THE US, THE UN AND IRAQ, TENTH THREAD.

Prominent neocons say Iraq was a strategic blunder.

Former chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee Richard Perle and former Pentagon insider Kenneth Adelman tell Vanity Fair that they blame the "dysfunctional" Bush administration for the "disaster" in Iraq and say that if they had it to do over again they would not advocate an invasion.

revel quoted :

"Prominent neocons say Iraq was a strategic blunder.

Former chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee Richard Perle and former Pentagon insider Kenneth Adelman tell Vanity Fair that they blame the "dysfunctional" Bush administration for the "disaster" in Iraq and say that if they had it to do over again they would not advocate an invasion. "

the question would seem to be : what now ?
is there a way for the united states to 'gracefully' get out of the mess or this this one of those situations where everyone is a loser ?
one often hears the slogan "this is a win-win situation" - right now looks more like a "lose-lose" situation .
and the pain and suffering will probably be on the shoulders of the innocent for a long time to come - as usual .
hbg

War simulation in 1999 pointed out Iraq invasion problems

WASHINGTON (AP) -- A series of secret U.S. war games in 1999 showed that an invasion and post-war administration of Iraq would require 400,000 troops, nearly three times the number there now.

And even then, the games showed, the country still had a chance of dissolving into chaos.

In the simulation, called Desert Crossing, 70 military, diplomatic and intelligence participants concluded the high troop levels would be needed to keep order, seal borders and take care of other security needs.

The documents came to light Saturday through a Freedom of Information Act request by George Washington University's National Security Archive, an independent research institute and library.

"The conventional wisdom is the U.S. mistake in Iraq was not enough troops," said Thomas Blanton, the archive's director. "But the Desert Crossing war game in 1999 suggests we would have ended up with a failed state even with 400,000 troops on the ground."

There are about 144,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, down from a peak in January of about 160,000.

A week after the invasion, in March 2003, the Pentagon said there were 250,000 U.S. ground force troops inside Iraq, along with 40,000 coalition force troops.

A spokeswoman for the U.S. Central Command, which sponsored the seminar and declassified the secret report in 2004, declined to comment Saturday because she was not familiar with the documents.

News of the war games results comes a day before judges are expected to deliver a verdict in Saddam Hussein war crimes trial. (Watch people prepare as curfew sets across Baghdad in anticipation of the verdicts -- 3:20)

The war games looked at "worst case" and "most likely" scenarios after a war that removed then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power. Some of the conclusions are similar to what actually occurred after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003:


"A change in regimes does not guarantee stability," the 1999 seminar briefings said. "A number of factors including aggressive neighbors, fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines, and chaos created by rival forces bidding for power could adversely affect regional stability."

"Even when civil order is restored and borders are secured, the replacement regime could be problematic -- especially if perceived as weak, a puppet, or out-of-step with prevailing regional governments."

"Iran's anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq," the briefings read. "The influx of U.S. and other western forces into Iraq would exacerbate worries in Tehran, as would the installation of a pro-western government in Baghdad."

"The debate on post-Saddam Iraq also reveals the paucity of information about the potential and capabilities of the external Iraqi opposition groups. The lack of intelligence concerning their roles hampers U.S. policy development."

"Also, some participants believe that no Arab government will welcome the kind of lengthy U.S. presence that would be required to install and sustain a democratic government."

"A long-term, large-scale military intervention may be at odds with many coalition partners."
Copyright 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

Sunni Insurgents Still Causing Most U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq
November 06, 2006 3:45 PM

Christopher Isham and Elizabeth Sprague Report:

The vast majority -- more than 80 percent -- of American military deaths in Iraq are still being caused by Sunni insurgents, according to an ABC News analysis of data released for the month of October by the Defense Department.

Of the 99 American soldiers killed in hostile action, at least 81 were killed by IED's or hostile fire in areas that are dominated by Sunni Arabs and where U.S. forces have been battling Sunni insurgents since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

By contrast, only three Americans were killed in areas dominated by Shiite Arabs. Fifteen were killed in central Baghdad where populations are mixed with Sunni and Shiite Arabs, and it is therefore difficult to determine the identity of the attackers.

Counter-insurgency analysts tell ABC News that the high percentage of deaths in the Sunni areas represents compelling evidence that Sunni insurgents remain the primary threat to the security of U.S. personnel. "If American troops are getting killed in predominantly Sunni areas, then they are getting killed by Sunni insurgents," Caleb Carr, Professor of Counter-Insurgency at Bard College, told ABC News.

IEDs continue to be the leading killer of Americans -- 65 percent, 42 U.S. soldiers were killed by roadside bombs. Thirty-four Americans were killed by "small arms fire," "hostile fire" or snipers.

U.S. military officials attribute the October death toll, which is the highest since January 2005, to several factors, including stepped-up U.S. counter-insurgency operations in Baghdad.

Forty-three U.S. soldiers were killed in Baghdad and surrounding environs, more deaths than any other area in Iraq. The majority, 67 percent of those killed, were in Sunni-controlled areas.

Despite the geographic data, U.S. military officials seemed unprepared or unwilling to describe which groups were causing the majority of U.S. casualties. When asked whether Americans were being killed primarily by Sunni or Shiite militants, Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, Director of the Combined Press Information Center for the Multi-National Forces in Iraq, said that he did not have the breakdown. "I would not want to categorize that...I would just be guessing," he said.

Counter-insurgency experts dismissed the notion that Shiite extremists could be infiltrating the Sunni areas to kill Americans. "The one thing we know for sure in the Muslim world in general, not just Iraq, is that everybody knows what the radicals are up to," said Professor Carr. "There are no hidden Shiite activists hiding out in Sunni areas because the populations won't tolerate it."

What are its implications for Iraq policy? Those are fewer, just because the executive makes foreign policy. Congress can only intervene decisively by cutting off money for foreign military adventures, which the Democrats have already pledged not to do. Moreover, the Iraq morass is a hopeless case and even if the legislature had more to say about policy there, it is not as if there are any good options.

One downside is that some Democrats campaigned on a platform of dividing Iraq into three ethnic provinces under a weak federal government, an idea they got from Senator Joe Biden of Delaware. I don't think they will be in a position to follow through on this (as if the US could dictate Iraq's future!), but one wouldn't want them to implement their rash promises in this regard.

What we can say is that the electoral outcome is a bellwether for the future of American involvement in Iraq. It will now gradually come to an end, barring a dramatic disaster, such as a guerrilla push to deprive our troops of fuel and then to surround and besiege them. More likely, the steady grind of bad news and further senseless death will force Bush's successor, whoever it, is, to get out of that country. One cannot imagine us staying in Afghanistan for the long haul, either. Bush's question in 2003 was, can we go back to the early 20th century and have a sort of Philippines-like colony with a major military investment? The answer is, "no." Iraqis are too politically and socially mobilized to be easily dominated in the way the old empires dominated isolated, illiterate peasants. The outcome of the Israel-Hizbullah war this summer further signalled that the peasants now have sharper staves that even penetrate state of the art tanks. The US can still easily win any wars it needs to win. It cannot any longer win long military occupations. The man who knew this most surely in the Bush administration, Donald Rumsfeld, most egregiously gave in to the occupation route, and will end up the fall guy as the public mood turns increasingly ugly in both countries.