On October 27, 1992, the Senate committee heard expert testimony that revealed that "dozens of United States firms, many holding United States export licenses, contributed directly to Iraq's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program, let alone its chemical weapons." The same hearings revealed that the Commerce Department "approved at least 220 export licenses for the Iraqi armed forces, major weapons complexes and enterprises identified by the Central Intelligence Agency as diverting technology to weapons programs."[1] US officials could have no doubt as to the end users of such exports, since they knew their destination.
Assumed and often articulated in these hearings were the interests at stake in US policy?-the role of oil and the value of the Iraqi market for US agribusiness and high-tech defense industries. The pursuit of such interests was at the root of US courting of the regime of Saddam Hussein, irrespective of its record of aggression and domestic repression.
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/gendzier.html
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We allowed and encouraged American corporations to do business with Saddam in the 1980s. That's how he got chemical and biological agents so he could use them in chemical and biological weapons. Here's the list of some of the stuff we sent him (according to a 1994 U.S. Senate report):
* Bacillus Anthracis, cause of anthrax.
* Clostridium Botulinum, a source of botulinum toxin.
* Histoplasma Capsulatam, cause of a disease attacking lungs, brain, spinal cord, and heart.
* Brucella Melitensis, a bacteria that can damage major organs.
* Clostridium Perfringens, a highly toxic bacteria causing systemic illness.
* Clostridium tetani, a highly toxigenic substance.
And here are some of the American corporations who helped to prop Saddam up by doing business with him: AT&T, Bechtel, Caterpillar, Dow Chemical, Dupont, Kodak, Hewlett-Packard, and IBM (for a full list of companies and descriptions of how they helped Saddam, go to:
www.laweekly.com/ink/03/23/news-crogan.php )
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Gary Pitts, a Houston attorney, has sued American and European companies for supplying Iraq's program to build weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations and the United States have so far refused to disclose publicly all the companies named by Iraq in U.N. documents as suppliers for its weapons programs. Pitts then sent his consultant, Scott Ritter, a former U.N. weapons inspector, to Baghdad. Ritter returned with a copy of Iraq's 1997 weapons declaration to the U.N., which Pitts is now incorporating into his lawsuit.
http://www.laweekly.com/general/features/made-in-the-usa/3025/
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Since 1980, U.S. policy has been to deny export licenses for
commercial sales of defense items to Iraq, except when the items were
for the protection of the head of state. As a result of the
exception, license applications valued at $48 million were approved.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has not made any foreign military
sales to Iraq since 1967. In contrast, U.S. policy toward Iraq for
sales of dual-use items (items that have both civilian and military
uses) was not constrained by national security controls, and there
were few applicable foreign policy controls until August 1990. Thus,
the Department of Commerce approved the licenses for exporting $1.5
billion of dual-use items to Iraq between 1985 and 1990.
Available information showed two cases of unauthorized transfers of
U.S. military items to Iraq by Middle East countries. Although
three other Middle East countries and one of the other countries had
proposed to serve as transshipment points of military equipment for
Iraq, the proposals were turned down by the Department of State.
There were also two additional cases of diversion to Iraq by two of
the three other countries, and one case of possible diversion-related
activity by the third. While this data does not suggest patterns of
diversion, we were unable to determine whether other unauthorized
transfers were made.
Because of sovereign political sensitivities, we were unable to visit
UAE to conduct a physical inspection; therefore, we could not
determine whether the U.S.-origin mortar bomb fuses shipped to UAE
were diverted to Iraq. We, therefore, recommended that the U.S.
Ambassador use an alternative method to verify that the fuses are
still in UAE's possession. After issuance of our classified report,
the U.S. Embassy in UAE reported that its personnel verified that
the U.S.-origin mortar bomb fuses shipped to UAE were not diverted to
Iraq.
http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9498.htm