Hey, Can A Woman "Ask To Get Raped"?

You are once again lying in the attempt to avoid a huge flaw in your position.

What "position"? I haven't taken a "position" other than to say I want the current sexual assault laws enforced.

If you can read, you will notice that your state requires consent before the act of penetration--however slight the penetration

Without consent, it is rape. It is just that simple.

II.A.4. Varieties of Unconsent
All of the sorts of consent detailed above105 repeat again in unconsensual form.
Thus, for instance, a party might expressly refuse to accept some proposition or
transaction, testifying, "I do not consent!" So, too, we might describe an exchange as
impliedly unconsensual because it does not conform to established practices. We thus
condemn conversion as a matter of course and afford legal remedies even to victims who
have never announced, "I object to all conversion of my property, now and after." Lastly,
when we postulate that a person would not have agreed to something, we mark it as
hypothetically unconsensual. Just as consent comes in express, implied, and hypothetical
forms, in other words, so does unconsent.
Consent's subtypes repeat in the negative range, too. We distinguish transactions
that would hypothetically evoke protest generally from transactions that would evoke the
objections of a particular individual. Even though both refer to hypothetically
unconsensual transactions, "Most people like peanut butter," influences our judgment
differently from, "I would never eat a peanut-butter sandwich; it would trigger my
allergy." The former speaks universally; the latter individually and, when considered as a
basis for judging what food suits the speaker, more forcefully.106
Just as implied consent divides into three subtypes—per acts under the agreement,
per past agreements, and per custom—implied unconsent comprises the subtypes per
custom, per past disputes, and per acts under the dispute. Here as generally, unconsent
mirrors consent. That should not surprise, given that tort law defines actionable wrongs
with an eye to the defense of consent. Observing that "contracts are entered into by the
mutual agreement of the interested parties, and are required to be performed in
accordance with their letter and spirit," the Mohr v. Williams court concluded that, in the
tort suit before it, "No reason occurs to us why the same rule should not apply between
physician and patient."107
We can thus distinguish between implied contract terms contrary to the parties'
performances, contrary to their past dealings, and contrary to usage in trade. Each of
those three subtypes of implied unconsent corresponds to a different level of
enforceability,108 marking each as unique and worthy of particularized consideration.
104 Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 39 (2nd Dist. 1950).
105 See supra Part II.A.1-3.
106 The latter speaks more powerfully, too. As discussed below, at Part II.B., universal
hypothetical unconsent has more justificatory force—or perhaps more clearly, less antijustificatory
force—than individuated hypothetical unconsent does.
107 95 Minn. 261, 268-69, 104 N.W. 12, 15 (1905).
108 As discussed below, at Part II.B., those distinctions order those three types of
unconsent along a scale of justification.
2009] CONSENT BY DEGREES 25
v. 2009.03.10
Tort courts seldom have occasion to delve into such subtleties, granted; happily, we live
in a world where consensual exchanges far exceed unconsensual ones, providing a larger
canvas for detailed portraiture. Still, courts made sketched the outlines, in tort law, of
implied unconsent, suggesting that it includes some fine distinctions.109
Like express consent, express unconsent contains subtle shadings. Tort law
reserves its strongest remedy—punitive damages—for maliciously personal, intentional
wrongs.110 Protests to impersonal and unintentional wrongs, in contrast, tend to evoke
mere remedies for negligence.111 Though each of those and other forms of express
unconsent rouse our righteous indignation, our reactions vary subtly from case to case.
Most of us would ordinarily object more strongly to suffering a gunshot aimed and fired
by a vicious criminal than we would to suffering the same wound purely by accident,
caused by a freak meteorite. Despite suffering the same amount of pain after the fact, we
would complain more vehemently about the former than the latter, condemning the
criminal but stoically shrugging off the vagaries of the uncaring cosmos. Even before the
fact, most of us would, if forced, choose the latter fate over the former. Holding all else
equal, who would not prefer to avoid adding ill-will to injury? Express unconsent thus
mirrors express consent, copying its structure in negative form.112

that is a meaningless statement without talking about definitions and interpretations, as the laws that you want enforced are written so broadly that very little guidance is given in statute for the meaning of consent. It is purposefully left up to the law enforcement and courts to determine if consent was given, by what ever standard that they think is appropriate. But you are not fine with this,as you routinely bitterly complain for example that when women get themselves drunk the guys who have sex with them who you want to be convicted of rape rarely are. You do have an operational definition of consent, one that you want all of the jurisdictions to use, but you refuse to lay it out because it would show just how far you are willing to go to obliterate individual freedom from state control of our sex lives.

But there are states that say that it is rape if she changes her mind AFTER penetration and the man doesnt pull out fast enough.

In the state Hawkeye lives in, it's a simple one sentence definition. I posted it a page or two back.

(7) "Consent" means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact

RCW 9A.44.060
Rape in the third degree.

(1) A person is guilty of rape in the third degree when, under circumstances not constituting rape in the first or second degrees, such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person, not married to the perpetrator:

(a) Where the victim did not consent as defined in RCW 9A.44.010(7), to sexual intercourse with the perpetrator and such lack of consent was clearly expressed by the victim's words or conduct, or

(b) Where there is threat of substantial unlawful harm to property rights of the victim.

(2) Rape in the third degree is a class C felony

We have discussed all of this before. I don't know why you keep bringing it up again.

I'm very skeptical of the article Hawkeye has posted. I've never heard of the journal he's linked to.

Professor Bell joined the faculty of Chapman University School of Law in 1998. He specializes in high-tech legal issues and has written a variety of papers on Intellectual Property and Internet Law. Professor Bell received his Juris Doctor from the University of Chicago Law School in 1993, where he served both as a member of the University of Chicago Law Review and as Articles Editor and cofounder of the University of Chicago Legal Roundtable. After graduating from law school, Professor Bell joined the Silicon Valley law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. He entered teaching in 1995, when he became an Assistant Professor of Law in the Law and Technology Program at the University of Dayton School of Law. During a one year leave of absence from that school, and just prior to joining the Chapman faculty, he served as Director of Telecommunications and Technology Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. In addition to writing a steady stream of scholarly works, Professor Bell has appeared on or been quoted in the Wall Street Journal, CNN, Los Angeles Times, and many other news sources. He teaches Intellectual Property, Internet Law, Advanced Seminar on Copyright Law, Entertainment Law, International Entertainment Law, Tort Law, Contract Law, and Agency and Partnership.

Courses Taught: Intellectual Property, Internet Law, Advanced Seminar on Copyright Law, Entertainment Law, International Entertainment Law, Tort Law, Contract Law, and Agency and Partnership

I don't agree that state definitions of "consent" are all that broadly written. I find them quite clear. I have no "problem with consent". I know when I consent to something. Don't you know when you are consenting to something and when you are not?

If we reference, either intentionally or not, the conventional criminal-code definition of rape to describe the phenomenon of "compuls0ry heterosexuality" because coercion is central to both, then we invite the mistaken conclusion that promoting greater enforcement and prosecution of rape crimes, as understood by the state, will end patriarchy.

But this conclusion is not warranted,and not simply because the sex described by the inclusive definition of "rape" previously is not what the state will prosecute,no mater what the definition of rape. It isn't warranted, more fundamentally, because the compulsory conditions that elicit consent to unwanted sex might be more central to obnoxious regimes than the knives and fists employed by rapists to overpower their victims will. Even if it is true, as McKinnon begins the most important book, that 'sexuality is to feminism what work is to Marxism; that which is most ones own and most taken away" 22 then the conflation between rape and consensual sex seems all the more particularly ill advised: Wiping out all theft, through more aggressive use of criminal law, will not fundamentally return sex to women. Economic exploitation of laborers is not the result of the states underinformcement of laws against theft,and likewise sexual exploitation is not the result of the states underenforcment of the laws against rape. By conflating the problem of exploitative and expropriated sexuality with the problem of rape , we encourage not only the conceptual confusion but also strategic misdirection. Much of third wave feminism- the "Take Back the Night" rallies, self defense and anti-rape education initiatives on high school and college campuses- though arguably vital to ensuring women's safety on the street, might be oversold as a means for ensuring women's equality, and an end to their sexual exploitation. We do need to address the conditions, states of mind , and social structures that so overwhelmingly prompt, suggest,or compel women to consent to sex that they do not desire or want: That is the deepest,most vital, and most profoundly historic claim at the heart of McKinnon's reconstruction of radical feminism. That sex, however, is not rape, and we don't come any closer to addressing it by calling it something that it is not

We do need to address the conditions, states of mind , and social structures that so overwhelmingly prompt, suggest,or compel women to consent to sex that they do not desire or want

Because the law is easily used to manipulate the man into rape...and as a instrument of cruelty towards men. If women know that they can say no and if the man does not withdraw with-in a very few seconds it will be tempting to start to have sex with him, then just as he is coming with draw consent, knowing that if he does not immediately comply he will be up for a 10+ year term in the state penitentiary. This is an excellent tool to enable female vengeance, of which we men know women tend to practice.

I'm not interested in that sort of political agenda.

In fact, calling the woman, "the one with the hole",

Women know what they want and don't want.

If you are really interested in the welfare of your partner, you wouldn't even have to think about the laws.

Most men do prefer consenting partners. They also have no trouble finding them.

Once your sexual behavior affects my body and my welfare it becomes my business. You cannot sexually touch or penetrate my body without my consent.

Rape crisis! Cruelty to men!

When you say "I want the laws applied" you are not saying anything, because we need to know HOW you want the law applied, what your version of definitions and best practices are, which you refuse to provide.

"Consent" means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact

Where the victim did not consent as defined in RCW 9A.44.010(7), to sexual intercourse with the perpetrator and such lack of consent was clearly expressed by the victim's words or conduct