The independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks said no evidence exists that al-Qeada had strong ties to Saddam Hussein.
The battle over adjectives appears silly especially when there is a quantum difference between what are the implications of such ties. Those who screech about a cabal between al Qeada and Iraq are making silk out of a sow's ear. Their underlying implication is that any dealings between al Qeada and Saddam's Iraq is prima fascia evidence that they were in cahoots and had an organized plan to destroy America, and therefore was sufficient cause to attack Iraq.
Sadly for those who feel that way, no such thing is evident.
Desperately weaving together a narrative of disparate items that are mostly unverified and at best second hand accounts is an exercise in passionate, but subjective idiocy or the work of loony Laurie Malroie aficionados.
In fact, it is more objectively confirmable that US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who visited Baghdad and who smilingly shook hands with Saddam Hussein had stronger connections with Saddam Hussein than did bin Laden.
Although Osama bin Laden asked for help from Iraq in the mid-1990s, Saddam's government never responded, according to a report by the commission staff based on interviews with government intelligence and law enforcement officials. The report asserted "no credible evidence" has emerged that Iraq was involved in the Sept. 11 strikes.
But this misdirection of equating Iraq with al Qeada is par for the rabid Right who conveniently drop down the Memory Hole the paramount reason stated by the Busheviks for attacking Iraq.
WMDs.
Don't believe me, check out the actual 911 Commission report instead of relying on distortions from paid propagandistas for the Bushevik cabal. It is available in either pdf or html form
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm
Report by the National Commission on terrorisat attacks upon the United States
Chapter 2 The Foundation of the New Terrorism
Quote:Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda-save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against "Crusaders" during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army. (ref 53)
53. CIA analytic report,"Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003.
Quote:To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad's control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy. (ref 54)
54. Ibid.; Intelligence report, al Qaeda and Iraq, Aug. 1, 1997.
Quote:With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request. (ref 55)
55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At least one of these reports dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg interview (June 25, 2004).
Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of Iraq's intelligence service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. The source claimed that Bin Ladin asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission.The information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, and there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received "third hand," passed from the foreign government service that "does not meet directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the Service." The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Ladin's Sudan farm in December 1995.
Quote:.There is also evidence that around this time Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response. According to one report, Saddam Hussein's efforts at this time to rebuild relations with the Saudis and other Middle Eastern regimes led him to stay clear of Bin Ladin. (ref 74)
74. Intelligence report, unsuccessful Bin Ladin probes for contact with Iraq, July 24, 1998; Intelligence report, Saddam Hussein's efforts to repair relations with Saudi government, 2001
Quote:In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December. (ref 75)
75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999.
Quote:Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States. (ref 76)
76. CIA analytic report,"Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003. See also DIA analytic report,"Special Analysis: Iraq's Inconclusive Ties to Al-Qaida," July 31, 2002; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 con-tacts.They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of his original information. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda operative, Feb. 14, 2004.Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that any such ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003 (cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas Feith memorandum,"Requested Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts (1990-2003),'" Dec. 10, 2003, p. 5).
Chapter 4 Responses to Al Qaeda's Initial Assaults
Quote:Though intelligence gave no clear indication of what might be afoot, some intelligence reports mentioned chemical weapons, pointing toward work at a camp in southern Afghanistan called Derunta. On November 4, 1998, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indictment of Bin Ladin, charging him with conspiracy to attack U.S. defense installations. The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah. The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had "reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq."109 This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was "probably a direct result of the Iraq-Al Qida agreement." Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the "exact formula used by Iraq (ref 110) This language about al Qaeda's "understanding" with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998.
110. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Nov. 4, 1998. Evidence on Iraqi ties to al Qaeda is summarized in chapter 2.
Chapter 7 The Attack Looms
Quote:The Hamburg operatives paid for their flight training primarily with funds wired from Dubai by KSM's nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali. Between June 29 and September 17, 2000,Ali sent Shehhi and Atta a total of $114,500 in five transfers ranging from $5,000 to $70,000.Ali relied on the unremarkable nature of his transactions, which were essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing daily across the globe.48 Ali was not required to provide identification in sending this money and the aliases he used were not questioned. (ref 49)
49. CIA cable,"Efforts to Locate al-Midhar," Jan. 13, 2000.We now know that two other al Qaeda operatives flew to Bangkok to meet Khallad to pass him money. See chapter 8.That was not known at the time. Mihdhar was met at the Kuala Lumpur airport by Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national. Reports that he was a lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi Fedayeen have turned out to be incorrect.They were based on a confusion of Shakir's identity with that of an Iraqi Fedayeen colonel with a similar name, who was later (in September 2001) in Iraq at the same time Shakir was in police custody in Qatar. See CIA briefing by CTC specialists (June 22, 2004);Walter Pincus and Dan Eggen,"Al Qaeda Link to Iraq May Be Confusion over Names," Washington Post, June 22, 2004, p. A13.
Quote:While Jarrah took his personal trips, Atta traveled to Germany in early January 2001 for a progress meeting with Ramzi Binalshibh. Binalshibh says Atta told him to report to the al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan that the three Hamburg pilots had completed their flight training and were awaiting orders. Atta also disclosed that a fourth pilot, Hanjour, had joined Hazmi. Upon returning to Florida, Atta wired Binalshibh travel money. Binalshibh proceeded to Afghanistan, made his report, and spent the next several months there and in Pakistan. (ref 67)
67. For Atta's trip to Germany and meeting with Binalshibh, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Dec. 10, 2002; FBI Penttbom timeline briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003). For Atta giving money to Binalshibh, see ibid. For Atta returning to Florida, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 10, 2001, entry citing INS NIIS report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134). For Binalshibh's trip to Afghanistan, see FBI Penttbom timeline briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003).
Quote:When Atta returned to Florida, Shehhi left for Morocco, traveling to Casablanca in mid-January. Shehhi's family, concerned about not having heard from him, reported him missing to the UAE government. The UAE embassy in turn contacted the Hamburg police and a UAE representative tried to find him in Germany, visiting mosques and Shehhi's last address in Hamburg. After learning that his family was looking for him, Shehhi telephoned them on January 20 and said he was still living and studying in Hamburg. The UAE government then told the Hamburg police they could call off the search. (ref 68)
68. For Shehhi's trip, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 11 and 12, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-TP, serials 11182, 11183; 265A-NY-280350-OUT, serials 2248, 2256, Intelligence report).We do not have information on what Shehhi did in Morocco.Atta's cell phone was used on January 2 to call the Moroccan embassy in Washington, D.C. before Shehhi left. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing cellular telephone records). Shehhi's trip occurred at a time when Abdelghani Mzoudi, one of the Hamburg cell associates, was also in Morocco. Mzoudi claims he went home to Morocco to get married but could not because he was injured in a car accident there. German BKA report, investigative summary re Mzoudi, Jan. 13, 2003, p. 43. He denies having met with Shehhi, and neither German nor U.S. investigators have uncovered evidence of a meeting. See Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004. For Shehhi's family contacting the UAE embassy, which contacted Hamburg police, and the UAE official's search, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002, p. 23. For Shehhi's call home, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-BN-98). For the search being called off, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002, p. 24.
Quote:Mohamed Atta is known to have been in Prague on two occasions: in December 1994, when he stayed one night at a transit hotel, and in June 2000, when he was en route to the United States. On the latter occasion, he arrived by bus from Germany, on June 2, and departed for Newark the following day. (ref 69)
69. Reports that Atta was in the Prague airport on May 30-31, 2000, and that he was turned back because he lacked a visa appear to be a case of mistaken identity: a Pakistani traveler with a name similar to Atta's attempted to enter the Czech Republic from Saudi Arabia via Germany but was forced to return to Germany because he lacked a valid Czech visa. CIA cable, report re traveler to Prague, Dec. 8, 2001.
Quote:The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of an Atta-Ani meeting. (ref 70)
70. For Czech source reporting and credibility assessment, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Eliska T. interview (May 20, 2004). For the information being reported to CIA, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004). For the leak and the ministers' statements, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). On April 4, 2001, Atta cashed an $8,000 check at a bank in Virginia Beach; he appears on a bank surveillance tape. For FBI evidence of Atta being in Virginia Beach, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 4, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302-615, 688, 896, 898). For FBI evidence of Atta being in Coral Springs, see ibid. (Apr. 11, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 381; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serials 3817, 5214). For Czech government finding no evidence of Atta's presence and having evidence that Ani was not in Prague, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004). Aside from scrutinizing various official records, the Czech government also reviewed surveillance photos taken outside the Iraqi embassy. CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). None of the people photographed that day resembled Atta, although the surveillance only operated from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. CIA cable, review of surveillance photos, Feb. 27, 2002. For Ani's denials of any meetings and request to superiors, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, Oct. 1, 2003. For KSM's denial of the meeting, see Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). Binalshibh has stated that Atta and he were so close that Atta probably would have told him of a meeting with an Iraqi official. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002. Binalshibh also stated that Bin Ladin was upset with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein for committing atrocities against Iraqi Muslims, and that Bin Ladin would never have approved such a meeting. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 4, 2002. For Atta not using an alias during his July 2001 trip, see FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 14, 2002.
Chapter 10 Wartime
Quote:President Bush had wondered immediately after the attack whether Saddam Hussein's regime might have had a hand in it. Iraq had been an enemy of the United States for 11 years, and was the only place in the world where the United States was engaged in ongoing combat operations. As a former pilot, the President was struck by the apparent sophistication of the operation and some of the piloting, especially Hanjour's high-speed dive into the Pentagon. He told us he recalled Iraqi support for Palestinian suicide terrorists as well. Speculating about other possible states that could be involved, the President told us he also thought about Iran. (ref 59)
59. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). On Iran, see Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
Quote:Clarke has written that on the evening of September 12, President Bush told him and some of his staff to explore possible Iraqi links to 9/11. "See if Sad-dam did this," Clarke recalls the President telling them. "See if he's linked in any way." (ref 60)
60. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004), p. 32. According to Clarke, he responded that "al Qaeda did this."When the President pressed Clarke to check if Saddam was involved and said that he wanted to learn of any shred of evidence, Clarke promised to look at the question again, but added that the NSC and the intelligence community had looked in the past for linkages between al Qaeda and Iraq and never found any real linkages. Ibid.
Quote:.While he believed the details of Clarke's account to be incorrect, President Bush acknowledged that he might well have spoken to Clarke at some point, asking him about Iraq. (ref 61)
61. President Bush told us that Clarke had mischaracterized this exchange. On the evening of September 12, the President was at the Pentagon and then went to the White House residence. He dismissed the idea that he had been wandering around the Situation Room alone, saying,"I don't do that." He said that he did not think that any president would roam around looking for something to do.While Clarke said he had found the President's tone "very intimidating," ("Clarke's Take on Terror," CBSnews.com, Mar. 21, 2004, online at www.cbsnews.com/stories /2004/03/19/60minutes/printable607356.shtml), President Bush doubted that anyone would have found his manner intimidating. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). Roger Cressey, Clarke's deputy, recalls this exchange with the President and Clarke concerning Iraq shortly after 9/11, but did not believe the Pres-ident's manner was intimidating. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004)
Quote:Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke's office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled "Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks." Rice's chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. The memo found no "compelling case" that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein's regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons. (ref 62)
62. NSC memo, Kurtz to Rice, Survey of Intelligence Information on any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks, Sept. 18, 2001. On 60 Minutes (CBS, Mar. 21, 2004), Clarke said that the first draft of this memo was returned by the NSC Front Office because it did not find a tie between Iraq and al Qaeda; Rice and Hadley deny that they asked to have the memo redone for this reason.
Quote:Within the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz continued to press the case for dealing with Iraq. Writing to Rumsfeld on September 17 in a memo headlined "Preventing More Events," he argued that if there was even a 10 percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum priority should be placed on eliminating that threat. Wolfowitz contended that the odds were "far more" than 1 in 10, citing Saddam's praise for the attack, his long record of involvement in terrorism, and theories that Ramzi Yousef was an Iraqi agent and Iraq was behind the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. (ref 73)
73. DOD memo, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, "Preventing More Events," Sept. 17, 2001. We review contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda in chapter 2.We have found no credible evidence to support theories of Iraqi government involvement in the 1993 WTC bombing.Wolfowitz added in his memo that he had attempted in June to get the CIA to explore these theories.
In total, based upon the Commission's report, Hussein's Iraq and al Qeada were not in cahoots, and there is no factual evidence that they were partners in international terrorism.
