Thomas wrote:georgeob1 wrote: The 400,000 troop question was equally absurd. We could not sustain such a large-scale deployment for more than two or three years.
I am not a military expert; but from a strictly logical point of view, I don't see the absurdity. Maybe you can't sustain a force the size Shinsake deemed necessary, while at the same time you can't win the war with a smaller force. It wouldn't surprise me at all if you couldn't win the war in Iraq with any force you can sustain. It may surprise you because unlike me, you always thought this war was a great idea. Anyway, even assuming what you said about sustainability, I stand by my opinion that Shinsake's assessment looks much better than Rumsfeld's today -- and that Bush's reaction to it was Orwellian.
Shinseke was already locked in a struggle with Rumsfeld over weapons programs and the Defense Secretary's "transformation Program" for the military. He used used the argument as a tactic at a moment when he needed alliwes in the government, and possibly because he may also have opposed the war. From a purely military perspective, he was dead wrong.
I had the chance to discuss this directly with Paul W last weekend. He was keenly aware of the economy of force issue - a major lesson learned in Vietnam, though he acknowledged underestimating the sustained ferocity of the insurgency. We agreed that more troops in the aftermath would not have changed the situation very much - except to increase the vulnerability of our logistical tail and give the insurgents more targets.
I believe the verdict of history on the invasion is still out. The only clear negative I can see now is our reduced ability to checkmate the Shiite zealots in Iran with a Sunni neighbor of proven brutality and willingness to engage them. However we threw that card away with the Gulf War: Saddam needed Kuwait money and oil revenue to restore his ravaged economy and war machine. That seemed too high a price for al of us.