THE US, THE UN AND IRAQ, TENTH THREAD.

None of what you highlighted actually supports your position.

Cycloptichorn

Cycloptichorn wrote:

And how do we do that, exactly?

Details, please.

Cycloptichorn

By killing as many rotters as we can, while warning the non-combatants of the dangers to their own lives of continuing to tolerate rotters in their midsts, or allowing themselves to continue to be ignorant of the rotters in their midsts.

Cycloptichorn wrote:

None of what you highlighted actually supports your position.

Cycloptichorn

I do not believe you are so obtuse as to actually believe that!

So, how do you determine which people know who is a terrorist, and which people don't know that terrorists live among them, because - and this is a key part that you seem to miss - there is no good way to tell who is a secret terrorist, and who isn't.
...
Cycloptichorn

You have several times written something like: it is the responsibility of the Iraqi people to defend themselves against the rotters. Many are doing that now. Many more will do that in future if we become and remain relentless and successful in our offensive attacks against the rotters.

Quote:

You have several times written something like: it is the responsibility of the Iraqi people to defend themselves against the rotters. Many are doing that now. Many more will do that in future if we become and remain relentless and successful in our offensive attacks against the rotters.

You think more will do that, if we tell them 'we're going to kill anyone who doesn't do what we say, and turn in those who are against the US, or are shi'ite militia members/sunni militia members/al qaeda agents/other?

You don't think that the threat of using violence against those who won't name names to a country that they don't even like, will make them like us more and convert them to our side?

No f*cking way. You're living in a fantasy world if you think we can threaten people into joining the side of freedom.

Cycloptichorn

Your interpretations of what I've advocated are irrational.

http://www.hillsdale.edu/imprimis/2006/09/
September 2006
"Freedom and Justice in Islam"
Bernard Lewis
Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University


...


The Iranian Revolution and Al-Qaeda
...

The third and most recent phase of the Islamic revival is that associated with the name Al-Qaeda--the organization headed by Osama bin Laden.

...

Thanks to modern communications and the modern media, we are quite well informed about how Al-Qaeda perceives things.

...

As Osama bin Laden puts it: "In this final phase of the ongoing struggle, the world of the infidels was divided between two superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union. Now we have defeated and destroyed the more difficult and the more dangerous of the two.

Dealing with the pampered and effeminate Americans will be easy."

...

They can't take it. Hit them and they'll run. All you have to do is hit harder.

...

The response to 9/11 came as a nasty surprise. They were expecting more of the same--bleating and apologies--instead of which they got a vigorous reaction, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq.

... It is no accident ... that there has been no successful attack in the United States since then.

... the debate in this country since then has caused many of the perpetrators and sponsors to return to their previous diagnosis.

...

What we see as free debate, they see as weakness, fear and division. Thus they prepare for the final victory, the final triumph and the final Jihad.

...

Conclusion

...

there are encouraging signs at the present moment--what happened in Iraq, for example, with millions of Iraqis willing to stand in line to vote, knowing that they were risking their lives, is a quite extraordinary achievement. It shows great courage, great resolution.

...

There is a bitter anti-Western feeling which derives partly and increasingly from our support for what they see as tyrannies ruling over them. It's interesting that pro-American feeling is strongest in countries with anti-American governments.
...

one of the greatest dangers is that on their side, they are firm and convinced and resolute. Whereas on our side, we are weak and undecided and irresolute. And in such a combat, it is not difficult to see which side will prevail.

...

Either we bring them freedom, or they destroy us.

Dealing with the pampered and effeminate Americans will be easy

They can't take it. Hit them and they'll run. All you have to do is hit harder.

The response to 9/11 came as a nasty surprise. They were expecting more of the same--bleating and apologies--instead of which they got a vigorous reaction, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq.
... It is no accident ... that there has been no successful attack in the United States since then.

... the debate in this country since then has caused many of the perpetrators and sponsors to return to their previous diagnosis.
... What we see as free debate, they see as weakness, fear and division. Thus they prepare for the final victory, the final triumph and the final Jihad.

there are encouraging signs at the present moment--what happened in Iraq, for example, with millions of Iraqis willing to stand in line to vote, knowing that they were risking their lives, is a quite extraordinary achievement. It shows great courage, great resolution.

There is a bitter anti-Western feeling which derives partly and increasingly from our support for what they see as tyrannies ruling over them. It's interesting that pro-American feeling is strongest in countries with anti-American governments.

one of the greatest dangers is that on their side, they are firm and convinced and resolute. Whereas on our side, we are weak and undecided and irresolute. And in such a combat, it is not difficult to see which side will prevail.

Either we bring them freedom, or they destroy us.

Quote:

Your interpretations of what I've advocated are irrational.

Bull.

You state that any innocent who does not move away from the area, or who does not turn in any insurgent/terrorist that lives in their area, will be considered to be an insurgent/terrorist themselves, in terms of our level of caring about protecting their lives. This isn't what you are saying?

Cycloptichorn

from CNN :
"BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- The Interior Ministry has removed a police brigade from the streets of Baghdad because of a brazen kidnapping this week of 26 people, a ministry spokesman said Wednesday.

...

Well, back to the question: how do we know if someone knows a terrorist lives nearby, or not?

How do we determine who is innocent, and who is helping the enemy?

Cycloptichorn

ican wrote :
"Any person who does not move away from an area they know contains a rotter (i.e., deliberate, etc. ... killer of non-combatants) , or who does not turn in any rotter whose location in that area that person knows, will be considered to be a rotter themselves, and the USA will not care about such person's life. "

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so the person should go to the police and report "the rotters" to the very same people who are in cahoots with the insurgents (see my earlier post) ?
...
No!

Such persons should go to the American or British military and report the locations of rotters or their ordnance, in order to reduce the risk of such persons and those they love being killed in the effort to kill rotters.
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having lived in germany after WW II , i'm glad the allies (i lived in the british occupied zone) provided for law , order and security while at the same time helping to re-build a german police force (one , that one didn't have to mistrust) .
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it is my understanding that the occupying force has responsibilities towards civilians in occupied terretory and to provide them with a measure of law , order and safety .
or am i mistaken ?

I think you are not mistaken.
...
hbg

So, you are advocating that we win the war as soon as possible - and what this means is that we start killing civilians who live in the same areas as the terrorists or insurgents.

Speak plainly. If this is what you believe the best course to be, don't dance around it, admit it.

Cycloptichron

Military Hones a New Strategy on Insurgency

WASHINGTON, Oct. 4 ?- The United States Army and Marines are finishing work on a new counterinsurgency doctrine that draws on the hard-learned lessons from Iraq and makes the welfare and protection of civilians a bedrock element of military strategy.

The doctrine warns against some of the practices used early in the war, when the military operated without an effective counterinsurgency playbook. It cautions against overly aggressive raids and mistreatment of detainees. Instead it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding civilians and restoring essential services, and the rapid development of local security forces.

The current military leadership in Iraq has already embraced many of the ideas in the doctrine. But some military experts question whether the Army and the Marines have sufficient troops to carry out the doctrine effectively while also preparing for other threats.

The subtleties of the battle were highlighted Wednesday when the Iraqi Interior Ministry suspended a police brigade on suspicion that some members had been involved in death squads. The move was the most serious step Iraqi officials had taken to tackle the festering problem of militias operating within ministry forces.

The new doctrine is part of a broader effort to change the culture of a military that has long promoted the virtues of using firepower and battlefield maneuvers in swift, decisive operations against a conventional enemy.

"The Army will use this manual to change its entire culture as it transitions to irregular warfare," said Jack Keane, a retired four-star general who served in 2003 as the acting chief of staff of the Army. "But the Army does not have nearly enough resources, particularly in terms of people, to meet its global responsibilities while making such a significant commitment to irregular warfare."

The doctrine is outlined in a new field manual on counterinsurgency that is to be published next month. But recent drafts of the unclassified documents have been made available to The New York Times, and military officials said that the major elements of final version would not change.

The spirit of the document is captured in nine paradoxes that reflect the nimbleness required to win the support of the people and isolate insurgents from their potential base of support ?- a task so complex that military officers refer to it as the graduate level of war.

Instead of massing firepower to destroy Republican Guard troops and other enemy forces, as was required in the opening weeks of the invasion of Iraq, the draft manual emphasizes the importance of minimizing civilian casualties. "The more force used, the less effective it is," it notes.

Stressing the need to build up local institutions and encourage economic development, the manual cautions against putting too much weight on purely military solutions. "Tactical success guarantees nothing," it says.

Noting the need to interact with the people to gather intelligence and understand the civilians' needs, the doctrine cautions against hunkering down at large bases. "The more you protect your force, the less secure you are," it asserts.

The military generally turned its back on counterinsurgency operations after the Vietnam War. The Army concentrated on defending Europe against a Soviet attack. The Marines were focused on expeditionary operations in the third world.

"Basically, after Vietnam, the general attitude of the American military was that we don't want to fight that kind of war again," said Conrad C. Crane, the director of the military history institute at the Army War College, a retired Army lieutenant colonel and one of the principal drafters of the new doctrine. "The Army's idea was to fight the big war against the Russians and ignore these other things."

A common assumption was that if the military trained for major combat operations, it would be able to easily handle less violent operations like peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. But that assumption proved to be wrong in Iraq; in effect, the military without an up-to-date doctrine. Different units improvised different approaches. The failure by civilian policy makers to prepare for the reconstruction of Iraq compounded the problem.

The limited number of forces was also a constraint. To mass enough troops to storm Falluja, an insurgent stronghold, in 2004, American commanders drew troops from Haditha, another town in western Iraq. Insurgents took advantage of the Americans' limited numbers to attack the police there. Iraqi policemen were executed, dealing a severe setback to efforts to build a local force.

Frank G. Hoffman, a retired Marine infantry officer who works as a research fellow at an agency at the Marine base at Quantico, Va., said that in 2005, the Marines sometimes lacked sufficient forces to safeguard civilians. As a result, while these forces were often effective "in neutralizing an identifiable foe, they could not stay and work with the population the way the classical counterinsurgency would suggest."

The effort to develop the new program began a year ago under Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, former commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the current chief of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. Colonel Crane, Lt. Col. John A. Nagl and Col. Douglas King of the Marines were among the major drafters.

Academics and experts from private groups were asked for input. A draft was completed in June and was circulated for comment. Almost 800 responses were received, but military officials said they would not alter the substance of the new doctrine.

"We are codifying the best practices of previous counterinsurgency campaigns and the lessons we have learned from Iraq and Afghanistan to help our forces succeed in the current fight and prepare for the future," Colonel Nagl said.

In drafting the doctrine, the military drew upon some of the classic texts on counterinsurgency by the likes of T. E. Lawrence of Arabia, and David Galula, whose ideas were partly informed by his experience in Algeria.

Colonel Crane said that many of the ideas adopted for the manual had been percolating throughout the military. "In many ways, this is a bottom-up change, " he said. "The young soldiers who had been through Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq and Afghanistan, understood why we need to do this."

As the manual is being drafted, the military has also revised the curriculum at its war colleges and training ranges to emphasize counterinsurgency. At the National Training Center in California, the old tank-on-tank war games against a Soviet-style enemy have been supplanted by combat rehearsals in which troops on their way to Iraq and Afghanistan engage in mock operations with role players who simulate insurgents, militias and civilians.

Dennis Tighe, a training program manager for the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, said the rehearsals were vital for preparing troops for their new counterinsurgency mission. But the Army is stretched so thin and so many units are focused on rehearsing for Iraq and Afghanistan at the training center that concerns have grown that the Army may be raising a new group of young officers with little experience in high-intensity warfare against heavily equipped armies like North Korea.

"That is one of the things folks are a little concerned about," Mr. Tighe said.

While the counterinsurgency doctrine attempts to look beyond Iraq, it cites as a positive example the experience in 2005 of the Army's Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which worked with Iraqi security forces to clear Tal Afar of insurgents, to hold the town with Iraqi and American troops, then to encourage reconstruction there, an approach known as "clear, hold, build."

One military officer who served in Iraq said American units there generally carried out the tenets of the emerging doctrine when they had sufficient forces. But protecting civilians is a troop-intensive task. He noted that there were areas in which there were not enough American and Iraqi troops to protect Iraqis adequately against intimidation, a central element of the counterinsurgency strategy.

"The units that have sufficient forces are applying the doctrine with good effect," said the officer, who is not authorized to speak on military policy. "Those units without sufficient forces can only conduct raids to disrupt the enemy while protecting themselves. They can't do enough to protect the population effectively and partner with Iraqi forces."

ican wrote :
...

it is my understanding that the occupying force has responsibilities towards civilians in occupied terretory and to provide them with a measure of law , order and safety .
or am i mistaken ?

I think you are not mistaken.
...
hbg

Of course I get it. I got it long ago, if you recall.

You seem to think that unrestricted warfare is the way for us to win this war on terror. You are 100% wrong, because you still believe deep down that there will be a military solution to this problem, and there simply will not be.

There you go again distorting what I believe. I do not believe in "unrestricted warfare." I believe in the following, no more no less:

Quote:

Rotters are currently deliberately waging war on Iraqi civilians. To adequately protect the civilians in Iraq, it is imperative that the rotters in Iraq be exterminated by the military even if that extermination occurs at the cost of some civilians as well as some military.

There will be no decisive battle.
There won't be a major offensive campaign that wins it.

You need to face the fact that the battle against Terrorism encompasses far more than just a military solution.

While not sufficient the following is necessary:

Quote:

Rotters are currently deliberately waging war on Iraqi civilians. To adequately protect the civilians in Iraq, it is imperative that the rotters in Iraq be exterminated by the military even if that extermination occurs at the cost of some civilians as well as some military.

Then we must help rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure including its civilian defense. Together, they are sufficient.

In fact, your recommendations are the exact opposite of the strategy which has been announced by the military:

Quote:

Military Hones a New Strategy on Insurgency

WASHINGTON, Oct. 4 — The United States Army and Marines are finishing work on a new counterinsurgency doctrine that draws on the hard-learned lessons from Iraq and makes the welfare and protection of civilians a bedrock element of military strategy.

The doctrine warns against some of the practices used early in the war, when the military operated without an effective counterinsurgency playbook. It cautions against overly aggressive raids and mistreatment of detainees. Instead it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding civilians and restoring essential services, and the rapid development of local security forces.

The current military leadership in Iraq has already embraced many of the ideas in the doctrine. But some military experts question whether the Army and the Marines have sufficient troops to carry out the doctrine effectively while also preparing for other threats.
...

It seems that those who run the military believe that my point of view - that protecting the civilians of Iraq from uneccessary harm - is far more important than your point of view.

It seems that you are correct.

But what do they mean or what do you mean by protecting ... from unnecessary harm? I think that what I propose will do a far better job of that than what you or those running the military propose.

Cycloptichorn