The Neutron Bomb has been in our inventory for over 30 years. My memory may be faulty, but it seems to me that a series of underground tests were made in the mid-70's. The Neutron Bomb has minimal blast/heat effects. The primary effect is a short duration burst of high energy radiation with a very short half life. This type device is designed solely for an airburst. I've forgotten what the optimum altitude is. It is safe to approach Ground Zero within hours after detonation. EMP exists with this weapon, but is relatively weak.
Less well known are a family of EMP weapons that accentuate EMP effects while minimizing blast/heat/radiation effects. Those effects still exist, and generally EMP devices are designed as high altitude air bursts.
Overall, U.S. warheads are the cleanest anywhere. Because our accuracy is so good, relatively small yield devices are as effective as the larger warheads of other powers. U.S. warheads of less than 3KT are probably available. The Japanese bombs were on the order of 10KT.
Damn right I do.
Iran will send their nuke straight to Tel Aviv once they get it working. No question. Their intent is clear.
Comon America. Get your intent straight. Who's your buddy?
Better thousands of dead in the Japaneses military cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, than hundreds of thousands of American soldiers killed in the invasion of Japan. The Bomb ended the war promptly, and that saved not only American soldiers from the long and costly effort to subdue a nation bent on Death before Dishonor, it also saved hundreds of thousands of Japanese men, women and children who would have perished in the final acts of a long, brutal war that Japan started.
Right. So clean we only killed 100,000 in the LAST Gulf War. And those were Tomahawks, not nukes.
The Neutron Bomb was developed primarily to stop an Soviet advance through the Fulda Gap. US and NATO forces on the ground were expected to be insufficient, and so were tasked with slowing the expected Tank Armies from the East. The war, at least in its early stages, would be fought inside West Germany, and we wanted to keep the damage to a minimum. Hence, the Neutron Bomb which would kill the Soviet soldiers inside their tanks, but leave the homes and industries of Germany intact. The intense radiation produced by this weapon becomes harmless a short distance from the detonation point, so even German deaths would have been limited to those quite close to the advancing target(s).
Which would kill more, conventional atomic weapons with a full-range of blast/heat/radiation/EMP effects, or the Neutron Bomb with almost no blast/heat effect, and with short range/radiation half-life?
Americanadian,
You may disagree, as some continue to do, that the war against Japan could have been ended by blockade and strategic bombing of Japanese military targets. Sorry, but you are wrong. The "conventional" bombing of Tokyo killed more civilians than either of the nuclear bombs actually used. Continued "conventional" bombing would have taken many times more lives, and almost certainly would not have been effective in driving the Japanese to surrender. Manned bombers operating from China, Okinawa, and Korea were vulnerable to AA fire and CAP, so the number of US aircrews killed would have continued indefinitely. No country has yet to be entirely defeated by blockade and conventional air strikes, and the level of force we could have delivered in 1945 was pretty small comparatively.
The closer U.S. force got to Japan, the stiffer the resistance. The Battle for Okinawa was the largest and bloodiest campaign in the Pacific. Kamikaze attacks increased, but the Japanese still held enough resources to have increased the scope and destructiveness of the Kamikaze when we invaded the southern home islands (BTW, Hiroshima was an important staging area for the final defense of the Home Islands). In preparation for the coming invasion, even small children were armed with sharpened sticks and admonished to kill as many Americans as possible. In our Island Hopping Campaign, we came to expect very, very few POWs because the Japanese preferred suicide to surrender. Mass suicide attacks and booby traps were common, and this was the resistance offered for tiny almost barren atolls. The expectation was that the invasion of the Home Islands would be perhaps fifty times more costly in lives than D-Day and Anzio combined. U.S. forces were being ordered from the European Theater to the Pacific in anticipation of an invasion. Even once the U.S. got off of the beaches, we would have faced an entire population from 6-95 years of age determined to take as many Americans as possible with them into death. These are the facts, and they aren't hard to find if you look with an open mind. Ask any veteran of WWII how they feel about the use of the Atomic Bomb on Japan.
... I believe Japan would have surrendered facing the circumstances above ...
... Operation Olympic, planned for October-November, 1945, was to be the first of a 2-part seaborne invasion of the Japanese Home Islands, with a 14 Division assault, some 300,000 land-combat troops and approximately 4 to 5 times that number of Naval, Airforce, and non-combatant support personnel, on the Southernmost Home Island, Kyushu. The second phase, named Operation Coronet, was to commence on or about March 1, 1946, providing Olympic had gone at least marginally according to plan, something that was by no means a foregone conclusion. The the Coronet assault was to be a 25 Division assault on the Main Home Island, Honshu, the immediate objective being a drive up the Tokyo Plain, both to take the capital and to bifurcate the defender's troop concentration. All told, between the two operations, an initial allocation of some 1.8 Million combat troops and over 3 Million other military, were to be committed, or nearly one half of all US uniformed forces at the time, would be involved in the operations, along with civilian support, mostly Merchant Marine, numbering into the low hundreds of thousands. Total manpower commitment to the invasion was to be well upwards of 5 Million souls; the entirety of The US Marine Corps, the entire US Pacific Fleet (some 3000 ships), the entire 8th Army, the entire 8th Air Force (redeployed from Europe), the entire 20th Airforce, and the entire American Far Eastern Air Force and roughly one third of The Merchant Marine.
Heavy casualties were expected, given experience gained from the nearly three years of island hopping begun at Guadalcanal in November of 1942. Estimates for the Kyushu assault alone were 2 to 3 hundred thousand. General Douglas MacArthur, overall US Pacific Commander, officially anticipated over 1 Million Own Forces would be killed or wounded by the Autum of 1946. General Charles Willoughby, Mac Arthur's Intelligence Chief, considered that a conservative estimate.
Though effectively contained by a nearly impenetrable naval blockade, and daily pummeled from the air by endless streams of bombers, Japan adamantly refused surrender. A blockade isolates a Power, but it does not kill it. Strategic bombing lays waste to cities, devastates populations, crippling industry and transport, but leaves entire Armies relatively unscathed.
Truman approved the invasion plans on July 24, 1945, while at the Potsdam Conference. 2 days later, the UN issued the Potsdam Proclamation, a final call for Japan immediately to surrender, unconditionally, or face sure and total destruction. On the 29th of July, The Japanese Governmental News Agency, the official organ of the regime, formally broadcast to the world Japan's unswerving intention to refuse surrender and to ignore all provisos of the Potsdam Proclamation.
At about this time, late July of 1945, intelligence intercepts revealed Japan had closed all schools, non-essential industry, and commerce, mobilizing and arming much of its civilian population. Aerial reconnaissance clearly showed massive fortification and underground facility construction underway throughout Japan.
It was anticipated the initial action against Kyushu would commence on 27 October 1945, with the first moves of a 4-pronged attack to be the taking and occupation of of several smaller islands South and Southwest of Kyushu proper. The 40th Infantry Division and the 158th Regimental Combat Team were assigned this task, with Naval support from 3 Battleships, 12 Cruisers, and 4 Aircraft Carriers, along with myriad lesser warships. The islands were to provide land-based communications and radar, both to warn the fleet of enemy air or surface activity, and air traffic control for the air armada accompanying the invasion, as well as emergency aircraft landing facilities and a sheltered anchorage for damaged invasion vessels.
Bombardment, both by surface ship and by aircraft, would precede the beach landing by 72 hours, and continue throughout the operation, "rolling" in front of the planned overland advance. The main invasion of Kyushu was to commence at dawn November 1, with simultaneous amphibious assaults along the Eastern, Northern, and Western coasts of the island.
The 25th, 33rd, and 41st Infantry Divisions would have the Eastern prong, landing near the city of Myasaki, at 6 beach heads codenamed "Austin", "Buick", "Cadillac", "Chevrolet", "Chrysler" and "Cord". The assault objectives were to be the capture of the city and of a nearby large military airfield.
On the Southern Flank, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 43 Division, and the Americal Division would invade the Amake Bay area at beaches codenamed "DeSoto", "Dusenberg", "Essex", "Ford" and "Franklin". The objectives were the capture of the port cities of Shibshi and Kanoya, and another large Imperial Army Airfield.
To the West, the beaches were codenamed "Pontiac", "Reo", "Rolls Royce", "Saxon", "Star", "Studebaker", "Stutz", "Winton" and "Zephyr". V Amphibious Corps, consisting of 2nd, 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions was to take the port city of Kagoshima and to drive inland to the city of Sendai, site of a major Imperial Army Base.
On November 4th, following a feint attack on the island of Shikoku, 81st and 98th Infantry Divisions and the 11th Airborne Division, unless already committed elsewhere as emergency reserve, would attack Kagoshima Bay, across beaches codenamed "Locomobile", "Lincoln", "LaSalle", "Hupmobile", "Moon", "Mercedes", "Maxwell", "Overland", "Oldsmobile", "Packard" and "Plymouth", with the city of Kaimondake, a Naval Airfield, and a Submarine base as objectives.
A 4-month timetable was established for Olympic, and each month would see the landing of an additional 3 Divisions. The assault on Kyushu, itself the largest single military endeavor in to that time in history, was to be but prelude. Assuming success for Olympic, Coronet, the Main Event and over twice the size of its predecessor, was scheduled to open March 1st, 1946.
East of Tokyo, the American 1st Army would land the 5th, 7th, 27th, 44th, 86th and 96th Infantry Divisions, along with 1st, 4th and 6th Marine Divisions. To the South, at Sagami Bay, 8th and 10th Armies, comprised of the 4th, 6th, 8th, 24th, 31st, 32nd, 37th, 38th and 87th Infantry Divisions, accompanied by the 13th and 20th Armoured Divisions would strike inland toward the city complex of Yokohama. Subsequent assaults were to be conducted at various points by an additional 8 Divisions, the 2nd, 28th, 35th, 91st, 95th, 97th and 104th Infantry Divisions and the 11th Airborne Division. Follow-on forces, consisting of as many as an additional dozen Divisions redeployed from Europe and currently undergoing refitting, replacement, and retraining in the US already had their re-deployment orders.
This almost unimaginable force structure was calculated as necessary and sufficient roaccomplishe the task given the best estimates of the intelligence services at the time. Postwar examination of documents, discovery ofassetss, and interrogation of captured Senior Officers revealed the available intelligence had badly underestimated the actual defensive capacity of Japan.
Following the Okinawa campaign, during which Kamikaze attacks sunk 32 ships and damaged over 400 more, the assessment was that Japan had largely spent her airpower. The assumption was aided by the fact US bombers and fighters faced essentially no Japanese air interdiction over The Home Islands, and were able to roam and strike almost at will, day or night, hindered only by desultory anti-aircraft fire.
In fact, the Japanese Homeland Defense Plan, codenamed Ketsu-Go, had seen to the marshalling of over 12,700 serviceable aircraft, along with the construction of dozens ofsubterraneann hangar facilities, scores of hidden,camouflagedd airstrips, and the stockpiling of tens of thousands of gallons of fuel and hundreds of thousand tons ofmunitionss, from bombs and torpedoes to rockets, mortar rounds, and artillery projectiles, and a few thousand tons of military-grade explosives not encompassed with projectiles. Additionally, in "cottage shops" and under bridges, in basements and in mines and tunnels, military production was continuing at a feverish pace.
The Ketsu-Go plan was for four separate aerial campaigns against the invasion fleet. While 2000 fighters were to contest the skies over Kyushu, an initial 800 plane Kamikaze attack was to engage the fleet during its assembly about the islands, over Kyushu. A second force of over 300 planes was to target specifically the aircraft carriers and other ground-fire-capable ships, attacking in waves from all points of the compass. Over 800 more suicide planes were to target the transports and landing ships.
The Kyushu defense was allotted approximately 2000 additional planes, most of which which were to be used in suicide waves of from 50 to over 100, as the situation merited and circumstances permitted.
The Japanese calculated they could stymie the invasion and inflict crippling losses on both the capital ships and escorts and the support ships. Relying not just on air power, they had 40 operational submarines, each fully manned, fueled, and armed. Some 20 destroyers and three cruisers remained operational as well, and were to be used variously to counterattack the invasion fleet and, beached, as fire support platforms.
Additionally, there was a force of some 400 suicide submarines ... little more than manned torpedoes, but deadly nonetheless. The invasion fleet would come under devastating, unceasing assault from land, sea, and air, before the troops even got to the beaches.
Confident of inflicting staggering losses, though at horrendous cost to themselves, the Japanese anticipated the Americans would falter, back off, abandon the endeavor, and, shocked and demoralized, perhaps to offer at least face-saving, less-than-unconditional surrender terms.
Nothing if not meticulous in planning, the Japanese had a fallback plan, should the invasion succeed in lodging troops ashore, as they thought likely.
The most determined and fanatical defense of the war had been prepared. The Japanese High Command had correctly worked out not only when, but almost to the foot where the Americans would attack. They planned an experience very different from that which the island-hopping war had led the Americans to expect. To that point throughout the Pacific War, the Americans invariably had outnumbered their island-defendingadversariess by margins of 2-or-3-to-1.
On Kyushu, the odds would be less favorable to the Americans. Considerably less favorable; facing the anticipated 14 American Divisions would be 14 Japanese Divisions, 7 independent combined-arms forces of roughly Brigade strength, 3 fully equipped Tank Brigades, and several thousand Naval Troops. Around 800,000 defenders stood ready torepell some 500,000 invaders, assuming even that many had survived the furious pre-invasion defense. And unlike so often in the island campaigns, the defending troopswouldlwouldd not be ill-equipped, poorly trained labor and punishment battalions. The Home Army was well fed, well led, well trained, and well equipped. The remaining cream of the Army, tens of thousands of battle-tested veterans, elite troops in every sense, stiffened the lesser formations, which were themselves of a calibre markedly higher than that to which The Americans had become accustomed to meeting. And these troops were flush with a fanatical, almost-beyond-religious determination to sell their lives as dearly as they could.
Offshore mines, scuba divers, manned torpedoes, cunningly crafted obstacles, and onshore mines in the thousands comprised the first belt of beach defenses. Behind these were laid out over hundreds of yards row upon row of trenches and revetments, pillboxes and bunkers, all designed to be as inconspicuous as possible, and to be resistant to naval bombardment and aerial attack, with interlocking fields of fire, multiply reinforcing one another and situated to rake the beaches with withering fire. Further back were emplaced artillery and mortars, again protected by construction specifically created to offermaximunn protection from bothbombss and shells. The troops to man these positions were garrisoned, with as much of their equipment as was practical deep underground, impervious even to the 1-ton projectiles fired by Battleships. They had been drilled to remain in the safety of their shelters undergroundd fortresses, really -untill the last moment, at which point, American troops swarming ashore, the bombardment lifted to strike deeper inland, they could assume their positions, lay their weapons, and engage the enemy at the tideline.
They had developed a transportation and communication system virtually undetectable from the air, and were adept at using it. There were massive caches of arms and munitions in hundreds of concealed locations. There were yet more intertwining trenches and tunnels, hidden bunkers, hundreds of heavy artillery pieces, some mounted on rail cars, rigged to shuttle in and out of deep tunnels with concealed entrances, mortars and machineguns secreted within houses, shops, and schools, tanks disguised under haystacks and rubbish piles, endless tangles of barbed wire, fire ditches ready to be flooded with flammable liquid and set alight, and there were literally millions of anti-personnel and anti-armor mines, many already laid in the vicinity of the anticipated invasion beaches, huge quantities ready to be deployed. There were chemical weapons too. Gases and biologics, tested against Chinese, Mongolian, and Korean adversaries, were available and situated with troops trained andexperiencedd in their deployment. The defenders knew the lay of the land, and they were going to be defending their own homes and families. It was for them literally a fight to death or victory with no alternative between.
And then there was the armed and mobilized citizenry ... literally millions of them. Possessed only of the most rudimentary training, and given the crudest of weapons ... suicide weapons in large part, they were no less determined to die for theirEmperorr, Homeland, heritage, and honor than were the uniformed forces. Some 28 Million strong, the National Volunteer Combat force was galvanized under theincessantlyy drummed mantra "A Hundred Million will die gladly for our Emperor and Homeland". Armed with rifles left over from the Russo-Japanese War of 4 decades earlier, with long, grenade-tipped "lunge sticks", molotov cocktails, crude black powder bombs and mortars, swords, spears, and bows, some even with nothing more than sharpened bamboo stakes, their task was to collect payment for Japanese soil by means of massed night suicide attacks, hit-and-run ambushes, and delaying and masking operations in support of uniformed forces.
Had the invasion occurred, the casualties would have been measured in the tens and scores of thousands weekly for months. A million American casualties indeed would have been an improbably fortunate low tally. Japanese casualties likely would have been all but immeasurable ... in the many Millions at the very least. Physical damage toinfrastructuree and environment would have been unimaginable; orders of magnitude beyond anything ever seen or even contemplated. A proud and ancient nation - its society and culture literally would all but have died.
But that never happened. A half dozen planes, only two of which were armed, on August 6 and again on August 9th, saved history from the awful burden of recounting that tale. Some 80,000 to 90,000 people died at Hiroshima, perhaps half that many at Nagasaki, according to official numbers accepted by both the US and Japanese governments, and by The United Nations. Residual deaths, due to injuries and radiation poisoning, push the toll a bit higher, but still most experts estimate the carnage at well under 200,000. A crime if you wish, but surely a lesser crime than a slaughter and devastation incalculably worse. Sometimes life hands you tough choices. For untold millions, the kinder, gentler choice was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
... Japan - the Government of Japan - had offered no acceptance of surrender terms prior to the bombing, and in fact officially and publicly defied the surrender demand; see This Post for specifics. There always are peace factions and war factions - in Japan, right up until the Emperor's decision to surrender, the war faction was the operative power in the government. The war faction was convinced Japan could force acceptable surrender terms through one last, desperate battle. The peace faction, lobbying for acceptance of Allied terms, maintained that even should Japan stymie the inevitable invasion for a time, the Allies would prevail in the end. This was seen, by the war faction - the War Cabinet, to be precise, the Government-in-Fact - to be a defeatist attitude, and contrary to the code of Bushido and Samurai tradition.
Following the Hiroshima bomb, the prevailing opinion within the War Cabinet was that there wasn't another bomb - their scientists assured them of that. On August 8, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow was told not only that The Soviet Union would not mediate surrender negotiations, but that as of that morning, a state of war existed between the Soviet Union and Japan. This announcement was coincident with an all-out Soviet attack on Japanese positions in Manchuria. News of that unexpected setback to Japanese hopes for a negotiated surrender arrived in Tokyo at about the same time news a second bomb had levelled Nagasaki arrived.
Throughout the remainder of that day and well into the next, debate raged in the cabinet. A unanimous agreement to surrender was required by then-current Japanese cabinet practice. A deadlock persisted, with 6 in favor of surrender under certain conditions, and 3 in favor of continuing the fight. No Japanese War Cabinet consideration was given to unconditional surrender. The issue was brought to the Emperor, who pronounced that he felt the time had come to "Bear the unbearable". An official announcement was drafted, outlining Japan's conditions for accepting surrender.
The Japanese Army, however, didn't agree, and on August 10th, an official army communique went out to all units saying in part " ... We shall fight on to the bitter end, ever firm in our faith that we shall find life in death . . . and surge forward to destroy the arrogant enemy." To counter this, the peace faction on the morning of August 11th countermanded the order with an announcement of their own,madee in the name of the Emperor. The Army, unhappy, but loyal, grudgingly went along, and while not exactly endorsing a peace proposal, did not stand in its way. The peace faction announced the terms on which Japan would surrender. The decision was made that afternoon that the Emperor would address the people, announcing the surrender as soon as the Allies had accepted Japan's counteroffer.
Around midnight Tokyo time Aug 11/12, an Allied announcement once more reaffirming the demand for unconditional surrender was made. Over the next 24 hours, the government was in turmoil, with the war faction - the War Cabinet, lobbying to commit 20 Million lives or more to the cause of defending Japanese honor through one last frenzy of air, land, and sea kamikaze tactics. The plan and the resources for this were in place; see This Post
On the morning of the 14th, Allied bombers spread leaflets throughout Japan, informing the Japanese people of their government's adamant refusal to surrender, and warning of assured destruction of the nation unless surrender was effected (it should ne noted as well that throughout June and July, continuous leaflet bombings had warned the populace that cities were targets, exhorting them to flee to the countryside). Another Imperial conference was convened, and while there was still much bickering, with the War Cabinet holding out for the last-ditch defense, the Emperor said he felt there was no choice but to accept the Allied terms. The cabinet thenaccededd to the Emperor's decision, and unanimously voted to accept the Allied terms. Around 3 that afternoon, an official broadcast announced to the Allies that "acceptance will be forthcoming soon." The Emperor's acceptance of surrender announcement was drafted, carefully refined, and the Emperor's reading of the announcement was recorded for broadcast.
The Allies immediately ceased offensive actions, reverting to ready alert status, while continuing active defense where necessary. The Japanese military showed no sign of laying down its arms, and in fact several attacks were mounted in various areas throughout the remaining Japanese-occupied territories over the next 12 to 18 hours.
In Tokyo, a coup attempt was mounted, and the commander of the Imperial Guard was assassinated. Orders to maintain resistance to the last breath were issued in his name. An abortive attack was launched on the government radio station, its goal being the prevention of the broadcast of the Emperor's recorded acceptance of Allied surrender terms. The insurrection was put down with some violence, and the staunchest proponent of continued resistance, War Minister General Anami Korechika, upon realizing that immediate surrender on Allied terms was inevitable, committed suicide.
The entire cabinet resigned, and an Imperial prince was appointed premier. The Emperor's acceptance speech was broadcast at noon on the 15th. Upon intercepting that broadcast, the Allies announced to their own forces the end of the war. The next 24 hours saw several dozen Japanese aircraft shot down while attempting to interfere with or actually attack Allied forces.
Some fragments of the military still remained reluctant to accept surrender. Over the next two weeks, members of the Imperial family, the General Staff, and higher government officials personally visited garrisons and outposts to specifically express to their commanders and officers the will of the Emperor that Japan accede to Allied demands unconditionally.
Not until the 25th of August did Allied carrier aircraft begin daily patrolling Japanese airfields, shipping facilities and movements, other military installations, and begin close reconnaissance to locate POW camps and begin emergency supply drops to them.
On August 27th, Halsey stood his fleet into Tokyo Bay. The following day, US forces landed at Tokyo's Atsugi airfield, the first US troops to set foot on Japanese soil other than as prisoners of war. On the 29th, the Allies began evacuation of the Japanese POW camps - appalled by the conditions found. On the 30th, wholesale landings of occupation troops began, first in the immediate Tokyo area, then over the next few days expanding throughout Japan. On the 2cnd of September, the formal instrument of surrender was executed aboard the USS Missouri, one civilian Japanese government representative, newly appointed Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigimitsu, one military Japanese representative, General Staff Chief Yoshijiro Umezu, and 9 Allied representatives, led by US General of The Armies, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers Douglas Mac Arthur, affixing their signatures to the document. A further 10 days were to pass before all major Japanese commands in the Pacific and on the Asian mainland signed individual instruments of surrender. See The Japanese Surrender Documents of World War II
It is my opinion, based on what I have determined to be the best available evidence, that had the bombs - both of them - not been dropped, the prevailing Allied assessment, and I believe that in fact it was overwhelmingly likely, that the Japanese Ketsu-Go defense would have met the Allied Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet invasions.
Among sources for the foregoing:
Japan's Decision to Surrender: Butow, R
Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1954
The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II: Cressman, R (ed)
Naval Historical Center Press, Washington DC, 1957, rev 1999
Downfall - The End of the Japanese Imperial Empire: Frank, R
Random House, New York, 1999
Website: Japan Capitulates, August - September 1945
cjhsa wrote:Damn right I do.
Iran will send their nuke straight to Tel Aviv once they get it working. No question. Their intent is clear.
Comon America. Get your intent straight. Who's your buddy?
So what if they do? What business is it of ours? Isreal is NOT my buddy.
cjhsa wrote:Comon, it would be fun.
America has yet to field test its Neutron Bom.
It is an environmentally friendly bom
with a very short half-life
( so that the oil wud not be long contaminated )
that only kills humans while leaving the real estate undisturbed.
The Neutron Bomb has been in our inventory for over 30 years. My memory may be faulty, but it seems to me that a series of underground tests were made in the mid-70's. The Neutron Bomb has minimal blast/heat effects. The primary effect is a short duration burst of high energy radiation
It is safe to approach Ground Zero within hours after detonation.
Overall, U.S. warheads are the cleanest anywhere. Because our accuracy is so good, relatively small yield devices are as effective as the larger warheads of other powers. U.S. warheads of less than 3KT are probably available. The Japanese bombs were on the order of 10KT.
Asherman wrote:Better thousands of dead in the Japaneses military cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, than hundreds of thousands of American soldiers killed in the invasion of Japan. The Bomb ended the war promptly, and that saved not only American soldiers from the long and costly effort to subdue a nation bent on Death before Dishonor, it also saved hundreds of thousands of Japanese men, women and children who would have perished in the final acts of a long, brutal war that Japan started.
I disagree with the idea that the A-bomb was necessary to end the war. I believe it was showcasing the new weapon to instill fear into the Soviets.
Who had complete control of the Pacific ocean and the skies above it? America. A complete naval blockade of Japan and regular conventional bombings would have sufficed to bring about the eventual surrender of Japan.
Present day Hiroshima and Japan, still suffer the side effects from A-bomb radiation,
much like the media suppression of DU effects on babies in Iraq.
There were other ways to achieve the same end. Truman wanted a display of power to end the war, and a quicker way out.
Yes, it may be true that more died (or could have died) due to conventional bombing, but the aftermath of conventional bomb use would not continue to affect the present day civilians living in those two cities. Birth defects are one devastating side effect of the decision to use the A-bombs.
The civilians which live there today continue to pay the price of American and Japanese negligence of 1945, with their health and lives.
Consider continuous bombing of Japanese cities with conventional bombs, and a naval blockade which would cut off their island from any outside materials. (Japan being an island, was dependent on importing large amounts of raw material to conduct a war in any manner, which is the reason they quickly overran the Pacific in 1942; to secure raw materials from any place they could grab it. If they failed to secure all the islands they endeavored to conquer, it would have limited their ability to fight the US. Not that Japan could ever match the industrial might of America, but it would buy them some time)
How long would it take before the Japanese were tired of having everything bombed with no outside relief? Living on rice for a couple of years wouldn't exactly be luxury.
The residual radiation effects from the high-energy Beta particles would rapidly diminish.
Nuclear warheads designed to take out deep and well constructed bunkers would almost certainly be in the 1/3 MT range, and set for a ground burst. This is one of the dirtier nuclear weapons in our inventory.
I'm not so sure that other more conventional bombs might not be a better choice for taking out a very hardened bunker. A variety of weapons used together to burn up the oxygen, close up the entry shafts, and a deep penetration bunker buster used in concert might do nicely.
