@FreeDuck,
FreeDuck wrote:
OCCOM BILL wrote:
FreeDuck wrote:
OCCOM BILL wrote:
One would think even a casual perusal of Medical Malpractice Insurance rates would suffice. The most rudimentary understanding of risk/reward ratios should eliminate the need for more specific correlation.
That's almost sufficient, but we still need to make a correlation between high malpractice insurance rates and frivolous lawsuits and unreasonable awards.
No, we don't. It's enough to accept that higher expenses equate to higher costs.
No, not really. It doesn't necessarily follow that higher prices are a result of higher costs. There is obviously more involved than that. Moreover, if the costs are high because of legitimate malpractice claims and awards, the solution is not to eliminate them. The solution is to reduce the malpractice. Otherwise you're just limiting patient rights so that insurance companies and doctors can continue to profit, which I don't think is the outcome we're aiming for.
You're not thinking this through full circle. The Doctors and/or Insurance companies may not drop their prices overnight because their costs go down, but in the free market world there is a limit to how much you can profit before a competitor comes in to underbid you. Lower costs inevitably lead to lower costs where ample competition exists.
And no one is suggesting we limit economic loss-based awards in any way, shape, or form. Tort reform is about limiting the
non-economic awards. If $250,000 won't make you
feel better about your loss, that's just tough luck. There should indeed be a limit on how much other people should have to pay to make you
feel better. This is wholly independent from
actual damages, which can still run well into the millions and are unaffected by Tort Reform. As I explained to Cyclo above, a non-economic award of $50,000,000 costs a hell of a lot more than $50,000,000. The prospect of such, opens the doors to 200 times more litigation, because the break-even point allows for 200 times more losses, while providing the same simple risk/reward margin.
But it is NOT that simple. The exposure to such incredible risk also provides that it is mathematically logical to settle cases at significantly higher settlement amounts (and/or significantly weaker, less merited cases) than they would otherwise merit. This leverage means the insurance company's break even point on a case that's has a 1 in a 1,000 chance of reaching such a plateau is worth $50,000 ($5,000 at 10,000 to 1 and so on). At $50,000 for a break-even over-under, I'd wager most lawyers are interested in taking this weak ass case, if only for a shot at a quick settlement. Now cap it at $250,000... A 1,000 to 1--> lousy case is worth $250... not enough to get a lawyer to show up for the initial appearance. Cases with higher degrees of
merit remain compelling, because the relative odds against winning drop as the degree of merit increases.
The result? Many, if not most frivolous lawsuits aren't pursued because the formula no longer makes them profitable pursue. Settlement offers drop to levels mandated by actual, not feel-good damages. All of this happens not just because the GIANT award is no longer possible, but also because the possibility is no longer there to give attorney's massive leverage, with weaker cases. Really... this cannot be hard to understand to anyone who gives it a legitimate try.
Cyclo, see above. It is my final effort to express what should be an obvious point of consideration. I'm not "the Republicans", and I'm not claiming Tort Reform alone will fix our health care system. I am arguing that reducing the costs on everyone in a way that will in no way reduce the quality of care available (quite the contrary, when one considers the areas being abandoned by specialists now) is in everyone but the lawyers who specialize in doctor demonizing and the relative few who think $250,000 is an insufficient
feel-good award.