Far from vindicating war critics, The
Duelfer Report found that "...[Saddam Hussein] wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction when sanctions were lifted.", that " ... [Saddam's] primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with the UN inspections to gain support for lifting the sanctions with his intention to preserve Iraq's intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face.", that Saddam saw the Oil For Food Program " ... could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.".
As noted in the report, " ... At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the five permanent members [of the Security Council] and foment international public support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign and an extensive diplomatic effort." and that " ... a large amount of material had been transferred by Iraq to Syria before the March 2003 war." In fairness, it must be noted the nature of that material is indeterminate; the transfer was accomplished almost entirely by night, " ... over a period of several months", with " ... military precision" and " ... under conditions of strictest secrecy, documented chiefly through infrared satellite photography."
Further, the report held that contrary to sanctions and requirements, and beyond the awareness of the UN inspection teams, Iraq continued development, domestic manufacture, foreign acquisition, and operational deployment of proscribed conventional weapons systems of various nature.
The report concluded that Iraq persisted in defiance of relevant Security Council Resolutions, that Iraq's dual use facillities could within " ...a matter of days produce substantial quantities" of proscribed agents, using " ... materials on hand" and that Iraq's assets, capabilities, and intentions posed an ongoing threat to both regional and global security.
"We must not allow that threat to become imminent"
