NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS NUCLEAR TEST

8/26/2003: El Baradei: US Must Disarm BERLIN (Reuters) - The head of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog called on the United States Tuesday to set an example to the rest of the world by cutting its nuclear arsenal and halting research programs.

"The U.S. government demands that other nations not possess nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, it is arming itself," Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told Germany's Stern weekly.

Criticizing President Bush's plan for a national missile defense shield, he said: "Then a small number of privileged countries will be under a nuclear protective shield, with the rest of the world outside."

"In truth there are no good or bad nuclear weapons. If we do not stop applying double standards we will end up with more nuclear weapons. We are at a turning point," ElBaradei told Stern in the interview released ahead of publication.

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parados wrote:

I'm not sure what the point is but it does show something.

Albright got North Korea to agree to not test or pursue its nuclear ambitions. That didn't change until Albright was no longer in a position of authority. Albright never sold N Korea any military weapons.

DPRK never upheld its end of that bargain, and persisted in using the tbreat of its nuke program as a bargaining chip.

Quote:

Timeline: North Korea's nuclear weapons program
The Associated Press

Published: October 8, 2006

A timeline on nuclear weapons development in North Korea:

- 1993: North Korea shocks world by saying it will quit Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, later suspends its withdrawal.

- 1994: North Korea, United States sign agreement in Geneva, North pledges to freeze, eventually dismantle, nuclear weapons program in exchange for help building two power-producing nuclear reactors.

- Sept. 17, 1999: U.S. President Bill Clinton agrees to first major easing of economic sanctions against North Korea since Korean War's end in 1953.

- July 2000: North Korea threatens to restart nuclear program if Washington does not compensate for loss of electricity due to delays in building nuclear power plants.

- June 2001: North Korea warns it will reconsider missile test moratorium if Washington doesn't resume contacts aimed at normalizing relations.

- July 2001: U.S. State Department reports North Korea developing long-range missile.

- December 2001: President Bush warns Iraq and North Korea will be "held accountable" if they develop weapons of mass destruction.

- Jan. 29, 2002: Bush labels North Korea, Iran and Iraq an "axis of evil."

- Oct. 4, 2002: North Korea tells visiting U.S. delegation it has a second covert nuclear weapons program, Washington says.

- Nov. 11, 2002: U.S. and key Asian allies - Japan, South Korea - halt oil supplies to North promised in 1994 deal.

- Jan. 10, 2003: North Korea says it will withdraw from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

- April 16, 2003: U.S., Chinese and North Korean officials announce talks in Beijing aimed at ending nuclear standoff.

- April 24, 2003: North Korea says it has nuclear weapons and may test, export or use them depending on U.S. actions, Washington says.

- Aug. 27-29, 2003: North Korea joins first round of six-nation nuclear talks in Beijing, which include China, U.S. Japan, Russia and South Korea.

- Feb. 25-28, 2004: Second round of six-nation talks.

- June 23-26, 2004: Third round of six-nation talks.

- September 2004: North Korea refuses to attend fourth round talks, accusing U.S. of "hostile" policies.

- Feb. 10, 2005: North Korea announces it has nuclear weapons.

- July 26, 2005: Fourth round of six-nation talks begins, ends in recess after 13 days with no agreement.

- Sept. 13, 2005: Talks resume.

- Sept. 15, 2005: U.S. blacklists a Macau-based bank for alleged involvement in North Korea's illicit activity such as money laundering and counterfeiting, leads the bank to freeze North Korean assets.

- Sept. 19, 2005: North Korea pledges to dismantle nuclear programs in exchange for pledges of energy assistance; U.S. pledges not to invade and to respect North's sovereignty in an agreement ending talks.

- Nov. 9-11, 2005: Fifth round of six-nation talks.

- Jan. 3, 2006: North Korea says it won't return to talks unless the U.S. lifts financial restrictions imposed for its alleged currency counterfeiting and other illegal activities.

- March 7: North Korean, U.S. officials meet in New York for talks over U.S. financial restrictions.

- July 5: North Korea launches seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, including a long-range Taepodong-2, drawing international condemnation an a later U.N. Security Council resolution condemning it.

- Sept. 26: North Korea rejects further talks on its nuclear program, claims Washington wants to rule the world.

- Oct. 3: North Korea says it will conduct a nuclear test in the face of what it claimed was "the U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war."

- Oct. 9: North Koreas says it has conducted its first-ever nuclear test.

A timeline on nuclear weapons development in North Korea:

- 1993: North Korea shocks world by saying it will quit Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, later suspends its withdrawal.

- 1994: North Korea, United States sign agreement in Geneva, North pledges to freeze, eventually dismantle, nuclear weapons program in exchange for help building two power-producing nuclear reactors.

- Sept. 17, 1999: U.S. President Bill Clinton agrees to first major easing of economic sanctions against North Korea since Korean War's end in 1953.

- July 2000: North Korea threatens to restart nuclear program if Washington does not compensate for loss of electricity due to delays in building nuclear power plants.

- June 2001: North Korea warns it will reconsider missile test moratorium if Washington doesn't resume contacts aimed at normalizing relations.

- July 2001: U.S. State Department reports North Korea developing long-range missile.

- December 2001: President Bush warns Iraq and North Korea will be "held accountable" if they develop weapons of mass destruction.

- Jan. 29, 2002: Bush labels North Korea, Iran and Iraq an "axis of evil."

- Oct. 4, 2002: North Korea tells visiting U.S. delegation it has a second covert nuclear weapons program, Washington says.

- Nov. 11, 2002: U.S. and key Asian allies - Japan, South Korea - halt oil supplies to North promised in 1994 deal.

- Jan. 10, 2003: North Korea says it will withdraw from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

- April 16, 2003: U.S., Chinese and North Korean officials announce talks in Beijing aimed at ending nuclear standoff.

- April 24, 2003: North Korea says it has nuclear weapons and may test, export or use them depending on U.S. actions, Washington says.

- Aug. 27-29, 2003: North Korea joins first round of six-nation nuclear talks in Beijing, which include China, U.S. Japan, Russia and South Korea.

- Feb. 25-28, 2004: Second round of six-nation talks.

- June 23-26, 2004: Third round of six-nation talks.

- September 2004: North Korea refuses to attend fourth round talks, accusing U.S. of "hostile" policies.

- Feb. 10, 2005: North Korea announces it has nuclear weapons.

- July 26, 2005: Fourth round of six-nation talks begins, ends in recess after 13 days with no agreement.

- Sept. 13, 2005: Talks resume.

- Sept. 15, 2005: U.S. blacklists a Macau-based bank for alleged involvement in North Korea's illicit activity such as money laundering and counterfeiting, leads the bank to freeze North Korean assets.

- Sept. 19, 2005: North Korea pledges to dismantle nuclear programs in exchange for pledges of energy assistance; U.S. pledges not to invade and to respect North's sovereignty in an agreement ending talks.

- Nov. 9-11, 2005: Fifth round of six-nation talks.

- Jan. 3, 2006: North Korea says it won't return to talks unless the U.S. lifts financial restrictions imposed for its alleged currency counterfeiting and other illegal activities.

- March 7: North Korean, U.S. officials meet in New York for talks over U.S. financial restrictions.

- July 5: North Korea launches seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, including a long-range Taepodong-2, drawing international condemnation an a later U.N. Security Council resolution condemning it.

- Sept. 26: North Korea rejects further talks on its nuclear program, claims Washington wants to rule the world.

- Oct. 3: North Korea says it will conduct a nuclear test in the face of what it claimed was "the U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war."

- Oct. 9: North Koreas says it has conducted its first-ever nuclear test

Clinton, to the objection of concerned scientists, realeased sensitive nuclear secrets:

Quote:

Declassification Let A Few Secrets Slip Error Involved 1950s, '60s Bomb Data (Note: Preview only, purchase required for full article)

Washington Post
Thursday, January 27, 2000; Page A25
By Vernon Loeb
Washington Post Staff Writer

Government agencies inadvertently declassified 14,890 pages of sensitive nuclear weapons information from the 1950s and 1960s that in at least one case were accessed by an outside researcher, according to a recent Department of Energy report to Congress.

In a cover letter, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said he recognized the "gravity" of releasing classified information about even the nation's earliest nuclear weapons, which the report said could "provide useful design parameters to emerging proliferant nations and to terrorist groups."

The report, an unclassified summary of a longer classified document, said the 14,890 pages of DOE documents inadvertently declassified by other agencies contained "nuclear weapon design information from the test results of a specified nuclear test program" and "records covering nuclear weapons utilization information such as yields of specified weapons and deployment and storage locations." All have now been withdrawn from public access ...

... Congress ordered the report in 1998 after Sen. Jon Kyl (Ariz.) and other Senate Republicans took steps to modify President Clinton's 1995 executive order mandating automatic declassification of historic documents after 25 years, fearing that just such nuclear secrets would be revealed in the process ...

... The official said further discoveries of inadvertently declassified nuclear weapons data are highly likely because DOE's review to date has only encompassed 948,000 pages considered the most likely to contain nuclear secrets. More than 600 million pages of historic records have been declassified so far under Clinton's executive order. Government agencies are declassifying more than 100 million pages a year.

Quote:

Rumsfeld thought Saddam was a great guy and sold him weapons. Rumsfeld then oversaw the invasion to oust Saddam for the way he used those weapons.

What weapons did the US sell to Saddam when?

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parados wrote:

Albright got North Korea to agree to not test or pursue its nuclear ambitions. That didn't change until Albright was no longer in a position of authority.

Not exactly. Albright got the North Koreans to pretend to not be pursuing nuclear weapons, but they still pursued them in secret.

The only way either Clinton or Bush could have gotten North Korea to not pursue nuclear weapons is by conquering them.

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Steve 41oo wrote:

I heard someone saying the Korean bomb is far from being weaponised. Although of course they have missiles. And they need oil, perhaps they might do a little deal with Iran. All in all another triumph of GW Bush foreign policy.

They should have the complete design of a 25 kiloton Chinese atomic missile warhead courtesy of the A Q Khan network.

On the other hand, their multi-stage missiles are a bad joke (or maybe they're a good joke, as they're pretty funny).

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I was, and continue to be concerned over radioactive contamination of the aquifer on the Korean Peninsula. If there was leakage into the underground water supply it wouldn't show up for quite some time.

When a nuclear device is detonated underground, we would expect to see a spherical chamber with walls of somewhat radioactive glass. Inside the heavier products of the explosion and irradiated material eventually settle to the bottom of the chamber. If the depth of the detonation isn't deep enough, there can be a collapse causing a surface crater, and some small amounts of radioactivity might be detected. Cracks in the sides and bottom of the chamber are well within the realm of possibility, and as in the case of North Korea (seismically active and with a large aquifer that is believed to be interconnected), the danger of radioactive contamination should be of concern.

The test, we are told took place in a horizontal tunnel into a large mountain in Northeast DPRK. I'm uncertain how that location/venue would effect radioactive contamination over time. Hopefully, it will remain safe for a long time, but the site should watched and the water table monitored locally for many years to come.

The Russians claim to have seen the test package, recorded an event consistent with 5KT, and have stated their belief that it was a nuclear test. How far can you trust the Russians? A bomb case, a cylinder some ten feet long weighing around 3 tons, is consistent with the gun design of the Hiroshima bomb. We would have expected the yield to be between 10 and 15KT. With an event yielding less than 1KT we have to suspect that the DPRK test was a fizzle. The amount of fissionable materials to make such a device pop would not produce such a low yield the device worked properly. The speed of the "bullet" into the "target" might have been too slow, or the reflectors inefficient allowing too many particles to escape prior to detonation. If the test was a fizzle, then the detonation chamber will probably remain very highly radioactive for some time.

To become nuclear capable an organization has to have a workable design, the technical ability and sophistication to manufacture and assemble the device, an effective program to maintain the weapon for years, and at least one delivery system. The design used seems to be more primitive than I would have expected. The DPRK has demonstrated a minimal sophistication and capability to construct a warhead. Whether they are able to maintain weapon readiness is doubtful. That leaves the delivery system open to question.

Most of the DPRK short range missiles would not be capable of launching a ten foot three ton warhead. The TD1 might handle the weight, but the length could give them some hellish guidance and attitude problems. The most likely missile system is the TD2, the missile that fizzled not long ago. Someone who has subscription access to Jane's might check the payload assumptions for the TD-1 and TD-2. If memory serves the TD-2 has a diameter of roughly 7 feet (is that correct, anyone?) A bit of math should be make an estimate of the diameter of the DPRK test package possible. If it isn't less than the TD-2, then the DPRK would have to deliver its weapon by manned aircraft or by surface transportation. Both of those delivery systems are highly problematical in the case of the DPRK. BTW, one shouldn't too easily dismiss the DPRK potential for bringing an intercontinental missile on line. U.S. missile failures are still dicy even today, and it the early days of development they blew up on the stand regularily.

The real danger at the moment is that Kim Jong-Il will become even more intransigent and threatening. This test could seriously change Japanese policies more than anything since the end of WWII, which would not go down well with the PRC, or even Russia. Iran will be taking careful note of what happens, and I expect will be further encouraged to accelerate their own program.

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Asherman wrote:

BTW, one shouldn't too easily dismiss the DPRK potential for bringing an intercontinental missile on line. U.S. missile failures are still dicy even today, and it the early days of development they blew up on the stand regularily.

We tried to make a real second stage for our two-stage rockets though. North Korea just tries to stick one single-stage rocket on top of another.

Asherman wrote:

The real danger at the moment is that Kim Jong-Il will become even more intransigent and threatening. This test could seriously change Japanese policies more than anything since the end of WWII, which would not go down well with the PRC, or even Russia. Iran will be taking careful note of what happens, and I expect will be further encouraged to accelerate their own program.

I think we should use this as an opportunity to base American nuclear missiles on South Korean and maybe also Japanese soil. It might be advisable for us to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.

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http://img130.imageshack.us/img130/5488/drstrangekimqv3.jpg

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There are a number of response open, but I doubt any will be effective in greatly reducing the threats posed by the DPRK. There would be serious repercussions if we forced nuclear weapons into ROK, or Japan. It isn't necessary, so why further rock the boat? We can strike any point on the globe with our nuclear delivery systems. Each provocation has to be weighed on the good old cost/benefit scales. Anything short of a nuclear attack on the United States or one of our allies, or clients, might well result in a nuclear response. First use of a nuclear weapon may not technically amount to much, but the political fallout would be devastating and the risk of escalation would be hard to justify.

In the case of the DPRK, the window for effectively keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of dangerous and irresponsible hands closed shortly after turn of the century. Too late now to close the gate, the horses are all over the ranch. I'm afraid we'll just have to see what happens next in N.E. Asia. It is certain however, that the stakes have gone up since the mid-90's. Isolation and sanctions do not work in cases like the DPRK and Iran, but that doesn't leave many really effective options short of military force. We could conceivably see a cooling of relations between the PRC and the DPRK, and that would be good though not a complete solution to the problem.

We should expect that the DPRK will at the very least give a lot of attention to developing a capable nuclear missile delivery platform.

As serious as these latest developments are, they are not totally unexpected. The immediate and direct dangers from the DPRK are confined to the region, and even there I wouldn't start building fallout shelters just yet. Both the ROK and Japanese governments have much more to be concerned with than the we do ... afterall it is those two nations who are immediately in danger of an atomic attack. It is the secondary effects of an increasingly dangerous DPRK that should worry us, and those might be very serious indeed. There is not, however, any great danger that the sky is falling.

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http://z.about.com/d/politicalhumor/1/0/d/Q/bush_strangelove.jpg

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Brandon9000 wrote:

Thomas wrote:
parados wrote:
Albright got North Korea to agree to not test or pursue its nuclear ambitions. That didn't change until Albright was no longer in a position of authority. Albright never sold N Korea any military weapons.

I think that's a bit of a weasel. It's literally true, but ignores that North Korea, after agreeing not to pursue its nuclear ambitions, continued to pursue them anyway. As far as I've heard, the complaint against Albright is not that she got North Korea to sign an agreement, but that she did not get it to abide by it.

Taking some steps to face the problem is probably a more rational response to danger than placing blame as to who dropped the ball. The real reason why North Korea, India, etc. have obtained nuclear weapons is simply that as technology marches on, less affluent and sophisticated entities have the capacity to meet the technological requirement. North Korea will certainly not be the last country to seek nukes, nor will it be the last "high risk" country to do so. Let me define "high risk." Nuclear weapons are not a good thing in anyone's hands, but there are some countries that a rational person would be particularly worried to see obtain them.

That's nice Brandon.

Maybe you should direct your comments at the person that posted the picture of Albright with the leader of North Korea.

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Quote:

Most of the DPRK short range missiles would not be capable of launching a ten foot three ton warhead. The TD1 might handle the weight, but the length could give them some hellish guidance and attitude problems. The most likely missile system is the TD2, the missile that fizzled not long ago. Someone who has subscription access to Jane's might check the payload assumptions for the TD-1 and TD-2. If memory serves the TD-2 has a diameter of roughly 7 feet (is that correct, anyone?) A bit of math should be make an estimate of the diameter of the DPRK test package possible. If it isn't less than the TD-2, then the DPRK would have to deliver its weapon by manned aircraft or by surface transportation.

They are both too small.

TD-1
1st stage 1.35m dia.
2nd stage 0.85m dia.
Payload about 1 ton max.

TD-2
1st stage 2.2m dia.
2nd stage 1.35m dia.
Payload about 1 ton max.

They need a fat boy style warhead or a bigger missile if they want to properly weaponise.

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All Nine Nuclear Powers Are Violating Non-Proliferation Treaty
By Scott Galindez
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Monday 09 October 2006

As North Korea becomes the eighth confirmed nuclear power (Israel is not confirmed but considered the ninth) some of the blame has to go to the original five nuclear powers. When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty went into effect in 1970, the five countries who had nuclear bombs - the US, France, China, Great Britain, and the USSR - agreed to work to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

Now, 36 years later, no disarmament talks are taking place between those countries. North Korea has been a "threshold" country since the late 80s. The fall of the Soviet Union eliminated shared security arrangements and prompted North Korea to aggressively pursue a nuclear weapon.

The Clinton administration, recognizing the threat, entered into an agreement with North Korea to provide reactors for peaceful use in exchange for an end to the weapons program. In 2003, North Korea announced they were leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reconstituting its weapons program, citing US failure to deliver the reactors.

North Korea's joining the list of nations with nuclear weapons is a sad day for our world. As was the day that the United States became the first nuclear power, and the Soviet Union the second, etc. As long as one country possesses the ability to annihilate another it is only natural for those without that power to seek it.

In the early 90s, during the lead-up to the extension of the treaty, the US and other nuclear powers agreed to stop testing nuclear weapons. It was widely believed that without that step many other "threshold" nations would not have remained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has been a long time since the original five nuclear powers have made any progress in negotiating a reduction in their arsenals; in fact the Bush administration is building new lower-yield nukes with conventional uses that could spur a new arms race.

If all of the nuclear powers that are condemning North Korea are serious about stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, perhaps they should read and come into compliance with the following section of the treaty they first signed in 1970 and extended in 1995:

Article VI Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
It should also be noted that it is possible for countries to leave the nuclear club. North Korea would have been the 10th country if South Africa hadn't abolished their nuclear weapons.

Iran May Not Be Next

In 2003, during his winning presidential campaign in Brazil, candidate Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva criticized the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty as unfair. "If someone asks me to disarm and keep a slingshot while he comes at me with a cannon, what good does that do?" da Silva asked in a speech. He later said Brazil has no intention to develop nuclear arms. That is a good thing; I support non-proliferation, but the sentiment that da Silva expressed will continue to grow as more and more nations feel they are being conned by the nuclear powers.

Let us hope that North Korea is the last to build the bomb, but let's also hope that one day North Korea, France, Great Britain, Israel, Pakistan, India, Russia, China, and the United States dismantle the bombs they have and eliminate the threat of nuclear annihilation.

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Quote:

A timeline on nuclear weapons development in North Korea:

- 1993: North Korea shocks world by saying it will quit Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, later suspends its withdrawal.

- 1994: North Korea, United States sign agreement in Geneva, North pledges to freeze, eventually dismantle, nuclear weapons program in exchange for help building two power-producing nuclear reactors.

- Sept. 17, 1999: U.S. President Bill Clinton agrees to first major easing of economic sanctions against North Korea since Korean War's end in 1953.

- July 2000: North Korea threatens to restart nuclear program if Washington does not compensate for loss of electricity due to delays in building nuclear power plants.

I don't know about you Timber, but I don't see any threat concerning nukes until after the US fails to live up to their end of the bargain.

Any evidence to back up the repeated suggestion by you and others that North Korea didn't live up to the bargain before the US failed it? Your timeline doesn't support it.

For the US arming Iraq

Quote:

February, 1982. Despite objections from congress, President Reagan removes Iraq from its list of known terrorist countries. [1]

December, 1982. Hughes Aircraft ships 60 Defender helicopters to Iraq. [9]

1982-1988. Defense Intelligence Agency provides detailed information for Iraq on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for air strikes and bomb damage assessments. [4]

November, 1983. A National Security Directive states that the U.S would do "whatever was necessary and legal" to prevent Iraq from losing its war with Iran. [1] & [15]

November, 1983. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro of Italy and its Branch in Atlanta begin to funnel $5 billion in unreported loans to Iraq. Iraq, with the blessing and official approval of the US government, purchased computer controlled machine tools, computers, scientific instruments, special alloy steel and aluminum, chemicals, and other industrial goods for Iraq's missile, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. [14]

October, 1983. The Reagan Administration begins secretly allowing Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt to transfer United States weapons, including Howitzers, Huey helicopters, and bombs to Iraq. These shipments violated the Arms Export Control Act. [16]

http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/arming_iraq.php

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bm

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Asherman,

Maybe you can expound a little bit. My first thought on the tell-tale signs of released radioactivity is that it needs to vent into the atmosphere and drift with the winds outside of North Korean airspace before US or others can pick it up. Then based on the trace elements they can get some sense of what the bomb was.

I seem to recall it took a while for the Chernobal fallout to reach Scandanavian countries. (a few days or weeks)

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u.s. exports of biological materials to iraq

The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has
oversight responsibility for the Export Administration Act. Pursuant to
the Act, Committee staff contacted the U.S. Department of Commerce and
requested information on the export of biological materials during the
years prior to the Gulf War. After receiving this information, we
contacted a principal supplier of these materials to determine what, if
any, materials were exported to Iraq which might have contributed to an
offensive or defensive biological warfare program. Records available
from the supplier for the period from 1985 until the present show that
during this time, pathogenic (meaning "disease producing"), toxigenic
(meaning "poisonous"), and other biological research materials were
exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. Records prior to 1985 were not available,
according to the supplier. These exported biological materials were not
attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction. According to
the Department of Defense's own Report to Congress on the Conduct of
the Persian Gulf War, released in April 1992:
"By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had developed
biological weapons. It's advanced and aggressive biological warfare
program was the most advanced in the Arab world. The program probably
began late in the 1970's and concentrated on the development of two
agents, botulinum toxin and anthrax bacteria. . . . Large scale
production of these agents began in 1989 at four facilities near
Baghdad. Delivery means for biological agents ranged from simple aerial
bombs and artillery rockets to surface-to-surface missiles."
Included in the approved sales are the following biological materials
(which have been considered by various nations for use in war), with
their associated disease symptoms:
Bacillus Anthracis: anthrax is a disease-producing bacteria
identified by the Department of Defense in the The Conduct of the
Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, as being a major component
in the Iraqi biological warfare program.
Anthrax is an often-fatal infectious disease due to ingestion of
spores. It begins abruptly with high fever, difficulty in breathing,
and chest pain. The disease eventually results in septicemia (blood
poisoning), and the mortality is high. Once septicemia is advanced,
antibiotic therapy may prove useless, probably because the exotoxins
remain, despite the death of the bacteria.
Clostridium Botulinum: a baterial source of botulinum toxin, which
causes vomiting, constipation, thirst, general weakness, headache,
fever, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the pupils and paralysis
of the muscles involving swallowing. It is often fatal.
Histoplasma Capsulatum: causes a disease superficially resembling
tuberculosis that may cause pneumonia, enlargement of the liver and
spleen, anemia, an influenza-like illness and an acute inflammatory
skin disease marked by tender red modules, usually on the shins.
Reactivated infection usually involves the lungs, the brain, spinal
membranes, heart, peritoneum, and the adrenals.
Brucella Melitensis: a bacterial which can cause chronic fatigue,
loss of appetite, profuse sweating when at rest, pain in joints and
muscles, insomnia, nausea, and damage to major organs.
Clostridium Perfringens: a highly toxic bacteria which causes gas
gangrene. The bacteria produce toxins that move along muscle bundles in
the body killing cells and producing necrotic tissue that is then
favorable for further growth of the bacteria itself. Eventually, these
toxins and bacteria enter the bloodstream and cause systemic illness.
In addition, several shipments of Escherichia Coli (E.Coli) and
genetic materials, as well as human and bacterial DNA, were shipped
directly to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
The following is a detailed listing of biological materials, provided
by the American Type Culture Collection, which were exported to
agencies of the government of Iraq pursuant to the issuance of an
export licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department:
Date: February 8, 1985
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Agency
Materials Shipped: Ustilago nuda (Jensen) Rostrup.
Date: February 22, 1985
Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education
Materials Shipped: Histoplasma capsulanum var. farciminosum (ATCC
32136). Class III pathogen.
Date: July 11, 1985.
Sent to: Middle And Near East Regional A.
Materials Shipped: Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum
(ATCC 32136). Class III pathogen.
Date: May 2, 1986.
Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education.
Materials Shipped: 1. Bacillus Anthracis Cohn (ATCC 10).
Batch #08-20-82 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
2. Bacillus Subtitlis (Ehrenberg) Cohn (ATCC 82). Batch
#06-20-84 (2 each).
3. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 3502). Batch #07-07-
81 (3 each). Class III Pathogen.
4. Clostridium perfringens (Weillon and Zuber) Hauduroy, et
al (ATCC 3624). Batch #10-85SV (2 each).
5. Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 6051). Batch #12-06-84 (2 each).
6. Francisella tularensis, var. tularensis Olsufiev (ATCC
6223) Batch #05-14-79 (2 each). Avirulent, suitable for
preparations of diagnostic antigens.
7. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 9441). Batch #03-84 (3 each).
Highly toxigenic.
8. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 9564). Batch #03-02-
79 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
9. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 10779). Batch #04-24-84S (3
each).
10. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 12916). Batch #08-14-80
(2 each). Agglutinating type 2.
11. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 13124). Batch #07-84SV (3
each). Type A, alpha-toxigenic, produces lechitinase C.J.
Appl.
12. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14185). Batch #01-14-80 (3
each). G.G. Wright (Fort Dertick) V770-NP1-R. Bovine anthrax,
Class III pathogen.
13. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14578). Batch #01-06-78 (2
each). Class III pathogen.
14. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14581). Batch #04-18-85 (2
each).
15. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14945). Batch #06-21-81 (2
each).
16. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 17855. Batch #06-21-
71. Class III pathogen.
17. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 19213). Batch #3-84 (2 each).
18. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 19397). Batch #08-
18-81 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
19. Brucella abortus Biotype 3 (ATCC 23450). Batch #08-02-
84 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
20. Brucella abortus Biotype 9 (ATCC 23455). Batch #02-05-
68 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
21. Brucella melitensis Biotype 1 (ATCC 23456). Batch #03-
08-78 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
22. Brucella melitensis Biotype 3 (ATCC 23458. Batch #01-
29-68 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
23. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 25763. Batch #8-83
(2 each). Class III pathogen.
24. Clostridium botulinum Type F (ATCC 35415). Batch #02-
02-84 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
Date: August 31, 1987.
Sent to: State Company for Drug Industries.
Materials Shipped:
1. Saccharomyces cerevesia (ATCC 2601). Batch #08-28-08 (1
each).
2. Salmonella choleraesuis subsp. choleraesuis Serotype
typhia (ATCC 6539). Batch #06-86S (1 each).
3. Bacillus subtillus (ATCC 6633). Batch# 10-85 (2 each).
4. Klebsiella pneumoniae subsp. pneumoniae (ATCC 10031).
Batch# 08-13-80 (1 each).
5. Escherichia coli (ATCC 10536). Batch# 04-09-80 (1 each).
6. Bacillus cereus (11778). Batch# 05-85SV (2 each).
7. Staphylococcus epidermidis (ATCC 12228). Batch# 11-86s
(1 each).
8. Bacillus pumilus (ATCC 14884). Batch# 09-08-90 (2 each).
Date: July 11, 1988.
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 11303). Batch# 04-87S. Phage
host.
2. Cauliflower Mosaic Caulimovirus (ATCC 45031). Batch# 06-
14-85. Plant virus.
3. Plasmid in Agrobacterium Tumefaciens (ATCC 37349). (Ti
plasmid for co-cultivation with plant integration vectors in
E Coli). Batch# 05-28-85.
Date: April 26, 1988.
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine
phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1
(ATCC 57236) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli.
2. Hulambdal 14-8, clone: human hypoxanthine
phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1
(ATCC 57240) Phage vector; Suggest host: E.coli.

[[Page S8997]]

3. Hulambda 15, clone: human hypoxanthine
phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1
(ATCC 57242) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli.
Date: August 31, 1987.
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 23846). Batch# 07-29-83 (1 each).
2. Escherichia coli (ATCC 33694). Batch# 05-87 (1 each).
Date: September 29, 1988.
Sent to: Ministry of Trade.
Materials Shipped:
1. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 240). Batch# 05-14-63 (3 each).
Class III pathogen.
2. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 938). Batch# 1963 (3 each).
Class III pathogen.
3. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 3629). Batch# 10-23-85 (3
each).
4. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 8009). Batch# 03-30-84 (3
each).
5. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 8705). Batch# 06-27-62 (3
each). Class III pathogen.
6. Brucella abortus (ATCC 9014). Batch# 05-11-66 (3 each).
Class III pathogen.
7. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 10388). Batch# 06-01-73 (3
each).
8. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 11966). Batch# 05-05-70 (3
each). Class III pathogen.
9. Clostridium botulinum Type A. Batch# 07-86 (3 each).
Class III pathogen.
10. Bacillus cereus (ATCC 33018). Batch# 04-83 (3 each).
11. Bacillus ceres (ATCC 33019). Batch# 03-88 (3 each).
Date: January 31, 1989.
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
1. PHPT31, clone: human hypoxanthine
phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1
(ATCC 57057)
2. plambda500, clone: human hypoxanthine
phosphoribosyltransferase pseudogene (HPRT). Chromosome(s): 5
p14-p13 (ATCC 57212).
Date: January 17, 1989
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine
phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1
(ATCC 57237) Phage vector; Suggested host: E. coli.
2. Hulambda14, clone: human hypoxanthine
phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1
(ATCC 57240) Cloned from human lymphoblast. Phage vector;
Suggested host: E. coli.
3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine
phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1
(ATCC 57241) Phage vector; Suggested host: E. coli.
Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control has compiled
a listing of biological materials shipped to Iraq prior to
the Gulf War. The listing covers the period from October 1,
1984 (when the CDC began keeping records) through October 13,
1993. The following materials with biological warfare
significance were shipped to Iraq during this period:
Date: November 28, 1989.
Sent to: University of Basrah, College of Science,
Department of Biology.
Materials Shipped:
1. Enterococcus faecalis.
2. Enterococcus faecium.
3. Enterococcus avium.
4. Enterococcus raffinosus.
5. Enterococcus gallinarium.
6. Enterococcus durans.
7. Enterococcus hirae.
8. Streptococcus bovis (etiologic).
Date: April 21, 1986.
Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street
13, Close 69 House 28/I, Baghdad, Iraq.
Materials Shipped:
1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid (non-infectious).
Date: March 10, 1986.
Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street
13, Close 69 House 28/I, Baghdad, Iraq.
Materials Shipped:
1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid #A2 (non-infectious).
Date: June 25, 1985.
Sent to: University of Baghdad, College of Medicine,
Department of Microbiology.
Materials Shipped:
1. 3 yeast cultures (etiologic) Candida sp.
Date: May 21, 1985.
Sent to: Basrah, Iraq.
Materials Shipped:
1. Lyophilized arbovirus seed (etiologic).
2. West Nile Fever Virus.
Date: April 26, 1985.
Sent to: Minister of Health, Ministry of Health, Baghdad,
Iraq.
Materials Shipped:
1.8 vials antigen and antisera (r. rickettsii and r. typhi)
to diagnose rickettsial infections (non-infectious).
link

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The U.S. has developed a very effective system of collecting air samples, testing them for certain trace elements that are a byproduct of a nuclear event. The system has been in place since the dawn of the Cold War, and it was from such evidence we first learned that the Soviets were testing nuclear devices. From a close analysis of the samples, other physical evidence, and meteorology, we can learn surprising details. Underground testing can greatly reduce the amount of released markers, so results are more likely to be ambiguous.

To find atmospheric traces would be both interesting and informative, but if the aquifer becomes contaminated over the next few years there might be very severe consequences to everyone living on the Peninsula. Hopefully that will never happen.

The thing for the public to watch, I believe, is what the world community does in response. The DPRK has survived some of the most rigorous sanctions ever imposed by the UN. They have virtually no foreign exchange, and the economy is in ruins already. Effective sanctions would be felt greatest by the People who face the greatest hardships and famine. All ready there are calls to resume the 6-Party talks, and that will probably happen. Personally I think negotiating with the DPRK is a waste of time, unless they perceive themselves to be in grave and immediate danger. The PRC must be fuming, and that isn't good for the DPRK since the PRC is their most important contact with the outside world. ROK and Japan should rightfully feel very threatened by the North. Any effective response carries a reasonably serious risk of renewed conventional war between the DPRK and ROK, with 36,000 Americans to hold the fort until major re-enforcements arrive. There are far too many variables out there at the moment to get a handle on what may happen in the next 6 months to a year.

The DPRK has close ties with Iran, and Iran is carefully watching what the world will do. If the world does nothing effective, then Iran can continue its nuclear program and strategy with little to fear. Iran is gong to have to be dealt with .... sooner or later. Which will cost the most in resources and lives, sooner or later? Talking with them is not going to change a thing, no promises by the rulers of Iran can be trusted. This problem isn't going to go away. I'm sure the Bush Administration would like to defer the decision until after the coming Presidential election, but that may not be possible. Windows of opportunity open and close, and no one can go back and change things with the certainty of hindsight. The DPRK test may force a decision on what to do about Iran's nuclear weapons program sooner instead of later. Tough break for the administration.

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Were American/Korean relations, North and South, better before Bushie? He came out swinging and destroyed the good will Clinton had been building. Who knows how far we may have gone in the right direction if Bushie hadn't of done a 180 on American/Korean relations and also on arms control treaties? "100 DPRK People Reunite With Their S.Korean Families in Seoul"

Mother Meets Son in Seoul

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200008/16/images/44866x.jpg

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In tearful reunions, 100 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) people hugged and wept with their South Korean relatives Tuesday afternoon whom they had not seen more than 55 years.

The 3,600-square conference hall of the Conference and Exhibition Center in southern Seoul was overwhelmed with tears and cries of bitter joy for minutes when the 100 DPRK people were crying or screaming together with some 500 South Koreans in each other's arms.

The separated family members kept calling "Mom !" "Dad" "My son !""My daughter !" "Sister !" "Brother !" as if they were trying to heal the pain of decades of separation in a single moment with tears streaming ceaselessly down their cheeks.

The family reunions demonstrated that blood is thicker than water no matter how long the separated family members have lived in different societies.

Most South Koreans reportedly wept when they watched the reunion of these lucky families on TV because it reflected the reality of 55 years' national division and the dream of national reunification.

In another move to further reconciliation after the Pyongyang inter-Korean summit, Seoul and Pyongyang Tuesday morning exchanged 100 people from each side by air for the family reunions, timed with the 55th anniversary of liberation from the Japanese colonial rule on August 15, 1945.

"We (South and North) are now ushering in the era of the Korean peninsula. This is a dream but a portrait of what will be in near future," said President Kim in his speech to mark the Liberation Day Tuesday.

Both Seoul and Pyongyang have agreed on more separated family reunions in near future.

"Separated families are a shameful thing worldwide. We are all brothers and sisters. We must reunify our nation," said DPRK Kim Dong Jin when asked of his comment on the family reunion.

Ryu Mi-youn, head of the 100-member DPRK delegation, said the family reunions will promote national reconciliation and unity and implement the South-North Joint Declaration signed by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and DPRK leader Kim Jong Il at their historic summit in Pyongyang on June 13-15.

"Now the wall of confrontation and division that had been frozen solidly has began collapsing," said the 78-year-old Ryu.

The 100 DPRK people arrived in Seoul aboard a DPRK Air Koryo plane, which was the first DPRK plane to have landed on South Korean soil since the 1950-1953 Korean War.

Under an itinerary issued by the South Korean government, the people to Seoul and Pyongyang will enjoy six family reunions and sightseeing during their four-day stay reunion.

Members of separated families on the Korean peninsula are estimated to be around 11 million, according to the South Korean Unification Ministry.

The ongoing inter-Korean family reunions are expected to help build mutual confidence between Seoul and Pyongyang, thus leading to further economic exchanges and reduction of military tension on the Korean Peninsula, South Korean officials said.

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No, U.S./DPRK relations have been bad since 1952. The DPRK has a long history of not abiding by its agreements, and it never lived up to its agreement with Clinton to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Some in the Clinton administration were taken in and probably believed they had achieved "Peace In Our Time". Didn't happen. What did happen is that far too many people thought that the DPRK could be dealt with diplomatically. In retrospect, Clinton probably should have destroyed the DPRK program even at the risk of a renewed ground war on the Peninsula. The problem faced by Clinton predated his administration, and I'm sure he made as good a decision at the time as he was capable of making. It is useless to go back and pick apart past decisions, we have to deal with the conditions we face right now, and will probably be facing for years to come.

What is the best practical response to the DPRK nuclear test?

What course of action should the United States take in response to the Iranian nuclear program?

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The USA is asking the UN to impose very harsh sanctions on N. Korea. You mean that its public is not downtrodden enough, and that we have to ensure they all starve to death.

It is interesting that we have kept harsh sanctions on Cuba for 35 years, which have been a total failure. They have not damaged the Cuban leaders, or made them change. The sanctions have, however, imposed terrible hardships on the Cuban public.

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NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS NUCLEAR TEST

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