THE US, THE UN AND IRAQ, TENTH THREAD.

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You are not alone. Many who appear to think like you are similarly reluctant to give their own opinions and instead quote the opinions of others. Is that reluctance a psychological thing? Or, is it a political thing?

I'd be happy to offer my opinion... and defend it...

Cycloptichorn

ican, All the questions you asked were answered. You just want to ignore them, because you don't wish to admit to them.

1. What did General Shinseki tell the Bush administration famous for his remarks to the U.S. Senate Armed Services committee before the war in Iraq?
2. What did the Iraq Study Group recommend?
3. What did the polls show about Bush's surge in troops?
4. What is the congress now working on concerning Iraq?

Do you read any newspaper, listen to the radio, or watch tv news?
Almost everybody in the US knows the answer to the above four questions, but you seem ignorant of something that's commonly known.

CLUE: No inference is needed in any of them.

Show us how the Iraq Study Groups recommendations are in conflict?

Maliki disputed President Bush's remarks broadcast Tuesday that the execution of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein "looked like it was kind of a revenge killing" and took exception to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's Senate testimony last week that Maliki's administration was on "borrowed time."

The prime minister said statements such as Rice's "give morale boosts for the terrorists and push them toward making an extra effort and making them believe they have defeated the American administration," Maliki said. "But I can tell you that they have not defeated the Iraqi government."

Quote:

Maliki disputed President Bush's remarks broadcast Tuesday that the execution of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein "looked like it was kind of a revenge killing" and took exception to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's Senate testimony last week that Maliki's administration was on "borrowed time."

The prime minister said statements such as Rice's "give morale boosts for the terrorists and push them toward making an extra effort and making them believe they have defeated the American administration," Maliki said. "But I can tell you that they have not defeated the Iraqi government."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/17/AR2007011702346.html

Seems like that's all Bush has done since the day he invaded Iraq; give aid to the terrorist.

If I sat down four years ago and tried to think up of a way to help terrorist, to make Muslims hate us more and to destroy our credibility with the rest of the world I suppose the best way to do that would be to do what Bush has done; invade Iraq based on lies and cooked intelligence. Instead of putting highly qualified people in Iraq to rebuild and bring order to the country I would put in unqualified loyalist who were pro-life and voted for Bush. I would destroy whatever government they had and create a huge power vacuum in a country beset with religious and ethnic differences. I would promote the Shiite faction that is very close to Iran than pick a fight with Iran. And on top of that I will blame the Iraqi people for all the problems that arose.

What better way to create new terrorist and hatred for America.

That is Bush's foreign policy; how can we get more Americans killed.

ican, Show us the contradiction.

link to the LINK TO THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT, Recommendations pages 32 - 62

PRO Iraq Study Group Report

Sadiq al-Rikabi, Ph.D., a political adviser to Nuri al-Maliki, Iraqi Prime Minister, in a 12/7/06 interview with Al Jazeera stated:


"...the report's recommendations were 'positive on the whole'...
[Sadiq al-Rikabi] said they conformed with the government's own plans to deal with the rampant violence engulfing the country since 2003.

'The parts I read were very positive.'"
12/7/06 Sadiq al-Rikabi Al Jazeera



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Saeb Erekat, Head of Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) Negotiations Affairs Department, as quoted by Al Jazeera.com in a 12/8/06 article titled "Reactions to the Long-awaited Iraq Study Group Report":


"We welcome the Hamilton-Baker report and hope the U.S. administration will translate it into deeds...
The region needs peace, the region needs dialogue and we have always stuck to dialogue toward a comprehensive peace."
12/8/06 Saeb Erekat



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Harry Reid, U.S. Senator (D-NV) and Democratic leader, issued the following statement on 12/7/06:


"We acknowledge that this is a tremendous step forward, and it will change course in Iraq. It's up to the president to fulfill his obligation, in my opinion, to the country, and follow the recommendations of this study group."
12/7/06 Harry Reid



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Adnan al-Dulaimi, leader of the General Council for the People of Iraq, the Iraqi parliament's largest Sunni Arab bloc, according to a 12/9/06 Associated Press article titled "Panel Response Mirrors Iraqi Divisions," stated:


"There are many very positive recommendations, but this government will not be able to carry out any of them."
12/9/06 Adnan al-Dulaimi



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Buthaina Shaaban, Ph.D., Syria's Expatriate Affairs Minister, in a 12/7/06 interview with Al Jazeera stated:


"We welcome this report and regard it as a very important step.
It means, God willing, the end of this era of American intervention in the region and the American occupation of Iraq which brought catastrophic ramifications on the whole region."
12/7/06 Buthaina Shaaban



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Lawrence Korb, Ph.D. and Max Bergmann, of the Center for American Progress, in a 12/6/06 article titled "Time to Act: Iraq Study Group Offers Way Forward" write that the report:


"...closely replicates the plan that the Center for American Progress first released in September 2005 called 'Strategic Redeployment,' offers a new, pragmatic approach to the war in Iraq and worsening crises across the Middle East--one that even its authors concede may not stave off defeat, but that still presents realistic options in the face of a deteriorating set of circumstances."
12/6/06 Lawrence Korb Max Bergmann

CON Iraq Study Group Report

Jalal Talabani, President of Iraq, as quoted by Al Jazeera.com in a 12/10/06 article titled "Talabani Slams 'Insulting' Iraq Report":


"I think that the Baker-Hamilton report is not fair and not just, and it contains dangerous articles which undermine the sovereignty of Iraq and its constitution...
If you read this report one would think that it is written for a young, small colony that they are imposing conditions on, neglecting the fact that we are a sovereign country."
12/10/06 Jalal Talabani


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Ehud Olmert, Prime Minister of Israel, commenting on the report's recommentation for direct talks between Israel and its neighbors, is quoted by the Associated Press on 12/7/06:


"The attempt to create a linkage between the Iraqi issue and the Mideast issue - we have a different view...
To the best of my knowledge, President Bush, throughout the recent years, also had a different view on this."
12/7/06 Ehud Olmert


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John McCain, U.S. Senator (R-AZ), at a 12/8/06 Senate hearing regarding the recommendation of the ISG report for the U.S. to withdraw the bulk of its combat forces by 2008, as quoted by a 12/8/06 Washington Times article titled "McCain Hits Report as 'Recipe' for Defeat":


"I believe that this is a recipe that will lead to, sooner or later, our defeat in Iraq...
I don't believe that a peace conference with people who are dedicated to your extinction has much short-term gain."
12/8/06 John McCain



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Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, President of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Iraq's largest Shia party, stated, according to a 12/9/06 Associated Press article titled "Panel Response Mirrors Iraqi Divisions":


"The report includes inaccurate information that's based on dishonest sources."
12/9/06 Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim


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Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, issued a 12/7/06 statement, stating the Kurdistan officials believe the ISG:


"...made some unrealistic and inappropriate recommendations for helping the U.S. to get out of these difficulties.
If under this pretext, these inappropriate recommendations are imposed on us; we declare, on behalf of the people of Kurdistan, that we reject anything that is against the constitution and the interest of Iraq and Kurdistan."
12/7/06 Massoud Barzani



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Anthony Cordesman, Ph.D., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy for the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in his 12/6/06 editorial titled "The Baker-Hamilton Study Group Report: The Elephant Gives Birth to a Mouse" stated:


"It is going to take time to make a full appraisal of all the annexes and content of the full report, but the principle recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Commission are very unlikely to produce success...
This does not mean that there are not many good ideas and a great deal of useful and thoughtful material embedded in the main body of the report. But, this is not a good or workable plan for the future."
12/6/06 Anthony Cordesman

I. Executive Summary of the 12/6/06 Iraq Study Group (ISG) Report TOP


Executive Summary

The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved.
In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. Our most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and America’s credibility, interests, and values will be protected.

The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability.

The Iraqi people have a democratically elected government, yet it is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive.

If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The global standing of the United States could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized.

During the past nine months we have considered a full range of approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region.

External Approach

The policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect its stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in the long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting stability.

The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort should include every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq’s neighbors and key states in and outside the region should form a support group to reinforce security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on its own.

Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively. In seeking to influence the behavior of both countries, the United States has disincentives and incentives available. Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.

The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab- Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and Syria.

As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle East, the United States should provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved out of Iraq.

Internal Approach

The most important questions about Iraq’s future are now the responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny.

The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move out of Iraq.

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq.

It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not implement their planned changes. The United States must not make an openended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.

As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training and education of forces that have returned to the United States in order to restore the force to full combat capability. As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment over the next five years.

The United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders to support the achievement of specific objectives—or milestones— on national reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens of the United States and other countries—that it deserves continued support.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. His list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include milestones that can strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people. President Bush and his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones.

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. They include improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the U.S. budget process, the training of U.S. government personnel, and U.S. intelligence capabilities.

Conclusion

It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation. The dynamics of the region are as important to Iraq as events within Iraq.

The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region, and the United States of America can emerge stronger.
12/6/06