For the US arming Iraq ...
North Korea and the End of the Agreed Framework
by Balbina Y. Hwang, Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D., and Baker Spring
Backgrounder #1605
October 18, 2002
North Korea's admission that it has been conducting a major clandestine nuclear weapons development program for the past several years was no surprise to the Bush Administration and others who have long deemed the North Korean regime as untrustworthy. While Pyongyang may have been trying to strengthen its negotiating position to extract concessions from the United States, Washington and its allies must respond with strength and clarity to North Korea's violations of its anti-nuclear agreements.
The Bush Administration must now coordinate with South Korea and Japan to institute a combination of security measures, economic sanctions and inducements, and a strong diplomatic effort to persuade North Korea to meet its international treaty obligations, cease its nuclear weapons development, and take a series of steps to improve security on the peninsula.
North Korea's Violations
Those who have claimed that Kim Jong-il has made an effort to bring North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation have consistently accused the Bush Administration of being unnecessarily "hard-line" toward North Korea. Some in the United States and South Korea have blamed President Bush for the lack of progress in the dialogue between North and South Korea.
Critics of the Administration's policy have often cited the 1994 Geneva Accords, or Agreed Framework, as evidence of North Korea's "good behavior." The Agreed Framework, signed by the Clinton Administration in October 1994, called for North Korea to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for two civilian light-water nuclear reactors (LWR).
Now that North Korea has confirmed that it has violated its United Nations treaties, as well as its agreements with the United States, Japan, and South Korea, it should be clear that President Bush was justified in his insistence on reciprocity and verification in these treaties and that North Korea, not the United States, is responsible for the demise of the Agreed Framework. In addition to violating the Geneva Accords, North Korea's development of nuclear weapons also violates a number of other international agreements, including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement ...
... Without a permanent resolution, Kim Jong-Il will continue to blackmail the world with the threat of crises in order to maintain his control of the regime. The United States must not allow North Korea to repeat the strategy of blackmailing the allies for handouts that it used during the 1994 nuclear standoff ...
Arms Control Today, June 2003: North Korea Chronology
Timeline: North Korea's nuclear weapons development
Tuesday, January 6, 2004 Posted: 3:32 AM EST (0832 GMT)
Chronology of nuclear weapons development in North Korea:
1993: North Korea says it has quit the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty amid suspicions that it is developing nuclear weapons. It later reverses that decision.
1994: North Korea and U.S. sign an agreement. North Korea pledges to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for international aid to build two power-producing nuclear reactors.
Aug. 31, 1998: North Korea fires a multistage over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean, proving it can strike any part of Japan's territory.
May 25-28, 1999: Former Defense Secretary William Perry visits North Korea and delivers a U.S. disarmament proposal.
Sept. 13: North Korea pledges to freeze long-range missile tests.
Sept. 17: U.S. President Bill Clinton eases economic sanctions against North Korea.
December: A U.S.-led consortium signs a US$4.6 billion contract for two safer, Western-developed light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea.
July 2000: North Korea again threatens to restart its nuclear program if Washington doesn't compensate for the loss of electricity caused by delays in building nuclear power plants.
June 2001: North Korea warns it will reconsider its moratorium on missile tests if the Bush administration doesn't resume contacts aimed at normalizing relations.
July: State Department reports North Korea is going ahead with development of its long-range missile. A Bush administration official says North Korea conducts an engine test of the Taepodong-1 missile.
December: President Bush warns Iraq and North Korea that they would be "held accountable" if they developed weapons of mass destruction "that will be used to terrorize nations."
Jan. 29, 2002: Bush labels North Korea, Iran and Iraq an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address. "By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger," he says.
Oct. 4: A visiting U.S. delegation says North Korean officials revealed that the country has a second covert nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 agreement -- a program using enriched uranium. North Korea later denies this.
Oct. 16: U.S. officials say they have discovered evidence of a nuclear weapons program in North Korea.
Oct. 26: Bush, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung meet at an Asian-Pacific regional summit in Mexico and agree to seek a peaceful end to the North's nuclear problem.
Nov. 11: The United States, Japan and South Korea halt oil supplies to North Korea promised under the 1994 deal.
Dec. 12: North Korea reactivates nuclear facilities at Yongbyon that were frozen under the 1994 deal with the United States.
Dec. 13: North Korea asks the U.N. nuclear watchdog to remove monitoring seals and cameras from its nuclear facilities.
Dec. 14: The U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency urges North Korea to retract its decision to reactivate its nuclear facilities and abide by its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Dec. 21: North Korea removes monitoring seals and cameras from its nuclear facilities
Jan. 10, 2003: North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Jan. 28: South Korean envoy Lim Dong-won meets North Korea's number two leader Kim Yong Nam. Lim says North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has received the letter from President Kim Dae-jung that suggests Pyongyang should reverse its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Feb. 3: The U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signs a "prepare to deploy" order that will send 24 bombers to the Pacific region.
Feb 4: Pyongyang describes the U.S. move as an attempt "to crush us to death."
Feb. 5: North Korea's official news agency says the nation has reactivated its nuclear power facilities.
Feb. 12: The 35-member IAEA board of governors declares North Korea in breach of atomic safeguards and refers the case to the U.N. Security Council.
Feb. 18: The (North) Korean People's Army threatens it will abandon the 1953 Korean War armistice if the United States continues its military buildup in the region.
Feb. 24: North Korea test fires a land-to-ship missile into the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.
Feb. 26: The United States says North Korea has reactivated its five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.
March 10: North Korea test fires another surface-to-vessel anti-ship missile into the Sea of Japan, or East Sea as it is known in South Korea.
March 29: Pyongyang says it will resist all international demands to allow nuclear inspections.
April 5: North Korea says it won't recognize any ruling made by the U.N. Security Council.
April 12: In a dramatic shift, North Korea backtracks on its calls for direct 'face-to- face' talks with Washington, saying it will consider any format for dialogue if the United States is prepared to make a "bold switchover."
June 2: Group of Eight world leaders meeting in France accuses North Korea of undermining non-proliferation agreements.
June 9: North Korea lifts its war of words with the United States to a new level, saying it may now need nuclear weapons to combat what it describes as a hostile threat from Washington.
July 12: A senior U.S. official says North Korea has begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods, suggesting the communist country intends to produce nuclear weapons.
July 16: China ups the pressure on North Korea to join mulitlateral talks to end the nuclear standoff during a visit to Pyongyang by a special envoy from Beijing. "In-depth" talks take place.
July 26: A Japanese newspaper report, citing North Korean and Japanese sources, says North Korea is prepared to conduct a nuclear test unless the U.S. responds positively to its proposals to end the nuclear row.
August 1: North Korea announces it will take part in six-nation talks on the crisis. No date or venue for the meet is set.
August 2: Pyongyang warns the United States not to discuss its suspected nuclear weapons program at the U.N. Such a move would be "a grave criminal act" that was "little short of a prelude to war," Pyongyang says.
August 12: Washington announces that six-way talks aimed at ending the crisis will take place in Beijing on August 27. The U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia will take part.
August 18: North Korea repeats a demand that Washington sign a non-aggression pact with North Korea, and says it could not dismantle its nuclear deterrent force if the United States did not abandon its "hostile policy" toward Pyongyang.
North Korean Nukes
WHEN NORTH KOREA STUNNED THE U.S.
in 2002 by admitting it was developing nuclear weapons TIME said, "The conundrum of Kim, who succeeded his father Kim Il Sung eight years ago as North Korea's absolute ruler, has flummoxed Washington for years....Like his father, when Kim has been most desperate for foreign aid, he has used the rattle of nukes to frighten the U.S. and its allies into buying him off."
Some articles from the TIME Archive to help you know why North Korea's nuclear program is so scary:
North Korea's Kim Jong Il, 51, wears high-heeled shoes and a bouffant hairdo in an attempt to look taller. He is a poor speaker and worries whether he can match his father's commanding power. But even those who laugh loudest at his vanities take one of his indulgences quite seriously: Kim, who has taken over day-to-day dictatorial duties from his 81-year-old father, 'Great Leader' Kim Il Sung, appears determined to build a secret arsenal of nuclear weapons.
From Fighting Off Doomsday
By Bruce W. Nelan
Jun. 21, 1993
Hans Blix, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is expected to tell the U.N. this week that North Korea's violation of international nuclear safeguards is 'continuing and widening.' In addition to blocking inspections of two secret sites to which the IAEA demanded access last February, Pyongyang is now refusing to allow even routine monitoring of five declared nuclear sites at Yongbyon.
From War of Nerves At the Nuclear Brink
By Bill Powell
Nov. 8, 1993
President Clinton goes to Seoul and warns the North Koreans that if they ever use the nuclear weapon they are suspected of developing, it will bring a response that destroys their nation. North Korea says if economic sanctions are imposed because it refuses to permit inspection of its nuclear sites, Pyongyang will consider it 'an act of war.' Should the world be getting nervous?
From Frightening Face-Off
By J.F.O. McAllister
Dec. 13, 1993
All the military talk sparked fears that the yearlong diplomatic campaign to haul Pyongyang back inside the safeguards of the nonproliferation treaty had collapsed. Given the touchy unpredictability of the Kim Il Sung regime, Seoul and Washington were worried that even small military signals could escalate toward a catastrophic war.
From Pyongyang's Dangerous Game
By J.F.O. McAllister
Apr. 4, 1994
After North Korea's nuclear technicians blocked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from verifying whether Pyongyang has already secretly diverted enough plutonium for a bomb or two, Clinton for the first time asked the U.N. Security Council to take up the issue of economic sanctions. In the past, North Korea has vowed to consider sanctions an act of war, a pledge that will surely be on the minds of council members as they discuss whether to try to coerce Pyongyang into compliance with the rules of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
From Down the Risky Path
By Bruce W. Nelan
Jun. 13, 1994
As the struggle over North Korea's nuclear capability crept a step closer to confrontation last week, men paid to think about the possibility of a war sketched dramatically different scenarios. In the worst case -- a computerized war game done in 1991 by one Pentagon analyst and never officially accepted -- an unstoppable North Korean force sweeps across the 150-mile-wide Demilitarized Zone, pushes south through disorganized defenders and reaches the southeastern port of Pusan within four weeks, just in time to block the arrival of U.S. reinforcements.
From What If... War Breaks Out In Korea?
By Jill Smolowe
Jun. 13, 1994
Any effort to choke the Kim regime economically would have to crack down on the traffic between Pyongyang and the liner's sponsor, Chongryun, the secretive 250,000-member General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, which is under the direct control of Pyongyang. The group is at the heart of a shadowy fund-raising effort that sends between $600 million and $1 billion annually to North Korea, most of it for the Kim regime itself.
From Kim Il Sung's Money Pipeline
By Edward W. Desmond
Jun. 13, 1994
Though the thoroughly Stalinist North Korea does not actually have a Kremlin, outside experts find themselves employing the oblique methods once used to evaluate Soviet politics to plumb the oddities in Pyongyang. Who is standing next to whom? What are the editorials hinting? Is Kim the successful successor or under challenge? These are not mere academic concerns when the U.S. needs to get on with talks about curbing North Korea's atom-bomb program.
From Lies and Whispers
By Bruce W. Nelan
Sep. 5, 1994
There was no doubt that North Korea was in danger of imploding economically. In Pyongyang, where food is most available, rations for bureaucrats have been reduced to between 3 and 6 oz. of rice per day. Many factories have closed; the rest are operating at 25% of capacity. Pyongyang is without electricity for hours each day. Many farmers are too weak from hunger to harvest crops or plant seeds.
From Ready to Implode?
By Douglas Waller
May. 05, 1997
Early last week, a powerful new missile lifted off from a secret base on North Korea's eastern coast.... Multiple-stage vehicles require expertise in guidance systems and other tricky technology. Thus last week's launch means the North is a step closer to building intercontinental ballistic missiles that could reach the mainland U.S
From Missile With A MessageThe Strange World of N. Korea's 'Great Leader'
By Massimo Calabresi
Oct. 28, 2000
For a moment last week it looked as if George W. Bush was about to declare war on three enemies at once. During his State of the Union speech, when the President asserted that Iran, Iraq and North Korea 'constitute an axis of evil,' he fired a shot that had been months in the making.
From The Axis Of Evil Is It For Real?
By Massimo Calabresi
Feb. 11, 2002
When the Bush Administration presented evidence to North Korean leaders on Oct. 3 that their country was developing nuclear weapons, it expected the regime to lie about it. A day later came the shocker. Yes, we've been secretly working to produce nukes, a top aide to 'Dear Leader' Kim Jong Il told astonished U.S. envoy James Kelly. And, he added, we've got 'more powerful' weapons--presumably meaning biological and chemical agents--to boot. He was not apologetic at all, says a U.S. official, but 'assertive, aggressive about it.'
From Look Who's Got The Bomb
By Johanna McGeary
Oct. 28, 2002
It took 12 days for U.S. officials to go public with North Korea's admission, which suggests they wrestled with the potential complications. Inside the Bush wheelhouse, the hard-liners will debate among themselves: Should we isolate North Korea--or just bomb its reprocessing facilities? Cooler heads are likely to prevail, and Bush will team up with China and Japan to force Pyongyang into another give-up-the-nukes-for-aid agreement--but only after enough time passes so that no one can accuse the men who model themselves on Churchill of looking like Chamberlain.
From When Evil Is EverywhereNorthern ExposureWhy the U.S. Changed its North Korea Stance
By Tony Karon
Jan. 07, 2003
What they really wanted, it seemed to me, was a face-saving way out of the uranium-enrichment program, which, according to U.S. intelligence, is years away from producing the raw material for even a single nuclear weapon. In the meantime, because the program violates Pyongyang's previous nonnuclear commitments, it is damaging the regime's relationships with its neighbors--relationships North Korea had been industriously seeking to improve to obtain the aid and trade that may be essential to its survival.
From Better Start Talking--and Fast!
By Don Oberdorfer
Jan. 13, 2003
North Korea, which the CIA believes already has enough fissile material for one or two bombs, is poised to extract enough plutonium from the spent fuel to produce four to eight more within a matter of months. It is unknown whether North Korea has ever actually constructed a nuclear weapon. But given the relative simplicity of making a crude device, some U.S. analysts suspect that it has a bomb, albeit an untested one.
From How Dangerous is North Korea?
By Romesh Ratnesar and Laura Bradford
Jan. 13, 2003
Photos and Graphics
In 1994 the U.S. almost went to war with the North to stop it from building such a nuclear arsenal, but with the U.S. military stretched thin around the globe, war is an even less attractive option now than it was then. But the alternative is awful: not just that North Korea might one day threaten the U.S. directly but also that the cash-strapped regime in Pyongyang could decide to sell its nuclear material to other rogue states or to terrorists. Last week Chinese diplomats shuttled between Pyongyang and Washington trying to restart talks among the U.S., China and North Korea, but internal divisions between hard-liners and moderates in all three capitals are stalling progress.
From The Next WMD Crisis
By Massimo Calabresi
Jul. 28, 2003
So what is it? Conciliation? Hard line? Such divisions have plagued President George W. Bush's approach to nuclear-security issues with both Iran and North Korea, the remaining points on the 'axis of evil.' The neocons argue that the only way to curb the suspected atomic ambitions of these regimes is to depose the rulers. The moderates believe that engaging adversaries in dialogue can diminish the threat more easily and cheaply. So the Bush team has alternately ignored, threatened, cajoled and coerced the two countries, driven not by a coherent strategy but by a disorderly struggle at the highest levels to find common tactical ground between two irreconcilable approaches, engagement and confrontation.
From What Will Make Them Stop?
By Johanna McGeary, Scott Macleod and Massimo Calabresi
Nov. 3, 2003
Khan expanded. He made contact with the North Korean government as early as 1993, according to Pakistani investigators. In the late 1990s he began shipping centrifuges and the means to make them--'the whole package,' as a U.S. intelligence official put it--in bulk to Pyongyang, sometimes aboard Pakistani military cargo planes.
From The Man Who Sold the BombKim Raises the Stakes
By Bill Powell
Feb. 14, 2005
Hard-liners in George W. Bush's administration, never known for their diplomatic bedside manner, have called it the 'strangulation strategy': forcing the North Korean despot Kim Jong Il to shelve his nuclear weapons program by cutting off his isolated country from trade and aid.
From Walking the Tightrope
By Bill Powell
Feb. 20, 2005
The U.S. still hopes to confront the North Koreans in a multilateral setting, and the linchpin of that strategy is China. Bush has long believed that Beijing has the most to gain and lose on the Korean peninsula and would quietly pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Beijing has been North Korea's closest ally, funneling oil and food. China would have to absorb many refugees if Kim's regime failed.
From What Does North Korea Want?
By Michael Duffy
Feb. 21, 2005
By most measures, North Korea remains one of the most isolated and desperate outposts on the planet. Most North Koreans earn barely enough to feed their families, and the country is plagued by chronic shortages of everything from food to fuel to electricity. But in recent years modest reforms aimed at liberalizing the economy have helped pry open the country just enough for its people to glimpse the possibilities of a better life.
From Cracks in Kim's World
By Donald Macintyre
Feb. 21, 2005
The U.S. believes North Korea could have as many as eight nukes. And although testing one would mark Pyongyang's unequivocal entry into the world's exclusive club of proven nuclear powers, North Korea watchers say the potential fallout with its ally China could stay Pyongyang's hand. But President Bush isn't taking any chances. He urged China's President Hu Jintao last week to rein in his irksome neighbor. And in case Kim Jong Il doesn't get the message, the U.S. is rotating Stealth bombers and fighter jets through Guam, where they are within striking distance of North Korea.
From Parsing North Korea's Nuclear Game
By Donald Macintyre
May. 16, 2005
If implemented, the blueprint released Monday will yield an agreement nearly identical to the 'Agreed Framework' negotiated by the Clinton Administration in 1994, which President Bush all but rejected in 2001. In that agreement, the U.S. also promised aid, a light-water reactor and the possibility of normal relations in exchange for a guarantee from North Korea that it would mothball its nuclear weapons program.
From
By Matthew Forney
Sep. 20, 2005
You'll hafta try harder than that.
The Defender helicopters to which your source refers were extremely unsophisticated, very light, 2-person machines and of little to no combat military value; they were capable of observation and medical evacuation (by means of outboard-slung litter baskets - with which they were shipped) and had a very limited payload (around 250 - 600 pound plus crew - depending on mission, 1 or 2 - and fuel - again, weight of which would depend on mission). The machines in question were in no sense of the word militarized. Now of course, where there's a will there's a way, and if such be your will and within your means, you can militarize a bicycle, but the Hughes helicopters sold to Iraq were not weapons platforms, were not part of any weapons system, nor were they configured to accommodate munitions delivery. Other variants of that machine, up-engined and with beefier rotor, electrical, hydraulic, and landing skid systems and assemblies, were configurable as functionally combat-capable weapons platforms, but not the ones sold to Iraq.
Defender 500
This foreign military sales helicopter is offered with either a four- or five-blade main rotor, depending on the model, with a weapons platform mounted on the lower rear body. This light utility commercial helicopter could seat five passengers in comfort, and is used mainly by the military, being very flexible and offering good all round capabilities. Other missions include: direct air support, antitank, reconnaissance, observation, and light utility.
Armament 2 - M134 7.62-mm 6x barrel, Gatling type twin MG pods
2 - M260 2.75-in Hydra 70 rocket pods (7 or 12 each)
2 - .50 cal MG pods
2 - M75 40-mm grenade launchers
2 - MK19 40-mm grenade launcher
2 - TOW missile pods (2 each)
2 - Hellfire ATGM
2 - Stinger AAM
Most Probable Armament
MD-500MD/Scout Defender: Fitted with guns, rockets, grenade launchers, or a combination on 2x fuselage hardpoints.
MD-500MD/TOW Defender: Twin TOW missile pods on 2x fuselage hardpoints; mounts missile sight in lower-left front windshield.
Scientists Probe North Korea Nuke Test
North Korea sets off an earthshaking explosion _ and claims it was nuclear. Was it? For scientists, that was not a quick and easy question to answer.
Like earthquakes, large explosions send out shockwaves that can be detected on seismographs. Big nuclear bombs make big waves, with clear signatures that make them fairly easy to detect, analyze and confirm that they were caused by splitting atoms. But smaller blasts _ as North Korea's appears to have been _ are trickier to break down.
The natural sound of the Earth, with its constant seismic activity of tectonic plates grinding together, complicates the task of trying to determine whether a smaller blast was caused by conventional explosives or a nuclear device, said Xavier Clement of France's Atomic Energy Commission.
He likened the problem to trying to "detect the violins or a flute in a symphony orchestra when you are playing the cymbals."
His agency estimated the North Korean blast at around 1 kiloton or less _ equivalent to the explosive force of 1,000 tons of TNT. For a nuclear device, that would be so weak that the French defense minister suggested that "there could have been a failure" with the North Korean reported test.
Clement said it could take days before scientists can declare with certainty whether the explosion was nuclear. And when blasts are very weak, "we could be in a situation where we cannot tell the difference between the two," he said.
The United States, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea are among the countries with equipment strong enough and close enough to monitor a North Korean test, said Russian nuclear physicist Vladimir Orlov of the Moscow-based PIR Center, a nonproliferation think-tank.
"It takes days, dozens of lab hours, to evaluate results. Now we can have only a rough estimate," he said.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, or CTBTO, has about 200 stations worldwide designed for monitoring nuclear tests as part of what it hopes will become the world's most reliable source for such tests. But until the treaty comes into force, the data are not made public, only released to governments and vetted partners.
Seismic data comes in almost immediately, and is usually passed to governments within an hour or so. Their scientists must decide what the numbers and graphs mean.
With the North Korean blast, there were wide variations. While the French atomic agency estimated around 1 kiloton and South Korea's geological institute half of that, Russia's defense minister expressed "no doubt" that North Korea detonated a nuclear test and said the force of the underground blast was equivalent to 5,000 to 15,000 tons of TNT.
"People have different way of cross cutting the data and interpreting them," said Lassina Zerbo, director of the International Data Center at the CTBTO, which is based in Vienna, Austria.
The test ban treaty, which bans all nuclear explosions, will not enter into force until it has been ratified by 44 states who possess either nuclear power or research reactors. So far 34 have ratified it. Holdouts include the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.
The CTBTO's stations are more extensive than those used by most countries. They monitor seismic events but also underwater data, radioactive particles in the air and radiowaves.
"Within 72 hours we will have full data. Then all this will be available to member states," said Zerbo.
While the North Korean explosion was small, potentially complicating monitoring efforts, sensors in South Korea were likely close enough to categorize it as nuclear, if that is what is was, said Friedrich Steinhaeusler, professor of physics at Salzburg University.
A nuclear blast also gives off a clear signature _ a clear graph of peaks and curves _ that differentiates it from other kinds of shocks, he added.
"We'll have the confirmation soon," he said.
Special Report: New North Korean Preparations Likely Just for Show
October 09, 2006 16 15 GMT
Summary
No sooner had the dust cleared from North Korea's first nuclear test Oct. 9 than speculation emerged about a second test. Although the North Koreans probably are capable of carrying out another test, Pyongyang can get almost as much political mileage by merely faking preparations for a second test.
Analysis
Within hours of North Korea's nuclear test Oct. 9, the head of Seoul's National Intelligence Service, Kim Seung Gyu, told South Korea's parliament that Pyongyang might be preparing a follow-on nuclear test at its Ponggye site in the country's northeast. Kim said increased activity, vehicles and personnel have been observed at the site, which was originally believed to be where the first North Korean nuclear test would take place.
The North's Oct. 9 test, now believed to have taken place in the Hwadae area, was about magnitude 4.2, which would be consistent with more than 1,000 tons of high explosives, or one kiloton. Other estimates have put the blast at around 550 tons of high explosives. In either case, the blast was very small compared to past and current nuclear weapons.
A second nuclear test certainly is within North Korea's capabilities. It is widely believed that Pyongyang possesses six to eight nuclear devices and material enough to produce a few more.
The relatively small explosive yield of the test suggests that the North Korean device failed to function properly, though it could also mean that the North Koreans wanted to test their design on a smaller scale before conducting a full-scale test. If that is the case, Pyongyang, now confident in the effectiveness of its device, could be preparing a full-effect test.
The preparations at Ponggye cited by Kim, however, could be just for show. North Korea might be seeking to capitalize politically on the first test by making the world think a second test is imminent. This would be useful for keeping those countries that are most concerned with its nuclear capabilities -- the United States, Japan, South Korea and China -- off balance. With elections set for 2007 in South Korea and U.S. midterm elections only weeks away, the political magnitude of the North's test might exceed what was actually measured on the Richter scale.
This behavior is consistent with Pyongyang's strategy in dealing with the United States, Japan, South Korea and China, part of which is delaying a solution to the nuclear crisis for as long as possible. Keeping these countries off balance and jittery over the possibility of another test prevents them from acting decisively. The indecision keeps them from being unified in their response, and the resulting lack of unity gives North Korea time and leverage.
North Korea's intent with its first nuclear test was to shock the world and demonstrate that it has the will and capability to carry out its threats. That was accomplished. From Pyongyang's perspective, there is little need for a second test. Just about the only reason the North Koreans would have for conducting a second test is that they have constructed two types of nuclear devices -- plutonium and uranium -- and want to test them both. Given their meager resources, the North Koreans are not likely to waste material to carry out two explosions of the same type.
In this sense, the preparations at Ponggye are similar to the activity at North Korea's missile test sites in the days and weeks following the July 4 test launch of the Taepodong-2 missile. After the test launch, a second Taepodong-2 was set up in plain view of U.S. reconnaissance satellites. The speculation about follow-on launches that followed caused the same kind of political tension that Pyongyang is hoping to foster now. About a month later, the North Koreans took the missile down.
Geopolitical Diary: A Failed Nuclear Test?
October 10, 2006 02 45 GMT
North Korea detonated something on Monday and it seems to have been atomic. The reason we begin this way is that the precise yield of the device is still uncertain, but current estimates are in the range of half a kiloton (save for the Russians, who have said it was over a kiloton and was certainly a nuclear weapon). That is about one-fortieth of the Nagasaki blast -- which was primitive -- and is substantially smaller than first tests by other nuclear powers. Unless the yield-estimate consensus is revised upward dramatically in the next day or so, this is all a bit odd.
There are three possible explanations for the apparently small yield: the North Koreans deliberately detonated a very small device, they tested a larger device but it failed to execute properly, or the explosion was not caused by an atomic device.
The first explanation could be true. Possibly the North Koreans wanted to show that they had the technology but did not want to appear too threatening, so they minimized the size. Or they could be demonstrating the ability to use lower-yield nuclear mines or artillery shells that would protect North Korea by blocking strategic passes into the country, and would possibly threaten Seoul but would not pose a significant threat elsewhere. Also, the water table is high in the area of the blast; maybe they were being careful not to break into the aquifer.
These are all good reasons, but the counterargument is that if you are going to go nuclear, go nuclear. North Korea does not have a pressing need -- or history -- of being subtle, so a small blast doesn't fit in with its plan. This brings us to the second explanation, that the fissioning process failed at some point, causing a partial detonation. We are not nuclear physicists, so we can't really say whether this is plausible; but some physicists have said that it is theoretically possible.
What if the North Koreans didn't go nuclear, but detonated a large chemical explosive in an underground chamber? It would take a lot of explosive to yield that result, but it is not impossible. A chemical explosion would have a different seismic signature than a nuclear one, and therefore geologists should have already discounted this theory; but the analysis is going to take up to two days, according to the White House. It is certainly not beyond the North Koreans to fake a nuclear explosion, and there have been some big explosions in North Korea that have been mistaken, for a short period of time, for something nuclear. But there is no evidence, beyond our speculation, for this theory.
We really don't think the North Koreans exploded a baby weapon deliberately. Following the failures in their missile launches, they needed to demonstrate a robust capability. We have to believe that they wanted an unambiguous explosion. We would suspect that, had it been a chemical blast, that fact would be already known and widely disseminated. That leaves us with the idea of a partially successful detonation. If we had to pick now, that's what we'd go for.
The reason this matters is credibility. What the North Koreans were buying with this blast was international credibility as a significant nuclear power not to be trifled with. They did not need a repeat of the missile fiasco, when just about everything went wrong with multiple launches. The failure to detonate according to plan cuts into their credibility. So knowing what the plan was really does matter. It tells us something about how close they are to actually having a deliverable weapon. If this test was in some sense a failure, it creates more time until a weapon is ready, potentially creates a crisis of confidence in North Korea and opens the door for other powers to pressure Pyongyang. If it was according to plan, the time required to produce a weapon decreases, meaning the North Koreans will be as cocky as only they can be and they will be doing the pressuring.
So it matters. We are waiting for a definitive answer.
US: North Korea Blast Not Nuclear Explosion
October 10, 2006 1715 GMT
Preliminary indications analyzed by U.S. intelligence show that North Korea did not create a nuclear explosion, the Washington Times reported Oct. 10. Intelligence officials said the seismic signature of the explosion indicates that the high explosives needed to start a reaction in plutonium were detonated but the full chain reaction was not created.
U.S. doubts Korean test was nuclear
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
October 10, 2006
U.S. intelligence agencies say, based on preliminary indications, that North Korea did not produce its first nuclear blast yesterday.
U.S. officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that seismic readings show that the conventional high explosives used to create a chain reaction in a plutonium-based device went off, but that the blast's readings were shy of a typical nuclear detonation.
"We're still evaluating the data, and as more data comes in, we hope to develop a clearer picture," said one official familiar with intelligence reports. "There was a seismic event that registered about 4 on the Richter scale, but it still isn't clear if it was a nuclear test. You can get that kind of seismic reading from high explosives."
The underground explosion, which Pyongyang dubbed a historic nuclear test, is thought to have been the equivalent of several hundred tons of TNT, far short of the several thousand tons of TNT, or kilotons, that are signs of a nuclear blast, the official said. The official said that so far, "it appears there was more fizz than pop." A successful nuclear detonation requires a properly timed and triggered conventional blast that splits atoms, setting off the nuclear chain reaction that produces the massive explosions associated with atomic bombs.
White House spokesman Tony Snow said assessing the validity of North Korea's claim of a successful nuclear test could take several days. "We need to find out precisely what it is that took place yesterday, and that is something that's going to take awhile for the scientists and others to work through," Mr. Snow said. Nobody could give me with any precision how long it will take until they can say with certainty what happened."
Nuclear bombs make big waves, with clear signatures that make them fairly easy to detect, analyze and confirm that they were caused by splitting atoms. But smaller blasts -- as North Korea's appears to have been -- are trickier to break down, scientists told the Associated Press. "It takes days, dozens of lab hours, to evaluate results. Now we can have only a rough estimate," said Russian nuclear physicist Vladimir Orlov of the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in Russia, a nonproliferation think tank.
Elements of the blast were detected by U.S. and allied sensors as it was set off in an underground tunnel in the north-central part of North Korea. U.S. intelligence agencies have been monitoring several tunnels thought to be nuclear test facilities and have not ruled out Pyongyang's conducting another test.
U.S. officials said the test was timed to coincide with several anniversaries in North Korea, including the end of mourning for the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's father, Kim Il-sung. The test was thought to have been linked to the commemoration. North Korea's military thinks that joining the world's seven other acknowledged nuclear powers is key to preserving the power of the communist regime.
There were wide variations in seismic data of the North Korean blast. The French atomic agency estimated about 1 kiloton, and South Korea's geological institute said half of that. But Russia's defense minister expressed "no doubt" that North Korea detonated a nuclear test and said the force of the underground blast was equivalent to 5,000 to 15,000 tons of TNT.
"People have different ways of cross-cutting the data and interpreting them," said Lassina Zerbo, director of the International Data Center at the nuclear-test-ban preparatory commission, which is based in Vienna, Austria.
The Bush administration is pushing for the United Nations to adopt economic sanctions against North Korea that would include a blockade of all goods moving into and out of the country. Key to the imposition of the tough sanctions will be support from China and Russia, two states that in the past opposed sanctions.
The most immediate impact of the underground test is that U.S. officials fear Japan will take steps to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent.
Official North Korean press for the past several years has been asserting that the United States is planning a pre-emptive nuclear attack on North Korea over its secret uranium-enrichment program.
Intelligence reports from several years ago indicated that North Korea was engaged in a covert program to develop a uranium-based nuclear program with the help of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. The Khan network supplied centrifuges and nuclear-weapons design techniques to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
What U.S. officials have been unable to confirm is whether North Korea received small warhead design information from the Khan network. Chinese-language documents on how to build a nuclear warhead for missiles were found in Libya and were supplied by Khan network associates. U.S. intelligence officials think Iran and North Korea received similar warhead design documents.
North Korea in July conducted flight tests of seven missiles including a long-range Taepodong-2.
U.S. officials think the plutonium for the pit of the North Korean device was produced by the reactor at Yongbyon, the regime's declared nuclear facility.
U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that North Korea has some 88 pounds of plutonium and that about 13 pounds were used in the recent test. The remaining plutonium is enough for North Korea to make about six bombs.
For a nuclear device, that would be so weak that the French defense minister suggested that "there could have been a failure" with the North Korean reported test.
Although I have to say, if Bush had called my country part of the "axis of evil" I would probably want some kind of WMDs with which to protect it.
Kiwimac
China reported it was a Neutron style device which would mean a relatively small explosion but 'dirty' which could be disastrous for the Korean Aquifers and river systems.
Although I have to say, if Bush had called my country part of the "axis of evil" I would probably want some kind of WMDs with which to protect it.
Kiwimac
