Cycloptichorn wrote:
...
When sufficient fear was used as the lever before it worked fine (e.g., WWI, WWII, Bosnia, Kuwait). Why not this time? And insufficient fear didn't work before (e.g., Korea, Vietnam)
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Different situations. We weren't threatening any of those nations, but responding to the agression of others. We didn't win any of those situations through intimidation.
Cycloptichorn
We threatened those nations that were the agressors!
We applied sufficient fear:
in WWI to Germany;
in WWII to Germany & Japan;
in Bosnia to Serbia;
in Kuwait to Iraq.
We applied insufficient fear:
in Korea to North Korea;
in Vietnam to North Vietnam.
We now must apply sufficient fear to IT (i.e., Islamo Totalitarians) and those nations that harbor IT. A nation that harbors IT, our enemy, is an ally of our enemy until such time as that nation begins working to purge itself of IT.
A nation that harbors IT and is not working to purge itself of IT will not be able to purge itself of IT no matter what such nations promise us or any other nations in negotiations with us or any other nations.
Quote:Rumsfeld More Stubborn than Bush
July was the deadliest month ever in Iraq. More than 3,000 Iraqis died violent deaths.
...
ICAN PREDICTIONS MADE IN JUNE 2006
1,050Iraqi civilians died violently in June 2006.
950Iraqi civilians died violently in July 2006.
850Iraqi civilians died violently in August 2006.
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Can you provide a historical example where, through force of fear, a populace was rid of terrorism?
Cycloptichorn
Main Entry: ter·ror·ism
Pronunciation: 'ter-&r-"i-z&m
Function: noun
: the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion
- ter·ror·ist /-&r-ist/ adjective or noun
- ter·ror·is·tic /"ter-&r-'is-tik/ adjective
Main Entry: ter·ror
Pronunciation: 'ter-&r, 'te-r&r
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Anglo-French terrour, from Latin terror, from terrEre to frighten; akin to Greek trein to be afraid, flee, tremein to tremble -- more at TREMBLE
1 : a state of intense fear
2 a : one that inspires fear : SCOURGE b : a frightening aspect <the> c : a cause of anxiety : WORRY d : an appalling person or thing; especially : BRAT
3 : REIGN OF TERROR
4 : violent or destructive acts (as bombing) committed by groups in order to intimidate a population or government into granting their demands <insurrection>
synonym see FEAR
- ter·ror·less /-l&s/ adjective
Incorrect! We didn't apply fear to Germany and Japan, we decimated their armed forces.
We didn't apply fear to Iraq in GW1, we decimated their forces in combat.
WWI - German terrorism;
WWII - German & Japanese terrorism;
Bosnia - Serbian terrorism;
Kuwait - Iraq terrorism.
Let's see here; IBC gives July's body count as 1133. Far more reliable sources give it as over 3,000. Since IBC readily admits that it undercounts we can safely assume a more accurate count would be three X IBC, or 3,399.
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This will never happen. You cannot possibly hope to create peace through fear. Your own example of Vietnam and Korea shows that there is never enough fear for us to apply to force a population to do what we wish, unless we are willing to kill vast swaths of them, which we are not willing to do.
All that will happen is that the oppressed populace will hate you more than they hate those you are trying to drive out of their society
... Cycloptichorn
xingu wrote:Let's see here; IBC gives July's body count as 1133. Far more reliable sources give it as over 3,000. Since IBC readily admits that it undercounts we can safely assume a more accurate count would be three X IBC, or 3,399.
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I can only imagine how that works in your head.
Cycloptichorn wrote:
...
This will never happen. You cannot possibly hope to create peace through fear. Your own example of Vietnam and Korea shows that there is never enough fear for us to apply to force a population to do what we wish, unless we are willing to kill vast swaths of them, which we are not willing to do.
All that will happen is that the oppressed populace will hate you more than they hate those you are trying to drive out of their society
... Cycloptichorn
Cyclo, I'm sorry to have to tell you this. You really don't know what you are posting about.
The USA has created peace through fear by killing "vast swaths" of people in addition to combatants, but, except for the nazis after WWI, the targeted populace did not come to hate us enough more to subsequently make war on us. They turned to civilized pursuits in cooperation with the USA. And even the nazis didn't declare war on us until early 1942, almost three years after they invaded Poland, and a month after we responded to their Japanese ally's attack and declaration of war on us with our declaration of war on the Japanese.
Admittedly it's just my impression, but you post like someone brainwashed by his teachers, taking everything your teachers preached as if it were gospel. It's not gospel. With just a tad of analysis and logic, you can discover that for yourself.
I suppose by icans definition any and all wars are terrorism.
T'ain't my definitions; it's Meriam-Webster's definitions. Also, I wrote nothing about "all wars".
ican thinks terror will sap a persons will to fight. It didn't work on Israel or America and it's not working in Afghanistan or Iraq. It's not working on Hamas, Hezbollah or the insurgents in Iraq either.
Boy have you got things reversed. IT (i.e., Islamo Totalitarianism) terror on the USA has not sapped the USA's will to fight.
What ican can't understand is terrorism pisses people off. It makes them want to have revenge. We kill women and children in Iraq and their friends and relatives want to kill us.
IT "kill women and children" in the USA and in Israel and in Iraq and in Afghanistan and in Lebanon, and we all are rightfully pissed off.
ican just can't understand that killing begets more killing and those who want to kill the most are conservatives.
Killing killers does not beget more killing; it begets less killing.
No! Those who want to kill the most are IT. Conservatives want to conserve liberty of all those who want to conserve liberty, and they want to conserve everyone's personal responsibilty.
The Left speaks, writes, and acts as if they want to conserve IT.
Hmmmm
Killing killers does not beget more killing; it begets less killing.
Quote:Killing killers does not beget more killing; it begets less killing.
No, it doesn't. It begets more killing.
IT = Islamo Totalitarians; for example, Fatah, Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Baathists.
Yes, killing the killers of non-combatants begets less killing of non-combatants. Killing IT who kill non-combatants will beget less killing of non-combatants. I've provided you four historical examples where that was true (e.g., WWI, WWII, Bosnia, Kuwait).
We can't kill our way out of this mess. You surely haven't provided a single bit of objective evidence that we can, or that historically this has worked; just your theories, which don't exactly match up to the reality of this modern world.
We can "kill our way out of this mess." I've provided you four historical examples where that has worked. You have yet to provide even one example where in "the reality of this modern world" (i.e., in the 20th and 21st centuries) negotiations only, has worked for more than one year.
Cycloptichorn
WWI, WWII, Bosnia, and Kuwait had nothing to do with terrorism. You are twisting the definition of terrorism in order to make this so. The definition you cited earlier did not refer to conflicts between armed forces, but inbetween terrorists (ununiformed irregulars at best) and civilians.
Cycloptichorn
www.m-w.com
Main Entry: ter·ror·ism
Pronunciation: 'ter-&r-"i-z&m
Function: noun
: the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion
- ter·ror·ist /-&r-ist/ adjective or noun
- ter·ror·is·tic /"ter-&r-'is-tik/ adjective
Main Entry: ter·ror
Pronunciation: 'ter-&r, 'te-r&r
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Anglo-French terrour, from Latin terror, from terrEre to frighten; akin to Greek trein to be afraid, flee, tremein to tremble -- more at TREMBLE
1 : a state of intense fear
2 a : one that inspires fear : SCOURGE b : a frightening aspect <the> c : a cause of anxiety : WORRY d : an appalling person or thing; especially : BRAT
3 : REIGN OF TERROR
4 : violent or destructive acts (as bombing) committed by groups in order to intimidate a population or government into granting their demands <insurrection>
synonym see FEAR
- ter·ror·less /-l&s/ adjective
U.S. force in Iraq at 140,000
By Will Dunham Thu Aug 31, 4:09 PM ET
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States has expanded its force in
Iraq to 140,000 troops, the most since January and 13,000 more than five weeks ago, the
Pentagon said on Thursday, amid relentless violence in Baghdad and elsewhere.
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This follows July's decision by commanders to augment the U.S. military presence in Baghdad to try to curb escalating sectarian violence that has heightened concern about all-out civil war in Iraq.
As American troops continue to fight a tenacious insurgency nearly 3 1/2 years into the war, U.S. military deaths in Iraq reached at least 62 in August -- increasing from 43 in July and ending three straight monthly declines.
August's total still was about average for a war in which about 64 U.S. troops have died per month. There have been 2,635 U.S. military deaths since war began in March 2003, and another 19,773 troops have been wounded in action, the Pentagon said.
Recent moves including the Pentagon's July 27 decision to delay for up to four months the scheduled departure from Iraq of about 4,000 soldiers from an Alaska-based brigade have indicated significant U.S. troop cuts are unlikely in the near future.
The Pentagon said the U.S. force, which stood at 127,000 on July 25, now numbers 140,000.
A defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the U.S. force likely will remain at about the current level in the coming months, but could shrink a bit by the end of the year depending on conditions in Iraq.
The arrival of fresh troops as part of the routine rotation of U.S. forces also has contributed to the current increase because some of those they are replacing have not yet left, officials said.
This summer's expansion of the U.S. force came in response to a surge of violence particularly in the capital -- much of it between Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims.
U.S. military officers in Baghdad have said violence including murders declined in August from July's high levels but that there are still about 56 attacks per day in the capital.
President George W. Bush, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Army Gen. George Casey, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, all have expressed a desire to reduce the U.S. presence in Iraq if Iraqi security and political conditions permit.
Casey on Wednesday said he foresaw Iraqi government security forces assuming control of security in their own country within 12 to 18 months with "very little" support from U.S.-led forces. But Casey said it was not clear when Iraqi troops would be able to go it alone and the United States could start withdrawing troops.
As recently as June, when the U.S. force stood at 125,000 with 14 combat brigades, Casey offered a plan to reduce by two brigades -- roughly 3,500 each -- this fall, with perhaps two more gone by December. His plan envisioned the U.S. force shrinking to five or six combat brigades by December 2007.
Currently all or parts of 18 combat brigades are in Iraq, according to the Pentagon.
The U.S. force in Iraq peaked last October and December at around 160,000 troops to help protect two Iraqi elections.
We put accuracy above speed and do not update the data base until we have located and cross-checked two or more independent approved news sources for the same incident (for more details see our Methodology). If you want to submit news stories that could help us confirm an incident involving civilian deaths please email news item weblinks to [email protected] (the more specific and detailed, the better).
Still, your "maximum" count seems very low to me. Surely there must be many, many more civilian deaths than you've published.
We are not a news organization ourselves and like everyone else can only base our information on what has been reported so far. What we are attempting to provide is a credible compilation of civilian deaths that have been reported by recognized sources. Our maximum therefore refers to reported deaths - which can only be a sample of true deaths unless one assumes that every civilian death has been reported. It is likely that many if not most civilian casualties will go unreported by the media. That is the sad nature of war.
Ican,
Where the hell are you getting your numbers from on bodycount.org? They don't do monthly totals. I had to copy them to a spreadsheet. Their counter is based on date they confirm a death not on the date happened.
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Pentagon Gives Gloomy Iraq Report
By ROBERT BURNS
The Associated Press
Friday, September 1, 2006; 2:52 PM
WASHINGTON -- Sectarian violence is spreading in Iraq and the security problems have become more complex than at any time since the U.S. invasion in 2003, the Pentagon said Friday.
In a notably gloomy report to Congress, the Pentagon said illegal militias have become more entrenched, especially in Baghdad neighborhoods where they are seen as providers of both security and basic social services.
The report described a rising tide of sectarian violence, fed in part by interference from neighboring Iran and Syria and driven by a "vocal minority" of religious extremists who oppose the idea of a democratic Iraq.
Death squads targeting mainly Iraqi civilians are a growing problem, heightening the risk of civil war, it said.
"Death squads and terrorists are locked in mutually reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife," the report said, adding that the Sunni-led insurgency "remains potent and viable" even as it is overshadowed by the sect-on-sect killing.
"Conditions that could lead to civil war exist in Iraq, specifically in and around Baghdad, and concern about civil war within the Iraqi civilian population has increased in recent months," the report said. It is the latest in a series of quarterly reports required by Congress to assess economic, political and security progress.
A growing number of members of Congress are calling for either a shift in the Bush administration's Iraq strategy or a timetable for beginning a substantial withdrawal of American forces. Although administration officials say progress is being made in Iraq, U.S. commanders have increased U.S. troop levels by about 13,000 over the past five weeks, to 140,000, mainly due to increased violence in the Baghdad area.
In response to the Pentagon's report Friday, the Senate's top Democrat, Harry Reid of Nevada, said it showed the Bush administration is "increasingly disconnected from the facts on the ground in Iraq."
"It is time for a new direction to end the war in Iraq, win the war on terror, and give the American people the real security they deserve," Reid said.
Col. Thomas Vail, commander of a 101st Airborne brigade operating in the mostly Shiite areas of eastern Baghdad, told reporters at the Pentagon on Friday that an intensified effort to root out insurgents and quell sectarian violence in the capital is bearing fruit, leading to a decrease in sectarian murders in recent days.
"They understand a big stick," he said, referring to a bigger U.S. and Iraqi force confronting militias and others responsible for violence like the barrage of coordinated attacks across eastern Baghdad that Iraqi police said killed at least 64 people and wounded more than 286 within a half hour Thursday.
Peter Rodman, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, in a separate session with reporters, said that despite progress this summer in reviving the Iraqi economy, raising electricity production and increasing the number of trained Iraqi troops, the security conditions have deteriorated.
The report covered the period since the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki was seated May 20.
From that date through Aug. 11, the average number of attacks per week against Americans and Iraqis was 792, up 24 percent from the previous period of Feb. 11 to May 19. The 792 figure was the highest for any counting period since the war began. The previous high was 641 in the Feb. 11 to May 19 period.
"The last quarter, as you know has been rough," Rodman said. "The levels of violence are up and the sectarian quality of the violence is particularly acute and disturbing."
That assessment was tempered by a degree of optimism that the Iraqi government _ with support from U.S. troops _ will succeed in quelling the sectarian strife.
Optimism among ordinary Iraqis, however, has declined, the 63-page report said.
When asked if they believe "things will be better" in the future, the percentage of Iraqis responding positively has dropped over the past year _ whether they were asked to look ahead six months, one year or five years _ according to polling data cited in the report.
"The security situation is currently at its most complex state since the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom," the report said, using the U.S. military's name for the war that was launched in March 2003 to topple Saddam Hussein.
The Great Equalizer
Lessons From Iraq and Lebanon
by Gabriel Kolko
The United States had a monopoly of nuclear weaponry only a few years before other nations challenged it, but from 1949 until roughly the 1990s deterrence theory worked - nations knew that if they used the awesome bomb they were likely to be devastated in the riposte. Despite such examples of brinkmanship as the Cuban missile crisis and numerous threats of nuclear annihilation against non-nuclear powers, by and large the few nations that possessed the bomb concluded that nuclear war was not worth its horrendous risks. Today, by contrast, weapons of mass destruction or precision and power are within the capacity of dozens of nations either to produce or purchase. With the multiplicity of weapons now available, deterrence theory is increasingly irrelevant and the equations of military power that existed in the period after World War Two no longer hold.
This process began in Korea after 1950, where the war ended in a stand off despite the nominal vast superiority of America's military power, and the Pentagon discovered that great space combined with guerrilla warfare was more than a match for it in Vietnam, where the U.S. was defeated. Both wars caused the American military and establishment strategists to reflect on the limits of high tech warfare, and for a time it seemed as if appropriate lessons would be learned and costly errors not repeated.
The conclusion drawn from these major wars should have been that there were decisive limits to American military and political power, and that the U. S. should drastically tailor its foreign policy and cease intervening anywhere it chose to. In short, it was necessary to accept the fact that it could not guide the world as it wished to. But such a conclusion, justified by experience, was far too radical for either party to fully embrace, and defense contractors never ceased promising the ultimate new weapon. America's leaders and military establishment in the wake of 9/11 argued that technology would rescue it from more political failures. But such illusions - fed by the technological fetishism which is the hallmark of their civilization - led to the Iraq debacle.
There has now been a qualitative leap in technology that makes all inherited conventional wisdom, and war as an instrument of political policy, utterly irrelevant, not just to the U.S. but to any other nation that embarks upon it.
Technology is now moving much faster than the diplomatic and political resources or will to control its inevitable consequences - not to mention traditional strategic theories. Hezbollah has far better and more lethal rockets than it had a few years ago, and American experts believe that the Iranians compelled them to keep in reserve the far more powerful and longer range cruise missiles they already possess. Iran itself possesses large quantities of these missiles and American experts believe they may very well be capable of destroying aircraft carrier battle groups. All attempts to devise defenses against these rockets, even the most primitive, have been expensive failures, and anti-missile technology everywhere has remained, after decades of effort and billions of dollars, unreliable.1
Even more ominous, the U. S. Army has just released a report that light water reactors - which 25 nations, from Armenia to Slovenia as well as Spain, already have and are covered by no existing arms control treaties - can be used to obtain near weapons-grade plutonium easily and cheaply.2 Within a few years, many more countries than the present ten or so - the Army study thinks Saudi Arabia and even Egypt most likely - will have nuclear bombs and far more destructive and accurate rockets and missiles. Weapons-poor fighters will have far more sophisticated guerilla tactics as well as far more lethal equipment, which deprives the heavily equipped and armed nations of the advantages of their overwhelming firepower, as demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. The battle between a few thousand Hezbullah fighters and a massive, ultra-modern Israeli army backed and financed by the U.S. proves this. Among many things, the war in Lebanon is a window of the future. The outcome suggests that either the Israelis cease their policy of destruction and intimidation, and accept the political prerequisites of peace with the Arab world, or they too will eventually be devastated by cheaper and more accurate missiles and nuclear weapons in the hands of at least two Arab nations and Iran.
What is now occurring in the Middle East reveals lessons just as relevant in the future to festering problems in East Asia, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. Access to nuclear weapons, cheap missiles of greater portability and accuracy, and the inherent limits of all antimissile systems, will set the context for whatever crises arise in North Korea, Iran, Taiwan or Venezuela. Trends which increase the limits of technology in warfare are not only applicable to relations between nations but also to groups within them - ranging from small conspiratorial entities up the scale of size to large guerilla movements. The events in the Middle East have proven that warfare has changed dramatically everywhere, and American hegemony can now be successfully challenged throughout the globe.
American power has been dependent to a large extent on its highly mobile navy. But ships are increasingly vulnerable to missiles, and while they are a long way from finished they are more-and-more circumscribed tactically and, ultimately, strategically. There is a greater balance-of-power militarily, the reemergence of a kind of deterrence that means all future wars will be increasingly protracted, expensive - and very costly politically to politicians who blunder into wars with illusions they will be short and decisive. Olmert and Peretz are very likely to lose power in Israel, and destroying Lebanon will not save their political futures. This too is a message not likely to be lost on politicians.
To this extent, what is emerging is a new era of more equal rivals. Enforceable universal disarmament of every kind of weapon would be far preferable. But short of this presently unattainable goal, this emergence of a new equivalency is a vital factor leading less to peace in the real meaning of that term than perhaps to greater prudence. Such restraint could be an important factor leading to less war.
We live with 21st century technology and also with primitive political attitudes, nationalisms of assorted sorts, and cults of heroism and irrationality existing across the political spectrum and the power spectrum. The world will destroy itself unless it realistically confronts the new technological equations. Israel must now accept this reality, and if it does not develop the political skills required to make serious compromises, this new equation warrants that it will be liquidated even as it rains destruction on its enemies.
This is the message of the conflicts in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon - to use only the examples in today's papers. Walls are no longer protection for the Israelis - one shoots over them. Their much-vaunted Merkava tanks have proven highly vulnerable to new weapons that are becoming more and more common and are soon likely to be in Palestinian hands as well. At least 20 of the tanks were seriously damaged or destroyed.
The U.S. war in Iraq is a political disaster against the guerrillas - a half trillion dollars spent there and in Afghanistan have left America on the verge of defeat in both places. The "shock and awe" military strategy has utterly failed save to produce contracts for weapons makers - indeed, it has also contributed heavily to de facto U.S. economic bankruptcy.
The Bush Administration has deeply alienated more of America's nominal allies than any government in modern times. The Iraq war and subsequent conflict in Lebanon have left its Middle East policy in shambles and made Iranian strategic predominance even more likely, all of which was predicted before the Iraq invasion. Its coalitions, as Thomas Ricks shows in his wordy but utterly convincing and critical book, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, are finished. Its sublime confidence and reliance on the power of its awesome weaponry is a crucial cause of its failure, although we cannot minimize its preemptory hubris and nationalist myopia. The United States, whose costliest political and military adventures since 1950 have ended in failure, now must face the fact that the technology for confronting its power is rapidly becoming widespread and cheap. It is within the reach of not merely states but of relatively small groups of people. Destructive power is now virtually "democratized."
If the challenges of producing a realistic concept of the world that confronts the mounting dangers and limits of military technology seriously are not resolved soon, recognizing that a decisive equality of military power is today in the process of being re-imposed, there is nothing more than wars and mankind's eventual destruction to look forward to.
Notes
1. Mark Williams, "The Missiles of August: The Lebanon War and the democratization of missile technology," Technology Review (MIT), August 16, 2006.
2. Henry Sokolski, ed., Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006, pp. 33ff., 86.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig6/kolko4.html