Was it a war crime when US nuked Hiroshima & Nagasaki?

I already know every single thing about this subject.

He said that in 1963.

Did you know that Admiral William Leahy was the highest ranking member of the U.S. military from 1942 until retiring in 1949, and also the first de facto Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and was at the center of all major American military decisions in World War II?

Well he said:

"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.

"The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children."

What, you don't trust his recollection?

It doesn't change the fact that the US government was desperately trying to make Japan surrender.

Did you know that Brigadier General Carter Clarke was the military intelligence officer in charge of preparing summaries of intercepted Japanese cables for President Truman and his advisors?

Well he said:

"When we didn’t need to do it, and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn’t need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs."

At some point you're going to have to admit that you weren't there,

and that the statements of those who were there show that you have been believing that dropping those bombs on cities was necessary when it wasn't.

He only said that well after the war was over. He certainly didn't say anything like that when the A-bombs were being dropped.

That's not true.

Even military officers who were in favor of using nuclear weapons favored using them on unpopulated areas or military targets--not cities. Lewis Straus was the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. He proposed to James Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, that a non-lethal demonstration of atomic weapons would be enough to convince the Japanese to surrender. The Navy Secretary agreed.

He said:

"I proposed to Secretary Forrestal that the weapon should be demonstrated before it was used. Primarily it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate… My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to Japanese observers and where its effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting that a satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomeria trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomeria tree is the Japanese version of our redwood… I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a suitable height above such a forest… would lay the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they were matchsticks, and, of course, set them afire in the center. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities at will… Secretary Forrestal agreed wholeheartedly with the recommendation…"

And Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bird said:

"It definitely seemed to me that the Japanese were becoming weaker and weaker. They were surrounded by the Navy. They couldn’t get any imports and they couldn’t export anything. Naturally, as time went on and the war developed in our favor it was quite logical to hope and expect that with the proper kind of a warning the Japanese would then be in a position to make peace, which would have made it unnecessary for us to drop the bomb and have had to bring Russia in."

And then we have Army Air Force General, Curtis Lemay, publicly stating shortly before the nuclear bombs were dropped on Japan:
"The war would have been over in two weeks. . . . The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all."

It would seem that your conjecture concerning the U.S. Government's ignorance of what it would take to make Japan surrender is at odds with actual history.

History is very clear that the US government had no idea what it would take to make Japan surrender.

Some people proposed a non-lethal demonstration. Other people feared that a non-lethal demonstration would make Japan think we were too weak to attack a real target and thereby make them less likely to surrender.

That he hoped Japan might soon surrender does not mean that he knew what it would take to actually make them surrender.

LeMay was one of the generals who reacted to news of Nagasaki by eagerly pressing the US government to drop the next bomb on Tokyo to see if that would better grab the attention of Japanese leaders.

Yes, you keep repeating this even though I've been placing documented evidence to the contrary before your eyes.

All you've produced in your effort to oppose the reality of what I've provided is your assurance that "history is clear . . ."

What people feared that a non-lethal demonstration would make Japan think we were too weak to incinerate their civilian population?

I'm not sure what to think about you thinking that rather than find out if a warning shot would do, it would be best to just bomb some population centers and kill a bunch of people.

oralloy wrote:

That he hoped Japan might soon surrender does not mean that he knew what it would take to actually make them surrender.

Again with the conjecture.

Did you not understand what the Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bird said?

"It definitely seemed to me that the Japanese were becoming weaker and weaker. They were surrounded by the Navy. They couldn’t get any imports and they couldn’t export anything. Naturally, as time went on and the war developed in our favor it was quite logical to hope and expect that with the proper kind of a warning the Japanese would then be in a position to make peace, which would have made it unnecessary for us to drop the bomb and have had to bring Russia in."

Japan was essentially under siege. Nothing coming in, and nothing going out. They were getting weaker and not stronger.

I know you understand that the U.S. Government was not so stupid as to not understand that Japan's defeat was inevitable, just as the members of the military have said.

oralloy wrote:

LeMay was one of the generals who reacted to news of Nagasaki by eagerly pressing the US government to drop the next bomb on Tokyo to see if that would better grab the attention of Japanese leaders.

Could you provide reference to that conversation?

On September 20, 1945 the famous "hawk" who commanded the Twenty-First Bomber Command, Major General Curtis E. LeMay (as reported in The New York Herald Tribune) publicly:

said flatly at one press conference that the atomic bomb "had nothing to do with the end of the war." He said the war would have been over in two weeks without the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war.
The text of the press conference provides these details:

LeMay: The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb.

The Press: You mean that, sir? Without the Russians and the atomic bomb?
. . .
LeMay: The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.

Virtually everything you've produced does NOT contradict the fact that the US government had no idea what it would take to make Japan surrender.

The only thing you've produced that contradicts this is a postwar claim made by General Carter Clarke. And his claim is clearly erroneous.

I've also pointed out how each item that you provided actually doesn't contradict the fact that the US didn't know what it would take to make Japan surrender.

Secretary of War Stimson, General Marshall, and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal opposed giving a guarantee for the Emperor until after we finished capturing Okinawa for fear that Japan would see it as proof that our will to fight was wavering and make them less likely to surrender.

As far as opposition to a non-lethal demonstration goes, here is a letter written by Enrico Fermi, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Arthur Compton saying there was no way to make an effective non-lethal demonstration

Yes. He said that he hoped that Japan would soon surrender if we gave them a warning.

And yet they were still refusing to surrender.

Had Japan continued to refuse to surrender, that inevitable defeat would have involved a horribly bloody ground invasion of Japan.

Quote:

Virtually everything you've produced does NOT contradict the fact that the US government had no idea what it would take to make Japan surrender.

And yet everyone I've quoted expressed their view that Japan was already beaten, and that incinerating two cities full of people was not necessary.

Quote:

The only thing you've produced that contradicts this is a postwar claim made by General Carter Clarke. And his claim is clearly erroneous.

I think you're overlooking the statements of everyone I've quoted who have clearly expressed their view that there was no need to kill a bunch of citizens to effect a surrender.

Quote:

I've also pointed out how each item that you provided actually doesn't contradict the fact that the US didn't know what it would take to make Japan surrender.

No you didn't. Your point was basically that all of the people I've quoted who've said that dropping the atomic bombs on cities full of people was unnecessary only felt that way after the bombs were dropped. What do think they knew after the fact that caused them to condemn wiping out a couple of cities full of human beings?

Quote:

Secretary of War Stimson, General Marshall, and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal opposed giving a guarantee for the Emperor until after we finished capturing Okinawa for fear that Japan would see it as proof that our will to fight was wavering and make them less likely to surrender.

Stimson said:

“the true question was not whether surrender could have been achieved without the use of the bomb but whether a different diplomatic and military course would have led to an earlier surrender. A large segment of the Japanese cabinet was ready in the spring of 1945 to accept substantially the same terms as those finally agreed on.”

Apparently, the one condition of surrender that Japan wanted was to keep their emperor. The U.S. refused. After the bombing, the U.S. accepted. Go figure . . .

In other words, Stimson knew that the US could have ended the war before wiping out two cities full of people.

Quote:

As far as opposition to a non-lethal demonstration goes, here is a letter written by Enrico Fermi, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Arthur Compton saying there was no way to make an effective non-lethal demonstration

Firstly, Fermi, Oppenheimer, Lawrence, and Compton are physicists, and they admit at much.

Here is what they said:

"With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power."

So, where I provide the statements from military personnel involved in the war, you provide a statement from some physicists who admit to their lack of expertise in the areas of war and politics.

Secondly, nowhere in the letter do they claim that there is "no way" to make an effective non-lethal demonstration. Some of them advocated a technical demonstration. So it would appear that your claim as to what the letter contained was fabricated to add weight to your statement that a demonstration was not possible.

Quote:

Yes. He said that he hoped that Japan would soon surrender if we gave them a warning.

But we didn't give them a warning. We just dropped atomic bombs on cities full of people. Remember, no technical demonstration?

Quote:

And yet they were still refusing to surrender.

And you're still refusing to acknowledge the fact that they were being strangled and would soon drop anyway. And there's also the matter of the U.S. refusing to agree to a condition of surrender, only to agree to it after they dropped atomic bombs on two cities full of people.

Quote:

Had Japan continued to refuse to surrender, that inevitable defeat would have involved a horribly bloody ground invasion of Japan.

There would have been no need for that. You keep overlooking the effect of the siege. You also overlook the illogic of the U.S. dropping atomic bombs on people because of one condition not met, only to accept that condition after incinerating the populations of two cities.

According to the courier who delivered Admiral King's Letter stating that the first bomb was expected to be available in August, Nimitz read it and then said, "This sounds fine, but this is only February. Can't we get one sooner?" Far from opposing the bombs, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki he favored using a third on Tokyo.

There is evidence that a third bomb might have been dropped on Tokyo as Spaatz, Twining, LeMay, and Nimitz had recommended. On August 9, General Marshall had stated that if Japan did not surrender "it was only a question of days for Tokyo to suffer the effects of the new explosive." On the fourteenth, after meeting with Truman about midday, a British official accompanying the visiting Duke of Windsor reported to London that the president had "remarked sadly that he now had no alternative but to order an atomic bomb to be dropped on Tokyo.

And yet everyone I've quoted expressed their view that Japan was already beaten, and that incinerating two cities full of people was not necessary.

I think you're overlooking the statements of everyone I've quoted who have clearly expressed their view that there was no need to kill a bunch of citizens to effect a surrender.

You want to believe that none of them felt this way before the bombs were dropped.

No you didn't.

Your point was basically that all of the people I've quoted who've said that dropping the atomic bombs on cities full of people was unnecessary only felt that way after the bombs were dropped.

What do think they knew after the bombs were dropped that caused them to condemn wiping out a couple of cities full of human beings?

Stimson said:

“the true question was not whether surrender could have been achieved without the use of the bomb but whether a different diplomatic and military course would have led to an earlier surrender. A large segment of the Japanese cabinet was ready in the spring of 1945 to accept substantially the same terms as those finally agreed on.”

Apparently, the one condition of surrender that Japan wanted was to keep their emperor. The U.S. refused.

After the bombing, the U.S. accepted. Go figure . . .

In other words, Stimson knew that the US could have ended the war before wiping out two cities full of people.

Firstly, Fermi, Oppenheimer, Lawrence, and Compton are physicists, and they admit at much.

Here is what they said:

"With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power."

So, where I provide the statements from military personnel involved in the war, you provide a statement from some physicists who admit to their lack of expertise in the areas of war and politics.

Secondly, nowhere in the letter do they claim that there is "no way" to make an effective non-lethal demonstration.

Some of them did advocate a technical demonstration.

So it would appear that your claim as to what the letter contained was fabricated to add weight to your statement that a demonstration was not possible.

But we didn't give them a warning.

We just dropped atomic bombs on cities full of people.

Remember, no technical demonstration?

And you're still refusing to acknowledge the fact that they were being strangled and would soon drop anyway.

And there's also the matter of the U.S. refusing a condition of surrender, but agreeing to it after they dropped atomic bombs on two cities.

There would have been no need for that. You keep overlooking the effect of the siege.

You also overlook the illogic of the U.S. dropping atomic bombs on people because of one condition not met, only to accept that condition after incinerating the populations of two cities.

Oh I'll bet he did. But your bringing this to everyone's attention does nothing to support the fact that it was unnecessary to drop atomic bombs on cities full of people,

especially when one considers the insanity of accepting a condition of surrender after the destruction of a population that was rejected before the destruction of a population of humans.

Interesting that you stopped reading after you heard what you wanted to hear.

The very next parpgraph says:

"Truman's comment resulted from a misunderstanding. At 11:15 A.M. Washington time, Tokyo had informed its Minister in Switzerland to forward to the United States upon receipt "supplimentary wire 353," without indicating when it could be expected. Instead of merely reporting that no reply to the Allied offer had yet arrived, however, Swiss officials sent the following message to Washington: "Very urgent 760. Japanese legation reports that coded cable it received this morning do not contain the answer waited by the whole world." This made it appear that what the japanese legation had received amounted to a rejection of the Allied note, and the Swiss charg'e hurried over to so inform Truman shortly before he met with the Britons."

So . . .

His opinion concerning the reliability of the bomb has no bearing on the question of whether or not he opposed its use in Japan. That he was opposed to its use is reflected in his statement that the sea blockade and conventional bombing left the Japanese already defeated. And his admission that he was not taught to make war in that fashion because wars are not won by destoying women and children leaves no doubt as to whether or not he knew it was not necessary, besides being wrong on moral grounds.

Your thoughts?

He did not offer such opposition during the war when the A-bombs were being dropped.

American Military Leaders Urge President Truman not to Drop the Atomic Bomb

The Joint Chiefs of Staff never formally studied the decision and never made an official recommendation to the President. Brief informal discussions may have occurred, but no record even of these exists. There is no record whatsoever of the usual extensive staff work and evaluation of alternative options by the Joint Chiefs, nor did the Chiefs ever claim to be involved. (See p. 322, Chapter 26)

In official internal military interviews, diaries and other private as well as public materials, literally every top U.S. military leader involved subsequently stated that the use of the bomb was not dictated by military necessity.

Navy Leaders

(Partial listing:
See Chapter 26 for an extended discussion)

In his memoirs Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff--and the top official who presided over meetings of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff--minced few words:

[T]he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . .

n being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. (See p. 3, Introduction)

Privately, on June 18, 1945--almost a month before the Emperor's July intervention to seek an end to the war and seven weeks before the atomic bomb was used--Leahy recorded in his diary:

It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression. (See p. 324, Chapter 26)

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stated in a public address given at the Washington Monument on October 5, 1945:

The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war. (See p. 329, Chapter 26) . . .

[Nimitz also stated: "The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan. . . ."]

In a private 1946 letter to Walter Michels of the Association of Philadelphia Scientists, Nimitz observed that "the decision to employ the atomic bomb on Japanese cities was made on a level higher than that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." (See pp. 330-331, Chapter 26)

Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet, stated publicly in 1946:

The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before. (See p. 331, Chapter 26)

Time-Life editor Henry R. Luce later recalled that during a May-June 1945 tour of the Pacific theater:

. . . I spent a morning at Cavite in the Philippines with Admiral Frank Wagner in front of huge maps. Admiral Wagner was in charge of air search-and-patrol of all the East Asian seas and coasts. He showed me that in all those millions of square miles there was literally not a single target worth the powder to blow it up; there were only junks and mostly small ones at that.

Similarly, I dined one night with Admiral [Arthur] Radford [later Joint Chiefs Chairman, 1953-57] on the carrier Yorktown leading a task force from Ulithi to bomb Kyushu, the main southern island of Japan. Radford had invited me to be alone with him in a tiny room far up the superstructure of the Yorktown, where not a sound could be heard. Even so, it was in a whisper that he turned to me and said: "Luce, don't you think the war is over?" My reply, of course, was that he should know better than I. For his part, all he could say was that the few little revetments and rural bridges that he might find to bomb in Kyushu wouldn't begin to pay for the fuel he was burning on his task force. (See pp. 331-332, Chapter 26)

The Under-Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, formally dissented from the Interim Committee's recommendation to use the bomb against a city without warning. In a June 27, 1945 memorandum Bard declared:

Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.

During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.

I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in the country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out. (See pp. 225-226, Chapter 18)

Rear Admiral L. Lewis Strauss, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from 1944 to 1945 (and later chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission), replaced Bard on the Interim Committee after he left government on July 1. Subsequently, Strauss repeatedly stated his belief that the use of the atomic bomb "was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. . . ." (See p. 332, Chapter 26) Strauss recalled:

I proposed to Secretary Forrestal at that time that the weapon should be demonstrated. . . . Primarily, it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate. . . . My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to the Japanese observers, and where its effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting that a good place--satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomaria [sic] trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomaria tree is the Japanese version of our redwood. . . . I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a suitable height above such a forest . . . would [have] laid the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they had been matchsticks, and of course set them afire in the center. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities, their fortifications at will. . . . (See p. 333, Chapter 26)

In a private letter to Navy historian Robert G. Albion concerning a clearer assurance that the Emperor would not be displaced, Strauss observed:

This was omitted from the Potsdam declaration and as you are undoubtedly aware was the only reason why it was not immediately accepted by the Japanese who were beaten and knew it before the first atomic bomb was dropped. (See p. 393, Chapter 31)

In his "third person" autobiography (co-authored with Walter Muir Whitehill) the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, stated:

The President in giving his approval for these [atomic] attacks appeared to believe that many thousands of American troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely correct; but King felt, as he had pointed out many times, that the dilemma was an unnecessary one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials. (See p. 327, Chapter 26)

Private interview notes taken by Walter Whitehill summarize King's feelings quite simply as: "I didn't like the atom bomb or any part of it." (See p. 329, Chapter 26; See also pp. 327-329)

As Japan faltered in July an effort was made by several top Navy officials--almost certainly including Secretary Forrestal himself--to end the war without using the atomic bomb. Forrestal made a special trip to Potsdam to discuss the issue and was involved in the Atlantic Charter broadcast.

Many other top Admirals criticized the bombing both privately and publicly. (Forrestal, see pp. 390-392, Chapter 31; p. 398, Chapter 31) (Strauss, see p. 333, Chapter 26; pp. 393-394, Chapter 31) (Bard, see pp. 225-227, Chapter 18; pp. 390-391, Chapter 31)

Air Force Leaders

(Partial listing:
See Chapter 27 for an extended discussion)

The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, gave a strong indication of his views in a public statement only eleven days after Hiroshima was attacked. Asked on August 17 by a New York Times reporter whether the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender, Arnold said:

The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air. (See p. 334, Chapter 27)
In his 1949 memoirs Arnold observed that "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." (See p. 334, Chapter 27)

Arnold's deputy, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, summed up his understanding this way in an internal military history interview:

Arnold's view was that it [the dropping of the atomic bomb] was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it. (See p. 335, Chapter 27)

Eaker reported that Arnold told him:

When the question comes up of whether we use the atomic bomb or not, my view is that the Air Force will not oppose the use of the bomb, and they will deliver it effectively if the Commander in Chief decides to use it. But it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion. (See p. 335, Chapter 27)
[Eaker also recalled: "That was the representation I made when I accompanied General Marshall up to the White House" for a discussion with Truman on June 18, 1945.]

On September 20, 1945 the famous "hawk" who commanded the Twenty-First Bomber Command, Major General Curtis E. LeMay (as reported in The New York Herald Tribune) publicly:

said flatly at one press conference that the atomic bomb "had nothing to do with the end of the war." He said the war would have been over in two weeks without the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war. (See p. 336, Chapter 27)
The text of the press conference provides these details:

LeMay: The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb.
The Press: You mean that, sir? Without the Russians and the atomic bomb?
. . .
LeMay: The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.
(See p. 336, Chapter 27)
On other occasions in internal histories and elsewhere LeMay gave even shorter estimates of how long the war might have lasted (e.g., "a few days"). (See pp. 336-341, Chapter 27)

Personally dictated notes found in the recently opened papers of former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman describe a private 1965 dinner with General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, who in July 1945 commanded the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force (USASTAF) and was subsequently chief of staff of U.S. Air Forces. Also with them at dinner was Spaatz's one-time deputy commanding general at USASTAF, Frederick L. Anderson. Harriman privately noted:

Both men . . . felt Japan would surrender without use of the bomb, and neither knew why the second bomb was used. (See p. 337, Chapter 27)
Harriman's notes also recall his own understanding:

I know this attitude is correctly described, because I had it from the Air Force when I was in Washington in April '45. (See p. 337, Chapter 27)

In an official 1962 interview Spaatz stated that he had directly challenged the Nagasaki bombing:

I thought that if we were going to drop the atomic bomb, drop it on the outskirts--say in Tokyo Bay--so that the effects would not be as devastating to the city and the people. I made this suggestion over the phone between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and I was told to go ahead with our targets. (See p. 345, Chapter 27)

Spaatz insisted on receiving written orders before going forward with the atomic bombings in 1945. Subsequently, Lieutenant General Thomas Handy, Marshall's deputy chief of staff, recalled:

Well, Tooey Spaatz came in . . . he said, "They tell me I am supposed to go out there and blow off the whole south end of the Japanese Islands. I've heard a lot about this thing, but my God, I haven't had a piece of paper yet and I think I need a piece of paper." "Well," I said, "I agree with you, Tooey. I think you do," and I said, "I guess I'm the fall guy to give it to you." (pp. 344-345, Chapter 27)
In 1962 Spaatz himself recalled that he gave "notification that I would not drop an atomic bomb on verbal orders--they had to be written--and this was accomplished." (p. 345, Chapter 27)
Spaatz also stated that

The dropping of the atomic bomb was done by a military man under military orders. We're supposed to carry out orders and not question them. (See p. 345, Chapter 27)
In a 1965 Air Force oral history interview Spaatz stressed: "That was purely a political decision, wasn't a military decision. The military man carries out the order of his political bosses." (See p. 345, Chapter 27)

Air Force General Claire Chennault, the founder of the American Volunteer Group (the famed "Flying Tigers")--and Army Air Forces commander in China--was even more blunt: A few days after Hiroshima was bombed The New York Times reported Chennault's view that:

Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped. . . . (See pp. 335-336, Chapter 27)

Army Leaders

(Partial listing:
See Chapter 28 for an extended discussion)

On the 40th Anniversary of the bombing former President Richard M. Nixon reported that:

[General Douglas] MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the Bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants. . . . MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off. . . . (See p. 352, Chapter 28)

The day after Hiroshima was bombed MacArthur's pilot, Weldon E. Rhoades, noted in his diary:
General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this Frankenstein monster [the bomb]. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa. . . . (See p. 350, Chapter 28)

Former President Herbert Hoover met with MacArthur alone for several hours on a tour of the Pacific in early May 1946. His diary states:

I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria. (See pp. 350-351, Chapter 28)

Saturday Review of Literature editor Norman Cousins also later reported that MacArthur told him he saw no military justification for using the atomic bomb, and that "The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor." (See p. 351, Chapter 28)

I just showed you--in his own words--how he personally felt about the idea of dropping such a bomb on women and children (actually everyone). And yet you still continue to dismiss his own words.

And your reasoning for doing so is that "He did not offer such opposition during the war when the A-bombs were being dropped."

Do you imagine that he didn't give a **** about the lives of Japanese civilians before the bomb was dropped, and then suddenly got religion? That boat doesn't float because he also made the comment that he was not taught to make war in that fashion because wars are not won by destroying women and children.

Now, since I have provided you with reference to his thoughts concerning the destruction of innocent human beings and justification for using the bomb, the onus is on you to provide a reference to back up your claim that he wasn't opposed to using the bomb on human beings before they were dropped. Got anything?