THE US, THE UN AND IRAQ, TENTH THREAD.

Now, the contradictions?

Petraeus Time
By Reuel Marc Gerecht
Wall Street Journal
Publication Date: January 17, 2007

Can one back President Bush's new strategy in Iraq? Yes. For all its serious faults, his new approach is the first one since the fall of Baghdad to offer a chance to reverse the radicalization of Iraq. But it needs revision quickly.

Too much of this new plan leaves unchanged the disastrous approach of John Abizaid and George Casey, the two top generals on Iraq. The new offensive, assuming it doesn't peter out through a slow arrival of soldiers, or become enfeebled by "Iraqi leadership" in its execution, envisions a too-small U.S. force doing too much. Recent remarks by Defense Secretary Robert Gates--predicting troop reductions within a year, and saying that we might not need an additional five brigades in Baghdad for a successful operation--are a frightening echo of the self-defeating, undermanned optimism that came from the U.S. military under Mr. Gates's predecessor.

* * *

The good news is that by emphasizing a military, not political, strategy to diminish Iraq's debilitating violence, the president has correctly set aside one of the primary factors destroying the Shiite Arab center. While waiting for a "political solution" to the Sunni insurgency, we watched Shiite timidity and patience turn to anger--and to a revenge which now threatens the integrity of the Shiite-led Iraqi government. Gens. Abizaid and Casey had gambled that they could stand up an effective Iraqi military and police against the Sunnis before violence threatened everything in Baghdad. That bet collapsed with the destruction of the Shiite shrine in Samarra in February 2006--but the administration kept playing the same hand as if nothing had happened. The reversal of this soft-power, politics-not-troops mentality is an essential step forward.

Still, David Petraeus, who will succeed Gen. Casey as the overall boss in Iraq and who is one of America's finest, most adaptable commanders, may have to perform a miracle to compensate for this shortfall in manpower, especially if the required five brigades for Baghdad take months to arrive, and if Washington allows the offensive to move forward before he is even in charge. The president can preempt these lethal problems by ensuring Gen. Petraeus's rapid arrival in Iraq and by allowing him to determine how many soldiers he needs.

Nevertheless, there is a dismaying hesitancy in the military's and the White House's deliberations on this conflict. Although the president wants a new approach, the Pentagon, the State Department and even the National Security Council appear wedded to the past. The contradiction between what the president says and what his government does has never been greater. We need to move rapidly: The enemy is digging in and the drift to full-scale civil war is gaining speed.

The administration needs to rethink its understanding of Iraqi culture and politics, as the "new" strategy still contains ideas that have catastrophically guided American officials in the Green Zone ever since Sunni Arab insurgents started killing Americans in significant numbers. U.S. officials still believe they must soon see sectarian reconciliation, a reversal of de-Baathification, and a nonsectarian, equitable distribution of oil wealth.

All these achievements are meant to placate the aggrieved Sunni Arabs, who represent 15% of the population. But no one knows how many Sunni Arabs sympathize with their brethren who've been killing Shia. It certainly seemed like a very large number before the Shiites started counterattacking through their militias. The statements of Iraqi Sunni Arab organizations, the coverage of the Iraqi Sunni press and the region's Sunni Arab media, which often quotes and echoes the opinions of Iraqi Sunnis, suggest strongly that there is substantial communitarian support for both domestic and foreign suicide bombers.

For the serious ex-Baathists, Sunni supremacists and Iraqi Sunni fundamentalists--the lethal hardcore of the insurgency--it's still a good bet that they're not into democratic negotiations. They probably don't think much at all about an equitable distribution of oil revenues--or wanting their jobs back in the new army's officer corps.

De-Baathification for the Shiites and the Sunnis is really about only one thing: the army. But from the moment the U.S. started building a more representative Iraqi military in 2003, there was no way in hell the old Baathist Sunni officer corps could come back. And now, with the Shiites killing Sunnis, even the most enlightened of the proscribed Baathist officers (this isn't a large group) know that return would be suicide. No one knows how many Sunni Arabs would turn against their uncompromising, murderous brethren and align themselves with Shiites if the right "deal" were struck. It's a very good guess that such men, if they exist in any number, would get mowed down by their radical compatriots.

If the U.S. and Iraqi governments are going to bring peace to the "Sunni triangle," they must break the back of the insurgency. A minority, used to the prerogatives of a communitarian dictatorship, the Sunnis have been trying to derail the new Iraq: They must come to know that they will lose everything if they don't abandon violence as their principal political tool. They must know that if they choose to cease their violent opposition, they will not be murdered for doing so. This means, as it has always meant, a combined American and Shiite Iraqi occupation of major Sunni Arab cities. If the Sunni community hasn't hopelessly gone into a dominance-or-death opposition, then it could still come to its senses, provided the violent hardcore among them is neutralized and the Shiites and the Kurds allow them sufficient access to oil wealth. Shiite death squads have certainly taught the Sunnis of Baghdad that there are worse things than infidel U.S. troops in their neighborhoods.

Baghdad is the first step. And as retired general Jack Keane and the military historian Frederick Kagan have been pointing out, restoring security in Baghdad will take at least 18 months and all the troops the president pledged. To quote Gen. Keane: "We need all five brigades in Baghdad as soon as possible. It will take three to four months to clear neighborhoods of death squads and insurgents, and at least the rest of the year to establish proper security for the population." This is going to be a long, hard slog. And the Americans, not the Iraqis, are going to have to lead it.

The president's stated contention--that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's army and police will lead efforts to cleanse the city, while the Americans just support them--will produce dismal results. Mr. Maliki's pride doesn't win battles. George Bush has been fond of underscoring the counterinsurgency success in Tal Afar, in which the Iraqi army played an important supporting role. If Gen. Petraeus is really put into a supporting role in the Battle of Baghdad, then we've lost already.

Gen. Petraeus will have to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr. The thuggish son of Iraq's most revered clerical family, he has become for many Shiites in Baghdad a rapturously praised defender. This esteem is merited: He, not any American general, increased the security of the average Shiite in the capital. And if he is smart, he'll attack the Americans before they have the chance to deploy much new strength. If the Americans successfully down Sunni insurgents in the capital, then they will go after Mr. Sadr.

But the U.S. military should absolutely not go after Mr. Sadr first. We may barely have sufficient forces to handle a one-front war against Sunni insurgents and holy warriors. We need to show the Shiite community, which by no means has embraced Mr. Sadr's radicalism en masse, that the Battle of Baghdad's primary thrust isn't against the capital's large Shiite ghetto.

The key here is how Shiites view the first encounter. If it goes against the insurgents, then a subsequent attack on Mr. Sadr and his militia might not provoke a large-scale uprising. And he just may play along. He and his forces were mauled by the Americans in 2004. Since then they haven't been particularly bold in attacking U.S. soldiers. Mr. Sadr has recently manifested some statesmen-like behavior, and has been more correct in his behavior toward Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the spiritual guide of Iraq's Shia and a bulwark of moderation. Yet Washington ought to plan on Mr. Sadr hitting U.S. forces--another reason why Gen. Petraeus, who appears acutely sensitive to the Sadr conundrum, should be given as many brigades as the U.S. can rapidly pull together.

Wars are often decided by one battle, where the genius and resources of one commander proves decisive. We are undoubtedly at that point in Iraq. The Bush administration should ensure that Gen. Petraeus has everything he needs, and that any opposition inside the military to him and a larger, longer counterinsurgency campaign is squelched. America and Iraq probably won't get a second chance.

Reuel Marc Gerecht is a resident fellow at AEI.

[/QUOTE]America and Iraq probably won't get a second chance.

Let's get this straight; they're changing the strategy in Iraq from a politcal to a military one? Is this why over 3,000 of our men and women have died, and untold thousands injured? This is a "new" strategy? Past surge in troops did nothing to improve the situation in Iraq. What makes them think 21,500 more troops (something on the ratio of 8 soldiers to every 10,000 Iraqis) on temporary duty will accomplish what they haven't during the past four years?

The obvious scenario will be more of our soldiers killed and maimed quicker. What a "new" solution!

Better late than never!

Hell, there are still too many seemingly intelligent people who do not comprehend the personal danger to themselves if America and Iraq fail.

It would be better if they come to comprehend their personal danger sooner rather than later.

Al Qaeda is the primary instigator of the mass murder of Iraqis by Iraqis.

Failure to stop this mass murder in Iraq will lead to failure to prevent the same kind of mass murder in Europe and America. Here's a three day sample of the daily personal danger faced by the Iraqis:

24 Dec 2006 - Baghdad - bodyguard V.Pres Adel Abdul Mahdi - gunfire - 1
24 Dec 2006 - Al-Budayr, Diwaniyah - bodies found - 3
24 Dec 2006 - Baghdad - bodies found shot dead - 29
24 Dec 2006 - Hawija - Shiite brothers - gunfire - 2
24 Dec 2006 - Muqdadiya police station - suicide bomber - 7
24 Dec 2006 - near Al Furosia Club, near Baquba - police car - gunfire - 2

23 Dec 2006 - Mosul Wadah Al-Jbouri - Sunni tribal leader - gunfire - 1
23 Dec 2006 - Al-Uthman, Baquba residential area - rockets or air strike - 6
23 Dec 2006 - northern Diwaniyah - bodies found shot dead gunfire - 2
23 Dec 2006 - Baghdad - bodies found shot dead gunfire - 47
23 Dec 2006 - near Al-Manzala, near Hawija - roadside bomb - 2
23 Dec 2006 - Al-Eslah, Mosul - Kurdish man - gunfire - 1
23 Dec 2006 - Samarra - policeman - gunfire - 1
23 Dec 2006 - Diwaniyah - Hussein Jabr Hadwan, military intelligence officer - drive-by-shooting - 1

22 Dec 2006 - 23 Dec 2006 - Samawa - clashes between police & Mahdi Army- gunfire - 6

22 Dec 2006 - Al-Shohadaa, east Samarra - police patrol - roadside bomb - 2
22 Dec 2006 - Al-Sikak, Samarra - Ahmed Al-Yasin, brother of MP Abdulkareem Al-Yasin wife also killed - car bomb - 2
22 Dec 2006 - Sawera - motorcycle bomb - 1
22 Dec 2006 - Kut - abducted hospital employee found dead - 1
22 Dec 2006 - Baghdad bodies found - shot dead gunfire - 12
22 Dec 2006 - Baqubah bodies found - 5

134

ican, I have a clue for you: get some information on the murder rate in the US from some of the worst crime cities.

Crime in the United States accounts for more death, injuries and loss of property then all Natural Disasters combined.

Why?

So?

mmmmmmmmmaybe this was true at one time, but it seems the Iraqis are getting busy murdering each other without help from AQ these days.

Cycloptichorn

ican wrote: Failure to stop this mass murder in Iraq will lead to failure to prevent the same kind of mass murder in Europe and America.

What's your point? We have high murder rates in this country too, and that's by Americans against Americans!

But it wouldnt if we just eliminated criminals.
The left moans and cries when somebody gets sentenced to death.
The moan and complain that it isnt the criminals fault,society made them that way.

The left wants criminals treated with kid gloves,instead of just eliminated.
The best way to eliminate crime is to eliminate the criminals.

That is a fact that cant be denied.

Yes but juries are not able to be always right and sometimes we kill innocent people letting the criminals walk around free committing more crimes. Not so easily solved after all.

mm, You are a simpleton with no hope to realize what the 'REAL" world is like. We have one of the costliest justice systems on this planet, and we still have the highest crime rates amongst the industrialized world.

It's not that simple to get rid of criminals.

William Buckley...

http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YTFjYTE3ODg4NGE1MjhlNjQ1YTllYWFmMjc4OGFlZmE=

It seems to me that the suicidal mass murderers in Iraq are--rather, were--affiliated with al Qaeda. While they murder fewer Iraqis than do the rest of the murderers in Iraq, they keep the Sunni-Shia hate alive.

ican, Study your history; the Sunni-Shia battle has been going on long before al Qaida went into Iraq.

CI is more right than Ican here. These guys sure don't need any excuses to fight each other.

Moreso, you need to realize Ican that what we call 'AQ' in Iraq in many cases has nothing to do with Al Qaeda, except for the fact that they decided to call themselves that. They are groups of sunnis and shiites who have turned to terrorism, and therefore not really some 'foreign fighter' fanning the flames.

You can be a member of simultaneous warring groups in Iraq... crazy

Cycloptichorn

The mass murder rate in the US in 2006 was less than 1,000 per year, while the mass murder rate in Iraq in 2006 was greater than 60,000 per year. Failure to solve the mass murder rate problem in Iraq will lead to a huge increase in the mass murder rate in the US.

You have not said what you think was the American 2006 homicide rate per million, so I'll assign it the variable HA6. Whatever is the value of HA6, I claim the future rate will increase significantly, if the mass murder rate problem in Iraq is not solved.

ican, We're talking about a country at war, Iraq, vs the US. Murder rates because of the sectarian violence/civil war should be obvious.

My response was made to your claim that their violence(murder) will eventually reach our shores. You still believe that Bush's fear tactic still works, but only a few like yourself continue to spread that rhetoric.

The murder rate in the US is one of the highest in any industrialized country. Show this to be wrong.

The murder rate in Iraq cannot be solved with 150,000 US troops.