Iran's Challenges from Within: An Overview of Ethno-Sectarian UnrestThe Domestic ThreatThe Demographic Picture
Iran's Farsi-speaking, ethnic Persian community comprises only a slim majority of the total population of an estimated 70 million, of whom nearly all are Shiites. Ethnic Azeris, who are estimated to number between 15 and 20 million and are also Shiites, constitute the second largest minority. Ethnic Kurds represent the third largest ethnic group, with a population between four and seven million, and are mostly Sunnis. Ethnic Baloch, the majority of whom are Sunnis, number between one and four million. Ethnic Arabs number between one and three million and are predominantly Shiites. Turkmen number between one and two million and are mostly Sunnis. Iran is also home to Gilakis, Mazandaranis, Bakhtiaris, Lurs and Qashqais, most of whom are Shiites, as well as Bahais, Zoroastrians, Armenian Christians and Jews [2].
Violence and Rebellion
Kurdish insurgents are among the most prolific militants operating in Iran. Most Iranian Kurds inhabit the mountainous region of northwestern Iran, where the borders of Turkey, Iraq and Iran meet, while smaller communities reside in Iran's northeastern region of Khorasan. Like their kin elsewhere in the region, they face widespread discrimination by the ethnic Persian-dominated Shiite clerical regime. As Sunni Muslims with a proud sense of cultural and national identity, they do not identify with the Shiite Islamist regime and efforts by the state to suppress their culture and identity. Iran's Kurdish regions have experienced growing violence in recent months between the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), a group alleged to have ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, and Iranian security forces (Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006). Iran claims that PJAK operates in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq and receives support from the United States (IRNA, July 14). On the political front, groups such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPKI) and the Komoleh-Revolutionary Party of Kurdistan advocate for Iranian Kurdish rights in the diaspora (http://www.pdki.org;
http://www.komala.org).
Iranian Baloch nationalist groups such as Jundallah (Soldiers of God), also known as People's Resistance Movement of Iran (PRMI), have orchestrated a series of high-profile attacks against Iranian security forces dating back to 2003. Ethnic Baloch inhabit Iran's impoverished and desolate southeastern province of Sistan-Balochistan, a lawless region and smuggling crossroads. Sistan-Balochistan is a frequent target for Iranian security forces. As a fiercely independent tribal society that has been neglected by a highly-centralized state, ethnic Baloch have always felt a sense of alienation from Tehran. Despite a lack of evidence, Iranian authorities often label Baloch militants as agents of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in an effort to tarnish the group's reputation due to their Sunni faith (Terrorism Monitor, June 29, 2006). Ethnic Baloch animosity toward Tehran runs so deep that they look to their kin in Pakistan's neighboring province of Balochistan, who are engaged in their own secessionist struggle, and the Baloch community in Afghanistan in what Baloch nationalists label as "Greater Balochistan." Iran accuses the United States of supporting Jundallah from Pakistani territory (IRNA, April 18). Baloch nationalists are represented by the Balochistan People's Party (BPP) and a host of other groups abroad (http://www.ostomaan.org/).
The southwestern province of Khuzestan located on the Iran-Iraq border is home to most of Iran's ethnic Arab population known as the Ahwazi (Ahvazi in Farsi). Khuzestan contains much of Iran's oil and gas wealth, yet remains one of the country's least developed regions. This is partly a legacy of the devastation it endured as the frontline for much of the Iran-Iraq war and, according to many Ahwazis, a deliberate policy by Tehran to ensure that the region remains underdeveloped and impoverished. Despite the fact that most Ahwazis are Shiite Muslims and speak Farsi, they maintain close tribal and cultural links with their Shiite Arab kin in southern Iraq and maintain a strong sense of Arab identity. The region was the scene of a number of bombings and attacks against government targets in recent years. Tehran blamed Ahwazi militants, including the obscure Hizb al-Nahda al-Arabi al-Ahwazi (Ahwazi Arab Renaissance Party) and other groups as acting on the behest of U.S. and British intelligence (http://www.al-mohamra.nu). Ahwaz nationalists are represented in the diaspora by the Democratic Solidarity Party of Ahwaz, Ahwaz Revolutionary Council, Ahwaz Study Center (ASC) and British-Ahwazi Friendship Society (http://www.alahwaz-revolutionary-council.org;
http://www.alahwaz-revolutionary-council.org; http://www.ahwaz.org.uk).
Tensions in the ethnic Azeri community boiled over in May 2006 when a state-run newspaper published a cartoon they believed likened them to cockroaches. The publication inspired widespread protests in ethnic Azeri-dominated regions of northern Iran and communities in Tehran. Despite their Shiite faith, ethnic Azeris mobilized in protest against what they saw as the ethnic Persian and Farsi chauvinism of the clerical regime and to agitate for greater cultural and linguistic rights (http://www.oursouthazerbaijan.com).
Although the publishers of the cartoon were quickly reprimanded and their actions were condemned by officials in Tehran, the spontaneous outburst of anger among ethnic Azeris, Iran's largest ethnic minority that shares close links to the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia, especially their kin in former Soviet Azerbaijan, is another example of the nascent domestic tensions that could ignite violence and unrest in Iranian society. Iranian officials blamed outside agitators, namely pan-Turkic nationalists acting on the behest of the United States, for inciting the riots (IRNA, May 25, 2006). The ethnic Azeri cause in Iran is represented by the Federal Democratic Movement of Azerbaijan and South Azerbaijan Human Rights Watch (http://www.achiq.org;
http://www.hr.baybak.com).
Iran's ethnic Turkmen community, a predominantly Sunni population that inhabits northern parts of Iran along the border with Turkmenistan, appears to be following the lead of other Iranian minorities and raising its voices in protest against what it sees as a deliberate policy to stifle its cultural identity and rights, especially in regards to religion, language and education. Ethnic Turkmen are also emboldened by the plight of their kin in Iraq and their attempt to return to oil-rich Kirkuk, where they were expelled along with other minorities as part of the former Baath regime's "Arabization" program. Tehran accuses foreign elements based in Iraq and the wider Turkic world of supporting Turkmen dissent in Iran. Iranian Turkmen are represented by the Organization for Defense of the Rights of Turkmen People and the Turkmensahra Liberation Organization (http://www.azatlyk.net).
Conclusion
The issues inspiring minority ethnic and sectarian-based dissent in Iran are the result of a multiplicity of factors, only one of which can be attributed to acts of foreign intervention by outside powers. Deep-seated grievances rooted in practical issues, such as Iran's inability to integrate entire communities into its social, political and economic fabric, is a case in point. Iran also has to adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape in the region that is seeing the rise of new centers of power and influence, such as Iraqi Kurdistan, which will reverberate well beyond their borders by serving as an inspiration to underserved communities to assert themselves, even through violence.
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373589
