Okay, Dems, What Went Wrong? And How Can We Fix It?

Another key reason why Bush supporters may hold to the beliefs that Iraq had WMD and supported al Qaeda, is that these beliefs are necessary for them to support the decision to go to war with Iraq. Eighty five percent of Bush supporters say that going to war was the right decision. However, asked what the US should have done "If, before the war, US intelligence services had concluded that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction and was not providing substantial support to al Qaeda," 58% of Bush supporters said in that case the US should not have gone to war. Furthermore, 61% express confidence that in that case the President would not have gone to war. To preserve the belief that that going to war was the right decision, it appears necessary for Bush supporters to believe that the assumptions that prompted going to war were correct.

Gradually the support for the decision to go to war and, concomitantly, public confidence in the president, began to wither. Moving in tandem down this slowly descending arc were the declining beliefs that Iraq had WMD and links to al Qaeda, and that world public opinion approved of the US going to war with Iraq.

But now, while others have peeled off, Bush supporters continue to hold onto their image of Bush as a capable protector. To do this it appears that many need to continue to screen out information that undermines this image.

Bush appears to assume that his support is fragile. He refuses to admit to making any mistakes. He admits that he was surprised that WMD were not found, but does not say that the most reasonable conclusion is that they were never there and continues to talk about "disarming" Iraq. He asserts that he never said that Iraq was directly involved in 9/11, but maintains that there were contacts with al Qaeda in a way that implies that they were significant. Most telling, his supporters as well as his opponents overwhelmingly say that they hear him still saying that Iraq had WMD and supported al Qaeda. To remain loyal and bonded to him means to enter into this false reality.

Bush may be right. Admitting his mistakes may shatter his idealized image in a way that some supporters may not forgive. But there also risks in succeeding in getting elected based on false beliefs. The number of people in the public who see through the illusion will likely continue to grow, eating away at the implied mandate of an election. Further, the cohesion of society can be damaged by a persisting and fundamental division in the perception of what is real, undermining pathways to consensus and mutual sacrifice, and making the country increasingly difficult to govern.

To preserve the belief that that going to war was the right decision, it appears necessary for Bush supporters to believe that the assumptions that prompted going to war were correct.

I don't know much about psychology, but this sounds like a classic case of cognitive dissonance to me, and it also sounds like a very persuasive account of what's happening. Does anybody know what's the "right" way of approaching persons who are in that state? I would be surprised if it was to tell them: "You're in a state of cognitive dissonance, get the hell out of it, right now" -- which seems to be what debaters on our side of the Iraq discussion are routinely doing, on A2K and elsewhere, and I'm not excluding myself from that.

The primary poll was conducted October 12-18 with 968 respondents, but the analysis also included polls that were conducted September 3-7 and September 8-12, with 798 and 959 respondents, respectively. Margins of error ranged from 3.2-4%. The polls were fielded by Knowledge Networks using its nationwide panel, which is randomly selected from the entire adult population and subsequently provided internet access. For more information about this methodology, go to www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp.

I know a lot of Bush supporters and I haven't known ANY of them to believe Saddam and Osama were working directly with each other. Most of them believed Saddam had WMD's prior to the war as did I. Many feel that the WMD's were moved or hidden, as do I.

WMD's WERE found in Iraq, just not the quantities we expected. Most, it is believed, were secreted into Syria.

Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80
Updated - February 11, 2004
Edited by Jeffrey Richelson

Originally posted December 20, 2002
Previously updated February 26, 2003

[...] As U.S. forces moved through Iraq, there were initial reports that chemical or biological weapons might have been uncovered, but closer examinations produced negative results. In May 2003, the Bush administration decided to establish a specialized group of about 1,500 individuals, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), to search the country for WMD - replacing the 75th Exploitation Task Force, which had originally been assigned the mission. Appointed to lead the Group, whose motto is "find, exploit, eliminate," was Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. In June, David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapons inspector after Operation Desert Storm, was appointed special advisor and traveled to Iraq to lead the search. (Note 4)

By the time of the creation of the ISG, and continuing to the date of this publication, a controversy has existed over the performance of U.S. (and British) intelligence in collecting and evaluating information about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The reliability of sources has been questioned. It has been suggested that some human intelligence may have been purposeful deception by the Iraqi intelligence and security services, while exiles and defectors may have provided other intelligence seeking to influence U.S. policy.

The quality of the intelligence analysis has also come under scrutiny. The failure to find weapons stocks or active production lines, undermining claims by the October 2002 NIE and both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell (Document 16, Document 27), has been one particular cause for criticism. Controversy has also centered around specific judgments - in the United States with regard to assessments of Iraq's motives for seeking high-strength aluminum tubes, and in the United Kingdom with respect to the government's claim that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Africa. Post-war evaluation of captured material, particularly two mobile facilities that the CIA and DIA judged to be biological weapons laboratories, has also been the subject of dispute. (Note 5)[...]

The Conservative Evangelical Christian movement is determined to impose their religious beliefs on everyone, not just in the US but on the entire world

McGentrix wrote:

WMD's WERE found in Iraq, just not the quantities we expected. Most, it is believed, were secreted into Syria.

I have not seen where this statement by McGentrix was actually refuted. Alluded to, yes, but point blank said is incorrect... no.

I'm therefore pointing McGentrix to this website, which I hope he finds to be an adequate reference:
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/

Quote:

Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80
Updated - February 11, 2004
Edited by Jeffrey Richelson

Originally posted December 20, 2002
Previously updated February 26, 2003

[...] As U.S. forces moved through Iraq, there were initial reports that chemical or biological weapons might have been uncovered, but closer examinations produced negative results. In May 2003, the Bush administration decided to establish a specialized group of about 1,500 individuals, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), to search the country for WMD - replacing the 75th Exploitation Task Force, which had originally been assigned the mission. Appointed to lead the Group, whose motto is "find, exploit, eliminate," was Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. In June, David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapons inspector after Operation Desert Storm, was appointed special advisor and traveled to Iraq to lead the search. (Note 4)

By the time of the creation of the ISG, and continuing to the date of this publication, a controversy has existed over the performance of U.S. (and British) intelligence in collecting and evaluating information about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The reliability of sources has been questioned. It has been suggested that some human intelligence may have been purposeful deception by the Iraqi intelligence and security services, while exiles and defectors may have provided other intelligence seeking to influence U.S. policy.

The quality of the intelligence analysis has also come under scrutiny. The failure to find weapons stocks or active production lines, undermining claims by the October 2002 NIE and both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell (Document 16, Document 27), has been one particular cause for criticism. Controversy has also centered around specific judgments - in the United States with regard to assessments of Iraq's motives for seeking high-strength aluminum tubes, and in the United Kingdom with respect to the government's claim that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Africa. Post-war evaluation of captured material, particularly two mobile facilities that the CIA and DIA judged to be biological weapons laboratories, has also been the subject of dispute. (Note 5)[...]