0
   

The UN, US and Iraq IV

 
 
Tartarin
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 12:24 pm
Agree with all of the above, PDiddie. But am most interested in Cronkite's observations. Quite apart from the damage we're causing to others, we're setting ourselves up for real trouble. I doubt Bush's legacy will be much anyway, but it will become a legacy of (as Bush himself might say) "evil," as time goes on. Only this time the evil will be real and tangible. The mess tracing back to this administration is going to keep us down for years.
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 12:26 pm
Steve's quote, "and most of those are evacuating wounded." What is most disturbing is that we "never" see those wounded in our media, but they're going to show a make-believe show about Private Lynch on t.v. which is movie making at it's worst hollywood hype. We're able to see fiction in this country, but the truth is off limits.
0 Replies
 
McTag
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 12:34 pm
Well, I ask myself, do I feel safer here in Britain as a result of the actions in Iraq and in Afghanistan this year?
And the answer is, no prizes for guessing correctly, I feel considerably less safe.
0 Replies
 
Tartarin
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 01:01 pm
McTag -- Our media pay little attention to the British in Basra (surprise! surprise!) but it looks as though Basra is not getting off the retaliation hook. It appears the Brits did a better job all the way around in Iraq, and I'm sorry to see them pay a price for guilt by association... And given the ubiquitous and powerful nature of today's weapons, none of us should feel safe.

CI -- I'm most exercised about the absence of wounded lists. It's said to be political and it's a disgrace.
0 Replies
 
Kara
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 01:46 pm
PDiddie quoted Cronkite:

Quote:
"Preventive war is a theory, a policy, that was put forth by the president in his policy address," Cronkite observed. "It upsets all of our previous concepts about the use of power. It is particularly worrying when our power is almost unchallenged around the world. It seems to me that this preventive action is a terrible policy to put forth to other nations. If we are viewed as a pacesetter by other nations, this is a policy that could lead to eternal war around the world. If every small nation with a border dispute believes they can go ahead and launch a pre-emptive war and that it will be approved by the greatest power, that is a very dangerous thing."


Gelisgesti quoted these words of George H.W. Bush (on 10/30):

Quote:
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 03:05 pm
I'd say Bush the Elder's remarks are pertinent ... to the '91 situation. The '91 mandate was strictly for the ejection of Iraq from Kuwait, which mission when accomplished fulfilled the conditions of the mandate. "Arabs departing the coalition in anger" simply is inapplicable to the current situation. The "precedent of international response to aggression" which Bush 41 sought was put to rest at the end of the ensuing 12 Year runup to Iraqi Freedom, with the abdication of their responsibilities of the UN members which placed self interest above the urgent necessity of eliminating the prospect of continuing and ever-developing threat from Saddam before it became "imminent" or even accomplished, and engaging terrorism on its home ground. The exit strategy in place and being implimented consists of rehabilitating Iraq's physical and administrative infrastructure in order to permit Iraq to assume her rightful place among the prosperous, self-sufficient, self-determining nations of the world.

Addessing Cronkite's concern that
Quote:
If every small nation with a border dispute believes they can go ahead and launch a pre-emptive war and that it will be approved by the greatest power, that is a very dangerous thing."
, I believe demonstrated US policy in fact makes it far less likely "small nations", border disputes or otherwise, will see security, profit, or US support ensuing from aggression, pre-emptive or otherwise.
0 Replies
 
hamburger
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 03:18 pm
Turkish general wants Iraq deployment


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

this should prove to be quite interesting. turkish general would like to have A PIECE OF THE PIE (also commonly called iraq). for the full article go to: http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/223FE44E-5BA5-46D6-A90E-AFAF1BD04958.htm hbg.
0 Replies
 
Kara
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 03:21 pm
Timber, what you ignore is his telling assessment and indictment of exactly what has happened.

Quote:
0 Replies
 
hamburger
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 03:26 pm
"Well if anarchy is not rife in Iraq, I'm pleased. I will book a Christmas break in Falluja." hi, steve ! would love to join you on your christmas holiday in falluju. since the weather forecast calls for snow around that time of the year, i'll have to stay here to do some shovelling. soooo sorry ! perhaps we could meet in baghdad for easter ? dar'n it, that's the day i have to take the garbage out ! well, better luck next time. hbg
0 Replies
 
Craven de Kere
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 04:20 pm
Walter Hinteler wrote:
BTW, timber:

if evryone here would use the 'huge font' on her/his reponses, it certainly would be much easier for as elderly to read, on the one side ...

but could be taken as a kind of 'aggressive loudness' by some and stretches a single reponse quite a lot on the other hand as well. :wink:


I agree, perhaps on Timber's high resolution it doesn't look as ridiculously huge as it does on lower resolutions. It often does look like a more irritating brother of ALL CAPS even on my high resolution
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 04:37 pm
I don't "ignore" that at all, Kara. I said I thought it pertinent to '91, not the current situation. I dispute that Iraqi insurgency has broad, or even statistically significant indiginous popular support. I do not see that what you perceive to be the current condition in fact pertains. What I see in Iraq is a desperate, determined, and increasingly pressured resistance comprised of former Regime Figures, other die-hard Ba'athists, and 3rd-Nation Jihadis and wannabees. I see a PR problem, not a military problem. I expect the next couple of months or so will see the peak and then the inevitable decline of the insurgency. I expect Iraqi internal security to increase exponentially, I expect Iraqi autonomy will grow both more rapidly and more democraticaly than many suppose will be the case, I expect the Iraqi economy to bring real opportunity to the Iraqi people ... in short, I expect this will work. It will take time, and will have both unexpected successes and unexpected setbacks, but it will succeed.
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 04:42 pm
CdK, Reference your observation pertaining to Walter's observation of screen-stretching ... good point about screen resolutions. I'll curtail my Graphical Enthusiasm with that in mind.
0 Replies
 
PDiddie
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 04:45 pm
Of course, Kara, he has to keep believing all that.

Nothing challenging those assumptions (he considers them 'facts') can be allowed.

Else the whole house of cards tumbles, as it does for The Administration.

Quote:
Sarab rolls up her sleeve and looks at the thick scar across her upper arm. The eight-year-old says she was playing in the bathroom of her house when the shots were fired but cannot remember anything else.

'It is their routine,' said her grandfather, Turk Jassim. 'After the Americans are attacked, they shoot everywhere. This is inhuman - a stupid act by a country always talking about human rights.'

Last September, US forces shot dead Sarab's two-year old sister, Dunya, and wounded two other girls in her family, 13-year-old Menal and 16-year old Bassad. The family belongs to the Albueisi tribe who farm the rich land along the Euphrates river south of Falluja. The Albueisi fought against the British and even Saddam Hussein found them difficult to control. Since April, at least 10 members of the tribe have been killed by US forces, including five policemen.

While the US authorities maintain that resistance attacks are carried out by former Baathists and supporters of Saddam, they continue to ignore the tribal nature of the insurgency which has grown steadily over recent months. Deeply conservative clans like the 50,000-strong Albueisi have codes of honour which they complain the American army ignores at checkpoints and during raids on houses.

They also believe that the Koran demands jihad against foreign invaders. Asked how many American lives should be taken if one of their own is killed, the answer is: 'As many as possible.'


America Sows Seeds of Hatred

Do you feel safer yet?
0 Replies
 
Craven de Kere
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 04:46 pm
It doesn't bother me but I bet it bothers those on 800 by 600. I've been thinking about lowering the max font size for that reason, on a high resolution it looks ok but on a low resulution it becomes gaudy. Then again the whole site looks damn ugly on a low res.
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 04:50 pm
I feel no safer than any prudent individual might feel in time of war. I am comfortable with the idea that the vigorous, resolute, and ultimately unquestionably successful prosecution of this war will make all of us safer, PDiddie ... even you and Tartarin :cool:
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 04:58 pm
Craven de Kere wrote:
It doesn't bother me but I bet it bothers those on 800 by 600. I've been thinking about lowering the max font size for that reason, on a high resolution it looks ok but on a low resulution it becomes gaudy. Then again the whole site looks damn ugly on a low res.

Agree about low res and ugly... I'll be more considerate of our pixel-challenged members. I've prolly been overdoing it anyway. Its just fun to reproduce article teasers which mimic the appearance of the actual article. A simple quote and a link will work just fine for conveying salient points, which, after all, is what its all about anyway. Flash is not substance ... even when flashy is fun.
0 Replies
 
pistoff
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 05:09 pm
Report Claims Bush Team Has Bungled Peace
Quote:
An official US army review leaked to the US NGO globalsecurity.org has revealed that the army had no plan for the occupation of Baghdad.


http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1109-06.htm
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 06:12 pm
What that refers to, pistoff, is 3ID's recently released After Action Report, a routine document. The purpose of After Action Reports primarily is to identify, isolate, analyze, and recommend solutions to, problems encountered during the action. Most of an After Action Report may be expected to be critical of the particular action at study. That's what After Action Reports are for. While the focus is "What went wrong, how could we have been done better", the Media are prone to perceive "It all went wrong and there was no plan". After Action Reports are not big secrets as a rule. They are readily available, and are far more frequently sought and found by those who know where and when to look than "leaked" by anyone to anyone. To claim a document of this sort was "leaked" is egregiously irresponsible journalism.

I've not yet read the entire 280+ page report (warning ... huge PDF download), but I look forward to doing so.

Without spin, here's the section dealing with Civil Affairs. It recognizes shortcomings and recommends improvements. That's all.
Quote:
Civil Affairs (CA)
Chapter Contents
Introduction/Lessons Learned
Topic A - Planning
Topic B - Mobilization Table of Equipment and Organization (MTOE) Changes
Introduction
During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion was the battalion
supporting the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]). During the attack to
Baghdad each maneuver battalion, each brigade headquarters, and each tactical
operations center needed civil affairs (CA) support to conduct population resource
control operations.
Lessons Learned
• Plan for the transition to stability and support operations (SASO) as part of the overall
plan.
• Staff the battalion with enough direct support teams (DSTs) to provide a DST to each
maneuver battalion and each brigade headquarters, and a DST each for the division
main command post (DMAIN), division rear command post (DREAR), and division
tactical operations center (DTAC).
• Equip the DSTs with sufficient armor and weapons to allow them to support their own
movement.
Chapter 28
Civil Affairs (CA)
Topic A - Planning
Issue: Planning for the transition to stability and support operations (SASO) and
support of civil-military operations (CMO).
Discussion: As combat operations progress they will arrive to the point where the unit
must transition to SASO. This transition must be carefully planned and targets identified
and prioritized for protection.
Part of SASO is protecting infrastructure, historic sites, administrative buildings, cultural
sites, financial institutions, judicial/legal sites, and religious sites. Protecting these sites
must be planned for early in the planning process. All sites must be prioritized and
protected based on the guidance from higher headquarters, relative impact on restoring
services to the area of operations (AO), and relative importance to the nation/AO.
Without prioritizing, the unit will find itself protecting unimportant sites without enough
forces to protect important sites.
The force occupying an area must plan for civil administration. Questions that must be
answered include:
Will there be a curfew and what will the hours be?
Who will be the interim city leadership?
Who will provide fire and police protection?
Who has the lead for restoring utilities?
Who will coordinate relief priorities?
Who has the authority to hire/fire/appoint civil workers and leaders?
When will the civilian population be allowed to begin moving about the city?
Establishing a centralized information-clearing house is vital to restoring the city
functions and keeping the civilian population informed. This clearinghouse may be the
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or adjacent to it.
The civil information plan must get the commander's message out to the civilian
population early and often. It must publicize the location of the information-clearing
house, the hours for any curfew, anti-looting messages, actions to take when
approaching U.S. checkpoints, guidance about expectations for civilian behavior, and
the purpose for U.S. forces being in the area of operations (AO).
Recommendation: Plan for the transition to SASO as part of the overall plan.


If I come across anything else of related interest as I actually study the report, I'll update. I don't expect that any update will be warranted, though.
0 Replies
 
Gelisgesti
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 06:30 pm
Blueprint for a Presidency ...
Just for fun see how much of the following you can relate to Bush's Presidency.

Quote:
PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

"Propaganda Techniques" is based upon "Appendix I: PSYOP Techniques" from "Psychological Operations Field Manual No.33-1" published by Headquarters; Department of the Army, in Washington DC, on 31 August 1979
(from http://www.zoehouse.com/is/sco/proptech.html
http://www.mcad.edu/classrooms/POLITPROP/palace/library/proptech.html )

Knowledge of propaganda techniques is necessary to improve one's own propaganda and to uncover enemy PSYOP stratagems. Techniques, however, are not substitutes for the procedures in PSYOP planning, development, or dissemination.
Techniques may be categorized as:
Characteristics of the content self-evident. additional information is required to recognize the characteristics of this type of propaganda. "Name calling" and the use of slogans are techniques of this nature.
Additional information required to be recognized. Additional information is required by the target or analyst for the use of this technique to be recognized. "Lying" is an example of this technique. The audience or analyst must have additional information in order to know whether a lie is being told.
Evident only after extended output. "Change of pace" is an example of this technique. Neither the audience nor the analyst can know that a change of pace has taken place until various amounts of propaganda have been brought into focus.
Nature of the arguments used. An argument is a reason, or a series of reasons, offered as to why the audience should behave, believe, or think in a certain manner. An argument is expressed or implied.
Inferred intent of the originator. This technique refers to the effect the propagandist wishes to achieve on the target audience. "Divisive" and "unifying" propaganda fall within this technique. It might also be classified on the basis of the effect it has on an audience.


SELF-EVIDENT TECHNIQUE

Appeal to Authority. Appeals to authority cite prominent figures to support a position idea, argument, or course of action.

Assertion. Assertions are positive statements presented as fact. They imply that what is stated is self-evident and needs no further proof. Assertions may or may not be true.

Bandwagon and Inevitable Victory. Bandwagon-and-inevitable-victory appeals attempt to persuade the target audience to take a course of action "everyone else is taking." "Join the crowd." This technique reinforces people's natural desire to be on the winning side. This technique is used to convince the audience that a program is an expression of an irresistible mass movement and that it is in their interest to join. "Inevitable victory" invites those not already on the bandwagon to join those already on the road to certain victory. Those already, or partially, on the bandwagon are reassured that staying aboard is the best course of action.

Obtain Disapproval. This technique is used to get the audience to disapprove an action or idea by suggesting the idea is popular with groups hated, feared, or held in contempt by the target audience. Thus, if a group which supports a policy is led to believe that undesirable, subversive, or contemptible people also support it, the members of the group might decide to change their position.

Glittering Generalities. Glittering generalities are intensely emotionally appealing words so closely associated with highly valued concepts and beliefs that they carry conviction without supporting information or reason. They appeal to such emotions as love of country, home; desire for peace, freedom, glory, honor, etc. They ask for approval without examination of the reason. Though the words and phrases are vague and suggest different things to different people, their connotation is always favorable: "The concepts and programs of the propagandist are always good, desirable, virtuous."
Generalities may gain or lose effectiveness with changes in conditions. They must, therefore, be responsive to current conditions. Phrases which called up pleasant associations at one time may evoke unpleasant or unfavorable connotations at another, particularly if their frame of reference has been altered.

Vagueness. Generalities are deliberately vague so that the audience may supply its own interpretations. The intention is to move the audience by use of undefined phrases, without analyzing their validity or attempting to determine their reasonableness or application.

Rationalization. Individuals or groups may use favorable generalities to rationalize questionable acts or beliefs. Vague and pleasant phrases are often used to justify such actions or beliefs.

Simplification. Favorable generalities are used to provide simple answers to complex social, political, economic, or military problems.

Transfer. This is a technique of projecting positive or negative qualities (praise or blame) of a person, entity, object, or value (an individual, group, organization, nation, patriotism, etc.) to another in order to make the second more acceptable or to discredit it. This technique is generally used to transfer blame from one member of a conflict to another. It evokes an emotional response which stimulates the target to identify with recognized authorities.

Least of Evils. This is a technique of acknowledging that the course of action being taken is perhaps undesirable but that any alternative would result in an outcome far worse. This technique is generally used to explain the need for sacrifices or to justify the seemingly harsh actions that displease the target audience or restrict personal liberties. Projecting blame on the enemy for the unpleasant or restrictive conditions is usually coupled with this technique.

Name Calling or Substitutions of Names or Moral Labels. This technique attempts to arouse prejudices in an audience by labeling the object of the propaganda campaign as something the target audience fears, hates, loathes, or finds undesirable.

* Types of name calling:

-Direct name calling is used when the audience is sympathetic or neutral. It is a simple, straightforward attack on an opponent or opposing idea.
-Indirect name calling is used when direct name calling would antagonize the audience. It is a label for the degree of attack between direct name calling and insinuation. Sarcasm and ridicule are employed with this technique.
-Cartoons, illustrations, and photographs are used in name calling, often with deadly effect.

* Dangers inherent in name calling: In its extreme form, name calling may indicate that the propagandist has lost his sense of proportion or is unable to conduct a positive campaign. Before using this technique, the propagandist must weigh the benefits against the possible harmful results. It is best to avoid use of this device. The obstacles are formidable, based primarily on the human tendency to close ranks against a stranger. For example, a group may despise, dislike, or even hate one of its leaders, even openly criticize him, but may (and probably will) resent any non group member who criticizes and makes disparaging remarks against that leader.


Pinpointing the Enemy: This is a form of simplification in which a complex situation is reduced to the point where the "enemy" is unequivocally identified. For example, the president of country X is forced to declare a state of emergency in order to protect the peaceful people of his country from the brutal, unprovoked aggression by the leaders of country.

Plain Folks or Common Man: The "plain folks" or "common man" approach attempts to convince the audience that the propagandist's positions reflect the common sense of the people. It is designed to win the confidence of the audience by communicating in the common manner and style of the audience. Propagandists use ordinary language and mannerisms (and clothes in face-to-face and audiovisual communications) in attempting to identify their point of view with that of the average person. With the plain folks device, the propagandist can win the confidence of persons who resent or distrust foreign sounding, intellectual speech, words, or mannerisms.
The audience can be persuaded to identify its interests with those of the propagandist:

* Presenting soldiers as plain folks. The propagandist wants to make the enemy feel he is fighting against soldiers who are "decent, everyday folks" much like himself; this helps to counter themes that paint the opponent as a "bloodthirsty" killer.

* Presenting civilians as plain folks. The "plain folks" or "common man" device also can help to convince the enemy that the opposing nation is not composed of arrogant, immoral, deceitful, aggressive, warmongering people, but of people like himself, wishing to live at peace.

* Humanizing leaders. This technique paints a more human portrait of US and friendly military and civilian leaders. It humanizes them so that the audience looks upon them as similar human beings or, preferably, as kind, wise, fatherly figures.

Categories of Plain Folk Devices:
* Vernacular. This is the contemporary language of a specific region or people as it is commonly spoken or written and includes songs, idioms, and jokes. The current vernacular of the specific target audience must be used.

* Dialect. Dialect is a variation in pronunciation, grammar, and vocabulary from the norm of a region or nation. When used by the propagandist, perfection is required. This technique is best left to those to whom the dialect is native, because native level speakers are generally the best users of dialects in propaganda appeals.

* Errors. Scholastic pronunciation, enunciation, and delivery give the impression of being artificial. To give the impression of spontaneity, deliberately hesitate between phrases, stammer, or mispronounce words. When not overdone, the effect is one of deep sincerity. Errors in written material may be made only when they are commonly made by members of the reading audience. Generally, errors should be restricted to colloquialisms.

* Homey words. Homey words are forms of "virtue words" used in the everyday life of the average man. These words are familiar ones, such as "home," "family," "children," "farm," "neighbors," or cultural equivalents. They evoke a favorable emotional response and help transfer the sympathies of the audience to the propagandist. Homey words are widely used to evoke nostalgia. Care must be taken to assure that homey messages addressed to enemy troops do not also have the same effect on US/friendly forces.

If the propaganda or the propagandist lacks naturalness, there may be an adverse backlash. The audience may resent what it considers attempts to mock it, its language, and its ways.

Social Disapproval. This is a technique by which the propagandist marshals group acceptance and suggests that attitudes or actions contrary to the one outlined will result in social rejection, disapproval, or outright ostracism. The latter, ostracism, is a control practice widely used within peer groups and traditional societies.

Virtue Words. These are words in the value system of the target audience which tend to produce a positive image when attached to a person or issue. Peace, happiness, security, wise leadership, freedom, etc., are virtue words.

Slogans. A slogan is a brief striking phrase that may include labeling and stereotyping. If ideas can be sloganized, they should be, as good slogans are self-perpetuating.

Testimonials. Testimonials are quotations, in or out of context, especially cited to support or reject a given policy, action, program, or personality. The reputation or the role (expert, respected public figure, etc.) of the individual giving the statement is exploited. The testimonial places the official sanction of a respected person or authority on a propaganda message. This is done in an effort to cause the target audience to identify itself with the authority or to accept the authority's opinions and beliefs as its own. Several types of testimonials are:

Official Sanction. The testimonial authority must have given the endorsement or be clearly on record as having approved the attributed idea, concept, action, or belief.
Four factors are involved:

* Accomplishment. People have confidence in an authority who has demonstrated outstanding ability and proficiency in his field. This accomplishment should be related to the subject of the testimonial.

* Identification with the target. People have greater confidence in an authority with whom they have a common bond. For example, the soldier more readily trusts an officer with whom he has undergone similar arduous experiences than a civilian authority on military subjects.

* Position of authority. The official position of authority may instill confidence in the testimony; i.e., head of state, division commander, etc.

* Inanimate objects. Inanimate objects may be used in the testimonial device. In such cases, the propagandist seeks to transfer physical attributes of an inanimate object to the message. The Rock of Gibraltar, for example, is a type of inanimate object associated with steadfast strength.

Personal Sources of Testimonial Authority:

* Enemy leaders. The enemy target audience will generally place great value on its high level military leaders as a source of information.

* Fellow soldiers. Because of their common experiences, soldiers form a bond of comradeship. As a result, those in the armed forces are inclined to pay close attention to what other soldiers have to say.

* Opposing leaders. Testimonials of leaders of the opposing nation are of particular value in messages that outline war aims and objectives for administering the enemy nation after it capitulates.

* Famous scholars, writers, and other personalities. Frequently, statements of civilians known to the target as authoritative or famous scholars, writers, scientists, commentators, etc., can be effectively used in propaganda messages.

Nonpersonal Sources of Testimonial Authority:
Institutions, ideologies, national flags, religious, and other nonpersonal sources are often used. The creeds, beliefs, principles, or dogmas of respected authorities or other public figures may make effective propaganda testimonials.

Factors To Be Considered:

* Plausibility. The testimonial must be plausible to the target audience. The esteem in which an authority is held by the target audience will not always transfer an implausible testimonial into effective propaganda.

* False testimonials. Never use false testimonials. Highly selective testimonials? Yes. Lies (fabrications)? Never. Fabricated (false) testimonials are extremely vulnerable because their lack of authenticity makes them easy to challenge and discredit.

THE REST OF THE PAPER
0 Replies
 
Tartarin
 
  1  
Reply Sun 9 Nov, 2003 06:38 pm
Oh what a web we weave.
0 Replies
 
 

Related Topics

Obama '08? - Discussion by sozobe
Let's get rid of the Electoral College - Discussion by Robert Gentel
McCain's VP: - Discussion by Cycloptichorn
The 2008 Democrat Convention - Discussion by Lash
McCain is blowing his election chances. - Discussion by McGentrix
Snowdon is a dummy - Discussion by cicerone imposter
Food Stamp Turkeys - Discussion by H2O MAN
TEA PARTY TO AMERICA: NOW WHAT?! - Discussion by farmerman
 
Copyright © 2025 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.03 seconds on 07/18/2025 at 11:21:26