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THE US, UN AND IRAQ V

 
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 05:16 pm
Tartar, Most of us understand the motivations for these photo ops, but let's give some credit to our military that really appreciated both Hillary and GWBush's visit. That had value IMHO.
0 Replies
 
blatham
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 05:31 pm
ci

Yes, of course it was wonderful to see those guys/gals happy. But...

they were props for PR. At election time when excerpts are run in the glorious leader tv ads, perhaps they'll put a circle around each smiling face which no longer exists as a living human.

It wasn't about them. Which of course it pretends to be. Compassionate warmongering.
0 Replies
 
PDiddie
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 05:58 pm
blatham wrote:
I think I'll just walk around my house naked all day, eating nothing but ice cream and fried chicken, listening to some Ira Gershwin songs and trying to remember inspirational words from my grandma.


Gershwin and fried chicken just don't go together.

Switch to Johnny Cash or switch to potatoes and tomatoes (long a). :wink:
0 Replies
 
blatham
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 06:56 pm
Porgy
0 Replies
 
hamburger
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 07:16 pm
on today's BBC news(shown here on the CBC network) a reporter spent time with some u.s. soldiers in afghanistan on patrol in the northern territories. they came under some pretty nasty attacks and you certainly did not see any smiling faces; instead you saw tears welling up when they spoke of their comrades that had been killed in action. a less inspiring picture (and sound) than shown from baghdad. i'm sure president bush's visit gave the soldiers a temporary lift - but how long is it going to last ??? hbg
0 Replies
 
Gelisgesti
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 07:19 pm
Someone that will not be swayed .....

Quote:


SOURCE
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Ethel2
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 08:36 pm
CNN, this morning, reported that most of the soldiers (other than those few chosen to be inside the hanger) didn't even know of the president's visit this morning until the news media asked them about it. They were not encouraged by his presence........they were mostly uninterested. What they're interested in is when they can go home and be with their families again.
0 Replies
 
hobitbob
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 08:37 pm
Those traitors! They should be shot!
0 Replies
 
Tartarin
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 08:45 pm
CI -- The point I was making (and which I think Blatham also makes) is that these soldiers have been political tools in the hands of the Bush administration -- as soldiers in Iraq and as photo-ops for the administration. It's very nice that they were cheered up, if that's the case, but it doesn't change the basic equation which puts these guys at the mercy of an administration which is using them... badly... for its own political purposes. (I'd like to have heard their conversation after Bush left...)

As for food to eat while listening to Gershwin, you happen to be talking about my first love (and I still love him). So no food is appropriate. Rapt adoration and a little dance here and there doesn't leave room for crass food.
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 09:18 pm
Quote:
http://www.cia.gov/graphics/images_home2/cia_banners_template3_01.gif

http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/graphics/prban.jpg


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
28 November 2003


Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths

Myth #1: The Estimate favored going to war: Intelligence judgments, including NIEs, are policy neutral. We do not propose policies and the Estimate in no way sought to sway policymakers toward a particular course of action. We described what we judged were Saddam's WMD programs and capabilities and how and when he might use them and left it to policymakers, as we always do, to determine the appropriate course of action.

Myth #2: Analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush Administration: The judgments presented in the October 2002 NIE were based on data acquired and analyzed over fifteen years. Any changes in judgments over that period were based on new evidence, including clandestinely collected information that led to new analysis. Our judgments were presented to three different Administrations. And the principal participants in the production of the NIE from across the entire US Intelligence Community have sworn to Congress, under oath, that they were NOT pressured to change their views on Iraq WMD or to conform to Administration positions on this issue. In my particular case, I was able to swear under oath that not only had no one pressured me to take a particular view but that I had not pressured anyone else working on the Estimate to change or alter their reading of the intelligence information.

Myth #3: NIE judgments were news to Congress: Over the past fifteen years our assessments on Iraq WMD issues have been presented routinely to six different congressional committees including the two oversight committees, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. To the best of my knowledge, prior to this NIE, these committees never came back to us with a concern of bias or an assertion that we had gotten it wrong.

Myth #4: We buried divergent views and concealed uncertainties: Diverse agency views, particularly on whether Baghdad was reconstituting its uranium enrichment effort and as a subset of that, the purposes of attempted Iraqi aluminum tube purchases, were fully vetted during the coordination process. Alternative views presented by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, the Office of Intelligence in the Department of Energy, and by the US Air Force were showcased in the National Intelligence Estimate and were acknowledged in unclassified papers on the subject. Moreover, suggestions that their alternative views were buried as footnotes in the text are wrong. All agencies were fully exposed to these alternative views, and the heads of those organizations blessed the wording and placement of their alternative views. Uncertainties were highlighted in the Key Judgments and throughout the main text. Any reader would have had to read only as far as the second paragraph of the Key Judgments to know that as we said: "We lacked specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD program."

Myth #5: Major NIE judgments were based on single sources: Overwhelmingly, major judgments in the NIE on WMD were based on multiple sources-often from human intelligence, satellite imagery, and communications intercepts. Not only is the allegation wrong, but it is also worth noting that it is not even a valid measure of the quality of intelligence performance. A single human source with direct access to a specific program and whose judgment and performance have proven reliable can provide the "crown jewels"; in the early 1960s Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, who was then this country's only penetration of the Soviet high command, was just such a source. His information enabled President Kennedy to stare down a Soviet threat emanating from Cuba, and his information informed US intelligence analysis for more than two decades thereafter. In short, the charge is both wrong and meaningless.

Myth #6: We relied too much on United Nations reporting and were complacent after UN inspectors left in 1998: We never accepted UN reporting at face value. I know, because in the mid 1990s I was the coordinator for US intelligence support to UNSCOM and the IAEA. Their ability to see firsthand what was going on in Iraq, including inside facilities that we could only peer at from above, demanded that we pay attention to what they saw and that we support their efforts fully. Did we ever have all the information that we wanted or required? Of course not. Moreover, for virtually any critical intelligence issue that faces us the answer always will be "no." There is a reason that the October 2002 review of Iraq's WMD programs is called a National Intelligence ESTIMATE and not a National Intelligence FACTBOOK. On almost any issue of the day that we face, hard evidence will only take intelligence professionals so far. Our job is to fill in the gaps with informed analysis. And we sought to do that consistently and with vigor. The departure of UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 certainly did reduce our information about what was occurring in Iraq's WMD programs. But to say that we were blind after 1998 is wrong. Efforts to enhance collection were vigorous, creative, and productive. Intelligence collection after 1998, including information collected by friendly and allied intelligence services, painted a picture of Saddam's continuing efforts to develop WMD programs and weapons that reasonable people would have found compelling.

This was not] one of the reasons underpinning our Key Judgment about nuclear reconstitution. In the body of the Estimate, after noting that Iraq had considerable low-enriched and other forms of uranium alreadyMyth #8: We overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991: Our judgments were based on the evidence we acquired and the analysis we produced over a 15-year period. The NIE noted that we had underestimated key aspects of Saddam's WMD efforts in the 1990s. We were not alone in that regard: UNSCOM missed Iraq's BW program and the IAEA underestimated Baghdad's progress on nuclear weapons development. But, what we learned from the past was the difficulty we have had in detecting key Iraqi WMD activities. Consequently, the Estimate specified what we knew and what we believed but also warned policymakers that we might have underestimated important aspects of Saddam's program. But in no case were any of the judgments "hyped" to compensate for earlier underestimates.

Myth #9: We mistook rapid mobilization programs for actual weapons: There is practically no difference in threat between a standing chemical and biological weapons capability and one that could be mobilized quickly with little chance of detection. The Estimate acknowledged that Saddam was seeking rapid mobilization capabilities that he could invigorate on short notice. Those who find such programs to be less of a threat than actual weapons should understand that Iraqi denial and deception activities virtually would have ensured our inability to detect the activation of such efforts. Even with "only" rapid mobilization capabilities, Saddam would have been able to achieve production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons in the midst of a crisis, and the Intelligence Community would have had little, if any, chance of detecting this activity, particularly in the case of BW. In the case of chemical weapons, although we might have detected indicators of mobilization activity, we would have been hard pressed to accurately interpret such evidence. Those who conclude that no threat existed because actual weapons have not yet been found do not understand the significance posed by biological and chemical warfare programs in the hands of tyrants.

Myth #10: The NIE asserted that there were "large WMD stockpiles" and because we haven't found them, Baghdad had no WMD: From experience gained at the end of Desert Storm more than ten years ago, it was clear to us and should have been clear to our critics, that finding WMD in the aftermath of a conflict wouldn't be easy. We judged that Iraq probably possessed one hundred to five hundred metric tons of CW munitions fill. One hundred metric tons would fit in a backyard swimming pool; five hundred could be hidden in a small warehouse. We made no assessment of the size of Iraq's biological weapons holdings but a biological weapon can be carried in a small container. (And of course, we judged that Saddam did not have a nuclear weapon.) When the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), led by David Kay, issued its interim report in October, acknowledging that it had not found chemical or biological weapons, the inspectors had then visited only ten of the 130 major ammunition depots in Iraq; these ammunition dumps are huge, sometimes five miles by five miles on a side. Two depots alone are roughly the size of Manhattan. It is worth recalling that after Desert Storm, US forces unknowingly destroyed over 1,000 rounds of chemical-filled munitions at a facility called Al Kamissiyah. Baghdad sometimes had special markings for chemical and biological munitions and sometimes did not. In short, much remains to be done in the hunt for Iraq's WMD.

We do not know whether the ISG ultimately will be able to find physical evidence of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons or confirm the status of its WMD programs and its nuclear ambitions. The purposeful, apparently regime-directed, destruction of evidence pertaining to WMD from one end of Iraq to the other, which began even before the Coalition occupied Baghdad, and has continued since then, already has affected the ISG's work. Moreover, Iraqis who have been willing to talk to US intelligence officers are in great danger. Many have been threatened; some have been killed. The denial and deception efforts directed by the extraordinarily brutal, but very competent Iraqi Intelligence Services, which matured through ten years of inspections by various UN agencies, remain a formidable challenge. And finally, finding physically small but extraordinarily lethal weapons in a country that is larger than the state of California would be a daunting task even under far more hospitable circumstances.Fundamentally, the Intelligence Community increasingly will be in danger of not connecting the dots until the dots have become a straight line. before they fall into the wrong hands


Stu Cohen is an intelligence professional with 30 years of service in the CIA. He was acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction was published.


Page last updated: 11/28/2003 16:59:31.
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0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 09:28 pm
After 15,000+ Iraqis and 300+ Americans dead, I would hope they'll be honest about Iraq's WMD program, but that's a little too late. The dead are dead, and more are dying every day. They are now claiming, they may have been wrong. Jeeesh!
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 09:40 pm
That is not at all what was written. Jeeesh indeed.
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blatham
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 09:43 pm
For balance on Cohen's statement, one would be advised to read the following.
Quote:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16813
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 09:44 pm
Quote, "If we eventually are proven wrong—that is, that there were no weapons of mass destruction and the WMD programs were dormant or abandoned—the American people will be told the truth; we would have it no other way."
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 09:48 pm
What is written c.i. is that the truth will be known, one way or the other, no matter who may be inconvenienced, or in what manner. There is nothing else there.
0 Replies
 
hobitbob
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 09:52 pm
Inconvenienced? Shocked
I hardly consider the dead (of both sides) to have been "inconvenienced!"
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PDiddie
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 09:59 pm
Quote:
"The last time we followed instructions from a Bush, we wandered the desert for forty years."

--my Jewish father-in-law

(edited to correct a chronological gaffe by Papi-in-law -- thanks to that renowned biblical scholar, blatham :wink: )
0 Replies
 
Tartarin
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 10:03 pm
Let's keep an eye on that Cohen fella and see which boards he's appointed to, what sudden upticks become noticeable in his "life-style"!!
0 Replies
 
pistoff
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 10:04 pm
Inconvienced Indeed!!!
All those deaths and those wounded and maimed. Let's be real. This President was going to invade Iraq no matter what. God instructed him to do so. Now the Iraqis will just have to be inconvienced some more and more Americans will need to die, be wounded &/or maimed. How can we disagree with the instructions of God?

Iraq will never be a Democracy. Hell, America is not a Demcracy. Come on folks, time for some reality.
0 Replies
 
blatham
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 Nov, 2003 10:05 pm
pd

Your jewish father-in-law must have read the Readers Digest Condensed old testament.
0 Replies
 
 

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