@Cycloptichorn,
Just saw this edit, so I'll reply separately.
Cycloptichorn wrote:The problem is, we can talk a lot about incentives and risk and moral hazards, but these are nebulous things that in many ways can't be proven.
The moral hazard really isn't abstract at all though, just quantifying what it was responsible for in the crisis is. That is what I keep trying to say with the quibbling over just how much the government is to blame here.
Yesterday I cited Paul Krugman too, who in an article
absolving the GSE's of all blame (I think he made a particular mistake to get to this particular conclusion but sticking to my main point....) still acknowledges that this is a fundamentally problematic situation that is a clear moral hazard.
Paul Krugman wrote:This implicit guarantee means that profits are privatized but losses are socialized. If Fannie and Freddie do well, their stockholders reap the benefits, but if things go badly, Washington picks up the tab. Heads they win, tails we lose.
That we insure some private risk with public money is not something that is in any serious dispute. We are just arguing now, over just how sheer the scope of this moral hazard is, and whether it is fair to blame the government exactly how much. The raging national debate this all sparked is because of the ideological conclusions that are being drawn, with conservative viewpoints like Pinto's trying to pin the entire problem on "overregulation" and then folks like Krugman trying to absolve the government's blame etc. I am not really interested in that political debate about what language we can use to describe the moral hazard, both sides pretty much agree that it's there and are just bickering on what political capital can be extracted from it, be it anti-government or anti-corporation.
This moral hazard was there, and is still there. Nobody is really disputing this, that is why I look forward to getting out of the bog of statistical equivocation and determining just how "problematic" this position of ours is and get to the core of debating taking this issue off the table.
But yeah, as you know you and I happen to have actually gotten this far and agree on not promoting home ownership this way. I'm hoping
parados makes it to this part of the argument as well and opines about the central issue at hand.
Quote:Regarding the idea that we can simply nationalize companies that go bad, and solve the problem that way: what happens when companies create a terrible situation, that we then have to inherit? Limiting the size of the companies (by using common-sense regulations requiring them to actually focus on, yaknow, banking OR investment, the ones that worked pretty well for 50 plus years) helps keep any of them from running up debts or bad investments to the level where it is a severe cost or risk to the rest of us.
I would also ask: what's the downside of what I propose?
Are you are proposing that when these companies are in distress, and are taken over by the public as I have advocated, that the option to break them up exist?
If so, have absolutely no problem with that. Provided it's discretionary (at the discretion of the public's representatives) and not mandatory (it's a crude implement, I would prefer it have more than just a legislative trigger). My problem with the "break them apart" solution is that it's usually advocated as a preventative measure, just to prevent the "too big to fail" scenario entirely. Break them up just for being big, and possibly putting us in that situation, and there.
My qualm with that approach is the "don't break it if it's not broken" mistake being applied with a very crudely expressed legislative instrument. I'm against pre-emptive breaking, if you will, but once such a bank in distress and has taken a public bailout I think certainly qualifies as broken and there's not as much systemic risk (if it's not clear, I prefer putting some human (and public-sector human) oversight on the triggers, automatic triggers are a great way to escalate a systemic burps into altogether different problems). And as I have advocated, I think that if the public bails out a corporation, that the public should take ownership of it precisely so it can make such fundamental decisions as it sees fit. And if the prudent course of action is determined to be to break the bank into a million tiny pieces so be it. That's what owning a bank let's you do, make decisions like that.