Sorry, I'm a member of the Democratic party, and Soros doesn't own me. I've never even met the guy, how can I be a slave of his?
The Dems are standing up against escalating the Iraq war because it is the right thing to do. The war was a mistake; those such as yourself who have supported it were wrong and continue to be wrong. The Dems who voted for the war were wrong also. Continuing to make the same sorts of errors over and over is foolishness, so the best course of action is to attempt something different. Sending a couple dozen thousand more troops isn't a difference.
You, and those who think like you, still have no clue how you messed this up so bad! And when people try to point it out, you call them anti-American for doing so. Hell with that.
I predict that the 'surge' will not save either Iraq nor Bush. I predict that the 2007 year will only see things get worse in Iraq. I'm not happy to make these predicitons but I feel that there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that they will come true, so there's no other choice except to hide from reality and keep insisting that everything will work out in the end; and I'm no Republican.
Cycloptichorn
parados wrote:Quote:These are valid questions. There is nothing crass about asking them.
We have three valid questions:
(1) What is the total cost--human and money--of failure in Iraq?
(2) What is the total cost--human and money--of obtaining success in Iraq?
(3) Do we possess the resources--human and money--required to obtain success in Iraq?
If only this administration had asked those questions before the invasion and honestly looked for answers. If they had, we probably wouldn't be asking them now.
The Bush administration did ask these questions. The Bush administration did answer these questions to its satisfaction.
They repeatedly stated that the total cost of
failure was intolerably high. They repeatedly described what they thought this cost would be.
They repeatedly stated that the total cost of
success was tolerable. They repeatedly described what they thought this cost would be.
They repeatedly stated that we did possess the
required resources to succeed. They repeatedly described what the required resources would be.
The fundamental question is not did they ask and answer these questions. Of course they did. The fundamental question is whether they answered these questions correctly or incorrectly.
I think they asked and answered question (1) correctly.
I think their failure was to choose an unworkable strategy inconsistent with the costs and resources they had estimated, instead of selecting a strategy consistent with how we won wars in the 20th century.
The gangs will own the neighborhood unless the cops clean it out and then put feet on the beat which is true in the Bronx and I am sure is true in Bagdad. I don't see peace and brotherhood in the South Bronx so I am not sure that the USA can bring them to Haifa St, and as for the Iraqis, not gonna happen anytime soon, soon being measured in years.
It's clear that the Sunnis and the Shiite are not going to give up until one of them is clearly defeated. In that sense clearing out the Sunnis in Baghdad might have the effect of lessoning the violence between the two. But what will we have at end? An Iranian Iraq, meanwhile there is trouble brewing up with Iran. If we go to war with Iran, I wonder how that will play out with the Iraqi government. Or if Israel nukes Iran like rumors suggest, I wonder what effect that will have on all the Middle East. There is also trouble brewing between the Turks and the Kurks which will also put us in a bad position.
Don't anybody see that all this violence just seems to begat more violence rather than ending anything? It's not as though anybody is going to give up as long as they have strength to hide out and hold a gun.
"war what is it good for"
Don't Give Up On Iraq Yet
By Tariq al-Hashimi
Washington Post
Wednesday, January 10, 2007; Page A13
During my recent visit to Washington I found a nation fatigued by news of a faraway battle that seemed to creep closer with each fallen soldier. I found an administration wearied by infighting among an Iraqi government that seems incapable of reaching simple agreements. The chaos and sectarian destruction plaguing my people are slowly becoming just statistics in passing headlines, as we become a nation whose people spend more time each day preparing for death than for life.
Many Americans unfortunately believe that Iraq can no longer be salvaged. Even some in the Bush administration see a civil war as inevitable.
First, both of our nations have invested too much to walk away now. If this battle is lost, the entire region could be destabilized.
Second, despite the chaos in my country, not all bridges of patriotism have been burned. Iraqis have ties to their beloved country, not only to their sects and ethnicities. Proof of this nationalism recently came from the most unlikely of venues.
During the Asian Games in Qatar last month, Iraq became quiet, if only for a few hours. Citizens united as brothers behind the national soccer team, which against all odds fought its way to the finals. The team didn't battle for a militia or a sect but for an idea -- the nation of Iraq. The players didn't win the medal but gained something far greater: They won us hope. From children on the streets to politicians to parents, we were all one, and we were all Iraqi. This tells me that all is not lost, that a deep-rooted sense of nationalism still lies within all Iraqis, and that it can and must be rekindled.
It is true that terrorism of an unparalleled nature rages in Iraq and that Iraqis are the ones killing each other on the basis of sectarian and ethnic identities. It is also true that reconstruction and economic development have ground to a halt because of the violence. And Iraqis are divided on such fundamental issues as reconciliation and how to bring about security.
Despite all the hardships, however, we Iraqis were able to raise the rudimentary pillars of our nascent democracy by writing a constitution, electing a parliament based on that constitution and granting a vote of confidence to a government through that elected parliament. It is not fair to look at Iraq as a collection of failures without identifying its successes. The birth of a new nation is not easy, but just as your nation has become a beacon for democracy, we hope that Iraq will one day do the same.
All is not lost! Eliminating regional influence is the only way to bring Iraqis back to their senses. Americans understandably find it difficult to support any strategy that prolongs the presence of your troops in Iraq. We do not want to stand in the way of your forces going home. But that decision should not be made under the pressure of car bombs and kidnappings. A precipitous withdrawal of forces would create a security vacuum in Iraq that our forces cannot yet handle -- and would therefore be filled by extremists. This does not serve the interests of Iraq or the United States.
If those soccer players taught us anything, it is that a proper strategy for eliminating sectarianism and fostering nationalism is key. Reconstituting the Iraqi Armed Services and then reforming, retraining and properly arming them must be a central component of this strategy. Another should be revising Iraq's constitution to give our central government effective powers but prevent any sort of dictatorship by the prime minister. The powers that the prime minister holds now must be revised to guarantee that all stakeholders can share in governing. Adherence to the rule of law is also central.
True reconciliation in line with what happened in South Africa and Ireland is needed for resolution of the conflict in Iraq, but that reconciliation must be free from regional stipulations. Economics is also key, as gainful employment keeps Iraqi youths away from the insurgents. All of this must be preceded by a coordinated effort to secure Baghdad, which has become a haven for militia and terrorist activity.
We need a greater focus on the militias, which kill innocent civilians and defy the government with impunity. The Pentagon recently told Congress that the militias pose more of a danger to the security and stability of Iraq than do the terrorist groups operating there. Militias do not differ from other terrorist groups; therefore, the Iraqi government and the United States must classify militias as such and must treat and fight them in the same manner as other terrorists.
A comprehensive plan is needed to save Iraq from disaster. I hope that the administration has considered these critical issues and that the new strategy effectively addresses them.
The writer is vice president of the Republic of Iraq.
Why They Fight
And what it means for us.
BY PETER WEHNER
Opinion Journal
Tuesday, January 9, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
President Bush has said that the war against global jihadism is more than a military conflict; it is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century. We are still in the early years of the struggle. The civilized world will either rise to the challenge and prevail against this latest form of barbarism, or grief and death will visit us and other innocents on a massive scale.
Given the stakes involved in this war and how little is known, even now, about what is at the core of this conflict, it is worth reviewing in some detail the nature of our enemy--including disaggregating who they are (Shia and Sunni extremists), what they believe and why they believe it, and the implications of that for America and the West.
Islam in the World Today
The enemy we face is not Islam per se; rather, we face a global network of extremists who are driven by a twisted vision of Islam. These jihadists are certainly a minority within Islam--but they exist, they are dangerous and resolute, in some places they are ascendant, and they need to be confronted and defeated.
It's worth looking at Islam more broadly. It is the second-largest religion in the world, with around 1.3 billion adherents. Islam is the dominant religion throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia, which alone claims more than 170 million adherents. There are also more than 100 million Muslims living in India.
Less than a quarter of the world's Muslims are Arabs.
The Muslim world is, as William J. Bennett wrote in his in 2002 in his book "Why We Fight," "vast and varied and runs the gamut from the Iran of the ayatollahs to secular and largely westernized Turkey."
The overwhelming majority of Muslims are Sunnites, or "traditionalists"; they comprise 83 percent of the Muslim world, or 934 million people. It is the dominant faith in countries like Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.
Sunni Islam recognizes several major schools of thought, including Wahhabism, which is based on the teachings of the 18th century Islamic scholar Mohammed ibn Abd Wahhab. His movement was a reaction to European modernism and what he believed was the corruption of Muslim theology and an insufficient fidelity to Islamic law. He gave jihad, or "holy war," a prominent place in his teachings.
Wahhabism--a xenophobic, puritanical version of Sunni Islam--became the reigning theology in modern Saudi Arabia and is the strand of Sunni faith in which Osama bin Laden was raised and with which he associates himself.
Shiites, or "partisans" of Ali, represent around 16 percent of the Muslim world, or 180 million people. The Shiite faith is dominant in Iraq and Iran and is the single largest community in Lebanon. The largest sect within the Shia faith is known as "twelvers," referring to those who believe that the twelfth imam, who is now hidden, will appear to establish peace, justice, and Islamic rule on earth.
"Across the Middle East Shias and Sunnis have often rallied around the same political causes and even fought together in the same trenches," Professor Vali Nasr, author of "The Shia Revival," has written. But he also points out that "followers of each sect are divided by language, ethnicity, geography, and class. There are also disagreements within each group over politics, theology, and religious law . . ." Professor Nasr points out that "[a]nti-Shiism is embedded in the ideology of Sunni militancy that has risen to prominence across the region in the last decade."
It is worth noting as well that for most of its history, the Shia have been largely powerless, marginalized, and oppressed--often by Sunnis. "Shia history," the Middle East scholar Fouad Ajami has written, "is about lamentations."
Shia and Sunni: Different Histories
The split between the Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam is rooted in the question of rightful succession after the death of Muhammad in 632.
The Shia believe that Muhammad designated Ali, his son-in-law and cousin, as his successor. To the Shia, it was impossible that God could have left open the question of leadership of the community. Only those who knew the prophet intimately would have the thorough knowledge of the true meaning of the Koran and the prophetic tradition. Further, for the new community to choose its own leader held the possibility that the wrong person would be chosen.
The majority view prevailing at an assembly following Muhammad's death, however, was that Muhammad had deliberately left succession an open question. These became the Sunnis, followers of the Sunnah, or Tradition of the Prophet. This is the root of the Sunni tradition. Sunnis have a belief in "the sanctity of the consensus of the community . . . 'My community will never agree in error': the Prophet is thus claimed by the Sunnis to have conferred on his community the very infallibility that the Shi`is ascribe to their Imams," Hamid Enayat, wrote in his book "Modern Islamic Political Thought."
The assembly elected as Muhammad's successor Abu Baker, a close companion of Muhammad, and gave Abu Baker the title Caliph, or successor, of God's messenger. Ali was the third successor to Abu Baker and, for the Shia, the first divinely sanctioned "imam," or male descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.
The seminal event in Shia history is the martyrdom in 680 of Ali's son Hussein, who led an uprising against the "illegitimate" caliph (72 of Hussein's followers were killed as well). "For the Shia, Hussein came to symbolize resistance to tyranny," according to Masood Farivar. "His martyrdom is commemorated to this day as the central act of Shia piety."
The end of Muhammad's line came with Muhammad al-Mahdi, the "Twelfth Imam"--or Mahdi ("the one who guides")--who disappeared as a child at the funeral of his father Hassan al-Askari, the eleventh imam.
Shia and Sunni: Different Eschatologies
Shiites believe that the Twelfth Imam, al-Mahdi, is merely hidden from view and will one day return from his "occultation" to rid the world of evil. Legitimate Islamic rule can only be re-established with the Mahdi's return because, in the Shiite view, the imams possessed secret knowledge, passed by each to his successor, vital to guiding the community.
History is moving toward the inevitable return of the Twelfth Imam, according to Shia. Professor Hamid Enayat has written:
"The Shi`is agree with the Sunnis that Muslim history since the era of the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs . . . has been for the most part a tale of woe. But whereas for the Sunnis the course of history since then has been a movement away from the ideal state, for the Shi`is it is a movement towards it."
It's worth noting that Shia have historically been politically quiescent, with "[the return of the Mahdi] remaining in practice merely a sanctifying tenet for the submissive acceptance of the status quo."
In more recent times, however--and in particular in Iran under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini--the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala in 680 has been used to catalyze political action. Ayatollah Khomeini embraced a view that Hussein was compelled to resist an unpopular, unjust and impious government and that his martyrdom serves as a call to rebellion for all Muslims in building an Islamic state.
The end-time views of Ayatollah Khomeini have been explained this way:
"[Khomeini] vested the myth [of the return of the Twelfth Imam] with an entirely new sense: The Twelfth Imam will only emerge when the believers have vanquished evil. To speed up the Mahdi's return, Muslims had to shake off their torpor and fight," according to Matthias Kuntzel writing in the New Republic this past April.
As Mr. Kuntzel points out, Khomeini's activism is a break with Shia tradition and, in fact, tracks more closely with the militancy of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks to reunite religion and politics, implement sharia (the body of Islamic laws derived from the Koran), and views the struggle for an Islamic state as a Muslim duty.
Professor Noah Feldman of New York University points out, "Recently, Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, contributed to renewed focus on the mahdi, by saying publicly that the mission of the Islamic revolution in Iran is to pave the way for the mahdi's return . . ."
Sunni radicals hold a very different eschatological view. "For all his talk of the war between civilizations," Professor Feldman has written:
"bin Laden has never spoken of the end of days. For him, the battle between the Muslims and the infidels is part of earthly human life, and has indeed been with us since the days of the Prophet himself. The war intensifies and lessens with time, but it is not something that occurs out of time or with the expectation that time itself will stop. Bin Laden and his sympathizers want to re-establish the caliphate and rule the Muslim world, but unlike some earlier revivalist movements within Sunni Islam, they do not declare their leader as the mahdi, or guided one, whose appearance will usher in a golden age of justice and peace to be followed by the Day of Judgment. From this perspective, the utter destruction of civilization would be a mistake, not the fulfillment of a divine plan."
Many Sunnis, then, look toward the rise of a new caliphate; Shia, on the other hand, are looking for the rule of the returned imam--with the extremist strain within Shia believing they can hasten the return of the twelfth imam by cleansing the world of what they believe to be evil in their midst.
Other prominent Shia, like Iraq's Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, according to Professor Feldman, "take a more fatalist stance, and prefer to believe that the mahdi's coming cannot be hastened by human activity . . . ." Indeed, as Anthony Shadid pointed out in the Washington Post in 2004, Ayatollah Sistani was a disciple of Ayatollah Abul-Qassim Khoei in Najaf, who was from the "quietist school" in Shiite Islam and attempted to keep Khomeini from claiming the mantle of Shiite leadership.
Contemporary Sunni Radicalism
Since the attacks of September 11, we have learned important things about al Qaeda and its allies. Their movement is fueled by hatred and deep resentments against the West, America, and the course of history.
In Islam's first few centuries of existence, it was a dominant and expanding force in the world, sweeping across lands in the modern-day Middle East, North Africa, Spain, and elsewhere. During its Golden Age--which spanned from the eighth to the 13th century--Islam was the philosophical, educational, and scientific center of the world. The Ottoman Empire reached the peak of its power in the 16th century. Islam then began to recede as a political force. In the 17th century, for example, advancing Muslims were defeated at the gates of Vienna, the last time an Islamic army threatened the heart of Europe. And for radicals like bin Laden, a milestone event and historic humiliation came when the Ottoman Empire crumbled at the end of World War I.
This is significant because for many Muslims, the proper order of life in this world is for them to rule and for the "infidels" to be ruled over. The end of the Ottoman Empire was deeply disorienting. Then, in 1923-24 came the establishment of modern, secular Turkey under Kemal Ataturk--and the abolishment of the caliphate.
Osama bin Laden and his militant Sunni followers seek to reverse all that. Bin Laden sees himself as the new caliph; he has referred to himself as the "commander of the faithful." He is seeking to unify all of Islam--and resume a jihad against the unbelievers.
According to Mary Habeck of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University:
"Jihadis thus neither recognize national boundaries within the Islamic lands nor do they believe that the coming Islamic state, when it is created, should have permanent borders with the unbelievers. The recognition of such boundaries would end the expansion of Islam and stop offensive jihad, both of which are transgressions against the laws of God that command jihad to last until Judgment Day or until the entire earth is under the rule of Islamic law."
Al Qaeda and its terrorist allies are waging their war on several continents. They have killed innocent people in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Far East, and the United States. They will try to overthrow governments and seize power where they can--and where they cannot, they will attempt to inflict fear and destruction by disrupting settled ways of life. They will employ every weapon they can: assassinations, car bombs, airplanes, and, if they can secure them, biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
The theocratic and totalitarian ideology that characterizes al Qaeda makes typical negotiations impossible. "Anyone who stands in the way of our struggle is our enemy and target of the swords," said Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. Osama bin Laden put it this way: "Death is better than living on this Earth with the unbelievers among us."
This struggle has an enormous ideological dimension. For example, both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two leader of al Qaeda and its ideological leader, were deeply influenced by Sayyid Qutb, whose writings (especially his manifesto "Milestones") gave rise and profoundly shaped the radical Islamist movement. Qutb, an Egyptian who was killed by Egyptian President Gamal Nasser in 1966, had a fierce hatred for America, the West, modernity, and Muslims who did not share his extremist views.
According to the author Lawrence Wright:
"Qutb divides the world into two camps, Islam and jahiliyya, the period of ignorance and barbarity that existed before the divine message of the Prophet Mohammed. Qutb uses the term to encompass all of modern life: manners, morals, art, literature, law, even much of what passed as Islamic culture. He was opposed not to modern technology but to the worship of science, which he believed had alienated humanity from natural harmony with creation. Only a complete rejection of rationalism and Western values offered the slim hope of the redemption of Islam. This was the choice: pure, primitive Islam or the doom of mankind."
Sunni jihadists, then, are committed to establishing a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia. Ayman al-Zawahiri, for example, has spoken about a "jihad for the liberation of Palestine, all Palestine, as well as every land that was a home for Islam, from Andalusia to Iraq. The whole world is an open field for us."
Their version of political utopia is Afghanistan under the Taliban, a land of almost unfathomable cruelty. The Taliban sought to control every sphere of human life and crush individuality and human creativity. And Afghanistan became a safe haven and launching pad for terrorists.
The Islamic radicals we are fighting know they are far less wealthy and far less advanced in technology and weaponry than the United States. But they believe they will prevail in this war, as they did against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, by wearing us down and breaking our will. They believe America and the West are "the weak horse"--soft, irresolute, and decadent. "[Americans are] the most cowardly of God's creatures," al-Zarqawi once said.
Contemporary Shia Radicalism
President Bush has said the Shia strain of Islamic radicalism is "just as dangerous, and just as hostile to America, and just as determined to establish its brand of hegemony across the broader Middle East." And Shia extremists have achieved something al Qaeda has not: in 1979, they took control of a major power, Iran.
The importance of the Iranian revolution is hard to overstate. In the words of the Islamic scholar Bernard Lewis (writing in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005):
"Political Islam first became a major international factor with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The word 'revolution' has been much misused in the Middle East and has served to designate and justify almost any violent transfer of power at the top. But what happened in Iran was a genuine revolution, a major change with a very significant ideological challenge, a shift in the basis of society that had an immense impact on the whole Islamic world, intellectually, morally, and politically. The process that began in Iran in 1979 was a revolution in the same sense as the French and the Russian revolutions were." (emphasis added)
The taking of American hostages in 1979 made it clear that "Islamism represented for the West an opponent of an entirely different nature than the Soviet Union: an opponent that not only did not accept the system of international relations founded after 1945 but combated it as a 'Christian-Jewish conspiracy,' " Mr. Kuntzel wrote in Policy Review recently.
Ayatollah Khomeini said in a radio address in November 1979 that the storming of the American embassy represented a "war between Muslims and pagans." He went on to say this:
"The Muslims must rise up in this struggle, which is more a struggle between unbelievers and Islam than one between Iran and America: between all unbelievers and Muslims. The Muslims must rise up and triumph in this struggle."
A year later, writes Mr. Kuntzel, in a speech in Qom, Khomeini indicated the type of mindset we are facing:
"We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah. For patriotism is another name for paganism. I say let this land [Iran] burn. I say let this land go up in smoke, provided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the world."
"Whether or not they share Teheran's Shiite orientation," Joshua Muravchik and Jeffrey Gedmin wrote in 1997 in Commentary magazine, "the various Islamist movements take inspiration (and in many cases material assistance) from the Islamic Republic of Iran."
Indeed. As Lawrence Wright points out in his book "The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11":
"The fact that Khomeini came from the Shiite branch of Islam, rather than the Sunni, which predominates in the Muslim world outside of Iraq and Iran, made him a complicated figure among Sunni radicals. Nonetheless, Zawahiri's organization, al-Jihad, supported the Iranian revolution with leaflets and cassette tapes urging all Islamic groups in Egypt to follow the Iranian example."
Today Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world. For example, it funds and arms Hezbollah, a Shia terrorist organization which has killed more Americans than any terrorist organization except al Qaeda. Hezbollah was behind the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 Americans and marked the advent of suicide bombing as a weapon of choice among Islamic radicals.
The leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, has said this: "Let the entire world hear me. Our hostility to the Great Satan [America] is absolute . . . Regardless of how the world has changed after 11 September, Death to America will remain our reverberating and powerful slogan: Death to America."
Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has also declared his absolute hostility to America. Last October, he said, "whether a world without the United States and Zionism can be achieved . . . I say that this . . . goal is achievable." In 2006 he declared to America and other Western powers: "open your eyes and see the fate of pharaoh . . . if you do not abandon the path of falsehood . . . your doomed destiny will be annihilation." Later he warned, "The anger of Muslims may reach an explosion point soon. If such a day comes [America and the West] should know that the waves of the blast will not remain within the boundaries of our region."
He also said this: "If you would like to have good relations with the Iranian nation in the future . . . bow down before the greatness of the Iranian nation and surrender. If you don't accept [to do this], the Iranian nation will . . . force you to surrender and bow down."
In Tehran in December, President Ahmadinejad hosted a conference of Holocaust deniers, and he has repeatedly threatened to wipe Israel off the map. "More than any leading Iranian figure since Ayatollah Khomeini himself," Vali Nasr has written, "Ahmadinejad appears to take seriously the old revolutionary goal of positioning Iran as the leading country of the entire Muslim world--an ambition that requires focusing on themes (such as hostility to Israel and the West) that tend to bring together Arabs and Iranians, Sunni and Shia, rather than divide them . . . "
Concluding Thoughts
It is the fate of the West, and in particular the United States, to have to deal with the combined threat of Shia and Sunni extremists. And for all the differences that exist between them--and they are significant--they share some common features.
Their brand of radicalism is theocratic, totalitarian, illiberal, expansionist, violent, and deeply anti-Semitic and anti-American. As President Bush has said, both Shia and Sunni militants want to impose their dark vision on the Middle East. And as we have seen with Shia-dominated Iran's support of the Sunni terrorist group Hamas, they can find common ground when they confront what they believe is a common enemy.
The war against global jihadism will be long, and we will experience success and setbacks along the way. The temptation of the West will be to grow impatient and, in the face of this long struggle, to grow weary. Some will demand a quick victory and, absent that, they will want to withdraw from the battle. But this is a war from which we cannot withdraw. As we saw on September 11th, there are no safe harbors in which to hide. Our enemies have declared war on us, and their hatreds cannot be sated. We will either defeat them, or they will come after us with the unsheathed sword.
All of us would prefer years of repose to years of conflict. But history will not allow it. And so it once again rests with this remarkable republic to do what we have done in the past: our duty.
Peter Wehner is deputy assistant to the president and director of the White House's Office of Strategic Initiatives.
Quote:First, both of our nations have invested too much to walk away now.
here we go again , "have invested too much to walk away" .
if you have invested too much already , you better walk away quickly before investing even more - and losing even more .
it reminds me of an interview with an experienced mountain-climber recently , when those climbers died while trying to scale the top of a mountain out west .
he was quite clear in what he said : "if you realize you'll be in trouble if you keep climbing - quit and turn around !
saying 'i'm 90% there , i can't quit now' is simply foolish .
turn around , wait for better weather and climbing conditions , get better equipment and backup for your next climb - but never bulldoze ahead saying : "i can't quit now - that's how people get killed ! ".
he also said : "it's only a roundtrip that counts . making it 90 or even 99 % and dying doesn't count because you haven't conquered the mountain ".
something to think about imo .
hbg
hamburger wrote:Quote:First, both of our nations have invested too much to walk away now.
here we go again , "have invested too much to walk away" .
if you have invested too much already , you better walk away quickly before investing even more - and losing even more .
...
"it's only a roundtrip that counts . making it 90 or even 99 % and dying doesn't count because you haven't conquered the mountain ".
something to think about imo .
hbg
Unfortunately, the conflict in Iraq is not analogous to climbing a real mountain. Your would be mountain climbers and the mountain they seek to climb will probably remain intact for a long enough time for the would be mountain climbers to try again some other day of their choosing
Climbing the
Iraq mountain is different. It is a growing mountain: a mountain more like a volcano which if not de-activated soon will be more difficult to de-activate later. Failing to persist in climbing the
Iraq mountain will result in a far taller mountain to climb, many more such mountains to climb and a requirement for far more mountain climbers to succeed in climbing them regardless of weather conditions.
Yes, we "have invested too much to walk away" from Iraq now. If we walk away now, next time we will have to invest far more to de-activate mass murder in Iraq as well as in the rest of the world.
Quote:Climbing the Iraq mountain is different. It is a growing mountain: a mountain more like a volcano which if not de-activated soon will be more difficult to de-activate later. Failing to persist in climbing the Iraq mountain will result in a far taller mountain to climb, many more such mountains to climb and a requirement for far more mountain climbers to succeed in climbing them regardless of weather conditions.
ican :
i doubt that you wanted to compare iraq to a volcano . if , indeed , iraq is a volcano , i don't think there is much hope .
to the best of my knowledge , no valcano has ever been 'deactivated' .
usually those living near a valcano adjust their lifestyle and are ready to move out on short notice .
you may also have noticed that the 'experienced' climber spoke of "better equipment and backup" .
i would compare the many (ex and in-service) military officers and generals who have spoken out about iraq to the 'experienced' mountain-climber .
from what i remember about the last four years in iraq , many spoke up and expressed their dissatisfaction with the direction from the administration .
i also find it rather unusual that after four years of nothing but praise for secretay rumsfeld , he was sent into retirement .
even just days before his dismissal he was being praised as being the best for the job .
i'm scratching my head - either secretary rumsfeld had not been the right person for the job - and i would think that it takes less than four years to find out ...
or he had started to have different ideas of how to continue the war and therefor fell out of favour .
perhaps someday he'll write a book about his experiences - might reveal interesting information .
(just like defence secretary robert mcnamara who provided some interesting insight into the vietnam war many years later) .
hbg(hoping it's not a volcano)
hamburger wrote:Quote:Climbing the Iraq mountain is different. It is a growing mountain: a mountain more like a volcano which if not de-activated soon will be more difficult to de-activate later. Failing to persist in climbing the Iraq mountain will result in a far taller mountain to climb, many more such mountains to climb and a requirement for far more mountain climbers to succeed in climbing them regardless of weather conditions.
ican :
i doubt that you wanted to compare iraq to a volcano . if , indeed , iraq is a volcano , i don't think there is much hope .
to the best of my knowledge , no valcano has ever been 'deactivated' .
usually those living near a valcano adjust their lifestyle and are ready to move out on short notice .
...
Iraq is neither a mountain or a volcano. I thought we both were writing in terms of what we each believed to be reasonable analogies and not true comparisons.
I think a
growing mountain rather than a
static mountain is more analogous to the wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Climbing a static mountain
can be delayed at one's convenience without penalty. Climbing a growing mountain becomes more difficult with time and
cannot be delayed at one's convenience without penalty.
To the best of my knowledge, too, no group of humans has ever de-activated a volcano. That has been accomplished by volcanos themselves (e.g., Mt. St Helena in the USA was a growing volcano that eventually exploded and for a time was de-activated as a result). Perhaps in future, a group of humans will be able to cause a volcano to explode and thereby de-activate itself.
However, human history has recorded many occassions when a group of humans has
de-activated a group of mass murderers at least for a time. Delaying the start of many of those
de-activations cost humanity dearly because of the rapid growth of those mass murderers during the delay.
hamburger wrote:
...
from what i remember about the last four years in iraq , many spoke up and expressed their dissatisfaction with the direction from the administration .
Yes, many (including me) expressed their dissatisfaction with the way the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were being directed.
i also find it rather unusual that after four years of nothing but praise for secretay rumsfeld , he was sent into retirement .
...
perhaps someday he'll write a book about his experiences - might reveal interesting information .
(just like defence secretary robert mcnamara who provided some interesting insight into the vietnam war many years later).
Both were slow learners at best.
hbg(hoping it's not a volcano)
These
growing mass murderer mountains--with their
mass murderer fissures spreading all over the world--have to be
de-activated. I pray the replacement team of
de-activators now knows not only what must be done and possesses the resources required, but also knows how to do it.
