Revel's post is the most cogent observation to make--one set of self-serving, flannel-mouthed politicians is little different than any other.
I have consistently posted in this forum that i have no good reason to believe that the Democrats will take over the House in this election. There is some hope for those who wish to see the Democrats succeed that they may get a (bare) majority in the Senate. Some observations on these ideas:
"Control" of the House in theory means only a simple majority. In practice, however, this can vary depending upon the extent to which any issue is seen to be partisan with regard to the professional politicians, or "divisive" with regard to the electorate at large. Those issues with a strong partisan--i.e., ideological--character will likely, but not with complete assurance, divide the House along party lines, and will probably result in the triumph of the majority party. There are some weak variables in this, in that not all politicians always succumb to the ideological pressue of their party, such as Republicans who secure seat is based upon a population which does not oppose abortion, or a Democrat whose secure seat is based upon a population with a strong identification with the military. The former is unlikely to favor legislation to restrict abortion despite an ideological appeal, and the latter is likely to support increased defense spending despite ideological appeal.
In the case of (alleged) "divisive" issues, the equation is more complex. Whether or not the electorate is actually divided on any particular issue (or even cares or notices) is often a matter of propaganda (euphemistically described these days as "spin"). Many issues described as "divisive" actually drawn a yawn of a "Huh?" from the electorate, and wrangles in ths House on such issues are examples of individual members playing to an audience only of other politicians, and usually attempting to score points with the party leadership. If an issue actually does exercise the electorate, and divide them deeply along ideological lines, the only certainty is that successful politicians will always vote what they know or believe their constituents want, and to Hell with party leadership.
So, in the House, "control" means simple majority--usually, but the situation is never simple.
In the Senate, partisan supporters often like to claim that a simple majority confers control, but this is even less true than in the House. First, on a purely procedural basis, the rules of the Senate (and the Constitution confers on each house the right to make their own rules of procedure) require a 60% vote of the quorum to close debate--so a simple majority can be prevented from bringing legislation to the floor is the minority opposes the measure and has sufficient votes. What is often referred to as the "nuclear option" in the Senate is so called because it entails ending debate on a simple majority vote (with the Vice President vote to break any tie) of the quorum, which is likely to end all cooperation between the parties for at the least, the rest of the session of that Congress, which can, of course be as much as almost two years. The idea is that if the majority party invokes "the nuclear option," the minority will close ranks to block every measure the majority party forwards, which is why it is "nuclear," and which is why either party will attempt to avoid. Furthermore, the "nuclear option" can only be exercised on a point of order, because of the 60% vote, and the party embarrassed by the use of the nuclear option is then likely to raise points of order on every occasion thereafter, paralyzing the business of the Senate.
The procedural rule that 60% of the quorum must otherwise be invoked to close debate. To change that rule, one must invoke Senate Rule 22, which requires a two thirds majority of the quorum to change any written rules of the Senate (procedural precedent can effectively create unwritten rules, another reason to avoid the "nuclear option")--which requires absolute control of the Senate. Neither party is likely to want to change the 60% rule, because even if a party is now out of power, they will hope to exercise it as such time as they are in power.
Which leads to the issue of absolute control. Absolute control can actually be seen as one of two situations. "Near" absolute control would be having 60 seats (and perhaps a few more to assure 60% of any quorum), enabling the party in power to close debate at will without invoking the nuclear option. However, "true" absolute control would involve the party in power holding 67 seats (and perhpas a few more to assure two thirds of any quorum), allowing the party in power to change Senate rules at will, and to assure the power to ratifying treaties or confirming appointments despite any objection of the minority party.
Therefore, control of the House means a simple majority, although a significant "buffer" of votes is necessary to overcome the potential defection of party members who are voting their constituency (after all, they're up for election every two years) rather than a party line. Control of the Senate is not conferred by a simple majority, and needs at least 60 seats for procedural control, and 67 seats for absolute control--and as is the case with the House, but in less exteme manner, a few seats more to assure the same control when there is a quorum, but not full attendance.
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All of that is actually good news for the Republicans--sort of. It means that even if the Democrats were to get a bare majority in both houses (not at all likely in the House; possible, but not terribly likely in the Senate)--they wouldn't necessarily be able to exercise true control of the Congress. They could, could however, improve their position to the extent that the Republicans cannot afford to ignore their demands, and that the Republicans would be obliged to behave in a conciliatory manner in almost cases. With a weak executive--which is what you have now, with the Presidency unpopular and seen as possibly being an electoral liability rather than an advantage--the party in power must always treat the minority power with care, unless they have the huge, more than two thirds majorities need in both houses to override vetoes, and can rely upon the vote of those majorities--a situation like that has not existed since the early days of Franklin Roosevelt, and his was a strong Presidency in the terms used above.
The reason i don't believe that the Democrats can effectively seize either house (even getting a bare majority which doesn't guarantee control) is the power of incumbency. While searching for another string containing the word "stagnation," i came across
this Wikipedia article on Congressional stagnation. It explains the history of the expression of the concept, as well as the concept itself. It is worth noting that Congressional stagnation--the power of incumbency--is not absolute, the Republicans broke the trend in 1994. However, that was an exception which, viewed against the record of Congressional elections since the Second World War, proves the rule. Incumbents attract more money and influential support because of a proven record. Incumbents have a huge advantage in "free" political advertising from their opportunities to get their names in the news, as the legislation of the political silly season before a mid-term election proves. Incumbents have franking privileges which allow them to do free mass mailings, under the cover of "reporting" to their constituency. Incumbents can not only get in the news, but can get free travel, if they can cobble together a political excuse, such as a "fact finding mission." Far and away, though, the biggest advantage of incumbency is the ready access to pork.
Things to think about, folks.
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just can't ignore temptation, can you?
