Just because I suspect this story isn't going away, I'll post this from the Investor Daily. As it is an unsigned editorial, we can assume that it is the official opinion of that publication.
Issues & Insights
Downplaying Poison
Posted 6/30/2006
WMD: The head of the House intelligence panel is calling the national intelligence director to task for misrepresenting the discovery of chemical munitions in Iraq. Why is the intelligence establishment playing games?
A strongly worded letter sent last week by Rep. Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., complained to John Negroponte about a June 21 press briefing that Negroponte's office organized and in which unidentified intelligence officials made "inaccurate, incomplete and occasionally misleading comments" to reporters.
Reporters were told that CIA weapons inspectors in Iraq weren't interested in weapons of mass destruction produced before the 1991 Gulf War. "This assertion is demonstrably false," Hoekstra wrote, and he quoted from the Transmittal Message to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report.
The report said inspectors were looking "to provide facts and meaning concerning the regime's experience with WMD" and "a dynamic analysis rather than simple static accounting of the debris found following Operation Iraqi Freedom."
Portions of a National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) report made public last month revealed that about 500 rocket and artillery shells were found in Iraq since 2003 containing the lethal nerve agent sarin or mustard gas.
A tiny dose of sarin can kill almost instantly. Mustard gas, which produces no immediate symptoms, can cause an area to remain contaminated for days. In the 1980s, Iraq used both chemicals against Iran and against Iraq's Kurds.
Saddam Hussein killed many thousands of Iranians and Iraqis with these chemical weapons. According to the ISG, on the eve of his ouster, Saddam's regime could manufacture large quantities of sulfur mustard in three to six months and of sarin in two years.
Sen. Rick Santorum, R-Pa., asked the Army for the NGIC document back in April, but got no response. Early last month he personally asked Negroponte, who also failed to reply. Hoekstra then stepped in and got Negroponte's office to declassify parts of the NGIC report. Why the foot-dragging?
At a House Armed Services Committee hearing Thursday, the Defense Intelligence Agency head, Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, said that although the Iraqi chemical weapons were in degraded condition, they were still "a danger in Iraq for those who could come in contact with them." Use "outside of Iraq could not be ruled out," he added.
The NGIC commander, Col. John Chiu, testified that "regardless of the purity . . . any remaining agent is toxic, with potential to be lethal."
The ISG's 2004 Duelfer Report documented Saddam's ability and willingness to use chemical weapons again. Among the findings:
Saddam's government intended to resume all banned weapons programs once sanctions against Iraq were lifted.
Saddam considered chemical warfare "a proven weapon against an enemy's superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already ?- during the Iran-Iraq War ?- and . . . deterred the coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad."
The U.N.'s oil-for-food program "sparked a flow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied to . . . Iraq's chemical industry."
"The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge base needed to restart a CW (chemical weapons) program."
Hardware found by the ISG "suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experimental CW rounds."
The head of the Iraqi paramilitary force tried to obtain chemical weapons for use during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) from 1991 to 2003 maintained "a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations." Those labs could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue R&D or small CW production.
Saddam's IIS program used human subjects for testing.
The Bush administration did not lie about WMD so we could go to war. In liberating Iraq, the U.S. ousted a dictator who already committed genocide against fellow Muslims using chemical weapons.
CIA elites now seem worried about evoking snickers on the Washington cocktail party circuit by telling the plain and simple truth about the lethal weapons we've found in Iraq. Both Negroponte and new CIA Director Michael Hayden should start realizing that withholding these facts is poison to America in time of war.
SOURCE