Why do you still support Bush?

July 7, 2006
Requiem for Bush's Unipolar Dream?

by Jim Lobe
A week before the Group of Eight (G8) summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, U.S. President George W. Bush finds his power and authority - both at home and abroad - at their lowest ebb.

With his approval ratings falling back into the cellar after a brief bounce following last month's death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, escalating violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and between Israelis and Palestinians, and shows of defiance by the two surviving members of the "Axis of Evil," Iran and North Korea, Bush's stature is much diminished compared to his previous G-8 appearances.

The man whose efforts to install a national order based on the dominance of the executive and a compliant Congress and a global order based primarily on U.S. military power and compliant "coalitions of the willing" now finds both under unprecedented challenge - from the Supreme Court to Somalia.

The latest and boldest challenge, of course, was this week's launch by North Korea of at least seven missiles - on the Fourth of July, no less - despite the president's explicit warning less than a week before that such a move was "unacceptable."

But, now that the deed is done, it remains unclear what, if anything, Bush can do about it, particularly without strong support from Russia, China, and South Korea, the three members of the Six-Party Talks that have been urging him to lift financial sanctions against Pyongyang as a way to get it back to negotiating a rollback of its nuclear arms program.

Pyongyang's "in-your-face" defiance came as Washington, in this case backed - albeit somewhat uncertainly - by its European allies, demanded that Iran agree to indefinitely suspend its uranium-enrichment program before the G-8 summit or face sanctions at the UN Security Council.

But most analysts believe Tehran will offer at best an ambiguous reply by Washington's deadline, sufficiently ambiguous to ensure that Moscow and Beijing will continue opposing sanctions, and that, ultimately, Washington will have to compromise on key positions that it has so far refused to concede.

These challenges come just a week, of course, after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the president lacked the power to create military tribunals for detainees in the "global war on terror" whose procedures did not conform to U.S. military law or the Geneva Conventions without Congress' explicit approval.

In a sweeping decision that appeared to destroy the administration's legal defense of its controversial domestic spying program, among other efforts to expand presidential power, the court "lectured Mr. Bush like a schoolboy on constitutional checks and balances, and on the dangers of an omnipotent executive," according to conservative constitutional analyst Bruce Fein.

That, of course, is not a lecture Bush - or his eminence grise and longtime advocate of an "imperial presidency," Vice President Dick Cheney - wanted to hear, just as they both despise the idea that the United States should have to rely on the backing of feckless Europeans, let alone on Russia and China, to deal with "evildoers" like Iran and North Korea.

For them, a "multi-polar world" in which all countries do not simply defer to the U.S. is as repulsive as a political system in which they must compromise not only with Congress as a co-equal branch of government, but even with Democrats.

Yet, after striving mightily to avoid multi-polarity both at home and abroad, that is the world Bush now faces, a fact that is likely to be on vivid display in St. Petersburg next week.

In order to cope with what Thursday's Washington Post called a "world of crises," Bush badly needs the help, or at least the acquiescence, of other major powers, including those like Russia and China that have been the most wary about his unipolar positions.

This was not how it was supposed to turn out, of course.

Just as the administration's post-9/11 will and determination were supposed to - and mostly did - overwhelm critics in Congress and the courts, so its lightning military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq were designed to "shock and awe" local populations and potential rivals near and far into passivity and compliance, if not active cooperation.

"Power is its own reward," wrote neoconservative columnist Charles Krauthammer - a longtime advocate of a U.S.-led "unipolar" world and Cheney favorite - after the ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan. "Victory changes everything, psychology above all. The psychology in the region is now one of fear and deep respect for American power."

Indeed, after the U.S. conquest of Iraq, both Syria and Iran took steps to assure Washington of their cooperation and goodwill, offering concessions on a range of issues rejected by administration hawks who asked why they should settle for changes in "regime behavior" when, with just a little effort, they could get "regime change" in both countries, and perhaps in North Korea, too.

Bush himself naturally dominated that year's G-8 summit at Evian-les-Bains, where prewar critics German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and host French President Jacques Chirac were graciously received - if only briefly - by a triumphant but forgiving president.

Three years later, that triumphant image has faded rather dramatically due to a ragtag Sunni insurgency, for which the administration was totally unprepared, that has effectively punctured the notion of U.S. invincibility and, with it, the "fear and deep respect for American power" on which the new unipolar order was supposed to be based.

Iran and Syria - not to mention North Korea - are now openly defiant; the Taliban in Afghanistan are now resurgent; Islamist parties throughout the region have been strengthened; Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts have fallen apart; the U.S. military prepares to abandon Iraq to civil war; China and Russia are seeking the expulsion of U.S. military bases from Central Asia; and public approval of Bush's performance has fallen to the lowest sustained levels since disgraced U.S. President Richard Nixon.

The G-8 leaders in St. Petersburg, representing Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Britain, and the United States, will be dealing with a multi-polar world.

(Inter Press Service)








Find this article at:
http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=9263

CI... antiwar.com?

Why don't you just cut and paste your "NEWS" stories directly from the source?

Al Jazeera and the North Korean times...

People can be for the Iraq War and not all be heartless baby killing imperialists.


People can be antiwar and not all be American hating terrorist sympathizers.


The hyperbole gets real old.

Hyperbole?

Who isn't anti war?

Answer:

North Korea
The insurgents
Iran
Al Qaeda

The list goes on...

Snood, AMERICANS did not want a darn war? Bush did not want a war? Republicans did not want a war? Our friends at the UN were being bought out right from under our nose. Our "friends" were "sticking it to us"...

To be against a war we did NOT choose when Americans are dying is just plain treason... This is pure partisan politics on the left, nothing more, nothing less.

Hyperbole?

Yea, maybe if the right just LOVED war. They just have the "guts" and unwavering commitment to stand up to tyranny which is allot more than I can say for others. They value freedom and are not about to just sit around and fiddle while Rome burns.

The left are (for the most part) anti-Christ and anti-American...

From CNN:

O'Neill: Bush planned Iraq invasion before 9/11
In new book, ex-Treasury secretary criticizes administration
Wednesday, January 14, 2004 Posted: 2:12 AM EST (0712 GMT)


Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill served nearly two years in Bush's Cabinet.





(CNN) -- The Bush administration began planning to use U.S. troops to invade Iraq within days after the former Texas governor entered the White House three years ago, former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill told CBS News' 60 Minutes.

"From the very beginning, there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go," O'Neill told CBS, according to excerpts released Saturday by the network. "For me, the notion of pre-emption, that the U.S. has the unilateral right to do whatever we decide to do, is a really huge leap."

O'Neill, who served nearly two years in Bush's Cabinet, was asked to resign by the White House in December 2002 over differences he had with the president's tax cuts. O'Neill was the main source for "The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill," by former Wall Street Journal reporter Ron Suskind.

The CBS report is scheduled to be broadcast Sunday night; the book is to be released Tuesday by publisher Simon & Schuster.

Suskind said O'Neill and other White House insiders gave him documents showing that in early 2001 the administration was already considering the use of force to oust Saddam, as well as planning for the aftermath.

"There are memos," Suskind told the network. "One of them marked 'secret' says 'Plan for Post-Saddam Iraq.'"

Suskind cited a Pentagon document titled "Foreign Suitors For Iraqi Oilfield Contracts," which, he said, outlines areas of oil exploration. "It talks about contractors around the world from ... 30, 40 countries and which ones have what intentions on oil in Iraq."

In the book, O'Neill is quoted as saying he was surprised that no one in a National Security Council meeting asked why Iraq should be invaded.

"It was all about finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The president saying 'Go find me a way to do this,'" O'Neill said.

Suskind also described a White House meeting in which he said Bush seemed to waver about going forward with a second round of tax cuts.

"Haven't we already given money to rich people... Shouldn't we be giving money to the middle?" Suskind says Bush asked, according to what CBS called a "nearly verbatim" transcript of an economic team meeting Suskind said he obtained from someone at the meeting.

O'Neill also said in the book that President Bush "was like a blind man in a roomful of deaf people" during Cabinet meetings.

One-on-one meetings were no different, O'Neill told the network.

Describing his first such meeting with Bush, O'Neill said, "I went in with a long list of things to talk about and, I thought, to engage [him] on. ... I was surprised it turned out me talking and the president just listening. It was mostly a monologue."

White House spokesman Scott McClellan brushed off O'Neill's criticism.

"We appreciate his service, but we are not in the business of doing book reviews," he told reporters. "It appears that the world according to Mr. O'Neill is more about trying to justify his own opinion than looking at the reality of the results we are achieving on behalf of the American people. The president will continue to be forward-looking, focusing on building upon the results we are achieving to strengthen the economy and making the world a safer and better place."

A senior administration official, who asked not to be named, expressed bewilderment at O'Neill's comments on the alleged war plans.

"The treasury secretary is not in the position to have access to that kind of information, where he can make observations of that nature," the official said. "This is a head-scratcher."

Even before the interview is broadcast, the topic became grist for election-year politics.

Former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean, who is the early front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination, issued a statement in response.

"I've always said the president had failed to make the case to go to war with Iraq," Dean said. "My Democratic opponents reached a different conclusion, and in the process, they failed to ask the difficult questions. Now, after the fact, we are learning new information about the true circumstances of the Bush administration's push for war, this time, by one of his former Cabinet secretaries.

"The country deserves to know -- and the president needs to answer -- why the American people were presented with misleading or manufactured intelligence as to why going to war with Iraq was necessary."

Democratic Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts also issued a statement. In 2002, Kerry voted to support a resolution giving Bush authority to wage war against Iraq if it didn't dismantle its presumed illegal weapons program.

"These are very serious charges. It would mean [Bush administration officials] were dead-set on going to war alone since almost the day they took office and deliberately lied to the American people, Congress, and the world," Kerry said. "It would mean that for purely ideological reasons they planned on putting American troops in a shooting gallery, occupying an Arab country almost alone. The White House needs to answer these charges truthfully because they threaten to shatter [its] already damaged credibility as never before."

washingtonpost.com
Bush Began to Plan War Three Months After 9/11
Book Says President Called Secrecy Vital
By William Hamilton
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 17, 2004; Page A01


Beginning in late December 2001, President Bush met repeatedly with Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks and his war cabinet to plan the U.S. attack on Iraq even as he and administration spokesmen insisted they were pursuing a diplomatic solution, according to a new book on the origins of the war.

The intensive war planning throughout 2002 created its own momentum, according to "Plan of Attack" by Bob Woodward, fueled in part by the CIA's conclusion that Saddam Hussein could not be removed from power except through a war and CIA Director George J. Tenet's assurance to the president that it was a "slam dunk" case that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.

In 3 1/2 hours of interviews with Woodward, an assistant managing editor at The Washington Post, Bush said that the secret planning was necessary to avoid "enormous international angst and domestic speculation" and that "war is my absolute last option."

Adding to the momentum, Woodward writes, was the pressure from advocates of war inside the administration. Vice President Cheney, whom Woodward describes as a "powerful, steamrolling force," led that group and had developed what some of his colleagues felt was a "fever" about removing Hussein by force.

By early January 2003, Bush had made up his mind to take military action against Iraq, according to the book. But Bush was so concerned that the government of his closest ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, might fall because of his support for Bush that he delayed the war's start until March 19 here (March 20 in Iraq) because Blair asked him to seek a second resolution from the United Nations. Bush later gave Blair the option of withholding British troops from combat, which Blair rejected. "I said I'm with you. I mean it," Blair replied.

Woodward describes a relationship between Cheney and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that became so strained Cheney and Powell are barely on speaking terms. Cheney engaged in a bitter and eventually winning struggle over Iraq with Powell, an opponent of war who believed Cheney was obsessively trying to establish a connection between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network and treated ambiguous intelligence as fact.

Powell felt Cheney and his allies -- his chief aide, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz; and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith and what Powell called Feith's "Gestapo" office -- had established what amounted to a separate government. The vice president, for his part, believed Powell was mainly concerned with his own popularity and told friends at a dinner he hosted a year ago celebrating the outcome of the war that Powell was a problem and "always had major reservations about what we were trying to do."

Before the war with Iraq, Powell bluntly told Bush that if he sent U.S. troops there "you're going to be owning this place." Powell and his deputy and closest friend, Richard L. Armitage, used to refer to what they called "the Pottery Barn rule" on Iraq: "You break it, you own it," according to Woodward.

But, when asked personally by the president, Powell agreed to make the U.S. case against Hussein at the United Nations in February 2003, a presentation described by White House communications director Dan Bartlett as "the Powell buy-in." Bush wanted someone with Powell's credibility to present the evidence that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, a case the president had initially found less than convincing when presented to him by CIA Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin at a White House meeting on Dec. 21, 2002.

McLaughlin's version used communications intercepts, satellite photos, diagrams and other intelligence. "Nice try," Bush said when the CIA official was finished, according to the book. "I don't think this quite -- it's not something that Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from."

He then turned to Tenet, McLaughlin's boss, and said, "I've been told all this intelligence about having WMD, and this is the best we've got?"

"It's a slam-dunk case," Tenet replied, throwing his arms in the air. Bush pressed him again. "George, how confident are you?"

"Don't worry, it's a slam dunk," Tenet repeated.

Tenet later told associates he should have said the evidence on weapons was not ironclad, according to Woodward. After the CIA director made a rare public speech in February defending the CIA's handling of intelligence about Iraq, Bush called him to say he had done "a great job."

In his previous book, "Bush at War," Woodward described the administration's response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001: its decision to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan and its increasing focus on Iraq. His new book is a narrative history of how Bush and his administration launched the war on Iraq. It is based on interviews with more than 75 people, including Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

On Nov. 21, 2001, 72 days after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Bush directed Rumsfeld to begin planning for war with Iraq. "Let's get started on this," Bush recalled saying. "And get Tommy Franks looking at what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to." He also asked: Could this be done on a basis that would not be terribly noticeable?

Bush received his first detailed briefing on Iraq war plans five weeks later, on Dec. 28, when Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the head of the U.S. Central Command, visited Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Tex. Bush told reporters afterward that they had discussed Afghanistan.

While it has been previously reported that Bush directed the Pentagon to begin considering options for an invasion of Iraq immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks, Bush's order to Rumsfeld began an intensive process in which Franks worked in secret with a small staff, talked almost daily with the defense secretary and met about once a month with Bush.

This week, the president acknowledged that the violent uprising against U.S. troops in Iraq has resulted in "a tough, tough series of weeks for the American people." But he insisted that his course of action in Iraq has been the correct one in language that echoed what he told Woodward more than four months ago.

In two interviews with Woodward in December, Bush minimized the failure to find the weapons of mass destruction, expressed no doubts about his decision to invade Iraq, and enunciated an activist role for the United States based on it being "the beacon for freedom in the world."

"I believe we have a duty to free people," Bush told Woodward. "I would hope we wouldn't have to do it militarily, but we have a duty."

The president described praying as he walked outside the Oval Office after giving the order to begin combat operations against Iraq, and the powerful role his religious beliefs played throughout that time.

"Going into this period, I was praying for strength to do the Lord's will. . . . I'm surely not going to justify war based upon God. Understand that. Nevertheless, in my case I pray that I be as good a messenger of His will as possible. And then, of course, I pray for personal strength and for forgiveness."

The president told Woodward: "I am prepared to risk my presidency to do what I think is right. I was going to act. And if it could cost the presidency, I fully realized that. But I felt so strongly that it was the right thing to do that I was prepared to do so."

Asked by Woodward how history would judge the war, Bush replied: "History. We don't know. We'll all be dead."

The president told Woodward he was cooperating on his book because he wanted the story of how the United States had gone to war in Iraq to be told. He said it would be a blueprint of historical significance that "will enable other leaders, if they feel like they have to go to war, to spare innocent citizens and their lives."

"But the news of this, in my judgment," Bush added, "the big news out of this isn't how George W. makes decisions. To me the big news is America has changed how you fight and win war, and therefore makes it easier to keep the peace in the long run. And that's the historical significance of this book, as far as I'm concerned."

Bush's critics have questioned whether he and his administration were focused on Iraq rather than terrorism when they took office early in 2001 and even after the Sept. 11 attacks. Former Treasury secretary Paul H. O'Neill and former White House counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke have made that charge in recently published memoirs.

According to "Plan of Attack," it was Cheney who was particularly focused on Iraq before the terrorist attacks. Before Bush's inauguration, Cheney sent word to departing Defense Secretary William S. Cohen that he wanted the traditional briefing given an incoming president to be a serious "discussion about Iraq and different options." Bush specifically assigned Cheney to focus as vice president on intelligence scenarios, particularly the possibility that terrorists would obtain nuclear or biological weapons.

Early discussions among the administration's national security "principals" -- Cheney, Powell, Tenet and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice -- and their deputies focused on how to weaken Hussein diplomatically. But Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz proposed sending in the military to seize Iraq's southern oil fields and establish the area as a foothold from which opposition groups could overthrow Hussein.

Powell dismissed the plan as "lunacy," according to Woodward, and told Bush what he thought. "You don't have to be bullied into this," Powell said.

Bush told Woodward he never saw a formal plan for a quick strike. "The idea may have floated around as an interesting nugget to chew on," he said.

White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr., according to Woodward, compared Bush to a circus rider with one foot on a "diplomacy" steed and the other on a "war" steed, both heading toward the same destination: regime change in Iraq. When it was clear that diplomacy would not get him to his goal, Card said, Bush let go of that horse and rode the one called war.

But as the planning proceeded, the administration began taking steps that Woodward describes as helping to make war inevitable. On Feb. 16, 2002, Bush signed an intelligence finding that directed the CIA to help the military overthrow Hussein and conduct operations within Iraq. At the time, according to "Plan of Attack," the CIA had only four informants in Iraq and told Bush that it would be impossible to overthrow Hussein through a coup.

In July, a CIA team entered northern Iraq and began to lay the groundwork for covert action, eventually recruiting an extensive network of 87 Iraqi informants code-named ROCKSTARS who gave the U.S. detailed information on Iraqi forces, including a CD-ROM containing the personnel files of the Iraq Special Security Organization (SSO).

Woodward writes that the CIA essentially became an advocate for war first by asserting that covert action would be ineffective, and later by saying that its new network of spies would be endangered if the United States did not attack Iraq. Another factor in the gathering momentum were the forces the military began shifting to Kuwait, the pre-positioning that was a key component of Franks's planning.

In the summer of 2002, Bush approved $700 million worth of "preparatory tasks" in the Persian Gulf region such as upgrading airfields, bases, fuel pipelines and munitions storage depots to accommodate a massive U.S. troop deployment. The Bush administration funded the projects from a supplemental appropriations bill for the war in Afghanistan and old appropriations, keeping Congress unaware of the reprogramming of money and the eventual cost.

During that summer, Powell and Cheney engaged in some of their sharpest debates. Powell argued that the United States should take its case to the United Nations, which Cheney said was a waste of time. Woodward had described some of that conflict in "Bush at War."

Among Powell's allies was Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to Bush's father, who wrote an op-ed piece against the war for the Wall Street Journal. After it was published in August 2002, Powell thanked Scowcroft for giving him "some running room." But Rice called Scowcroft to tell her former boss that it looked as if he was speaking for Bush's father and that the article was a slap at the incumbent president.

Despite Powell's admonitions to the president, "Plan of Attack" suggests it was Blair who may have played a more critical role in persuading Bush to seek a resolution from the United Nations. At a meeting with the president at Camp David in early September, Blair backed Bush on Iraq but said he needed to show he had tried U.N. diplomacy. Bush agreed, and later referred to the Camp David session with Blair as "the cojones meeting," using a colloquial Spanish term for courage.

After the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the resumption of weapons inspections in Iraq, Bush became increasingly impatient with their effectiveness and the role of chief weapons inspector Hans Blix. Shortly after New Year's 2003, he told Rice at his Texas ranch: "We're not winning. Time is not on our side here. Probably going to have to, we're going to have to go to war."

Bush said much the same thing to White House political adviser Karl Rove, who had gone to Crawford to brief him on plans for his reelection campaign. In the next 10 days, Bush also made his decision known to Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell and the Saudi ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Bandar, who helped arrange Saudi cooperation with the U.S. military, feared Saudi interests would be damaged if Bush did not follow through on attacking Hussein, and became another advocate for war.

According to "Plan of Attack," Bush asked Rice and his longtime communications adviser, Karen Hughes, whether he should attack Iraq, but he did not specifically ask Powell or Rumsfeld. "I could tell what they thought," the president said. "I didn't need to ask their opinion about Saddam Hussein or how to deal with Saddam Hussein. If you were sitting where I sit, you could be pretty clear."

Rumsfeld, whom Woodward interviewed for three hours, is portrayed in the book as a "defense technocrat" intimately involved with details of the war planning but not focused on the need to attack Iraq in the same way that Cheney and some of Rumsfeld's subordinates such as Wolfowitz and Feith were.

Bush told Powell of his decision in a brief meeting in the White House. Evidently concerned about Powell's reaction, he said, "Are you with me on this? I think I have to do this. I want you with me."

"I'll do the best I can," Powell answered. "Yes, sir, I will support you. I'm with you, Mr. President."

Bush said he did not remember asking the question of his father, former president George H.W. Bush, who fought Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. But, he added that the two had discussed developments in Iraq.

"You know he is the wrong father to appeal to in terms of strength. There is a higher father that I appeal to," Bush said.

Describing what the 41st president said to him about Iraq, the 43rd president told Woodward:

"It was less 'Here's how you have to take care of the guy [Hussein]' and more 'I've been through what you've been through and I know what's happening and therefore I love you' would be a more accurate way to describe it."



© 2004 The Washington Post Company

Blair-Bush deal before Iraq war revealed in secret memo

PM promised to be 'solidly behind' US invasion with or without UN backing Richard Norton-Taylor
Friday February 3, 2006


Tony Blair and George Bush at a press conference in the White House on January 31 2003. Photograph: Shawn Thew/AFP



Tony Blair told President George Bush that he was "solidly" behind US plans to invade Iraq before he sought advice about the invasion's legality and despite the absence of a second UN resolution, according to a new account of the build-up to the war published today.
A memo of a two-hour meeting between the two leaders at the White House on January 31 2003 - nearly two months before the invasion - reveals that Mr Bush made it clear the US intended to invade whether or not there was a second UN resolution and even if UN inspectors found no evidence of a banned Iraqi weapons programme.

"The diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning", the president told Mr Blair. The prime minister is said to have raised no objection. He is quoted as saying he was "solidly with the president and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam".

The disclosures come in a new edition of Lawless World, by Phillipe Sands, a QC and professor of international law at University College, London. Professor Sands last year exposed the doubts shared by Foreign Office lawyers about the legality of the invasion in disclosures which eventually forced the prime minister to publish the full legal advice given to him by the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith.

The memo seen by Prof Sands reveals:

· Mr Bush told Mr Blair that the US was so worried about the failure to find hard evidence against Saddam that it thought of "flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft planes with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in UN colours". Mr Bush added: "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach [of UN resolutions]".

· Mr Bush even expressed the hope that a defector would be extracted from Iraq and give a "public presentation about Saddam's WMD". He is also said to have referred Mr Blair to a "small possibility" that Saddam would be "assassinated".

· Mr Blair told the US president that a second UN resolution would be an "insurance policy", providing "international cover, including with the Arabs" if anything went wrong with the military campaign, or if Saddam increased the stakes by burning oil wells, killing children, or fomenting internal divisions within Iraq.

· Mr Bush told the prime minister that he "thought it unlikely that there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups". Mr Blair did not demur, according to the book.

The revelation that Mr Blair had supported the US president's plans to go to war with Iraq even in the absence of a second UN resolution contrasts with the assurances the prime minister gave parliament shortly after. On February 25 2003 - three weeks after his trip to Washington - Mr Blair told the Commons that the government was giving "Saddam one further, final chance to disarm voluntarily".

He added: "Even now, today, we are offering Saddam the prospect of voluntary disarmament through the UN. I detest his regime - I hope most people do - but even now, he could save it by complying with the UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared to go the extra step to achieve disarmament peacefully."

On March 18, before the crucial vote on the war, he told MPs: "The UN should be the focus both of diplomacy and of action... [and that not to take military action] would do more damage in the long term to the UN than any other single course that we could pursue."

The meeting between Mr Bush and Mr Blair, attended by six close aides, came at a time of growing concern about the failure of any hard intelligence to back up claims that Saddam was producing weapons of mass destruction in breach of UN disarmament obligations. It took place a few days before the then US secretary Colin Powell made claims - since discredited - in a dramatic presentation at the UN about Iraq's weapons programme.

Earlier in January 2003, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, expressed his private concerns about the absence of a smoking gun in a private note to Mr Blair, according to the book. He said he hoped that the UN's chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, would come up with enough evidence to report a breach by Iraq of is its UN obligations.

Downing Street did not deny the existence of the memo last night, but said: "The prime minister only committed UK forces to Iraq after securing the approval of the House of Commons in a vote on March 18, 2003." It added the decision to resort to military action to ensure Iraq fulfilled its obligations imposed by successive security council resolutions was taken only after attempts to disarm Iraq had failed. "Of course during this time there were frequent discussions between the UK and US governments about Iraq. We do not comment on the prime minister's conversations with other leaders."

Sir Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat acting leader, said last night: "The fact that consideration was apparently given to using American military aircraft in UN colours in the hope of provoking Saddam Hussein is a graphic illustration of the rush to war. It would also appear to be the case that the diplomatic efforts in New York after the meeting of January 31 were simply going through the motions.

"The prime minister's offer of February 25 to Saddam Hussein was about as empty as it could get. He has a lot of explaining to do."

Prof Sands says Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's UN ambassador at the time, told a foreign colleague he was "clearly uncomfortable" about the failure to get a second resolution. Foreign Office lawyers consistently warned that an invasion would be regarded as unlawful. The book reveals that Elizabeth Wilmshurst, the FO's deputy chief legal adviser who resigned over the war, told the Butler inquiry into the use of intelligence during the run-up to the war, of her belief that Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, shared the FO view. According to private evidence to the Butler inquiry, Lord Goldsmith told FO lawyers in early 2003: "The prime minister has told me that I cannot give advice, but you know what my views are".

On March 7 2003 he advised the prime minister that the Bush administration believed that a case could be made for an invasion without a second UN resolution. But he warned that Britain could be challenged in the international criminal court. Ten days later, he said a second resolution was not necessary.

2001
· November 21: According to Bob Woodward in Plan of Attack, the US president, George Bush, says to the secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld: "Lets get started on this."

· December 28: General Tommy Franks briefs Mr Bush on current Pentagon Iraq war planning.

2002

· March 18: Sir David Manning, Mr Blair's foreign policy adviser, writes to prime minister confirming he has told Condoleezza Rice that "you would not budge in your support for regime change".

· March: Senior officials in Whitehall advise ministers that "regime change of itself" has "no basis in international law".

· April 6: Mr Blair visits Mr Bush at Crawford where Iraq is discussed. Mr Bush tells Trevor McDonald of ITV: "I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go."

· Mid-July: At a meeting of ministers, the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, confirms that claiming authorisation for use of force from UN security council will be difficult.

· September 12: In a speech to the UN, Mr Bush says world leaders must get tough with Iraq or stand aside as the US acts.

· September 16: Iraq announces weapons inspectors are welcome to return unconditionally after nearly four years.

· September 24: Britain publishes dossier saying Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon within one or two years, if it obtains fissile material and other components from abroad. Includes now famous "45 minutes from attack" claim.

· November 8: UN security council unanimously approves US-drafted resolution aimed at getting Saddam to disarm, after eight weeks of negotiation. The resolution says Saddam will face "serious consequences" if he does not comply with weapons inspectors. France argues that UN resolution 1441 does not give US and UK an automatic right to attack Iraq.

· November 13: Iraq accepts UN resolution 1441 unconditionally, while denying that it has any banned weapons programmes.

· November 18: First UN weapons inspectors arrive in Baghdad.

· December 7: Iraq hands a 12,000-page declaration of its arms programmes to UN inspectors, a day before a deadline set by the UN resolution.

· December 18: Britain says a first assessment of Iraq's weapons declaration to the UN shows it is not the "full and complete declaration" requested by the security council.

· December 19: The chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix, says gaps remain in Iraq's declaration, although it is cooperating well with the inspectors. US ambassador John Negroponte says the omissions mean Iraq is in "material breach" of Resolution 1441 and has "spurned its last opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations".

2003

· January 9: Mr Blix says his teams have so far found no "smoking gun" in Iraq but adds Baghdad has failed to answer "many questions" about its weapons programmes.

· January 14: Mr Bush says he is "sick and tired" of Iraq's deception over its suspected weapons and warns time is running out for Baghdad to comply with UN demands to disarm.

· January 16: Mr Blix says UN inspectors have found illegally imported conventional arms materials in Iraq and only fuller cooperation with his team could avert the option of war.

· January 20: Iraq promises UN weapons experts more help and says it will form its own teams of inspectors to search for banned weapons after two days of talks with chief UN arms inspectors.

· January 27: Mr Blix and fellow weapons inspector Mohamed ElBaradei, reporting to the UN security council, outline the gaps in information that Iraq should have delivered by now. But Mr Blix says those gaps could not lead him to conclude Baghdad possessed prohibited arms.

· January 28: Britain declares Iraq in "material breach" of UN disarmament demands and says the chances of averting war are receding.

· January 31: Mr Bush meets with Mr Blair at the White House where the prime minister presses for a new UN resolution authorising military force against Iraq, for British political reasons. Mr Bush recalls to Bob Woodward that he told Mr Blair: "If that's what you need, we will go flat out to try and help you get it."

· February 5: The US secretary of state, Colin Powell, addresses the UN security council, laying out what he says is evidence of Iraq's ongoing weapons of mass destruction programmes. He says: "how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's noncompliance before we, as a council, we, as the United Nations, say: 'Enough. Enough.'"

· February 11: Lord Goldsmith meets John Bellinger, legal adviser to White House, in Washington. Mr Bellinger reportedly says of the meeting: "We had trouble with your attorney, we got him there eventually."

· February 14: Mr Blix tells security council his team has not found any weapons of mass destruction and interviews with scientists have been useful. The French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, drawing rare applause from security council colleagues, said weapons inspections "are producing results" and there was no justification yet for war.

· February 23: Mr Blair tells the Commons they were giving "Saddam one further final chance to disarm voluntarily". He later says, "and even now, today, we are offering Saddam the prospect of voluntary disarmament through the UN. I detest his regime - I hope most people do - but even now, he could save it by complying with the UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared to go the extra step to achieve disarmament peacefully."

· February 24: Mr Blix delivers a list of some 30 unresolved questions about Iraqi disarmament in preparation for his report. - Washington, London and Madrid introduce new draft resolution declaring Iraq has squandered its "final opportunity" to disarm. A French counter-proposal, endorsed by Germany and Russia, calls for more UN inspections.

· February 27: Security council members open discussion of the US-British-Spanish draft that lays the groundwork for war.

· February 28: Iraq says it will obey UN orders to destroy its al-Samoud 2 missiles, drawing reactions that underscore the deep rift in the security council.

· March 1: Iraq crushes four al-Samoud 2 missiles, meeting a UN deadline to begin a destruction programme.

· March 5: The foreign ministers of France, Russia and Germany release a joint declaration stating that they will "not allow" a resolution authorising military action to pass the UN security council. The hardening stance from the anti-war bloc increases the pressure on the US and Britain to compromise on their draft UN resolution.

· March 7: Mr Blix delivers a new report to the UN security council saying Baghdad has made some progress on disarmament recently but has still not cleared up key questions about chemical and biological weapons programmes.

· March 7: The US, Britain and Spain present a revised draft resolution giving Saddam an ultimatum to disarm by March 17 or face the possibility of war. France, heading opposition to any US-led rush to war, says it could not accept the March 17 ultimatum.

· March 7: Lord Goldsmith produces an early draft of his legal advice, equivocating on whether an invasion of Iraq was legal without a second United Nations resolution. This advice, not publicly known at the time, was published by the Guardian during the 2005 election. Lord Goldsmith warned Mr Blair: "I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force." He also said: "We would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of [Iraqi] non-compliance and non-cooperation."

· March 10: Britain announces "six key tests" for Iraq to comply to if it is to avoid war, including President Saddam making a TV address admitting having weapons of mass destruction. The idea galvanises some diplomatic support, but not enough to suggest the US/UK could win a second UN resolution, effectively authorising an attack.

· March 13: Phillipe Sands reveals in Lawless World that Lord Falconer and Lady Morgan met Lord Goldsmith in Downing Street to discuss the legality of war. The attorney general then "communicated" his clearer view that war would be legal without a second resolution. It remains unclear if he decided this before the meeting took place.

· March 14: The French president, Jacques Chirac, removes any lingering doubts about France's intentions on Iraq, confirming to Mr Blair in a brief phone call that France was willing to seek a compromise on disarming Saddam but would not accept any UN resolution that set an ultimatum.

· March 17: The US, Britain and Spain abandon efforts to get international endorsement for war against Saddam. Mr Bush later gives Saddam 48 hours to leave the country.

· March 17: Lord Goldsmith's gives his legal advice to cabinet. Clare Short later claimed she was not informed at the meeting that he had changed his view. Unusually a summary of Lord Goldsmith's advice is published arguing that the war is legal without a second resolution based on a decade of non-compliance by Saddam.

· March 17: The leader of the Commons, Robin Cook, resigns in protest at the government's decision to back a war without "international authority nor domestic support".

· March 18: Commons vote on the war. The prime minister says in the Commons that: "The UN should be the focus both of diplomacy and of action ... [and that not to take military action] would do more damage in the long term to the UN than any other single course that we could pursue." Yet it appears that the prime minister was committed to war since at least January 2003: the will of the United Nations was irrelevant.

· March 20: The war begins.

CI how would you like a few posts from FOX NEWS?

Here is a site you should LOVE CI.

http://www.communistsforkerry.com/

Here is the one you voted for CI

JOHN KERRY RESUME
By Red Eye
08/12/04 - 10:01 pm

My name is John Kerry and I would like to report for duty. Here is my resume for your review.

(We've never had an ethics problem with two Democratic lawyers in the Whitehouse before - why worry now?)

NAME: John F. Kerry

RESIDENCE: 7 mansions, including Washington, DC, all worth multimillions.

EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE:

Law Enforcement. I voted to cut every law enforcement, CIA and defense bill in my career as a US Senator. (Source: Congressional Record) I ordered Boston to remove a fire hydrant which I considered unsightly, in front of my mansion, thereby endangering my neighbors in the event of fire. (Source: Boston Globe)

MILITARY:

I used three minor injuries to get an early discharge from the military and served four months in Vietnam (as documented by the attending doctor). I then returned to the US, joined Jane Fonda in protesting the war, and insulted returning Vietnam vets, claiming that I and they committed atrocities and were baby killers. I threw my medals, ribbons, or something away in protest. Of course I did not report these atrocities when they happened nor did I try to stop them. (Source: My book; Vietnam Veterans Against the War: The New Soldier shows how I truly feel about the military. I deplore the military!)

COLLEGE:

I graduated from Yale University with a low C average. (Source: Registrar @ Yale University and many national news media) Unlike my counterpart George Bush, I did not get admitted to Harvard nor graduate with an M.B.A

PAST WORK EXPERIENCE:

I was Lietenant Governor under Michael Dukakis and I ran George McGovern's campaign. I ran for U.S. Congress and have been there ever since. I have no real world experience except that of a gigolo, by marrying rich women and running HJ Heinz vicariously through my wife Teresa. (Source: Every major news media)

ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

Name one!

But, as a US Senator I set the record for the most liberal voting record, exceeding even Ted Kennedy and Hillary Clinton. I have consistently failed to support our military and CIA by voting against budgets, thus gutting our country's ability ! to defend itself. Although I voted for the Iraq War, now I am against it and refuse to admit that I voted for it. I voted for every liberal piece of legislation.(Source: Congressional Record) I have no plan (well, I have a plan but it's a secret) to help this country but I intend to raise taxes significantly if I am elected. (Source: Every major news media, based on what he has promised.)

My wealth so far exceeds that of my counterpart, George Bush, that he will never catch up. I make no or little charitable contributions and have never agreed to pay any voluntary excess taxes in MA, despite family wealth in excess of $700 million. (Source: Campaign Disclosure Act)

I (we) own 28 manufacturing plants (Heinz) outside of the U.S. in places like Asia, Mexico and Europe.(Source: US News and World Report, Time) We can make more profit from the cheaper cost of labor in those Countries, although I like to blame George Bush for sending all of the jobs out of the US.

I claim to be in favor of alternative energy sources, while! Ted Kennedy and I oppose windmills off Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard as it might spoil our view of the ocean as we cruise on our yachts. (Source: Boston Globe)

RECORDS AND REFERENCES:

Name one thing that I have done in my 20+ years in Congress that is noteworthy PERSONAL I ride a Serotta Bike.* My Gulfstream V Jet, I call The Flying Squirrel.* I call my $850,000 42-foot Hinckley twin diesel yacht! The "Scarmouche." * I am fascinated by rap and hip-hop and feel it reflects our real culture. (Source: Time)

I own several "Large" SUVs including one parked at my Nantucket summer mansion, though I am against large polluting inefficient vehicles and blame George Bush for the energy problems. I also own an Audi but I told the auto workers union I only buy US made vehicles. (Source: Time )

PLEASE CONSIDER MY EXPERIENCE WHEN VOTING IN 2004


Comment:
With the left and people like Kerry we don't even need to "smear" the truth...

See, I can cut and paste too... There are many more where that came from. CI

Rex Red- No wonder the American people turned him down. Kerry is a fraud. Your evidence shows it clearly.

Oh, you don't want to get into a cut and paste war with c.i., RR.

His ability to cut and paste is surpassed only by the prolific BBB.

Ticomaya- Yes, Mr. Imposter can cut and paste but his cut and pastes are not very accurate. He does a terrible job of picking accurate sources.

He lists a source which quotes from A PLAN OF ATTACK by Woodward. In that book President Bush is quoted as saying to Secretary Rumsfeld--What kind of a war plan do you have for Iraq? How do you feel about the war plan for Iraq?

Rumsfeld replied: I am concerned about all of our war plans. Woodward noted that He( Rumsfeld ) was reviewing all 68( sixty eight) of the department's secret war AND OTHER CONTINGENCY PLANS world wide and had for months.

Perhaps, Mr. Imposter does not know the meaning of the word-Contingency.

There is nothing more anti-Christ than the American conservative agenda. Anyone who calls him/herself a Christian...especially the folks who make a big display of it...who identifies him/herself as an American conservative...is spitting in the face of Jesus.

It's pretty funny though. Here you have a movie that is based on as about as good research and information as Fahrenheit 911, and produced by a dedicated liberal ([size=7]nutcase[/size]) type that some other good liberals are going to have to run against. But they have to buy into a global warming crisis too as they campaign against more conservative candidates that take a more sensible view about that. And every time they do, Gore can use them to illustrate how they agree with him.

It's going to be fun to watch.

Just when did the swift boaters write that Kerry resume? Kerry is a great American with a mountain of accomplishments. Moreover, he is a certified combat hero.

Now let's talk about Bush. * * *

Who said I voted for Kerry?