joefromchicago wrote:Brandon9000 wrote:It's of little consequence. This isn't the reason Bush gave for invading Iraq.
Who said it was?
Are you unaware that he said repeatedly that his motive for wanting to invade was WMD?
Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States.
The report goes on to say that the September 11 investigators found "no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship." It also says that the commission did not find any "evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States."
Obvious close contact far previous to 911.
Why would you ignore it?
hello lash, hope all is well with your readings, jesus doesn't like liars or confabulators like stephen hayes. and he is well known as one in the intel field, his books on this subject having been so debunked that they are considered fictional pieces or cruel jokes on the truth by intel professionals.
Hi. I did tell my daughter about your titles and as soon as we can get some reading projects behind us, we plan to check one of them out.
But for some unknown reason his essays and books are brandished like cleavers by the uninformed right wing when in fact they have the intellectual sharpness of warm butter.
I hear you, but actually the parts of Hayes' article I'm interested in is where he quotes the 911 Commission report and then elucidates. I'm not hanging my argument on Hayes or the National Review. It is affixed to the words in the 911 Commission Report. You guys continue to try to change my argument, and then assail the argument you created.
you linked an essay by Hayes that is just another superficial distortion that leaves out much information that undermines the general thrust of the argument that Saddam was a harborer of al-Quida or simply an old folks home for terrorists.
Well. I'll be happy to go point counterpoint, but the 911 Report is really all that is necessary.
or to point to the linked references to the documents provided to the 911 commission, or the select senate intelligence committee )SSCI), where both found no operational evidence of support between saddan hussein and al quida.
This is what I reference above. I did not say there is evidence of an operational relationship. There is evidence of a relationship, however, and in my opinion, the only credible assumption is that they either had--or planned to have--a mutually beneficial relationship. Knowing of their meetings and envoys and offers of assistance and cooperation, I think only someone is very deep denial would say that they knew the two absolutely did not have any type of relationship--I showed up here when people were acting like it was fodder for personal insult to even hold out a belief that a collusion was possible. It was not only possible--it was likely.
in fact if one is to refer to collusion between iraq and al quida because some al quida members were in iraq under saddam's reign, then a case could be made that george bush colluded with al quida because al quida agents were in the US when bush was president.
I said it was possible--and that the insulting language on this thread toward those who see a pattern, that possibly--and likely--led to a mutually beneficial relationship--is overdone and unsupportable.
lets get to the facts here so you don't get taken by hayes again.
first go to the sources:
SSCI Report
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html
read it and find where there was any operational support mentioned.
Didn't say there was operational support, if you will check.
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm
Notes of that Report. (Report by the National Commission on terrorisat attacks upon the United States)
Chapter 2 The Foundation of the New Terrorism
Quote:Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda-save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against "Crusaders" during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army. (ref 53)
This is evidence of nothing. The fact that Saddam made overtures negates the value of this assumption.
53. CIA analytic report,"Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003.
Quote:To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad's control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy. (ref 54)
This is AQ, OBL and Saddam in bed.
54. Ibid.; Intelligence report, al Qaeda and Iraq, Aug. 1, 1997.
Quote:With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request. (ref 55)
This is willingness of the part of OBL to work with Saddam, negating all assumptions that OBL looked down on SH's secularity. He asked for training camps. Please explain Salman Pak and moreso--why SH wouldn't join forces with the one person in the world who may have hated W and the US more than he did??55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At least one of these reports dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg interview (June 25, 2004).
This is in my favor. It corresponds with Iraqi defectors remarks about Islamists training at Salman Pak around this time.Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of Iraq's intelligence service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. The source claimed that Bin Ladin asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission.The information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, and there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received "third hand," passed from the foreign government service that "does not meet directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the Service." The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Ladin's Sudan farm in December 1995.
Quote:.There is also evidence that around this time Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response. According to one report, Saddam Hussein's efforts at this time to rebuild relations with the Saudis and other Middle Eastern regimes led him to stay clear of Bin Ladin. (ref 74)
More Bin Laden proving willingness and motivation to work with SH.
74. Intelligence report, unsuccessful Bin Ladin probes for contact with Iraq, July 24, 1998; Intelligence report, Saddam Hussein's efforts to repair relations with Saudi government, 2001
Quote:In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December. (ref 75)
75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999.
I mean, you make my case. We had one willing and motivated, and the other reticent. Now, we have all we need to make my case that the possibility and likelihood existed. Now, we have proof that SH was seeking out OBL, who he knew wanted his help and partnership. They met. They had the same goal. One had safe harbor, the other had the organization. It was a perfect partnership. Why did SH establish meetings with a man who we know had asked for training ground and a partnership? Discuss old times? Discuss their religious similarities? Why?
Quote:Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States. (ref 76)
The offer was made. At the time, it may not have been in OBL's best interests, but the offer was made and on the table. What more do reasonable people need? It was possible and likely that they worked together. SH provided free access and safe harbor, a training ground, money, logistics and manpower. OBL provided organization and zealotry to attract manpower. They were perfect together.
76. CIA analytic report,"Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003. See also DIA analytic report,"Special Analysis: Iraq's Inconclusive Ties to Al-Qaida," July 31, 2002; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 con-tacts.They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of his original information. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda operative, Feb. 14, 2004.Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that any such ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003 (cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas Feith memorandum,"Requested Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts (1990-2003),'" Dec. 10, 2003, p. 5).
Now as to those harboured terrorists....
1. Abu Nidal.
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jwit/jwit020823_1_n.shtml
Quote:
Whether this is true or not doesn't prove anything either way.
2. Abu Abbas.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2952879.stm
Quote:His capture in Baghdad in April 2003 was used by the United States as evidence that Iraq had been harbouring international terrorists, and his detention an example to others in the post-11 September, post-Saddam climate.
Turning a blind eye to anyone who has a record like his - and his group did murder an elderly, disabled man - was not an option for a US administration. But he was not quite the big catch in the the Americans were seeking for their "war on terror".
Abbas' arrest was not the link between Iraq and al-Qaeda that Washington had been seeking to establish. He came from a different era.
He was a Palestinian terrorist. His birthday doesn't matter. He was an Islamist.
He ended up in Baghdad because there was nowhere else for this aging militant or terrorist leader to go. He and his kind have been partly overtaken by the new zealots from al-Qaeda, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who are motivated by religion as well as nationalism.
Overtaken, or joined?
Even Israel allowed him in and out of Gaza a few years ago as it accepted that he had given up violence and was supporting the Oslo peace process. Israel could not prosecute him under the terms of the Oslo accords anyway.
This is meaningless. It isn't proof of anything..
4. Abu Musab al Zarqawi
http://www.rotten.com/library/bio/crime/terrorists/abu-musab-al-zarqawi/
Quote:Zarqawi found shelter in Iran for a while, but Colin Powell didn't care. According to U.S. intelligence, Zarqawi traveled to Iraq in early 2002, and allegedly began associating with Ansar al-Islam, an impoverished group of 600 to 800 Iraqi Kurds whose stated goal was to secede from Saddam's Iraq so that its tiny, ethnically exclusive clan could go hide out in the mountains.
Of course, there's room for a different interpretation of Ansar's role. For instance, if you're Colin Powell and you're desperate to sell an Iraq invasion to the international community, you could argue that Ansar was a "sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder."
The American Heritage Dictionary defines a nexus as "A means of connection; a link or tie." Whatever else Ansar was, it certainly wasn't a nexus.
Says who? Ansar al Islam became an offshoot of AQ.
Geographically stuck between Iran, Iraq and the mainstream Kurds, Ansar was not an effective force in the region. al Qaeda briefly cultivated a relationship with the group, because of its strategic location relative to Afghanistan. When bin Laden and his crew were forced to retreat to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, al Qaeda's interest in Asnar faded.
Says who? Is that fact or opinion? Do they have evidence of this?
According to the U.S. pre-Iraq party line, Zarqawi used his "base" in Iraq to stage bombings and terrorist attacks in Turkey and Morocco. Powell told the U.N. that Zarqawi received medical treatment during a stay in Baghdad in May 2002. This was supposed to illustrate Saddam's alliance with al Qaeda. (No one ever talks about the fact that Ramzi Yousef received medical treatment from a hospital in New Jersey after a minor car accident in 1993. Did Bill Clinton personally fluff his pillow?)
As it turns out, the report of medical treatment wasn't even credible to begin with. According to U.S. intelligence, Zarqawi had a leg amputated in Baghdad. Except that most sources now believe Zarqawi is equipped with two working legs. As Newsweek colorfully put in in early 2004, "The stark fact is that we don't even know for sure how many legs Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi has, let alone whether the Jordanian terrorist, purportedly tied to al Qaeda, is really behind the latest outrages in Iraq."
The remainder of Powell's claims about Iraq were less than airtight, as we all know by now. There is virtually no evidence to support claims that al Qaeda and Iraq were working together. bin Laden openly advocated the overthrow of Hussein before the U.S. decided to invade.
This is negated by his later proven requests for help and meetings with SH reps.
There may well have been al Qaeda operatives in Baghdad, but there were also al Qaeda operatives in New York, Madrid, Cairo, Fort Lauderdale and Norman, Oklahoma.
Were the leaders of those countries mortal enemies of the US, who had offered safe haven to OBL??
Despite all the laborious U.S. efforts to prove a link, most independent experts believe Zarqawi is not operating on behalf of al Qaeda, a conclusion which the U.S. military reluctantly conceded in early 2004.
So, Zarqawi isn't operating on behalf of OBL/AQ???
In recent media interviews with captured Ansar al-Islam operatives, the terrorists said they never laid eyes on Zarqawi (the interviewees provided other verifiable information on Ansar activities).
If you don't buy flimsy **** from our gov, why buy this ****?Quote:
So, Abu Nidal was murdered by Saddam.
Not a fact. A theory. But, even if HE WAS, it could have been for a myriad of reasons.
So, Abu Abbas was free to travel to Israeli held Palestine where the Israeli and American and Italian governments could have captured him, but none did.
I am baffled that you guys don't get the distinction. When Abbas and the dreck of the world are operating, training, plotting and organizing a murdering force with impunity as the guests of the country's President, who is hiding them from justice, THAT is the difference.
So, Abdul Rahman Yasin was a prisoner in Saddam's jails.
So, Abu Musab al Zarqawi was in Iraq, but not a part of the country actually under the control of the Iraqi government, and in fact was operating to help Kurdish nationalists overthrow Saddam. And just how many legs does Zarqawi have anyway?
Zarqawi was an AQ operative working for OBL, training the Kurds (Al Ansar)--until OBL saw that he could use SH's land. OBL later told his officer, Zarqawi, to stop opposing SH. And he did. It doesn't matter how many legs he had. It matter that he was OBL's officer, who suddenly put a stop to opposition to SH and later fought for SH.
__________________________
joe--
You said this: Indeed, the report notes that bin Laden was an enemy of Saddam's Baathist regime.
But you must know OBL and SH did both offer help to one another--which supercedes any previous BS pop psychology some lame Democrat woman in the CIA divined out of her coffee cup. They proved a willingness and motivation to work together.
You further said:Emphasizing the contacts, without mentioning the conclusions, is disingenuous at best.
....You don't know the conclusions. Which is my point.
And, you know. I know you people know this. It is just astonishing the lengths you go to to try to avoid admitting it.
Brandon9000 wrote:joefromchicago wrote:Brandon9000 wrote:It's of little consequence. This isn't the reason Bush gave for invading Iraq.
Who said it was?
Are you unaware that he said repeatedly that his motive for wanting to invade was WMD?
No, I'm not unaware of that. But then that doesn't answer my question. When presented with poll results indicating that a majority of Republicans think that Saddam Hussein was involved in the 9-11 attacks, you replied: "It's of little consequence. This isn't the reason Bush gave for invading Iraq." So I'm still left wondering: who said it was? In other words, why would you bring up the rationale for invading Iraq when the poll didn't ask people what they thought was the rationale for invading Iraq?
This is what I reference above. I did not say there is evidence of an operational relationship. There is evidence of a relationship, however, and in my opinion, the only credible assumption is that they either had--or planned to have--a mutually beneficial relationship. Knowing of their meetings and envoys and offers of assistance and cooperation, I think only someone is very deep denial would say that they knew the two absolutely did not have any type of relationship--I showed up here when people were acting like it was fodder for personal insult to even hold out a belief that a collusion was possible. It was not only possible--it was likely.
There is evidence of a relationship, however, and in my opinion, the only credible assumption is that they either had--or planned to have--a mutually beneficial relationship.
(I)Didn't say there was operational support, if you will check.
Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda-save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against "Crusaders" during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army. (ref 53)
Lash's remark "This is evidence of nothing. The fact that Saddam made overtures negates the value of this assumption."
53. CIA analytic report,"Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003.
To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad's control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy. (ref 54)
Lash's remark This is AQ, OBL and Saddam in bed.
54. Ibid.; Intelligence report, al Qaeda and Iraq, Aug. 1, 1997
With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request. (ref 55)
lash's remark ..This is willingness of the part of OBL to work with Saddam, negating all assumptions that OBL looked down on SH's secularity. He asked for training camps. Please explain Salman Pak and moreso--why SH wouldn't join forces with the one person in the world who may have hated W and the US more than he did??
And my reply .It is not I who has to explain your assumption, it is you who have to prove it against the statement that "there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request."[/i]
55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At least one of these reports dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg interview (June 25, 2004).
Lash's remark ..This is in my favor. It corresponds with Iraqi defectors remarks about Islamists training at Salman Pak around this time.
Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of Iraq's intelligence service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. The source claimed that Bin Ladin asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission.The information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, and there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received "third hand," passed from the foreign government service that "does not meet directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the Service." The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Ladin's Sudan farm in December 1995.
There is also evidence that around this time Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response. According to one report, Saddam Hussein's efforts at this time to rebuild relations with the Saudis and other Middle Eastern regimes led him to stay clear of Bin Ladin. (ref 74)
Lash's remark ..More Bin Laden proving willingness and motivation to work with SH.
74. Intelligence report, unsuccessful Bin Ladin probes for contact with Iraq, July 24, 1998; Intelligence report, Saddam Hussein's efforts to repair relations with Saudi government, 2001
In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December. (ref 75)
75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999.
I mean, you make my case. We had one willing and motivated, and the other reticent. Now, we have all we need to make my case that the possibility and likelihood existed. Now, we have proof that SH was seeking out OBL, who he knew wanted his help and partnership. They met. They had the same goal. One had safe harbor, the other had the organization. It was a perfect partnership. Why did SH establish meetings with a man who we know had asked for training ground and a partnership? Discuss old times? Discuss their religious similarities? Why?
Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting,
Lash's remark .Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq.
Mine .READ THE DAMNED REFERENCE IN TOTAL, AL QUIDA OFFICIALS DENY THIS EVER HAPPENED.
Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States. (ref 76)
Lash's remark .The offer was made. At the time, it may not have been in OBL's best interests, but the offer was made and on the table. What more do reasonable people need? It was possible and likely that they worked together. SH provided free access and safe harbor, a training ground, money, logistics and manpower. OBL provided organization and zealotry to attract manpower. They were perfect together.
AGAIN, READ THE DAMNED REFERENCE IN TOTAL, AL QUIDA OFFICIALS DENY THIS EVER HAPPENED.
76. CIA analytic report,"Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003. See also DIA analytic report,"Special Analysis: Iraq's Inconclusive Ties to Al-Qaida," July 31, 2002; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 con-tacts.They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of his original information. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda operative, Feb. 14, 2004.Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that any such ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003[/u] (cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas Feith memorandum,"Requested Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts (1990-2003),'" Dec. 10, 2003, p. 5).
joefromchicago wrote:Brandon9000 wrote:joefromchicago wrote:Brandon9000 wrote:It's of little consequence. This isn't the reason Bush gave for invading Iraq.
Who said it was?
Are you unaware that he said repeatedly that his motive for wanting to invade was WMD?
No, I'm not unaware of that. But then that doesn't answer my question. When presented with poll results indicating that a majority of Republicans think that Saddam Hussein was involved in the 9-11 attacks, you replied: "It's of little consequence. This isn't the reason Bush gave for invading Iraq." So I'm still left wondering: who said it was? In other words, why would you bring up the rationale for invading Iraq when the poll didn't ask people what they thought was the rationale for invading Iraq?
Because I presume that the reason for creating this thread is to advance the idea that a primary Republican motive for the invasion of Iraq is a silly and false one. I, therefore, logically point out that this wasn't a significant part of the motivation for the invasion.
But you must know OBL and SH did both offer help to one another--which supercedes any previous BS pop psychology some lame Democrat woman in the CIA divined out of her coffee cup. They proved a willingness and motivation to work together.
You don't know the conclusions. Which is my point.
And, you know. I know you people know this. It is just astonishing the lengths you go to to try to avoid admitting it.
Because I presume that the reason for creating this thread is to advance the idea that a primary Republican motive for the invasion of Iraq is a silly and false one. I, therefore, logically point out that this wasn't a significant part of the motivation for the invasion.
Brandon9000 wrote:Because I presume that the reason for creating this thread is to advance the idea that a primary Republican motive for the invasion of Iraq is a silly and false one. I, therefore, logically point out that this wasn't a significant part of the motivation for the invasion.
I believe that your presumption was wrong. As DrewDad points out, the thread was most likely started to show the general stupidity of the rank and file of the GOP. But rather than speculate, why didn't you simply ask the originator of the thread, freedom4free, to explain the point of the thread?
joefromchicago wrote:Brandon9000 wrote:Because I presume that the reason for creating this thread is to advance the idea that a primary Republican motive for the invasion of Iraq is a silly and false one. I, therefore, logically point out that this wasn't a significant part of the motivation for the invasion.
I believe that your presumption was wrong. As DrewDad points out, the thread was most likely started to show the general stupidity of the rank and file of the GOP. But rather than speculate, why didn't you simply ask the originator of the thread, freedom4free, to explain the point of the thread?
Because it's close enough. Even if that wasn't the purpose in the author's mind, some people would take it that way. I have heard countless arguments against the war in Iraq that focus on arguing against a Saddam - 9/11 connection.
I presume that the point of the thread is to show that Republicans are uninformed idiots.
Because it's close enough. Even if that wasn't the purpose in the author's mind, some people would take it that way.
I have heard countless arguments against the war in Iraq that focus on arguing against a Saddam - 9/11 connection.
Besides, it's not a matter of such great urgency that every post be perfect, it's just a message board. Your posts, for instance, aren't always very respectful of the author's stated intention for the thread.
Lash wrote:But you must know OBL and SH did both offer help to one another--which supercedes any previous BS pop psychology some lame Democrat woman in the CIA divined out of her coffee cup. They proved a willingness and motivation to work together.
Even if what you say were true (and I don't think it is), so what?
Use your lawyerly razzle-dazzle. Make a case for the defense--and then the prosecution.
If you are "prosecuting" SH and OBL for culpability in 911, where do you start? You start with establishing a relationship between them. Did they know one another? Did they have reason to work together? Is there any evidence that shows that they were interested in working together toward this goal?
The defense would try to find an alibi for any alleged meetings--say they never contacted one another...they were not interested in the same goal....if they were faced with evidence of meetings, it would look very bad for their clients, but of course, they could then defend them as you are--and say just because there is evidence of several meetings and they are highly motivated to work together and there are clear signs that OBL was calling off his Al Ansar goons for SH, and SH had a Terrorist Med going on...well. That's not proof.
Yeah. OJ got off too.
IMO, neither side has enough evidence to mount a convincing case, so the decision has to made on a preponderance of the evidence.
If there had been no evidence of any meetings or good vibes between them, I wouldn't be having this conversation. I would have shut up about this a couple of years ago.
But, there is more evidence that they DID work together than they DIDN'T.
You won't see me marching in full uniform, blaring that it is a slam dunk case. But, you also won't see me avoid confrontation when some yahoo starts insulting those who think there is credence to the belief SH and OBL possibly worked together. The 62% thinks SH, at least indirectly, assisted with 911. So do I. There is good reason to.
So what if bin Laden and Saddam Hussein showed "willingness and motivation to work together?" Even that doesn't prove that there were any significant contacts between the two prior to 9-11, much less that Saddam had anything to do with the attacks. To argue otherwise would be about as idiotic as claiming that the US needed to invade Iraq because it was engaged in "weapons of mass destruction-related program activities."
Never said it was proven. I said it was possible and likely.
Lash wrote:You don't know the conclusions. Which is my point.
Whose conclusions? Yours?
You are unaware of the conclusions to both men's requests of the other. If you are holding out with the tapes of their conversations, please call the 911 Commission. They'd be quite interested.
This is what I reference above. I did not say there is evidence of an operational relationship. There is evidence of a relationship, however, and in my opinion, the only credible assumption is that they either had--or planned to have--a mutually beneficial relationship. Knowing of their meetings and envoys and offers of assistance and cooperation, I think only someone is very deep denial would say that they knew the two absolutely did not have any type of relationship--I showed up here when people were acting like it was fodder for personal insult to even hold out a belief that a collusion was possible. It was not only possible--it was likely.
Ample evidence defines requests by OBL and offers of assistance by SH. This HAS been established. It is not unreasonable to assume further cooperation. It IS unreasonable to insult those who consider this connecion feasible
They are likely connected. Based on factual contacts.
There is evidence of a relationship, however, and in my opinion, the only credible assumption is that they either had--or planned to have--a mutually beneficial relationship.
There is credible evidence of requests and offers of assistance. Mutual action does not have to mean directly against the US...Most people believe SH's assistance was indirect, but invaluable.
Good grief.
The meetings and requests and offers between them are in the report and factual.
Actually, a preponderance of the evidence shows a relationship, and mutual goals and willingness and motivation to work together and a despised common enemy who was making life nearly impossible for both of them
(I)Didn't say there was operational support, if you will check.
I didn't say anything about supporting Bush. I separated that from the case between SH and OBL. It is you who is hellbent on disagreeing with the obvious relationship as not to give credence to Bush's decision. I believe they were working together as the evidence suggests, and that is one of the reasons I thought the invasion was the right thing to do.
However, if no evidence of any meetings had been found, I wouldn't make this argument. I would be much more inclined to think I'd been wrong.
Oh. Ansar Al Islam doesn't count???
I think one of your errors is taking a fact and then assigning it stuff it doesn't come with. Where do you see that in their minds that had to mean there was operational support? And, have you confused that with operational cooperation with 911? The words are specific and mean very diferent things.
My only argument is with those who think they have the moral authority to insult others, who look at the evidence introduced in the 911 Commission report and see the likelihood of collusion.
Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda-save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against "Crusaders" during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army. (ref 53)
Lash's remark "This is evidence of nothing. The fact that Saddam made overtures negates the value of this assumption."
53. CIA analytic report,"Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003.
When they reached out to one another, that immediately negated the assumption that they wouldn't do so because of differences
I don't have a problem with you, so to speak. I just think you are ignoring the evidence in the Report.
It is not known that nothing came of the requests and offers.
How about one short post at a time to flesh out the facts. Start with this one. Where did I do this?
To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad's control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy. (ref 54)
Lash's remark This is AQ, OBL and Saddam in bed.
54. Ibid.; Intelligence report, al Qaeda and Iraq, Aug. 1, 1997
Correct. I didn't assume this. I'm sure SH hated this prospect and was more than glad to join up with OBL to goive him safe haven in return, partially, for a stop to Ansar Al Islam ceasing within his borders. TA-DAAAA!!! Come on, dear. Smell the coffee.
The action is listed in the 911 Report. I don't think you know what you're looking for.
With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request. (ref 55)
lash's remark ..This is willingness of the part of OBL to work with Saddam, negating all assumptions that OBL looked down on SH's secularity. He asked for training camps. Please explain Salman Pak and moreso--why SH wouldn't join forces with the one person in the world who may have hated W and the US more than he did??
And my reply .It is not I who has to explain your assumption, it is you who have to prove it against the statement that "there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request."[/i]
Quote:If I was saying unequivocably that my belief is a fact, you'd be right. I am merely upholding it as a possibility, therefore, I have proven what is necessary.
55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At least one of these reports dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg interview (June 25, 2004).
Lash's remark ..This is in my favor. It corresponds with Iraqi defectors remarks about Islamists training at Salman Pak around this time.
Wrong. It states they don't know of a positive response. I would venture to say that a lot of things occur in this world that ecapes the CIA.
Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of Iraq's intelligence service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. The source claimed that Bin Ladin asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission.The information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, and there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received "third hand," passed from the foreign government service that "does not meet directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the Service." The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Ladin's Sudan farm in December 1995.
There is also evidence that around this time Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response. According to one report, Saddam Hussein's efforts at this time to rebuild relations with the Saudis and other Middle Eastern regimes led him to stay clear of Bin Ladin. (ref 74)
Lash's remark ..More Bin Laden proving willingness and motivation to work with SH.
74. Intelligence report, unsuccessful Bin Ladin probes for contact with Iraq, July 24, 1998; Intelligence report, Saddam Hussein's efforts to repair relations with Saudi government, 2001
Try to take your partisan blinders off for a sec. In order to prove an alliance, both must have shown a willingness. I was showing willingnes re one of the two. Later, SH showed his hand.
In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December. (ref 75)
75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999.
I mean, you make my case. We had one willing and motivated, and the other reticent. Now, we have all we need to make my case that the possibility and likelihood existed. Now, we have proof that SH was seeking out OBL, who he knew wanted his help and partnership. They met. They had the same goal. One had safe harbor, the other had the organization. It was a perfect partnership. Why did SH establish meetings with a man who we know had asked for training ground and a partnership? Discuss old times? Discuss their religious similarities? Why?
You can't hide from the reality of this:
In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis.
Nice dodge. Not. My "thesis" is that collusion is possible and likely. The report proves it for me.
Do you believe everything Al Quaida says? Damn.
Would you let them babysit your children, too? Damn. This is where the disconnect is. I DON'T BUY WHAT AL QUAIDA SAYS. YOU APPARENTLY DO. I guess Republicans are more apt to believe our government than Al Quaida--and you believe Al Quaida and think our own government are the murdering bastards.