Bush Speaks Tonight From Fort Bragg- Oooh-Rah!

Try this.

Its called ...reading.

Stay with me, parados.

Quote:

I showed a couple of instances where they worked together.

Quote:

Because the Commission couldn't cite specific collaboration in an act of international terrorism DOES NOT preclude them from working together to benefit one anothers' causes. This document in fact, proves that they did.

Working together, and working together on international terrorism are...two....different.....things.

They are shown and proven to have worked together.

...two al Qaeda members reportedly ...
Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently ...
Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred
But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship.

This language about al Qaeda's "understanding" with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998
The memo found no "compelling case" ...
Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin ....

LOL!!! <laughed, but a bit tiring...>

Yes, you're right.

After all, the thing is called the 911 Report.

It is a report, hence their pesky use of reportedly....LOL!!!

Anyway, you're cut off.

...probably...?

Anyway, my point has been that it is proven they met, did stuff for each other--and that points to a likelihood that they colluded. On 911? Maybe not. On Salam Pak, some weapons procurement...? A safe haven for some nasty AQ guys...probably...

Quite simple. Nothing sinister. Some people just can't seem to bear to admit it is quite a glaring possibility.

Working together, and working together on international terrorism are...two....different.....things.

I am not the first to get personal--but when others do-- I take it as a welcomed invitation to do the same. And, I will. Every time. No matter how many people don't like it.

No, revel. It says there was no collaborative OPERATIONAL relationship.

Quote:

They (911 Report) give testimony of a collaborative relationship.

This post is a colorific nightmare. Here is the code. Red is straight from the 911 Commission report. Blue is me. Black is Commission Report that I didn't care to make red.

I will not entertain any comments that don't cite specific quotes from the 911 Commission Report.

kuvasz--

I don't mind at all going through this again--as long as we ONLY consider the direct quotes from the 911 Commission. I'm not going to hold myself to that standard, and you start dragging up MoveOn.org and Dem.com theories.

I'm tired of linking to the sites and bringing stuff over, so I'll just highlight some of kicky's excerpts from the previous page.

Quote:

Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq,

No one seems to understand that this simple statement completely and utterly negates the "OBL wouldn't work with Saddam due to religious differences. This has been proven, therefore religious differences were OBVIOUSLY not as important to OBL as getting assistance when he needed it.

Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army. (ref 53)

Which is important because he later STOPPED THIS BEHAVIOR ON SADDAM'S REQUEST. This is proof that OBL was willing to make concessions for Saddam Hussein. He did Saddam a favor. He complied with a request from Saddam.

53. CIA analytic report,"Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003.

Quote:

To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge,

More proof that OBL did a favor for Saddam. He took action to benefit Saddam.


In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy. (ref 54)

54. Ibid.; Intelligence report, al Qaeda and Iraq, Aug. 1, 1997.

Well, HELLO!!!! Here we have OBL and SADDAM working together!!!! What's that you say...???? Did you say WORKING TOGETHER...??? OSAMA BIN LADEN AND SADDAM, YOU SAY????

Yeah. That's what I say. It's also what the 911 Commission say. An al-Quaida group in Iraq, with Iraq's tolerance. Just what Bush said.

Quote:

With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request. (ref 55)
Again, OBL not to proud to beg...Saddam. There's "no evidence" that Saddam said OK, but as we have seen, Saddam and OBL have a history of rubbing each others' backs. Why wouldn't he do it? Did he give his good bud some land? Was it named Salman Pak? Maybe.

Quote:

There is also evidence that around this time Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response. According to one report, Saddam Hussein's efforts at this time to rebuild relations with the Saudis and other Middle Eastern regimes led him to stay clear of Bin Ladin. (ref 74)

Binny, begging his bud Saddam for more help. They say ONE report poo-poo's the plausibility of Saddam helping him, as asked. What did the OTHER reports say?

Quote:

In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December. (ref 75)
75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999.

Um, hello. What does his mean to you?

Quote:

Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States. (ref 76)

Quote:

Though intelligence gave no clear indication of what might be afoot, some intelligence reports mentioned chemical weapons, pointing toward work at a camp in southern Afghanistan called Derunta. On November 4, 1998, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indictment of Bin Ladin, charging him with conspiracy to attack U.S. defense installations. The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah. The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had "reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq."

[code]Wot?

Wot???


WOT???[/code]
109 This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was "probably a direct result of the Iraq-Al Qida agreement."

But...how could that be...? a direct result of an AlQuaida/Iraq whatty-wot? Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the "exact formula used by Iraq (ref 110) This language about al Qaeda's "understanding" with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998.

110. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Nov. 4, 1998. Evidence on Iraqi ties to al Qaeda is summarized in chapter 2.

. The memo found no "compelling case" that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. .... Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein's regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons. (ref 62)

There are people who have so much invested in not seeing a connection between Saddam and OBL that they refuse to see what is laid out here in very explicit language.

It gives you very clear instances of the two working together, doing things to benefit one another, helping one another... It is undeniable. Because the Commission couldn't cite specific collaboration in an act of international terrorism DOES NOT preclude them from working together to benefit one anothers' causes. This document in fact, proves that they did.

[/color]

Refute it.

Read red. Red is from the Report. Most people who don't have an agenda will read the red excerpts and realize the evidence and reports are overwhelming evidence that the two did stuff for each other. Doing stuff for each other is working toward mutual goals...which is working together....which is collaboration.