THE EU, the US, IRAN, and the ARMS EMBARGO on CHINA

The concept of the EU goes back to l948? I'm really impressed. (My knowledge of European history post WWII is not something to brag about).

The history of the European Union

JW- Have you read the whole constitution of the United States?

Just curious.

JustWonders wrote:

Old...you can't vote on it? How many member states can, do you know?

Seems like I read nine or so. I have been known to be wrong on numbers lately, though. LOL.

10, JW. Can you vote on amendments to the constitution?

old europe wrote:

JustWonders wrote:

Old...you can't vote on it? How many member states can, do you know?

Seems like I read nine or so. I have been known to be wrong on numbers lately, though. LOL.

10, JW. Can you vote on amendments to the constitution?

Indirectly. The will of the voters is expressed by the state legislators we elect, and a majority (three-fourths, I think) of states is needed for ratification. Getting an amendment through ain't easy.

The Bundestag functions as our parliament.

Soft power can't do everything. Sometimes you need the ability to pose a plausible threat. By the same token, hard power eventually breaks down unless there's positive incentive for peaceful cooperation. Neglecting your allies is no way to keep them happy, as Washington is finding out. "I'm quite curious why U.S. scholars and officials didn't notice that the Chinese are establishing their own empire in East Asia," says Chen Po-chih, chairman of a Taiwan think tank. The Americans have been busy, of course. But so has China. Ensuring a peaceful future will take a special kind of power: brainpower.

U.S. Lawmakers Warn Europe on Arms Sales to China
By THOM SHANKER and DAVID E. SANGER

Published: March 2, 2005


WASHINGTON, March 1 - Senior members of Congress from both parties emerged from a meeting with President Bush on Tuesday warning Europe that if it lifts its ban on arms sales to China, the United States may retaliate with severe restrictions on technology sales to European companies.

The warning came after Mr. Bush, on his trip to Europe last week, twice cautioned the Europeans not to lift the restrictions, in place for 15 years. His insistence was based, at least in part, on a new American intelligence assessment that Beijing is rapidly becoming better equipped to carry out a sophisticated invasion of Taiwan and to counter any effort by the United States to react to such an attack, administration officials and intelligence analysts say.

After the White House meeting on Tuesday, Senator Richard G. Lugar, the Indiana Republican who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said that if the ban is lifted - as European leaders have said they plan to do in coming months - Congress could react with "a prohibition on a great number of technical skills and materials, or products, being available to Europeans." The ranking Democrat on the committee, Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, called a lifting of the ban "a nonstarter with Congress."

Their statements reinforce warnings that Mr. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made in meetings with Europeans over the past several weeks that the weapons sales would amount to a transfer of even more sophisticated military technology to China. But European officials say that the concerns are overstated, and that they are considering a compromise proposal that would keep advanced technologies from being exported.

Although Mr. Bush and Ms. Rice have spoken publicly about the sale of heavy weapons, Pentagon officials say the biggest concern is the technology that goes with it, including radar and battlefield communication systems that could take China's rapid military buildup to a new level. And to make their case, the officials have begun to discuss how such technology would give China an increased ability to intimidate Taiwan with the threat of invasion if it moves too aggressively toward independence.

The motivations for the officials to discuss this intelligence in interviews over the past two weeks are varied, and certainly include concerns about how the Chinese buildup could affect American security interests. But the discussion also comes as Congress takes up Mr. Bush's new spending proposals, which devote a majority of supplemental funding to land forces and the war in Iraq, while missions related to perceived threats from China fall mainly to the Navy and the Air Force.

In addition, some administration hawks are concerned about China's rapid growth as a military power in the Pacific at a time that American attention is focused on the Middle East.

The new intelligence reports indicate that since Mr. Bush came to office, China has raced ahead with one of the most ambitious military buildups in the world - including building 23 new amphibious assault ships that could ferry tanks, armored vehicles and troops across the 100 miles to Taiwan, and 13 new attack submarines.

"Their amphibious assault shipbuilding alone equals the entire U.S. Navy shipbuilding since 2002," one intelligence official said.

The official said Chinese military purchases abroad and domestic production of ships and warplanes "definitely represents a significant increase in overall capacity." At the same time, any advances in radar and communications ability would improve how rapidly and effectively those ships and planes could support an invasion or counter American moves in the region.

Military experts in European capitals and in Washington say they do not dispute the American intelligence reports on the growth in quality and quantity of Chinese arms. But European political leaders argue that the sanctions were placed to punish China because of its killing of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 16 years ago, not because of its military power.

Now that a new generation of leaders has taken over in Beijing, they say, the specific cause of the sanctions is removed.

In contrast, Japan has sided with the United States in asserting a growing Chinese threat to Taiwan, publicly inserting those concerns for the first time into a joint security statement issued in recent days.

The latest intelligence reports give the fullest sense to date of what China has actually fielded in the past several years, and how, as the new director of central intelligence, Porter J. Goss, recently told Congress, the weaponry could "tilt the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait."

The United States has deliberately left vague whether or how it would defend Taiwan in the event of invasion. The last time a crisis erupted in the region, President Clinton put a carrier near the Taiwan Strait - but not inside it - as a caution to Beijing.

That event prompted a rethinking of military strategy in Beijing, China experts say. One intelligence official noted that China's military expansion has tried to fill gaps that have been identified in a range of Pentagon reports and public American intelligence estimates.

The intelligence official said: "What the Chinese have systematically done is look at what other people have said about them, and said, 'Fine. I don't have a credible amphibious capability. Well, I'm going to build one. I don't have a credible surface force that can provide adequate air cover and surface-to-surface strike capability against incoming fleets. Fine, I'll build that. Submarines worry you? Fine, I'll buy them or I'll build them.' "

"It's a modernization across the force," the official added.

China's growing submarine fleet, which includes new nuclear- and conventional-powered vessels, helps China patch a major vulnerability: an inability until now to control the Taiwan Strait. This larger submarine fleet, even if less effective than its American counterpart, would vastly complicate any effort by Washington to intervene. Past calculations of how quickly the American aircraft carrier fleet could safely move into the area are even now being rewritten to include new estimates of the patrolling range of the new Chinese submarine fleet.

In a written statement on "Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States" submitted to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence earlier this month, Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, discussed an even broader nature of the Pentagon's concern.

"In addition to key Taiwanese military and civilian facilities," Admiral Jacoby said, "Chinese missiles will be capable of targeting U.S. and allied military installations in the region to either deter outside intervention in a Taiwan crisis or attack those installations if deterrent efforts fail."

Admiral Jacoby, in unclassified testimony, predicted that by 2015, the number of Chinese nuclear warheads "capable of targeting the continental United States will increase severalfold."

For now, though, China's capabilities are not considered a threat to the United States mainland; China still lacks an oceangoing navy that could rival America's presence in the Pacific, while America has no lack of nuclear missiles that can strike China from land or from submarines.

Experts also say it is clear that China will be able to proceed with its modernization plans with or without European weapons, though its progress may be slower. China has purchased destroyers, as well as many other weapons, from Russia, its main supplier. At the same time, it is modernizing its fleet of warships, built at a rapidly growing chain of domestic shipyards that is financing its own expansion by taking an increasing share of commercial shipbuilding contracts in Asia, according to United States government assessments.

Joint Statement
Richard Boucher, Spokesman
Washington, DC
February 19, 2005

Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee

1. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hosted Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Minister of State for Defense and Director-General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ohno in a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, DC, on February 19, 2005. They addressed security and alliance issues facing the United States and Japan, as well as other aspects of the relationship.

Working Together on Challenges Facing the World Today

2. The Ministers noted the excellent state of cooperative relations between the United States and Japan on a broad array of security, political, and economic issues. They looked to expand that cooperation, recognizing that the U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements at its core, continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as in enhancing regional and global peace and stability.

3. The Ministers underscored the importance of U.S. and Japanese leadership in providing international assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East -- efforts that are already producing results. The Ministers lauded the successful cooperation between the United States and Japan with other countries in extending wide-ranging assistance to those who suffered from the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean.

4. The Ministers recognized that cooperation and consultation between the United States and Japan have been pivotal in promoting nonproliferation, particularly through the Proliferation Security Initiative. They welcomed the success of multinational interdiction exercises hosted by the United States and Japan and by others.

5. The Ministers expressed their confidence that ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhances our ability to defend against and deter ballistic missile attacks and dissuade other parties from investing in ballistic missiles. Taking note of achievements in missile defense cooperation, such as Japan's decision to introduce ballistic missile defense systems and its recent announcement on its Three Principles on Arms Export, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advancing U.S.-Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperative development.

Common Strategic Objectives

6. The Ministers discussed the new security environment in which new and emerging threats, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, have surfaced as common challenges. They recognized that deepening interdependence among nations in a global community means that such threats can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the United States and Japan.

7. While noting that these threats are also emerging in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers also emphasized that persistent challenges continue to create unpredictability and uncertainty. Moreover, they noted that modernization of military capabilities in the region also requires attention.

8. The Ministers strongly urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks expeditiously and without preconditions, and to commit itself to complete dismantlement of all its nuclear programs in a transparent manner subject to verification.

9. Based on this understanding of the international security environment, the Ministers concurred that both Governments need to work closely together to pursue common strategic objectives through their respective efforts, implementation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and other joint efforts based on the alliance. Both sides decided to hold regular consultations to coordinate policies in accordance with these common strategic objectives and to update these objectives as the security environment requires.

10. In the region, common strategic objectives include:

* Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan.
* Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
* Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear programs, ballistic missile activities, illicit activities, and humanitarian issues such as the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.
* Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.
* Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.
* Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs.
* Encourage Russia's constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
* Fully normalize Japan-Russia relations through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.
* Promote a peaceful, stable, and vibrant Southeast Asia.
* Welcome the development of various forms of regional cooperation, while stressing the importance of open, inclusive, and transparent regional mechanisms.
* Discourage destabilizing sales and transfers of arms and military technology.
* Maintain the security of maritime traffic.

11. Global common strategic objectives include:

* Promote fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community.
* Further consolidate U.S.-Japan partnership in international peace cooperation activities and development assistance to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide.
* Promote the reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, including through improved reliability and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other regimes, and initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.
* Prevent and eradicate terrorism.
* Coordinate efforts to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council by making the best use of the current momentum to realize Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member.
* Maintain and enhance the stability of the global energy supply.

Strengthening of U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation

12. The Ministers expressed their support and appreciation for each other's efforts to develop their respective security and defense policies. Japan's new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) emphasize Japan's capability to respond effectively to new threats and diverse contingencies, Japan's active engagement to improve the international security environment, and the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. As a central component of its broad defense transformation effort, the United States is reorienting and strengthening its global defense posture to provide it with appropriate, strategy-driven capabilities in an uncertain security environment. The Ministers confirmed that these efforts will ensure and strengthen effective security and defense cooperation as both countries pursue common strategic objectives.

13. In this context, the Ministers underscored the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. This examination will take into account recent achievements and developments such as Japan's NDPG and new legislation to deal with contingencies, as well as the expanded agreement on mutual logistical support and progress in BMD cooperation. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.


14. The Ministers concurred that this examination should contribute to these consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. They decided to intensify these consultations in a comprehensive effort to strengthen the alliance as the bedrock of Japan's security and the anchor of regional stability. In this context, both sides confirmed their commitment to maintaining deterrence and capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan while reducing the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa. The Ministers directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results of these consultations.

15. The Ministers also stressed the importance of continued efforts to enhance positive relations between local communities and U.S. forces. They emphasized that improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including due attention to the environment, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report are important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

16. The Ministers, noting that the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) will expire in March 2006, decided to start consultations on future arrangements to provide appropriate levels of host nation support, bearing in mind the significant role of the SMA in supporting the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.