twill break any man;
Whatever the goal you are seeking, keep trying
... And answer this demon by saying: "I can."

Quote:

However, the question I continue to ask myself is how effective your method would be if al-Qaeda after the first strike migrated to densely populated areas of Iraq instead of remaining in the relatively low population area of northeastern Iraq? I think Saddam would have had an even greater problem trying to clean up the mess that would cause than Bush has had.

Thing is, the AQ affiliated groups hated Saddam. They didn't get along with him. He had ways of rooting them out of the densely populated areas; that's why they had to locate in areas he didn't control.

So I find it hard to believe that AQ could set up camp in the middle of Fallujah; there just isn't a lot of evidence that they would have been successful in doing such a thing.

...

Cycloptichorn

Cycloptichorn wrote:

Quote:

However, the question I continue to ask myself is how effective your method would be if al-Qaeda after the first strike migrated to densely populated areas of Iraq instead of remaining in the relatively low population area of northeastern Iraq? I think Saddam would have had an even greater problem trying to clean up the mess that would cause than Bush has had.

Thing is, the AQ affiliated groups hated Saddam. They didn't get along with him. He had ways of rooting them out of the densely populated areas; that's why they had to locate in areas he didn't control.

So I find it hard to believe that AQ could set up camp in the middle of Fallujah; there just isn't a lot of evidence that they would have been successful in doing such a thing.

...

Cycloptichorn

How about al-Qaeda setting up camps scattered over Anbar province in Iraq?

The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan assisted them financially and logistically.[9] For the Saudi regime, their activity was a blessing: not only did it portray Saudi Arabia as a leading force in the liberation of Afghanistan without the kingdom having to directly intervene in the conflict, but it also kept the most radical and adventurous young Saudis far from Saudi Arabia. Instead of fighting the U.S. presence on Saudi soil, the kingdom's young radicals fought Soviet penetration of Afghan soil.