You continue to refuse to acknowledge that the military leaders of that time were legally obligated to obey the orders of their political masters without question.
I've provided the quote from one of those leaders stating as much.
Your argument that they weren't opposed to using the atomic bomb on those cities and people only holds up if we ignore the fact that they were bound by duty to obey and not question the decisions of their superiors.
You would think that if they weren't opposed, as you say they weren't, their statements after the bombing would reflect that. But the fact is that their statements after the bombing do not reflect anything like approval.
Why on earth would you think that a surrender wouldn't come long before that happened?
After all, you believe that the killing of a couple hundred thousand caused them to surrender. That's not very logical.
American Military Leaders Urge President Truman not to Drop the Atomic Bomb.
In an article reprinted in 1947 by Reader's Digest, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers (in charge of psychological warfare on MacArthur's wartime staff and subsequently MacArthur's military secretary in Tokyo) stated:
Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war." (See p. 352, Chapter 28)
Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, 1945 chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section, subsequently recalled in a military history interview: "[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia. . . ." (See p. 359, Chapter 28)
Brigadier Gen. Carter W. Clarke, the officer in charge of preparing MAGIC intercepted cable summaries in 1945, stated in a 1959 interview:
we brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs. (See p. 359, Chapter 28)
In a 1985 letter recalling the views of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, former Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy elaborated on an incident that was
very vivid in my mind. . . . I can recall as if it were yesterday, [Marshall's] insistence to me that whether we should drop an atomic bomb on Japan was a matter for the President to decide, not the Chief of Staff since it was not a military question . . . the question of whether we should drop this new bomb on Japan, in his judgment, involved such imponderable considerations as to remove it from the field of a military decision. (See p. 364, Chapter 28)
In a separate memorandum written the same year McCloy recalled: "General Marshall was right when he said you must not ask me to declare that a surprise nuclear attack on Japan is a military necessity. It is not a military problem." (See p. 364, Chapter 28)
In addition:
- On May 29, 1945 Marshall joined with Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal in approving Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew's proposal that the unconditional surrender language be clarified (but, with Stimson, proposed a brief delay). (See pp. 53-54, Chapter 4)
- On June 9, 1945, along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall recommended that a statement clarifying the surrender terms be issued on the fall of Okinawa (June 21). (See pp. 55-57, Chapter 4)
- On July 16, 1945 at Potsdam--again along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs --Marshall urged the British Chiefs of Staff to ask Churchill to approach Truman about clarifying the terms. (See pp. 245-246, Chapter 19)
- On July 18, 1945, Marshall led the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in directly urging the president to include language in the Potsdam Proclamation allowing Japan to choose its own form of government. (See pp. 299-300, Chapter 23)
In his memoirs President Dwight D. Eisenhower reports the following reaction when Secretary of War Stimson informed him the atomic bomb would be used:
During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. . . . (See p. 4, Introduction)
Eisenhower made similar private and public statements on numerous occasions. For instance, in a 1963 interview he said simply: ". . . it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." (See pp. 352-358, Chapter 28)
If, after reading the opinions of these top military leaders, you come away with the idea that none of them were opposed to using atomic bombs on cities full of people, then I guess I'll leave you to your suspicions that they all thought it was a good idea.
Whatever you're cut-and-pasting is a lie. No one ever advised Truman against using the A-bombs against live targets.
His statement is at odds with history.
This advice was taken. We DID issue the Potsdam Proclamation before using the A-bombs.
Ike was spectacularly unconvincing. Stimson essentially called him an idiot.
The historical record makes it abundantly clear that no such opposition was voiced.
Let's see who's lying.
In May 1945, Truman had formed the Interim Committee, a committee to advise the president about matters pertaining to the use of nuclear energy and weapons. The Committee’s first priority was to advise on the use of the atomic bomb.
The Under-Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, formally dissented from the Interim Committee's recommendation to use the bomb against a city without warning.
Apparently, unless those who were opposed to needlessly using atomic bombs on cities full of people stood on the other side of Truman's desk and said, "I am opposed to using these bombs on populated cities," you arbitrarily say that their opposition doesn't count.
Rear Admiral L. Lewis Strauss, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from 1944 to 1945 (and later chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission), replaced Bard on the Interim Committee after he left government on July 1. Subsequently, Strauss repeatedly stated his belief that the use of the atomic bomb "was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. . . ."
Same committee, different guy, same advice.
That makes two military leaders opposing the use of atomic bombs on cities full of people.
Let's see if there's another.
Henry Arnold was the commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces. His deputy was Lieutenant General Ira Eaker who summed up his understanding in an internal military history interview. Eaker reported that Arnold told him:
"When the question comes up of whether we use the atomic bomb or not, my view is that the Air Force will not oppose the use of the bomb, and they will deliver it effectively if the Commander in Chief decides to use it. But it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion." (See p. 335, Chapter 27)
Eaker also recalled: "That was the representation I made when I accompanied General Marshall up to the White House" for a discussion with Truman on June 18, 1945.]
How do you not see these accounts as military leaders urging Truman not to use the atom bomb on cities full of people?
No, they are at odds with the narrative you've come to accept.
Yeah, about that:
On July 2, 1945, Sec. of War Henry Stimson and Truman discussed a proposal by Stimson to call for Japan to surrender. Stimson's memo to the President advised, "I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance". Stimson's proposed surrender demand stated that the reformed Japanese government "may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty" (Potsdam 1, pg. 889-894).
However, this line was not included in the surrender demand, known as the Potsdam Proclamation, that was broadcast on July 26th, in spite of Stimson's eleventh hour protestations that it be left in (Diary of Henry L. Stimson, 7/24/45, Yale Univ. Library, New Haven, Conn). Pacific war historian Akira Iriye explains, "One reason for this change [the removal of the emperor retention line] was the growing influence within the State Department of men like [Sec. of State] Byrnes, Acheson, and MacLeish - with no expertise on Japanese affairs but keenly sensitive to public opinion - and the president's tendency to listen to them rather than to Grew and other experts." (PAC, pg. 255-256). In regard to his disagreement with Under Sec. of State Grew over allowing Japan to retain the Emperor, Dean Acheson later admitted, "I very shortly came to see that I was quite wrong." (Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, pg. 112-113).
Well sure, as long you omit the historical record contained in the statements of opposition from military leaders that I just showed you,
and as long as you continue to believe that all of the military leaders who voiced opposition after the bombs were dropped were all for it just before they were dropped.
No one ever advised Truman against using the A-bombs against live targets.
Unless you can provide proof of time travel, post-war statements don't count as wartime advice.
The report that Truman received on the question of non-lethal demonstrations is that some people had proposed a non-lethal demonstration, but top nuclear scientists had considered it and found that it just wasn't possible.
The Under-Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, formally dissented from the Interim Committee's recommendation to use the bomb against a city without warning.
You appear to not understand that when someone is opposed to using the bomb on a city without warning, they are against using the bombs against live targets;
specifically innocent civilians.
Did you not see that Bard, as a member of the Interim Committee, dissented from using the bomb on innocent civilians?
Did you not see that the Interim Committee was organized to advise the President? Did you not know that the advice was asked for before the dropping of the bomb?
The fact is that the documented statements from most of the military leaders of that time denounced the use of the atom bomb as unnecessary and without merit.
There is no one here who doesn't see the unreasonableness of your effort to render their statements null and void simply because they spoke after the bombs were dropped.
So just to clarify your position, you believe that they didn't oppose dropping the bombs just before they were dropped, and that they suddenly did an about-face and opposed it just after they were dropped. Is that right?
US Strategic Bombing Survey Verdict
It seems clear ... that air supremacy and its later exploitation over Japan proper was the major factor which determined the timing of Japan's surrender and obviated any need for invasion.
If you're talking about Compton, Lawrence, Oppenheimer, and Fermi, here is what they said concerning their credentials when it comes to this issue:
"With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power."
From your link:
"Ten days later, at Oppenheimer's invitation, Lawrence, Fermi, and I spend a long week end at Los Alamos. We were keenly aware of our responsibility as the scientific advisers to the Interim Committee. Among our colleagues were the scientists who supported Franck in suggesting a nonmilitary demonstration only . We thought of the fighting men who were set for an invasion which would be so very costly in both American and Japanese lives. We were determined to find, if we could, some effective way of demonstrating the power of an atomic bomb without loss of life that would impress Japan's warlords. If only this could be done!"
I assume that this is the segment that you interpreted as explaining the impossibility of dropping the bomb in a nonlethal demonstration.
Well, true their earlier word concerning their lack of competence regarding solutions to social and military problems, their assessment of the impossibility of a nonlethal demonstration is proven false according to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Sruvey Verdict, which assesses that it seems clear that air supremacy and its later exploitation over Japan proper was the major factor which determined the timing of Japan's surrender and obviated any need for invasion.
But didn't all of those military leaders say the same thing? Yes they did. And trust me when I tell you that no one believes your claim that they all felt that way only after the event.
Unexpected Opposition
Before Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima, Leo Szilard at Met Lab in Chicago tried to stop its use. Ironically, Szilard had led atomic bomb research in 1939, but since the threat of a German bomb was over, he started a petition to President Truman against bombing Japan. With 88 signatures on the petition, Szilard circulated copies in Chicago and Oak Ridge, only to have the petition quashed at Los Alamos by theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer.
When General Leslie Groves learned of the petition, he polled the Met Lab scientists and learned that only 15 percent wanted the bomb used "in the most effective military manner." While 46 percent voted for "military demonstration in Japan to be followed by a new opportunity for surrender before full use of the weapon is employed," somehow the figures were manipulated to suggest that 87 percent of the Met Lab scientists favored some sort of military use. Ultimately, Groves sat on Szilard's petition and the poll until August 1, and then had them filed away. President Truman never saw them.
Bard did not object to using the A-bombs on live targets.
That's because I adhere to reality.
The A-bombs were dropped on military targets.
The interim committee advised that there was no alternative but to use the A-bombs against a live target.
Unless you can provide proof that time machines exist, post-war statements do not count as wartime advice.
Self-serving post-war statements do not count as wartime advice.
That's nice. They were still the only people with expertise in nuclear weapons, and they were still the people that the government relied on to assess whether a non-lethal demonstration would be feasible or not.
And they unfortunately concluded that no non-lethal demonstration was feasible.
It is hard to see how that self-serving nonsense from the Air Force proves anything at all.
But even if the scientists' assessment had been proven false after the war, it would not change the reality that their wartime advice was to use the A-bombs against a live target.
Glennn wrote:
But didn't all of those military leaders say the same thing? Yes they did. And trust me when I tell you that no one believes your claim that they all felt that way only after the event.
I am not responsible for claims that other people imagine that I've made.
Right. He simply dissented from the recommendation to use the bomb against al city without warning.
Sounds like he was opposed to using the bombs on live targets to me.
Believing that someone who is opposed to using the bomb on a city without warning is in favor of using the bomb on live targets does not reflect an adherence to reality.
A naval sea blockade had reduced resources--including food--to severe levels.
And this is to say nothing about the fact that nearly every military leader acknowledged the fact that Japan was already defeated due to the earlier campaign of firebombing that destroyed nearly every major city.
From the Associated Press:
In the spring and summer of 1945, the U.S. Army Air Forces destroyed nearly every major city in Japan. The early raids were daytime, high-altitude bombing runs with many bombs missing their mark. Later the tactic was changed to low-flying, night-time raids that utilized hundreds of B-29 bombers that dropped bombs with napalm and other incendiary chemicals.
From January 1944 to August 1945, the U.S. dropped 157,000 tons of bombs on Japanese cities, according to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The death toll from the bombings is estimated at more than 300,000, while another 15 million were left homeless. The firebombing of central Tokyo, killed more than 100,000 people and left hundreds of thousands more homeless. Cities in which more than 2,000 people were killed in air raids included Tokyo, Yokohama, Toyama, Shizuoka, Hamanmatsu, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Kure, Kitakyushi and Kagoshima.
Now, are you still going to argue that dropping the atomic bomb on those two cities were necessary to bring about a surrender?
As stated by military leaders at that time, the bombs weren't necessary.
Do you actually believe that trucks were moving and delivering resources necessary to the war effort after all that firebombing of nearly every major city?
Also, the surrender was the result of the Soviet Union declaring war on Japan one minute after midnight on August 9th.
Yeah but the truth of the matter is that Japan was already firebombed and strangled (defeated) before the bombs were used, as confirmed by the military leaders of that time.
So yes, there was the choice to effect a nonlethal demonstration.
The rationale for using it on people is nonexistent considering the facts of the matter.
The interim committee gave advice based on the preimise that Japan was not already defeated.
But it was.
The military leaders who voiced the truth concerning Japan's military predicament were not approached nor asked for their advice on the matter. They were under orders to obey the command of the their superiors and not to question them. They did, however, later offer their understanding of the situation as they observed it. You're just still attempting to call their observations null and void because their function was not at the advisory level.
Actually, your rejection of the facts put forth by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Verdict and the top military leaders at that time is what is self-serving.
Perhaps you would care to explain their reasoning for declaring a nonlethal demonstration impossible.
Sure, but then again, they were under the mistaken impression that Japan was not already defeated, and that no ground invasion was going to be necessary, especially with the Soviets invading. They were very ill-informed.
That was another of your self-serving assessments of the people involved in real investigation into the matter.
Yes. As I have said, they were ill-informed. Japan was basically on fire with no naval power and no air power to speak of.
Oh good. So you believe that they felt that way before the event.
His advice was followed. We did issue the Potsdam Proclamation first.
That does not change the reality that the A-bombs were dropped on military targets.
They certainly weren't telling the government this during the war when the A-bombs were actually being used.
Glennn wrote:
Now, are you still going to argue that dropping the atomic bomb on those two cities were necessary to bring about a surrender?
I have never made such an argument
They certainly weren't telling the US government this during the war when the A-bombs were being dropped.
Perhaps not. But there is the fact that two million Japanese soldiers were already equipped to fight to the death in an attempt to repel our invasion.
Glennn wrote:
Also, the surrender was the result of the Soviet Union declaring war on Japan one minute after midnight on August 9th.
In part, yes.
This does not change the reality that the Interim Committee advised that a non-lethal demonstration was not possible.
The military leaders certainly weren't giving such advice to the US government when the A-bombs were being dropped.
Top nuclear scientists concluded that this was not possible.
The scientists had a rationale that their conclusions were based on.
The question of whether or not Japan was defeated was not considered by them.
Glennn wrote:
Actually, your rejection of the facts put forth by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Verdict and the top military leaders at that time is what is self-serving.
Only in the sense that my position is served when I point out the truth.
In addition to the scientific recommendations (which we have yet to hear anything about), Secretary of State Byrnes feared that if we announced that we would nuke some place in Japan as a demonstration, Japan would then move captured American POWs to that location."
The fact that they had no expertise in brain surgery is probably why the government didn't consult them on questions of brain surgery.
No. I continue to neither know nor care how they felt about the A-bombs before the event.
But the Potsdam Proclamation was not a warning concerning the use of the atomic bomb.
Please provide reference to the segment of the proclamation that includes a warning that the atomic bomb will be dropped.
And saying that does not change the fact that the A-bombs were dropped in the middle of a city full of people.
And it doesn't change the fact that dropping them in the first place was unnecessary.
One would think that the superiors of those military leaders wouldn't need to be told what their subordinates knew.
And you already know that their job was to follow orders without question.
Where did you get the two million figure?
Well let's see. They didn't surrender after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, but they did just after the Soviets declared war.
I recall asking you to explain the reasoning behind these scientists' opinion that it was impossible to drop the A-bomb somewhere besides the middle of a city full of people. What have you heard?
And what was the basis of that conclusion?
And that conclusion was . . .
Then their opinion concerning the impossibility of dropping the bomb elsewhere was based on what?
But the truth in this case is that the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Verdict which was based on the facts presented after investigation is contrary to your opinion.
scientific recommendations (which we have yet to hear anything about),
Nonsense. There would be no need to disclose exactly where the bombs would be dropped. As I recall, one military leader recommended a forested area. Furthermore, there were twelve American POWs being held in Hiroshima about 1300 feet from ground zero who died. So the concern about worry over U.S. POWs being moved to target areas doesn't really hold water.
Also, from your link:
It was evident that everyone would suspect trickery. If a bomb were exploded in Japan with previous notice, the Japanese air power was still adequate to give serious interference.
This demonstrates that these physicists were unaware of the status of the Japanese air power. And their comment makes no sense when one considers that the Potsdam Proclamation allegedly offered a warning that hell was on the way, and yet there was no interference from Japanese air power. So . . .
Right. Makes one wonder why on earth the military would ask those with no expertise concerning military matters whether a nonlethal demonstration would be wise.
I'm still waiting to hear an explanation as to why a nonlethal demonstration would have been impossible.
I tend to acknowledge what they had to say after the event, especially when their observations are in lockstep with the observation of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Verdict.
All anyone knew when the A-bombs were being dropped is that Japan was still refusing to surrender. It was anyone's guess what it would take to make them surrender.
And here are Compton's recollections of their decision that a non-lethal demonstration would not work:
http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/interim-committee/interim-committee-discussion.htm
As far as opposition to a non-lethal demonstration goes, here is a letter written by Enrico Fermi, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Arthur Compton saying there was no way to make an effective non-lethal demonstration:
http://www.dannen.com/decision/scipanel.html
Recorded history is quite clear that Secretary Byrnes was concerned that if we announced the location of an A-bomb demonstration, Japan would move captured American POWs to that location.
The question being asked was whether a non-lethal demonstration would be possible.
I'm not sure that the people who said "naval blockades won the war" were entirely in lockstep with the people who said "conventional air power won the war".
Recorded history is quite clear that Secretary Byrnes ...
Their is no guess work as to the certainty of the progressive effects of the naval sea blockade, the complete firebombing of nearly every major city, and the Soviet's declaration of war.
I didn't ask for a confirmation that a decision was made. I asked why they concluded that it would be impossible to drop the bomb in a forested area as recommended by one of the military leaders of that time.
From your link:
We could not afford the chance that one of them might be a dud. If the test were made on some neutral territory, it was hard to believe that Japan's determined and fanatical military men would be impressed. If such an open test were made first and failed to bring surrender, the chance would be gone to give the shock of surprise that proved so effective..
If it turned out to be a dud, it wouldn't matter where it was dropped.
As far as the concern that dropping it on a neutral target would then eliminate the shock of surprise that proved so effective, the Nagasaki bombing was successful.
And why would the location of the target have to be announced?
Of course it was possible, just as the lethal demonstration was possible, as proven by the fact that it was accomplished.
Concerning the physicists expertise in matters of military import, here is how they characterized their qualifications:
"With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power."
My meaning was that both the leading military leaders and the authors of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Verdict concurred when it came to the question of whether the bombs were necessary.
What you really mean is Recorded US propaganda is quite clear that Secretary Byrnes ...
Better though to consult reputable historians than to rely on the word of people who had a sizable axe to grind.
Actually, they could have dropped those two bombs on Mecca and Medina and sent films of that to the Japanese.....
