Cycloptichorn wrote:Quote:
How is your pulling out rather than helping us return to rationality, going to serve your interests? You appear at greater risk from the currently rapidly growing high density of jihadist nut cases in the midst of your population than we do from same in our midst.
It's called 'cutting your losses.' Something that reasonable and rational people realize has to happen when you've made a big mistake.
The war in Iraq was a strategic mistake, ICan. Do you disagree with this?
Cycloptichorn
Rationally, one does not cut one's losses by merely ending what one discovers does not to work. Failure to subsequently chose that which works, merely continues one's losses in other forms and magnitudes. To really cut one's losses, one must learn from what doesn't work to discover what does work, and then chose that.
Invading Iraq was not a mistake. Removal of Saddam's regime was not a mistake. Destruction of al-Qaeda camps in Iraq was not a mistake.
The
method we employed to replace the Saddam government with a self-securing democratic government was a mistake. So, replace the
failed method with one that does work. Simply ending our failed method without replacing it with one that does work, will itself be just another failed method that does not work.
Many of us have failed multiple times before we found a way to eventually succeed at what we aspired to accomplish. Because of that experience, we have learned not to quit, but to persist trying what we judge from experience to be better ways to succeed. We know that in our cases that kind of persistence won, so we think it probably wins. We know from observing others, that giving up lost, so we think giving up probably loses.
ican711nm wrote:Cycloptichorn wrote:Quote:
How is your pulling out rather than helping us return to rationality, going to serve your interests? You appear at greater risk from the currently rapidly growing high density of jihadist nut cases in the midst of your population than we do from same in our midst.
It's called 'cutting your losses.' Something that reasonable and rational people realize has to happen when you've made a big mistake.
The war in Iraq was a strategic mistake, ICan. Do you disagree with this?
Cycloptichorn
Rationally, one does not cut one's losses by merely ending what one discovers does not to work. Failure to subsequently chose that which works, merely continues one's losses in other forms and magnitudes. To really cut one's losses, one must learn from what doesn't work to discover what does work, and then chose that.
Invading Iraq was not a mistake. Removal of Saddam's regime was not a mistake. Destruction of al-Qaeda camps in Iraq was not a mistake.
The
method we employed to replace the Saddam government with a self-securing democratic government was a mistake. So, replace the
failed method with one that does work. Simply ending our failed method without replacing it with one that does work, will itself be just another failed method that does not work.
Many of us have failed multiple times before we found a way to eventually succeed at what we aspired to accomplish. Because of that experience, we have learned not to quit, but to persist trying what we judge from experience to be better ways to succeed. We know that in our cases that kind of persistence won, so we think it probably wins. We know from observing others, that giving up lost, so we think giving up probably loses.
Naturally a huge component of the problem is the fact that those who are supposed to be solving it have zero credibility. There is no reason to believe they won't screw up the 'new method' as badly as they have screwed up the old one.
The war in Iraq
was a strategic mistake. A big one. Part of a strategy is taking into account the competency of those who are set to implement a strategic or tactical move; for example, you don't send your captain who is a whiz at defense-in-depth to the front lines to manage your calvalry.
The strategy has been flawed from the start, because it assumed that those who were responsible for prosecuting the war - and, much more importantly, in rebuilding and securing Iraq - would perform in a competent manner. This was a gigantic error, not realizing that the leadership wasn't up to the job, but not an unforseeable one.
Cycloptichorn
Cycloptichorn wrote:
...
I don't give a fig about what 'soros' says; I've never met the guy or read anything he's written.
I call it a lynching because the Iraqi government didn't kill Saddam - the Shiite militia under Sadr's control did.
...
Cycloptichorn
These assertions by you are obviously pseudology.
You have repeatedly posted here quotes, excerpts and copies of articles written by atheistic collectivists
owned by Soros, or by quotes, excerpts and copies of articles that conform to those written by atheistic collectivists
owned by Soros.
I think it rational for me to infer that you did indeed read whatever you have quoted, excerpted, and copied. Consequently, you have read what Soros has written, albeit possibly unknowingly, you have read what Soros has written.
The Iraqi government, much of it Shia, did indeed kill Saddam, because their government has said so. That is sufficient rational cause to believe the Iraqi government has killed Saddam.
while i have no problem calling SH a butcher , the (so called) trial of SH is a bad start for an iraqi judicial system .
how many lawyers and judges have been killed or resigned throughout this process - i've lost count of it .
i can't understand why he could not have been tried by an international court - like many other war criminals who have been tried in the hague .
this is a bad way to develop a modern judicial system for iraq - and let's forget talking about 'building democracy in iraq' ; it's not going to happen .
hbg
ican711nm wrote:Cycloptichorn wrote:
...
I don't give a fig about what 'soros' says; I've never met the guy or read anything he's written.
I call it a lynching because the Iraqi government didn't kill Saddam - the Shiite militia under Sadr's control did.
...
Cycloptichorn
These assertions by you are obviously pseudology.
You have repeatedly posted here quotes, excerpts and copies of articles written by atheistic collectivists
owned by Soros, or by quotes, excerpts and copies of articles that conform to those written by atheistic collectivists
owned by Soros.
I think it rational for me to infer that you did indeed read whatever you have quoted, excerpted, and copied. Consequently, you have read what Soros has written, albeit possibly unknowingly, you have read what Soros has written.
You only believe this because you are extremely irrational. There is no evdience to support the idea that Soros controls the message of all Democrats.
Quote:The Iraqi government, much of it Shia, did indeed kill Saddam, because their government has said so. That is sufficient rational cause to believe the Iraqi government has killed Saddam.
No, it isn't. If the US gov't wanted to execute someone who had been found guilty in Fed. court, and handed the person over to a group of gang members who proceeded to film themselves doing the deed in a rather barbaric fashion, would you say the US gov't had done it, or given him to someone else to do?
Cycloptichorn
Cycloptichorn wrote:
Naturally a huge component of the problem is the fact that those who are supposed to be solving it have zero credibility. There is no reason to believe they won't screw up the 'new method' as badly as they have screwed up the old one.
There is reason to believe that those who previously screwed up will have learned from the consequences of their mistakes and will not screw up again.
The war in Iraq was a strategic mistake. A big one. Part of a strategy is taking into account the competency of those who are set to implement a strategic or tactical move; for example, you don't send your captain who is a whiz at defense-in-depth to the front lines to manage your calvalry.
The strategy has been flawed from the start, because it assumed that those who were responsible for prosecuting the war - and, much more importantly, in rebuilding and securing Iraq - would perform in a competent manner. This was a gigantic error, not realizing that the leadership wasn't up to the job, but not an unforseeable one.
I have agreed so many times here about our screwed up strategy for rebuilding and securing Iraq, and the limitations of the people who implemented that strategy, that my statements of agreement are boring me.
Cycloptichorn
I'll take another approach. I personally know of no one or group (Democratic, Republican, or other) that possesses the capability and courage to adequately implement a successful strategy for rebuilding and securing Iraq under the conditions that exist in America. Without persistent support by more than half the American adult population, I expect such an implementation, will probably elude us. And, I expect such support is unlikely. I expect such support unlikely to be unobtainable until the potential danger of abandoning Iraq becomes a kinetic danger; that is, becomes a reality.
You appear to be among those who think that abandoning Iraq will not convert what I see to be the potential danger of that action into a kinetic danger. You appear to share the belief that the US presence in Iraq is what is causing the current Iraqi government's failure to solve its own problems.
I would like to believe that. Can you supply more than your opinion or the opinion of others to help me believe that?
Gonna get bloodier. Smell the white phosphorus. "50,000 more US troops can save Iraq"
By John Keegan
President George W. Bush is about to launch a final push in Iraq with a large reinforcement of American troops in the hope of crushing the insurgency before America embarks on a large-scale withdrawal of force from the country.
The size of the force is commonly set at about 40,000-50,000 troops. The aim of this surge will be to inflict severe damage and loss on the problem-making elements within Iraq, including both Shia and Sunni militias, and to increase training of the Iraqi security forces under American supervision.
The arguments against the surge are that it might exacerbate the violence without deterring the perpetrators from persisting in their attacks and that it might result in a sharp increase in American casualties with no observable gain. The arguments for trying a surge are that it is defeatist to concentrate on withdrawal from Iraq without attempting a final effort to make military force work.
A major consideration is where the troops are to be found. Some formations of the regular American army and some national guard formations remain within the United States, but much has already been deployed to Iraq and it may prove difficult to find the necessary soldiers. Also problematic is the task of transporting them and their equipment to the fighting zones. How are they to be moved and where are they to be based?
Despite the deployment to Iraq already made and the number of units and formations elsewhere in the world (specifically in Afghanistan), the US Army and Marine Corps still maintain a large deployable reserve in America. There should be no difficulty in finding a regular or national guard army division or a marine division.
Its equipment could be transported in the designated huge transport vehicles of its C-lift reserve fleet, while the personnel could be flown by the vast fleet of C-5 transports. The obvious point of entry is Kuwait, from which the invasion of Iraq was launched in 2003.
Military logic requires that any reinforcements should contain a sizeable number of armoured vehicles. Insurgents, though they have had some success in attacking tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, are not properly equipped to resist a heavily armoured enemy.
The object of the surge deployment should be to overwhelm the insurgents with a sudden concentration, both of numbers, armoured vehicles and firepower with the intention to inflict severe losses and heavy shock. The Mahdi Army in Sadr City should prove vulnerable to such tactics, which would of course be supported by helicopters and fixed-wing aviation.
Hitherto most military activity by coalition forces has been reactive rather than unilateral. Typically, units have become involved in fire fights while on patrol or on convoy protection duties. During the surge, the additional troops would take the fight to the enemy with the intention of doing him harm, destabilising him and his leaders and damaging or destroying the bases from which he operates.
The cost of such tactics is likely to be high but not unbearable if enough armoured vehicles are used to protect the attacking troops. The advantage of committing recently arrived troops to such operations is that they will come to operations fresh and enthusiastic. Though there is the disadvantage that they may not be familiar with local conditions or topography, this need not be a disqualification since the purpose of a surge strike would be to create a shock effect, not to alter local conditions by informal action.
The British contingent recently demonstrated that such overwhelming tactics have their effect. After their surprise move into Basra with massed columns of fighting vehicles and Challenger tanks, they succeeded in dominating the chosen area and evoking respect from the local militias.
In any case, the sending of such force will be a necessary preliminary to any reduction in strength, since it would be necessary to cover the withdrawal. Retreat is a complicated operation of war which paradoxically always involves far more troops if it is to be brought off successfully. The reason for that is that the spectacle of withdrawal tempts the enemy to interpret the time of withdrawal as an indication of weakness, and so risks infliction of passing shots and the launching of farewell attacks. It is vastly important to have additional troops on hand at such a time.
The surge reinforcements may therefore have a dual purpose to cover the reduction and also to deal final blows at the source of the disorder prior to departure. American commanders certainly will not wish to leave Iraq, tail between legs. We may therefore confidently expect to see the number of American troops in the theatre increase suddenly from 150,000 to 200,000, if only for a short time.
An important side effect of the surge for which Western leaders will hope is that it will increase the size and capability of Iraqi security forces, which it will be vital to include in the operation.
For it is upon them that the stability of Iraq and its elected government will depend when the size of Western involvement is reduced.
I think you either go all-in or get the hell out. You need a big freakin army to get the whole country under control and you better plan on being there for a long long time. If you're not willing to do that then stop dicking around and get out.
Vinny, yeah, yeah. So let's get the hell out.
That's what you vote. Somebody else might vote all-in. But you know and I know that neither one is going to happen.
imo for the united states to stay in iraq is like being inside a collapsing building and deciding to stay in the house while the roof is caving in , because you 'have to figure out what to do better' .
the roof isn't going to wait falling down while you are trying to figure what to do - it's going to come crashing down on you .
as for going after the enemy , canadian and other troops are finding out in afghanistan that their big offensive isn't doing much good . the enemy has disappeared into the general population - as they have done for hundreds of years - and they'll come out again to fight again when it suits them . the british had plenty of opportunities to learn those realities more than once in their attempts to defeat the 'enemy' (i can't remember what label they were given during the 19th century ) . the british were bloodied over and over again in those wars - and so was the soviet army .
hbg
Surge or no surge the war in Iraq was lost the moment the Rumsfeld and his co-conspirators decided not to listen to the military and committed insufficient forces to the action. Now it is like a snow ball going down hill with the insurgentcy and civil strife growing stronger and more intrenched as it moves
hamburger wrote:imo for the united states to stay in iraq is like being inside a collapsing building and deciding to stay in the house while the roof is caving in , because you 'have to figure out what to do better' .
the roof isn't going to wait falling down while you are trying to figure what to do - it's going to come crashing down on you .
...
hbg
Interesting metaphor: The USA in Iraq is in a
building whose collapse appears unstoppable or even undelayable.
Let's say we attempt to leave the
building before it collapses.
What then?
Will we then find we were unable to leave the
building before it collapsed?
Will we then find ourselves outside all other collapsing buildings?
Will we then find ourselves inside another collapsing building?
Will we then find too late that the
building's collapse could have been stopped?
ican :
i REALLY do wish that a solution will be found to the (deteriorating ?) situation in iraq that will help ALL (americans , iraqis , the people of the world) to live better and more peaceful lives .
i'm not so deluded as to believe that the sheep will lie with the lion - or was it the other way round ?
as i stated elsewhere , i really have no qualifications to judge what's going on in itaq , but the whole thing is beginning to make me feel queasy .
as far as the 'crashing house' - personally i would get out of the house if i could and have a look at it from the outside rather than being inside and getting crushed .
let me put it this way : i'd take general abizaid's advice under consideration - pronto .
hbg
hamburger wrote:ican :
...
let me put it this way : i'd take general abizaid's advice under consideration - pronto .
hbg
Did the general discuss
both the probable upside and probable downside of our leaving before we were asked to leave? The probable downside of our leaving before we're asked to leave is rarely discussed in the media.
Which are more preferable:
The consequences of our
not leaving before we are asked to leave?
The consequences of our leaving before we are asked to leave?
Quote:
You appear to be among those who think that abandoning Iraq will not convert what I see to be the potential danger of that action into a kinetic danger. You appear to share the belief that the US presence in Iraq is what is causing the current Iraqi government's failure to solve its own problems.
Well, I think that the Iraqis are busy causing their own problems right now without our help, and that our presence makes things worse.
Quote:I would like to believe that. Can you supply more than your opinion or the opinion of others to help me believe that?
I believe that Iraq is becoming a Kinetic danger no matter what we do, and we can only hasten the process. There was a point where I thought things could be turned around, but we are far beyond it and now are left with nothing but bad options. That's why I advocate removal of our forces - it is the best of the bad options.
Cycloptichorn
Cycloptichorn wrote:
...
I advocate removal of our forces - it is the best of the bad options.
Cycloptichorn
I advocate ... well ... you already know what I advocate.
At this point, assuming we don't do either, and since I trust secret ballots more than non-secret polls, I advocate we run an Iraqi plebiscite with the question:
<> Shall the US remove its forces as soon as possible?
Or,
<> Shall the US forces remain in Iraq until the Iraqi governent asks us to leave?
ican711nm wrote:Cycloptichorn wrote:
...
I advocate removal of our forces - it is the best of the bad options.
Cycloptichorn
I advocate ... well ... you already know what I advocate.
At this point, assuming we don't do either, and since I trust secret ballots more than non-secret polls, I advocate we run an Iraqi plebiscite with the question:
<> Shall the US remove its forces as soon as possible?
Or,
<> Shall the US forces remain in Iraq until the Iraqi governent asks us to leave?
I firmly believe that this would end with a supermajority asking us to leave.
I say this because there isn't much evidence that we are improving the security situation with our presence; that is, we aren't actually stopping the Shiites and the Sunnis from killing each other.
There have been polls taken which show this to be the case (supermajority supports immediate withdrawl). What would cause you to believe a secret ballot over said polls? Who would be conducting the balloting? The US or Iraqi gov't? I would say that neither of those two groups can be trusted to give a straight answer on this question, so it would have to be some third group...
Cycloptichorn
