Student suspended for speaking Spanish in school hallway

ENGLISH, ENGLISH, ENGLISH.

I'm a mexican liberal (radical) from california and I don't see any reason why English should not be the official language. Everybody should learn the same language so we can communicate better, whats the friggin problem. If I came here as an Immigrant coming to a new country I would immediately begin to learn that language. To better myself and as a matter of respect for my new country. As for the kid getting suspended for speaking spanish in the hallway at school. That's just stupid.

However I am completely ignorant to what making English the official language really means. There is an answer to this problem but judging how we've been handling every other problem in this country lately lack of understanding will prevail

So if the kid was suspended for repeatedly yelling in the Library, would his right to free speech have been violated.

Do you think the First Amendment protects the right of an individual to speak in Spanish when he or she can say the exact same thing in English and not break any rules? Certainly it wasn't the content of the student's speech that was being controlled.

There is no question that the young man's first amendment rights were violated UNLESS the rules prohibit SPEAKING in the hallway. I am surprised that anyone would question this and then compound his ignorance with a false analogy.

Speaking in one's native tongue is a form of self expression. And is protected.

Make the argument then, and suggest what remedy the student will seek.

Since you're a law student, perhaps you can explain where I erred in my posting.

Yñiguez v. Mofford
(excerpts)
730 F.Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990), aff'd. 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated as moot by the U.S. Supreme Court, March 3, 1997



Arizona's Proposition 106, passed by the voters on November 8, 1988, was the most restrictive Official English measure ever enacted at the state level. It added a new Article XXVIII to the state constitution that imposed, with a few exceptions, the sweeping policy: "This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English and in no other language." María-Kelly F. Yñiguez, an insurance-claims manager employed by Arizona's Risk Management Division, and Jaime P. Gutiérrez, a state senator from Tucson, challenged the measure as a violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Even though Article XXVIII is explicit by comparison with other Official English amendments, this case illustrates the potential for disputes about the legal reach of such measures. Acting on a broad interpretation, Yñiguez refrained from speaking any language other than English during working hours, fearing she would violate the law and risk punishment by continuing to communicate in Spanish, when necessary, with members of the public. Gutiérrez did not stop addressing his constituents in Spanish, but questioned whether the practice conflicted with his oath to obey the state constitution. On the other hand, Arizona's Attorney General, Bob Corbin, issued an official opinion (I89-009, Jan. 24, 1989) that Article XXVIII "does not prohibit the use of a language other than English to facilitate the delivery of governmental services." This seemed to settle the matter, to the satisfaction of most Arizonans on both sides of the issue.

But a federal court took the plaintiffs' complaint seriously, regarding their interpretation of Article XXVIII to be reasonable. On February 6, 1990, U.S. District Judge Paul G. Rosenblatt struck down the Official English amendment as unconstitutionally "overbroad" - that is, as prohibiting speech protected under the First Amendment far beyond the means necessary to achieve a legitimate state purpose. Also, in a significant procedural ruling, the court removed Corbin and another state official as defendants in the case. Governor Rose Mofford, a staunch opponent of Proposition 106, chose not to appeal the decision. But in July 1991, Arizonans for Official English won the right to do so. Judge Rosenblatt's ruling follows.

In order to determine whether Article XXVIII reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, the court must first determine what the Article means, which is a matter of substantial dispute between the parties. The plaintiffs' position is that Article XXVIII is a blanket prohibition on the use of any language other than English in the state workplace, whereas the defendants' position is that Article XXVIII does not reach that broadly because it is merely a directive for state and local governmental entities to act in English when acting in their sovereign capacities. For the purposes of the instant action, the court finds from Article XXVIII's plain language that it is a prohibition on the use of any language other than English by all officers and employees of all political subdivisions in Arizona while performing their official duties, save to the extent that they may be allowed to use a foreign language by the limited exceptions contained in § 3(2) of Article XXVIII. Given this interpretation of the Article, an interpretation obviously not binding on state authorities, the court concludes that there is a realistic danger of, and a substantial potential for, the unconstitutional application of Article XXVIII.

The court's determination of Article XXVIII's facial validity is not dependent upon Yñiguez having a First Amendment right to speak a language of her choice during the performance of her duties, a "right" which the defendants assert does not exist. All the court need find, and all that it does find in this regard, is that Article XXVIII is so broad as to inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties. While public employees, as a general proposition, enjoy less First Amendment protection than private citizens because governmental entities have a significant interest as employers in regulating the speech of their employees so as to promote the efficiency of public services, Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of H.S. Dist. 205, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), a state may not apply stricter First Amendment standards to its legislators than it may to private citizens, Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132-22 (1966), nor may a state require that its officers and employees relinquish rights guaranteed them by the First Amendment as a condition of public employment. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977). The sweeping language of Article XXVIII has such a prohibited effect, however. When read at its full literal breadth, Article XXVIII would force Arizona governmental officers and employees whose use of a non-English language in the performance of their official duties is protected by the First Amendment, such as state legislators speaking to constituents in a language other than English, state employees officially commenting on matters of public concern in a language other than English, and state judges performing marriage ceremonies in a language other than English, to either violate their sworn oaths to obey the state constitution, and thereby subject themselves to potential sanctions and private suits, or to curtail their free speech rights.

Although the plaintiffs have not argued that Article XXVIII is unconstitutionally vague, vagueness affects the overbreadth analysis because, in determining whether Article XXVIII is so overbroad as to deter others from engaging in otherwise protected expression, the court has to evaluate the ambiguous as well as the unambiguous scope of the article. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.6 (1982). While the defendants' assertion that the examples of Article XXVIII's unconstitutional reach proffered by the plaintiffs are too extreme to demonstrate the Article's facial unconstitutionality because they represent situations which plainly do not come within the rational parameters of Article XXVIII may be correct, the defendants' assertion only emphasizes Article XXVIII's potential for chilling First Amendment rights. If those affected by Article XXVIII are unclear as to its coverage, the result will be that they will "`steer far wider of the unlawful zone' ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372, 373 (1964). Yñiguez's self-imposed decision to refrain from speaking Spanish while performing her job, a decision vociferously criticized as unfounded by the defendants, is but a product of her legitimate sensitivity to the perils posed by the Article's language and her desire to restrict her conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. A law which reasonably results in such restrictions is unconstitutionally overbroad.

In determining the facial constitutionality of Article XXVIII, the court must also consider any authoritative limiting construction placed on the enactment by Arizona state courts or enforcement agencies, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 (1973), because a state law cannot be facially invalidated as overbroad if it is readily susceptible to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional. As the Supreme Court has noted, the key to the application of this principle is that the state law must be "readily susceptible" of the limitation proffered by the state court or agency because a federal court lacks the power itself to rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements. Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988). No Arizona state court has as yet construed or interpreted Article XXVIII. The Arizona Attorney General has, however, construed Article XXVIII in a narrow fashion in a formal opinion, I89-009, an opinion which the defendants argue resolves the overbreadth issue in this action. ...

The gist of the Attorney General's interpretation of Article XXVIII is that the English-only requirement applies solely to official acts of the state governmental entities and does not prohibit the use of languages other than English that are reasonably necessary to facilitate the day-to-day operation of government. The Attorney General's belief that Article XXVIII is directed only towards sovereign governmental acts centers upon § 3(1)(a) of Article XXVIII, which provides, with a few limited exceptions, that the "State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English and in no other language." The Attorney General's interpretation of what "to act" means, however, in effect ignores § 1(3)(a)(iv) of Article XXVIII, which states that the Article applies to "all government officials and employees during the performance of government business." The various levels of legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government in Arizona affected by Article XXVIII perform business in a whole variety of ways that do not rise to the level of "sovereign" acts, as the Attorney General apparently uses that term. The manner in which the term "act" is used in § 3(2) of the Article, the subsection setting forth the exceptions to the ban on the use of non-English languages, is illustrative of the unreasonableness of the Attorney General's limitation on the meaning of "act." Under the provisions of § 3(2)(c), for example, a governmental entity within Arizona "may act in a language other than English" to teach a student a foreign language as part of an educational curriculum. While the teaching of a foreign language by a public school teacher comes within the definition of performing government business, it does not come within the definition of performing a sovereign act. The Attorney General's restrictive interpretation of Article XXVIII is in effect a "remarkable job of plastic surgery upon the face of the ordinance," Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969), and one which this court cannot accept.

The defendants have not proffered any other limiting construction of Article XXVIII and the court is unable to discern any construction to which the Article is fairly subject that would limit its application in such a way as to render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional questions. ...

Are you kidding me?
You need a serious refresher course in what constitutes the First Amendment.
Particularly "Time, place and manner restrictions." Here ya go:


"Time, place and manner restrictions"

Do yourself a favor.

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This guy is so far afield on language rights that his posts barely deserve response.

I wonder, why nowone looked in the papers, how that story went on (and least, I didn't notice it; and some responses show that at least some posters don't know it):
source: AP, Wed, Dec. 07, 2005

As jo pointed out, the student speaks English fluently, and so prohibiting him from speaking Spanish (for whatever reason) wouldn't necessarily prevent him from expressing himself.

The cited article doesn't provide background for the story, nor why the principle didn't want the student to speak Spanish in the hallway.

Since it was a teacher who heard the Spanish and reported it to the principle, I think its fairly safe to assume that either there was a rule that no one could speak Spanish in the hallways, or the student's speaking of Spanish had previously figured in an incident which somehow gave rise to his individual ban. It is important to note, as well, that only one of the two students was punished and therefore it would appear that the ban was specific to the suspended student.

It is not hard to imagine a situation where a Spanish speaking student said inappropriate things in Spanish to non-Spanish speaking students and teachers. In such a case, it is also not hard to imagine a non-Spanish speaking student learning what the other had actually said, and objecting with strong emotion. After several such incidents, it would be reasonable for a principle to ban the offensive student from speaking Spanish in the hallways, and this would, arguably, be a valid reason for restricting the young man's freedom of speech.

Further, it would not be difficult to imagine the offensive student pleading his innocence to the press and his protective father making a ruckus about it.

All of this is of course speculation, but is it more likely that this student was an innocent victim of a xenophobic, authoritarian school administrator who hates brown skinned people and wants to enforce English as our national language?

That this incident can be found "scary" by anyone is laughable. The suspension was almost immediately rescinded, by the school district (no federal court was required).

If the student chooses to bring this matter to court, he has three, feasible, avenues: He can claim that the principle is guilty of violating a federal, state, or local statute and is therefore subject to criminal penalties (nothing in this for him personally except the satisfaction of seeing justice served), he can ask the court to provide injunctive relief and restore him to normal status at school (oops, too late, that's already happened), or he can file a civil suit, in tort, against the school district, principle, and teacher and seek damages. (oh yeah, here we return to the required three elements of a tort).

Law students of any year are invited to tell me how I am wrong.

Enough said.

Then don't respond. I promise not to cry.

So, in other words, you believe that a kid suspended for repeatedly yelling in a school library has had his First Amendment rights violated?

Of course this link has nothing to do with your criticism of my prior posting on the elements of a tort and that's where I can really use your instruction.

I wonder now, why you, Finn, don't believe my article as well.

Any source for your opinion:

Walter - I have to admit I didn't read your article. Not being independently wealthy, unemployed, or retired, I cannot spend a whole lot of time in the wonder world of A2K.

I know I should read each and every posting before I respond, but I just don't have the time or the attention span.

I'll go back and read your link and see if it changes my opinion.

And now I wonder even more: sice my response is exactly above your several responses, how is this connected to money and/or (un-) employment?

Enough said is right since the plaintiff prevailed.

I had a smart ass come back all ready, but it's the Christmas season and so I am trying to rein myself back - at least temporarily.

I am going to assume that your question was sincere and not a smart-ass come back. (I know, the holidays make us all romantic fools).

Whether or not you are included (Walter paranoid?), there are numerous posters in A2K who are able to remain current on all threads. Reason tells me that this is not possible unless:

1) The posters are independently wealthy and don't need to work
2) The posters are retired and do not work
3) The posters have been fired or layed off and cannot work
4) The posters are employed, but are curs who refuse to give a decent day's work for a decent wage, and spend their time on A2K

I come to A2K in waves.

Late nights on the road, late nights on Fridays. (I have a vacation day tomorrow)

It is not unusual to see a number of Finn replies in a row, because I am catching up.

You will not, however, see a daily dose of Finn replies spread out throughout the day.

For those that can spend many hours on A2K, God bless you.

That I am not wealthy, unemployed, or retired is a statement of fact, not a value judgment.

Our computers are online when started.

But back to my question about what you think re the Superintendent of Schools answer.

Plaintiffs prevail all the time. It only matters, as respects another case, if the fact pattern and issues of law are similar.

The Court in the case you cited, clearly, did not establish a First Amendment right to speak a language of choice.

There is nothing to the case at hand beyond a student speaking a language of his choice.