MEASURABLE PROGRESS IN IRAQ TOWARD THE IRAQ SOLUTION -- AS OF May 21, 2006
The USA and Iraq's solution is to establish a democracy in Iraq secured by the Iraqis themselves. Iraq and the USA have completed six of eight steps toward their solution:
(1) Select an initial Iraq government to hold a first election;
(2) Establish and begin training an Iraq self-defense military;
(3) Hold a democratic election of an interim government whose primary function is to write a proposed constitution for a new Iraq democratic government;
(4) Submit that proposed constitution to Iraq voters for approval or disapproval;
(5) After approval by Iraq voters of an Iraq democratic government constitution, hold under that constitution a first election of the members of that government;
(6) After that election, organize the newly elected Iraq government;
(7) Train, as specified by the new Iraq government, an Iraq military to secure that Iraq government;
(8) After the Iraq government is secured, remove the USA military from Iraq in a phased withdrawal.
The USA will withdraw from Iraq in phases in harmony with the evolution of Iraq's self-governance. As a consequence, both Iraqis and Americans will in their mutual self-interest achieve the following goals:
(A) Stop the terrorists and Saddamists from threatening Iraq's democracy;
(B) Enable Iraqi security forces to protect their own people;
(C) Prevent Iraq from becoming a potential safe haven for terrorists to plot attacks against the USA and other countries.
I say the anti-USA cacklers are single-dimensional analysts determined to convince us multi-dimensional analysts that whatever the USA does is bad.
I say the anti-USA cacklers are single-dimensional analysts determined to convince us multi-dimensional analysts that whatever the USA does is bad.
Why are they so determined to do that? What's in it for them?
Shi'ite resurgence? (2005)
Two years after the fall of Saddam's regime in Iraq, it is safe to ask: Who were the real victors in this bloody war of the Middle East in 2003? At first glance, the only victors were George W Bush and the neo-conservatives at the White House. A closer look would show, however, that Iran as well, ironically, has a lot to gain from the new Middle East.
Or more specifically, the real victors are the Shi'ites of Iran and the Muslim world. They will enjoy the fruits of the post-Saddam order long after Bush's army leaves Iraq. This region, many fear, is now dominated by a "Shi'ite crescent" uniting the Shi'ites of Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and the Arab Gulf region.
Fear of this threat was first used by King Abdullah of Jordan in an interview with the Washington Post last December, arousing anger of the Shi'ite community in the Arab world. Actually, the fear of a "crescent" in this part of the world dates back to the 1950s, when Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Sa'id talked about a "fertile crescent" plan for the Middle East, to unite Iraq with Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan, in a federal union to be ruled by the Hashemite family in Baghdad.
This plan, lobbied for extensively in Amman and Baghdad, was received with cold shivers in Damascus, Beirut, Cairo and Riyadh. The "crescent" remains, but players and roles have shifted over the past 50 years. Today's "crescent" is lobbied for extensively by its Iranian creator, and supported by Baghdad, parts of Beirut and Damascus, while it is being spurned in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen and Kuwait. Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GD20Ak01.html
"Victory"? Forget it
Bush is trying to keep Americans from abandoning his disastrous war by claiming victory is at hand. But even his own generals know that's a lie.
By Sidney Blumenthal
05/25/06 "Salon" -- -- When new Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-Maliki unveiled his government last week, five months after his country's elections, and was unable to appoint ministers of defense and interior, President Bush hailed it as a "turning point." And that was just one month after Maliki's mentor, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari, to whom he had been loyal deputy, installed in the position through the support of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, was forced to relinquish his office through U.S. pressure.
Bush has been proclaiming Iraq at a turning point for years. "Turning point" is a frequent and recurring talking point, often taken up by the full chorus of the president ("We've reached another great turning point," Nov. 6, 2003; "A turning point will come in less than two weeks," June 18, 2004), vice president ("I think about when we look back and get some historical perspective on this period, I'll believe that the period we were in through 2005 was, in fact, a turning point," Feb. 7, 2006), secretary of state and secretary of defense, and ringing down the echo chamber.
This latest "turning point" reveals an Iraqi state without a social contract, a government without a center, a prime minister without power and an American president without a strategy. Each sectarian group maintains its own militia. Each leader's influence rests on these armed bands, separate armies of tens of thousands of men. The militias have infiltrated and taken over key units of the Iraqi army and local police, using them as death squads, protection rackets and deterrent forces against enemies. Reliable statistics are impossible, but knowledgeable reporters estimate there are about 40 assassinations a day in Iraq. Ethnic cleansing is sweeping the country. From Kirkuk in the north to Baghdad in the middle to Basra in the south, Kurds are driving out Turkmen and Arabs, Shiites are killing Sunnis, and the insurgency enjoys near unanimous support among Sunnis. Contrary to Bush's blanket rhetoric about "terrorists" and constant reference to the insurgency as "the enemy," "foreign fighters are a small component of the insurgency," according to Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Patrick Cockburn, one of the most accurate and intrepid journalists in Iraq, wrote last week in the Independent of London that "the overall security situation in Iraq is far worse than it was a year ago. Baghdad and central Iraq, where Shia, Sunni and Kurd are mixed, is in the grip of a civil war fought by assassins and death squads. As in Bosnia in 1992, each community is pulling back into enclaves where it is the overwhelming majority and able to defend itself."
While Prime Minister Maliki has declared his intention to enforce an unused militia-demobilization decree proclaimed by the now disbanded Coalition Provisional Authority in 2004, he has made no gesture beyond his statement, and no Iraqi leader has volunteered to be the first test case of demobilization. The New York Times Wednesday cited an American official on the absence of action on this front: "'They need to begin by setting examples,' an American official in Baghdad said of the Iraqi government. 'It is just very noticeable to me that they are not making any examples.' 'None,' the official said. 'Zero.'"
Maliki's inability to fill the posts of minister of defense and minister of the interior reflects the control of the means of violence by factions and sects unwilling to cede it to a central authority. Inside the new government, ministries are being operated as sectarian fiefdoms. The vacuum at the Defense and Interior ministries represents a state of civil war in which no one can be vested with power above all.
In his speech on Monday referring to another "turning point," President Bush twice spoke of "victory." "Victory" is the constant theme he has adopted since last summer, when he hired public opinion specialist Peter Feaver for the National Security Council. Feaver's research claims that the public will sustain military casualties so long as it is persuaded that they will lead to "victory." Bush clings to this P.R. formula to explain, at least to himself, the decline of his political fortunes. "Because we're at war, and war unsettles people," he said in an interview with NBC News last week. To make sense of the disconcerting war, he imposes his familiar framework of us vs. them, "the enemy" who gets "on your TV screen by killing innocent people" against himself.
In his Monday speech, Bush reverted yet again to citing Sept. 11, 2001, as the ultimate justification for the Iraq war. Defiant in the face of terrorists, he repeated whole paragraphs from his 2004 campaign stump speech. "That's just the lessons of September the 11th that I refuse to forget," he said. Stung by the dissent of the former commanders of the U.S. Army in Iraq who have demanded the firing of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Bush reassured the audience that he listens to generals. "I make my mind up based not upon politics or political opinion polls, but based upon what the commanders on the ground tell me is going on," he said.
Yet currently serving U.S. military commanders have been explicitly telling him for more than two years, and making public their view, that there is no purely military solution in Iraq. For example, Gen. John Abizaid, the U.S. commander, said on April 12, 2004: "There is not a purely U.S. military solution to any of the particular problems that we're facing here in Iraq today."
Newsweek reported this week that the U.S. military, in fact, is no longer pursuing a strategy for "victory." "It is consolidating to several 'superbases' in hopes that its continued presence will prevent Iraq from succumbing to full-flown civil war and turning into a failed state. Pentagon strategists admit they have not figured out how to move to superbases, as a way of reducing the pressure -- and casualties -- inflicted on the U.S. Army, while at the same time remaining embedded with Iraqi police and military units. It is a circle no one has squared. But consolidation plans are moving ahead as a default position, and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has talked frankly about containing the spillover from Iraq's chaos in the region."
Yet Bush continues to declare as his goal (with encouragement from his polling expert on the NSC) the victory that the U.S. military has given up on. And he continues to wave the banner of a military solution against "the enemy," although this "enemy" consists of a Sunni insurgency whose leadership must eventually be conciliated and brought into a federal Iraqi government and of which the criminal Abu Musab al-Zarqawi faction and foreign fighters are a small part.
Bush's belief in a military solution, moreover, renders moot progress on a political solution, which is the only potentially practical approach. His war on the Sunnis simply agitates the process of civil war. The entire burden of progress falls on the U.S. ambassador, whose inherent situation as representative of the occupying power inside the country limits his ability to engage in the international diplomacy that might make his efforts to bring factions together possible. Khalilzad's tentative outreach to Iran, in any case, was shut down by Washington. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for her part, finds herself in Bulgaria, instead of conducting shuttle diplomacy in Amman, Jordan; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Ankara, Turkey; and Tehran. The diplomatic vacuum intensifies the power vacuum in Iraq, exciting Bush's flights of magical thinking about victory: I speak, therefore it is.
Bush doesn't know that he can't achieve victory. He doesn't know that seeking victory worsens his prospects. He doesn't know that the U.S. military has abandoned victory in the field, though it has been reporting that to him for years. But the president has no rhetoric beyond "victory."
Bush's chance for a quick victory in Iraq evaporated when the neoconservative fantasy collapsed almost immediately after the invasion. But the "make-believe" of "liberation" that failed to provide basic security set in motion "fratricidal violence," as Nir Rosen writes in his new book, "In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq," based on firsthand observation of the developing insurgency in the vacuum created by U.S. policy.
Indeed, Bush's nominee for director of the CIA, Gen. Michael Hayden, former director of the National Security Agency, in his confirmation hearings, acknowledged the neoconservative manipulation of intelligence to make the case for the Iraq war and disdained it. Asked by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., about the administration's efforts to tie Saddam Hussein to al-Qaida, Hayden replied: "Sir, I -- as director of NSA, we did have a series of inquiries about this potential connection between al Qaeda and the Iraqi government. Yes, sir."
The exchange continued:
Levin: Now, prior to the war, the undersecretary of defense for policy, Mr. [Douglas] Feith, established an intelligence analysis cell within his policy office at the Defense Department. While the intelligence community was consistently dubious about links between Iraq and al Qaeda, Mr. Feith produced an alternative analysis, asserting that there was a strong connection. Were you comfortable with Mr. Feith's office's approach to intelligence analysis?
Hayden: No, sir, I wasn't. I wasn't aware of a lot of the activity going on, you know, when it was contemporaneous with running up to the war. No, sir, I wasn't comfortable.
Hayden then explained at length the difference between working from the facts and trying to cherry-pick data to support a hypothesis. He made clear that the administration had engaged in the latter. Levin asked: "Now, I believe that you actually placed a disclaimer on NSA reporting relative to any links between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. And it was apparently following the repeated inquiries from the Feith office. Would you just tell us what that disclaimer was?" Hayden answered: "Yes, sir. SIGINT neither confirms nor denies -- and let me stop at that point in the sentence so we can stay safely on the side of unclassified. SIGINT neither confirms nor denies, and then we finished the sentence based upon the question that was asked. And then we provided the data, sir." In the language of the agency, in other words, Hayden would not lend support to the Bush's administration's twisting of intelligence.
On May 15, Karl Rove, Bush's chief political advisor, gave a speech revealing one of his ideas about politics. "I think," he said, "there's also a great utility in looking at game changers. What are the things that will allow us to fundamentally change people's behavior in a different way?" Since Sept. 11, Rove has made plain that terrorism and war are the great game changers for Bush.
But while war may be the game changer for Bush's desire to put in place a one-party state, forge a permanent Republican majority, redefine the Constitution and the relationships of the branches of the federal government, and concentrate power in the executive, Bush has only the rhetoric of "victory." He has not stated what would happen the day after "victory." Although a victory parade would be his political nightmare, now the absence of victory is his nightmare. With every proclaimed "turning point," "victory" becomes ever more evanescent. He has no policy for victory and no politics beyond victory.
Ican asked:Quote:I say the anti-USA cacklers are single-dimensional analysts determined to convince us multi-dimensional analysts that whatever the USA does is bad.
Why are they so determined to do that? What's in it for them?
...
By ROBERT BURNS, AP Military Writer
32 minutes ago
WASHINGTON - Investigators believe that their criminal investigation into the deaths of about two dozen Iraqi civilians points toward a conclusion that Marines committed unprovoked murders, a senior defense official said Friday.
The Marine Corps initially reported 15 deaths and said they were caused by a roadside bomb and an ensuing firefight with insurgents. A separate investigation is seeking to determine if Marines lied to cover up the killings.
The official, who discussed the matter on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the yet-to-be-completed investigation, said the evidence developed by investigators strongly indicates the killings last November in the insurgent-plagued city of Haditha in the western province of Anbar were unjustified.
The official did not disclose specific evidence. The incident, if confirmed, could be the most serious case of criminal misconduct by U.S. troops during three years of combat in Iraq.
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 22202
April 20, 2006
On April 13, 2006, a message posted in Arabic on a web forum explained how to identify private American jets and urged Muslims to destroy all such aircraft:
>>Destroy private American aircraft:; We call upon all Muslims to follow and identify private civilian American aircrafts in all airports of the world;It is the duty of Muslims to destroy all types of private American aircrafts that are of the types Gulf Stream and Lear Jet and all small jet aircraft usually used by distinguished (people) and businessmen.
The message also advised readers how to identify American aircraft and provided the tail number of a private aircraft allegedly used by the CIA.
TSA reminds general aviation aircraft and airport owners and operators to review the security measures contained in the TSA Information Publication, Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports (available at http://www.tsa.gov/public/interapp/editorial/editorial_1113.xml), and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association’s Airport Watch Program materials (available at www.aopa.org/airportwatch). In addition, general aviation aircraft and airport owners and operators are encouraged to consider the following:
* Secure unattended aircraft to prevent unauthorized use.
* Verify the identification of crew and passengers prior to departure.
* Verify that baggage and cargo are known to the persons on board.
* Where identification systems are in place, encourage employees to wear proper identification and challenge persons not wearing proper identification.
* Direct increased vigilance to unknown pilots and/or clients for aircraft rental or charters – as well as unknown service/delivery personnel.
* Be alert/aware of and report persons masquerading as pilots, security personnel, emergency medical technicians, or other personnel using uniforms and/or vehicles as methods to gain access to aviation facilities or aircraft.
* Be alert/aware of and report aircraft with unusual or unauthorized modifications.
* Be alert/aware of and report persons loitering in the vicinity of aircraft or air operations areas – as well as persons loading unusual or unauthorized payload onto aircraft.
* Be alert/aware of and report persons who appear to be under stress or the control of other persons.
* Be alert/aware of and report persons whose identification appears altered or inconsistent.
The theft of any General Aviation aircraft should be immediately reported to the appropriate authorities and the TSA General Aviation Hotline at 866-GASECUR (866-427-3287). In addition, persons should report any suspicious activity immediately to local law enforcement and the TSA General Aviation Hotline.
I SAY AGAIN the anti-USA cacklers are single-dimensional analysts determined to convince us multi-dimensional analysts that whatever the USA does is bad.
Why are they so determined to do that? What's in it for them?
ONE DIMENSIONAL ANALYSTS
We're going to bring democracy to the Middle East.
TWO DIMENSIONAL ANALYSTS
Major combat operations are now over.
THREE DIMENSIONAL ANALYSTS
Bring them on!
FOUR DIMENSIONAL ANALYSTS
While the country continues its show its disapproval of Bush's performance on Iraq. Bush continues his rhetoric of "we're making progress" as tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis are killed, over 2,400 of our military killed, over 16,000 wounded, and now costing some two billion every week. All this, while terrorism has increased across the globe.
Progresss is great, isn't it? Are we ready to start a war in Iran?
I say the anti-USA cacklers are single-dimensional analysts determined to convince us multi-dimensional analysts that whatever the USA does is bad.
Why are they so determined to do that? What's in it for them?
I BELIEVE there are four kinds of analysts of current processes: one dimensional; two dimensional; three dimensional; and four dimensional.
ONE DIMENSIONAL ANALYSTS
Focus exclusively on showing that the process is bad, or focus excusively on showing the process is good.
TWO DIMENSIONAL ANALYSTS
Focus on showing whether the process is more bad than good, or more good than bad.
THREE DIMENSIONAL ANALYSTS
Focus on determining whether the process is better or worse than one or more alternative processes.
FOUR DIMENSIONAL ANALYSTS
Focus on determining whether over time the process will evolve to be better or worse than one or more alternative processes.
THE ANTI-USA CACKLERS SAY:
1. We're bad because we will stay;
2. We're bad because we will leave;
3. We're bad because we say we're going to stay, but actually will leave;
4. We're bad because we say we're going to leave, but actually will stay.
I SAY AGAIN the anti-USA cacklers are single-dimensional analysts determined to convince us multi-dimensional analysts that whatever the USA does is bad.
Why are they so determined to do that? What's in it for them?
Yenny Wahid
Daughter of Islam
By NANCY DE WOLF SMITH
February 25, 2006; Page A10Wall Street Journal
WASHINGTON -- Yenny Wahid has a smile that could melt a Hershey bar at 100 yards. Her sunny disposition is all the more remarkable because Ms. Wahid is on what may be the world's most difficult mission right now: She's a prominent Muslim (and a woman at that) who speaks out against terror and the hijacking of her religion by ideologues who twist it to their own political ends.
After 9/11, many Americans assume that the radical Islamic agenda is to destroy the U.S. The reality is that attacks on Western targets are designed to function as brutal propaganda coups that will attract recruits to the cause of violent revolution. The main goal of ideologues like Osama bin Laden is to topple the governments of Muslim countries, including, most famously, the Wahabi royal regime of Saudi Arabia. But the real strategic plum, Ms. Wahid says, would be her native Indonesia and its 220 million citizens -- with the largest Muslim population on earth.
"We are the ultimate target," she told me in Washington during a trip to the U.S. earlier this month. "The real battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims is happening in Indonesia, not anywhere else. And that's why the world should focus on Indonesia and help."
Think of it as a potential domino whose fall would be felt far beyond Asia. "It's big enough to destabilize the region," Ms. Wahid notes. But "imagine if Indonesia became a hotbed for terrorism, or a source for people to get martyrs from. We've got enough people to provide an army of terrorists if we're not careful."
At present, Ms. Wahid calls that a "worst-case, doomsday scenario," and she is probably correct, given Indonesia's history of moderate, syncretic Islam, with elements from the region's Hindu and Buddhist past. While there have been demonstrations there over the Danish cartoons that lampooned the prophet Muhammad, they have generally involved a only few hundred people. By contrast, Ms. Wahid points out, a December rally she helped organize under the banner of "Islam for Peace" attracted some 12,000 marchers.
* * *
At the head of that crowd, riding in a wheelchair alongside Ms. Wahid, was her father, Abdurrahman Wahid, the respected and beloved Islamic scholar who headed Indonesia's largest Muslim cultural organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), before becoming the first president of newly democratic Indonesia from 1999 to 2001. In a seminal article for this newspaper -- "Right Islam vs. Wrong Islam" -- Mr. Wahid wrote on Dec. 30 that "a terrible danger threatens humanity" in the form of "an extreme and perverse ideology" that grossly distorts the true meaning of the religion. He called on fellow Muslims to end the "complicity of silence" about terrorism and other acts of intolerance which characterize the radicals' behavior.
At 31, Yenny Wahid -- her real name is Zannuba -- is trying to follow her father's example and defend the values their faith teaches. Educated in Indonesia, she got a Master's degree in public administration from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in 2002. Her ease in Western surroundings is apparent not merely from the snappy cream-colored pantsuit she was wearing when we met but also from her elegantly accented English.
She is active in the NU's political wing, the National Awakening Party, and an adviser to Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The job most dear to her heart, however, is running the Wahid Foundation -- named after her father -- which works to promote, in the words of its Web site (at www.wahidinstitute.org <http> ), "democratic reform, religious pluralism, multiculturalism and tolerance amongst Muslims" and reflects "a universal Islam [that] desires justice and prosperity for all."
The key word may be prosperity. Indonesia, which was on its way to Asian Tigerhood until the currency crisis of 1997-98, has not recovered from the economic meltdown that coincided with the fall of the Suharto dictatorship. The country is a democracy now, but a struggling one to which few investors have returned. It also has a free press, among the friskiest in Asia. Yet the new openness has also paved the way for vocal opponents of Indonesia's traditional secular approach to government -- voices previously suppressed -- and they are gaining ground.
It is still politically incorrect to call for an Islamic state; and the mainstream press, along with the vast majority of Indonesians, vigorously supports efforts to fight and arrest terrorists such as the ones who perpetrated the Bali and Marriott hotel bombings of 2002 and 2003. Even so, Ms. Wahid says, the fear of being labeled un-Islamic has become intimidating to many moderate political candidates. Radicals who want to install an Islamic regime -- those who dream of violence while many ordinary religious conservatives still do not -- also are operating in an economic milieu not unlike the one communists exploited in poor countries a generation ago.
Poverty and a lack of education make millions of Indonesians desperate, and easy, targets, Ms. Wahid says. "After the fall of Suharto, people expected democracy would solve all their problems. But of course it takes a long time for things to fall into their right places, and people are not patient. They want a quick answer. So there is this sense of democracy-fatigue in Indonesia. And my fear is if people are willing to entertain the idea of Islam, and an Islamic state, as an alternative solution to governing, because they are so frustrated by the level of corruption . . . we'd be in big trouble."
Ms. Wahid is not imagining things. She points to other examples: "This is exactly the issue that just happened in Palestine. Because Hamas managed to portray themselves as the clean party. We do have parties like that as well [in Indonesia], like Hamas."
Well-financed radicals have already infiltrated at least some of Indonesia's traditional religious boarding schools, or pesantren. For poor rural families especially, these schools -- called madrassas in other Muslim countries -- are the only way to see that their sons get decent food and clothing. Yet even the majority of pesantren that teach a moderate form of Islam turn out young clerics who find it difficult to make a living in the outside world. This is one reason, Ms. Wahid believes, that Indonesia's mosques have become a potent trouble zone.
"The market for these preachers is quite limited, and you get to be the top preacher by being the preacher with a sexy message. A sexy message can be very inflammatory: 'Christians are the ones that created all these problems for you guys -- kill them!' Friday prayer is an obligation for men, so it has become a very effective medium to propagandize with preachings that are just very, very hateful toward non-Muslims."
Like her famous father and other influential clerics in Indonesia, Ms. Wahid is trying to hold the line against this trend. Their task, as she sees it, is to remind Indonesians of the true teachings of Islam and its sacred texts. "One thing for sure is that [radicals] have a very distorted view of what religion should be," she says. "Killing people meaning glory? It's lunacy. We do discuss these things, we hold conferences, for instance on the word 'jihad' and how it's been used and abused throughout history. The prophet Muhammad said the greatest jihad is against yourself, how to make yourself a better person. It's not . . . running to kill people."
For a true definition of martyrdom, she points to the sacrifice of Riyanto, a young man dispatched with other members of the Nahdlatul Ulama youth militia during Christmas several years ago to guard churches threatened with attacks. When he discovered a bomb outside a church, he tried to throw it out of the way of the crowds and was killed when it blew up. Ms. Wahid and others mark the anniversary of his death every year. "We always tell this message: This is the real case of martyrdom. That's the way to defend religion, not by killing others but by defending others' rights to practice their religion."
As uplifting as her story is, Ms. Wahid cannot speak to Indonesians with the same authority as her father, whose power to influence public opinion derives in part from his credentials as an Islamic scholar. However, Abdurrahman Wahid is 65, blind and frail. The NU organization where he remains a towering figure may have 40 million members, but there are power struggles under way inside the group, and no guarantee that its future leaders will be as wise and outspoken as he has been.
Ms. Wahid is doing what she can to help a new generation follow in her father's footsteps, through the Wahid Foundation. It involves "trying to . . . identify these young leaders, young clerics with same-minded beliefs, and connect them with one another and provide them with something, a house, so that they can come out and speak. An army of able, dedicated young men who can talk in a unified message of tolerant and peaceful Islam."
That's an ambitious project, and Ms. Wahid says Indonesia cannot prepare for the future without help. It needs foreign investors "willing to take the risk," and more contact with the West on every level -- including contact as rudimentary as instruction in English that will enable people to pull themselves out of poverty. The Wahid Foundation, for instance, has a program that tries to arrange micro-loans in rural communities.
She's not surprised when I point out that calling for foreign investment in a country with Indonesia's financial reputation is a tall order. "This is a difficult period for us," she admits, "but this is a win-win situation for all. We have all these resources, we have a population of 220 million, a big market. As for rule of law . . . we're trying to simplify the bureaucracy, the red tape and there have been many corruption cases brought to court. The wheels of justice are starting."
Given the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism, ignoring Indonesia could quickly become a lose-lose situation. If for no other reason, she says, "the world has an interest in making Indonesia a stable country politically and economically so that people do not entertain this idea that an Islamic state is a solution to their problems. When people are hungry, when people are poor, they can do drastic things."
One could argue that by openly resisting the ideology of Islamic extremists, Ms. Wahid herself is taking a drastic step, albeit one born of courage, not desperation. When I asked her where she got the strength to speak the truth at a time when many prefer to remain silent, she beamed and said: "This is the real thing that defines people of faith. I have faith in God. That's enough for my father, and enough for myself."
Ms. Smith is a member of the Journal's editorial board.
People like ican are blind and dumb; they can't see the increase in the violence/killings of Iraqis against Iraqis. Their political leaders and police are getting killed almost every day. Bushco continues to call this "progress."
...
NON-COMBATANT IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED BY VIOLENCE
The number of non-combatant civilians killed by violence since 01/01/2000, as of:
12/31/2002 (1096 days) -- total = 56,049 -- approximate average monthly rate / daily rate = 1,556.9 / 51.1.
The number of non-combatant civilians killed by violence since 01/01/2003, as of:
12/31/2005 (1095 days) -- total = 31,319 -- approximate average monthly rate / daily rate = 870.0 / 28.6.
Note: Less than 8,000 of these non-combatant civilians killed by violence, since 01/01/2003 as of 12/31/2005, were killed by coalition forces.
The number of non-combatant civilians killed by violence since 01/01/2003, as of:
01/31/2006 (1126 days) -- total = 31,928 -- approximate average monthly rate / daily rate = 862.9 / 28.4;
02/28/2006 (1154 days) -- total = 32,506 -- approximate average monthly rate / daily rate = 855.4 / 28.2;
03/31/2006 (1185 days) -- total = 38,161 -- approximate average monthly rate / daily rate = 978.5 / 32.2;
04/30/2006 (1215 days) -- total = 39,024 -- approximate average monthly rate / daily rate = 975.6 / 32.1.
The total number of non-combatant civilians killed by violence since 01/01/2003, as of 5/18/2006 = 42,288 in 1233 days -- approximate average monthly rate / daily rate = 1042.1 / 34.3.
