THE US, THE UN AND IRAQ VI

Foxfyre wrote:

To the rest of you elite who judge via style.....I agree Bush isn't a good extemporaneous speaker. But I would rather hear a man speak unscripted and uncoached from conviction and the heart than hear the smooth, oiled, slick oratory of a politician who speaks from the carefully crafted script designed to evoke emotion from those who decide on feelings instead of facts.

I like how you unwittingly contradict yourself in this post. Awesome.

No WMD's In Iraq?
By Douglas Hanson
AmericanThinker.com | April 7, 2004



It has become established conventional wisdom that ãno stockpiles of WMD
have been discovered in Iraq.ä But this reading of the evidence
uncovered to date is premature at best, and highly questionable. A
closer look at the data, and at the uses made of it, is essential for
those who wish to understand the genuine state of Iraqâs WMD threat at
the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Another Congressional committee hearing has come and gone for the head
of the hapless Iraqi Survey Group (ISG). Charles Duelfer has testified
that he did not know how much longer the weapons hunt might take, but
that the "picture is much more complicated than I anticipated going
in." In addition, he also figured out that pinning hopes on getting
information from frightened Iraqi scientists was probably not the best
way to find the locations of all those WMD stockpiles. (see my previous
article Cased Not Closed: Iraqâs WMDs).

Despite contracting out for assistance in document exploitation last
October, only a small fraction of the seized documents have been
analyzed. Keep in mind that the ISG is largely composed of personnel
from the CIA, State Department, such as Duelfer, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), such as the deputy, Maj. Gen. Keith
Dayton. These are the same organizations that are currently getting
raked over the coals for bureaucratic bungling of intelligence prior to
9-11.

In turn, the beleaguered agencies are deflecting this criticism to the
President and his national security advisors, by essentially complaining
the ãdevil made me do it.ä In other words, their technical and tactical
incompetence and/or their motivation to embarrass the administration has
allowed the ISG to make proclamations about WMD stockpiles that minimize
the significance of their findings, or deliberately downplay and
contradict the findings of Coalition forces in the field. Such is the
case with chemical weapons (CW) precursors.

The anti-war left and the media continuously shift the goal posts about
WMD stockpiles. But what does the term ãstockpileä mean for WMDs? One
nuclear bomb is not really a ãstockpile,ä but it would only take one,
set off in an American city or dropped on US forces in the field, to
make everybody wake up and smell the coffee.

What did we expect to find in Iraq, the equivalent of the Pantex Plant
? In fact, we did find hundreds of metric tons of yellowcake and
low-enriched uranium. But I digress.

ãStockpilesä of biological weapons? A stockpile of bio-weapons can be
kept in a fridge in a scientistâs house. Ricin and botulinum toxin have
already been found in sufficient quantities to regenerate a biological
weapon (BW) capability in short order. No, the standard established by
the left and their allies in the media is that we must find chemical
weapons (CW). That is, if the US has not found pallets of CW projectiles
in ammo dumps or munitions factories or at Iraqi Army unit areas, well
then that George Bush flat-out lied to us. In a fashion, the critics are
correct concerning CW stockpiles. Hereâs why.

Chemical weapons are very potent in small amounts in a sterile setting.
Hence, the bit in movies where the leading man dips a pen into a glass
of water and says something to the effect that ãthese few drops of nerve
agent are enough to wipe out hundreds of thousands of peopleä is
correct, but only if those people are crammed into the
Silverdome. Chemical weapons have very important weaknesses: They can be
destroyed by light, heat, water, and wind -- that is, the weather -- not
to mention the heat from the explosive charge designed to disperse the
agent. It is for this reason that CWs are employed en masse with strict
targeting protocols, when attacking an army in the field.

Even if done properly, depending upon the equipment and training of your
adversary, the killing and incapacitating effects may not be tactically
significant. For these reasons, Saddam initially ãtestedä his CW on
unsuspecting Kurd civilians to gain an accurate medical picture of
chemical agent effects. Simply put, anyone contemplating use of CW needs
a lot of it, and it must be delivered at the right time and place.

UNSCOM inspectors understood these factors when they concluded in 1995
that, at the time of Operation Desert Storm in January of 1991, Iraq had
largely solved key technical issues. The problem of precursor storage
and stabilization for VX, a powerful and persistent nerve agent was
solved by Saddamâs scientists. In addition, UNSCOM noted the development
of prototypes for binary sarin (non-persistent nerve agent) artillery
shells and 122mm rockets. Binary rounds consist of two non-lethal
substances that combine upon detonation to form a lethal agent.

The technically advanced binary nature of these projectiles was amazing
enough, but they also had developed ãquantities well beyond the
prototype levels.ä The DIA concurred with UNSCOM that Iraq had retained
production equipment and chemical precursors to reconstitute a CW
program absent an inspection regime.

Specifically, the DIA noted that Baghdad had rebuilt segments of its
industrial chemical infrastructure under the ãguise of a civilian need
for pesticides, chlorine, and other legitimate chemical
products.ä Pesticides are the key elements in the chemical agent
arena. In fact, the general pesticide chemical formula (organophosphate)
is the ãgrandfatherä of modern day nerve agents. Pesticides are also
precursors of many other chemical weapons including Mustard-Lewisite
(HL), Phosgene (CG) a choking agent, and Hydrogen Cyanide (AC) a blood
agent.

It was not surprising then, as Coalition forces attacked into Iraq, that
huge warehouses and caches of ãcommercial and agriculturalä chemicals
were seized and painstakingly tested by Army and Marine chemical
specialists. What was surprising was how quickly the ISG refuted the
findings of our ground forces, and how silent they have been on the
significance of these caches.

US forces participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom had the latest
chemical detection gear, including chemical detection paper, chemical
agent detector kits, improved chemical agent monitors, and sophisticated
Fox Chemical Recon Vehicles. Some American GIs remembered well the
shortfalls of this equipment in Gulf War I. Now all of these older
devices had been improved, and new and more accurate devices had been
issued. In fact, some mobile Army labs had highly sensitive mass
spectrometers to test for suspicious substances. Who could argue the
results of repeated tests using these devices without explaining how DoD
had apparently been ripped off by contractors for faulty
products? Apparently, the ISG could and did.

One of the reported incidents occurred near Karbala where there appeared
to be a very large ãagricultural supplyä area of 55-gallon drums of
pesticide. In addition, there was also a camouflaged bunker complex full
of these drums that some people entered with unpleasant results. More
than a dozen soldiers, a Knight-Ridder reporter, a CNN cameraman, and
two Iraqi POWs came down with symptoms consistent with exposure to nerve
agent. A full day of tests on the drums resulted in one positive for
nerve agent, and then one resulted in a negative. Later, an Army Fox NBC
[nuclear, biological, chemical] Recon Vehicle confirmed the existence of
Sarin. An officer from the 63d Chemical Company thought there might well
be chemical weapons at the site.

But later ISG tests resulted in a proclamation of negative, end of
story, nothing to see here, etc., and the earlier findings and injuries
dissolved into non-existence. Left unexplained is the small matter of
the obvious pains taken to disguise the cache of ostensibly legitimate
pesticides. One wonders about the advantage an agricultural commodities
business gains by securing drums of pesticide in camouflaged bunkers six
feet underground. The ãagricultural siteä was also co-located with a
military ammunition dump, evidently nothing more than a coincidence in
the eyes of the ISG.

Another find occurred around the northern Iraqi town of Baiâji, where
elements of the 4th Infantry Division (Mech) discovered 55-gallon drums
of a substance that mass spectrometer testing confirmed was cyclosarin
and an unspecified blister agent. A mobile laboratory was also found
nearby that could have been used to mix chemicals at the site. And only
yards away, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, as well as
gas masks were found. Of course, later tests by the experts revealed
that these were only the ubiquitous pesticides that everybody was
turning up. It seems that Iraqi soldiers were obsessed with keeping
their ammo dumps insect-free, according to the reading of the evidence
now enshrined by the conventional wisdom that ãno WMD stockpiles have be
en discovered.ä

Coalition forces continued to find evidence of CW after major combat
operations had concluded. The US unit around Taji, just north of Baghdad
discovered pesticides in one of the largest ammo dumps in Iraq. The unit
wanted to use the ammo dump for their own operations, when they
discovered the pesticides in ãnon-standardä drums that were smaller in
diameter but much longer than the standard 55-gallon drums.

Then in January of this year, Danish forces discovered 120mm mortar
shells with a mysterious liquid inside that initially tested positive
for blister agents. Further tests in Southern Iraq and in the US were,
of course, negative. The Danish Army said, ãIt is unclear why the
initial field tests were wrong.ä This is the understatement of the year,
and also points to a most basic question: If it wasnât a chemical agent,
what was it? More pesticides? Dishwashing detergent? From this old
soldierâs perspective, I gain nothing from putting a liquid in my mortar
rounds unless that stuff will do bad things to the enemy.

Virtually all agencies concerned with Iraqâs WMD programs have reached
the conclusion that Saddam was an expert at delay, dispersion, and
deception. His nuclear program had restarted as reported earlier this
year by Dr. Kay, the previous head of the ISG. Also, ãseed agentsä and
other bio-toxins had been dispersed throughout Baghdad and Iraq to form
the basis for the regeneration of a full-fledged BW program. This modus
operandi was no different for the regeneration of Saddamâs chemical
weapons program. Operating under the guise of legitimate industrial and
agricultural chemical production and storage, Iraq would have gone into
full-scale conversion of its stockpile of chemical precursors into
weaponized agents, had the Coalition not attacked and seized Iraq.

What is stunning is that the ISG seems incapable of connecting the dots
to present to the American people the clear evidence of Saddamâs
flouting of 12 years of UN resolutions, and the grave consequences if we
had failed to act. The ISG also owes a detailed explanation to DoD as to
how 12 years of research, development, and money has apparently gone
down the drain in the effort to upgrade the militaryâs chemical
detection capability and NBC training regimen. That the ISG can
consistently contradict other technical specialists, while ignoring
years of UNSCOM and US intelligence assessments, without accountability
is unconscionable, and must be rectified as soon as possible.

Douglas Hanson was a US Army cavalry reconnaissance officer for 20
years, and is a Gulf War I combat veteran. He was an Atomic Demolitions
Munitions (ADM) Security Officer, and a Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Defense Officer. As a civilian analyst, he has worked on
stability and support operations in Bosnia, and was initially an
operations officer in the operations/intelligence cell of the
Requirements Coordination Office of the CPA in Baghdad. He was later
assigned as the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Science and
Technology.

American Thinker classics:

An Open Letter to Dan Rather and CBS News

The Saudi War on George Bush

Case Not Closed: Iraq's WMD Stockpiles

GWB: HBS MBA

Why Does the Left Hate Israel?

The Choice of Anger

The Myth of the Stolen Election

From your source's website:

Quote:

American Thinker classics:

An Open Letter to Dan Rather and CBS News

The Saudi War on George Bush

Case Not Closed: Iraq's WMD Stockpiles

GWB: HBS MBA

Why Does the Left Hate Israel?

The Choice of Anger

The Myth of the Stolen Election

Better try again.

Argumentum ad hominem (argument directed at the person).
This is the error of attacking the character or motives of a person who has stated an idea, rather than the idea itself. The most obvious example of this fallacy is when one debater maligns the character of another debater (e.g, "The members of the opposition are a couple of fascists!"), but this is actually not that common.
A more typical manifestation of argumentum ad hominem is attacking a source of information -- for example, responding to a quotation from Richard Nixon on the subject of free trade with China by saying, "We all know Nixon was a liar and a cheat, so why should we believe anything he says?" Argumentum ad hominem also occurs when someone's arguments are discounted merely because they stand to benefit from the policy they advocate -- such as Bill Gates arguing against antitrust, rich people arguing for lower taxes, white people arguing against affirmative action, minorities arguing for affirmative action, etc. In all of these cases, the relevant question is not who makes the argument, but whether the argument is valid.

Great piece of self analysis there McEgntrix. there is hope for you yet!

From your source's website:
...
Better try again.

From The Guardian, an article by an American author

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1192218,00.html

McTag wrote:

From The Guardian, an article by an American author

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1192218,00.html

That is certainly one way to look at it. Wrong in my opinion, but everyone is entitled to express their opinion.