We've heard this before.
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The Vietnam Analogy 
April 16, 2004 
 By PAUL KRUGMAN 
Iraq isn't Vietnam. The most important difference is the 
death toll, which is only a small fraction of the carnage 
in Indochina. But there are also real parallels, and in 
some ways Iraq looks worse. 
It's true that the current American force in Iraq is much 
smaller than the Army we sent to Vietnam. But the U.S. 
military as a whole, and the Army in particular, is also 
much smaller than it was in 1968. Measured by the share of 
our military strength it ties down, Iraq is a Vietnam-size 
conflict. 
And the stress Iraq places on our military is, if anything, 
worse. In Vietnam, American forces consisted mainly of 
short-term draftees, who returned to civilian life after 
their tours of duty. Our Iraq force consists of long-term 
volunteers, including reservists who never expected to be 
called up for extended missions overseas. The training of 
these volunteers, their morale and their willingness to 
re-enlist will suffer severely if they are called upon to 
spend years fighting a guerrilla war. 
Some hawks say this proves that we need a bigger Army. But 
President Bush hasn't called for larger forces. In fact, he 
seems unwilling to pay for the forces we have. 
A fiscal comparison of George Bush's and Lyndon Johnson's 
policies makes the Vietnam era seem like a golden age of 
personal responsibility. At first, Johnson was reluctant to 
face up to the cost of the war. But in 1968 he bit the 
bullet, raising taxes and cutting spending; he turned a 
large deficit into a surplus the next year. A comparable 
program today - the budget went from a deficit of 3.2 
percent of G.D.P. to a 0.3 percent surplus in just one year 
- would eliminate most of our budget deficit. 
By contrast, Mr. Bush, for all his talk about staying the 
course, hasn't been willing to strike anything off his 
domestic wish list. On the contrary, he used the initial 
glow of apparent success in Iraq to ram through yet another 
tax cut, waiting until later to tell us about the extra $87 
billion he needed. And he's still at it: in his press 
conference on Tuesday he said nothing about the $50 
billion-to-$70 billion extra that everyone knows will be 
needed to pay for continuing operations. 
This fiscal chicanery is part of a larger pattern. Vietnam 
shook the nation's confidence not just because we lost, but 
because our leaders didn't tell us the truth. Last 
September Gen. Anthony Zinni spoke of "Vietnam, where we 
heard the garbage and the lies," and asked his audience of 
military officers, "Is it happening again?" Sure enough, 
the parallels are proliferating. Gulf of Tonkin attack, 
meet nonexistent W.M.D. and Al Qaeda links. "Hearts and 
minds," meet "welcome us as liberators." "Light at the end 
of the tunnel," meet "turned the corner." Vietnamization, 
meet the new Iraqi Army. 
Some say that Iraq isn't Vietnam because we've come to 
bring democracy, not to support a corrupt regime. But 
idealistic talk is cheap. In Vietnam, U.S. officials never 
said, "We're supporting a corrupt regime." They said they 
were defending democracy. The rest of the world, and the 
Iraqis themselves, will believe in America's idealistic 
intentions if and when they see a legitimate, noncorrupt 
Iraqi government - as opposed to, say, a rigged election 
that puts Ahmad Chalabi in charge. 
If we aren't promoting democracy in Iraq, what are we 
doing? Many of the more moderate supporters of the war have 
already reached the stage of quagmire logic: they no longer 
have high hopes for what we may accomplish, but they fear 
the consequences if we leave. The irony is painful. One of 
the real motives for the invasion of Iraq was to give the 
world a demonstration of American power. It's a measure of 
how badly things have gone that now we're told we can't 
leave because that would be a demonstration of American 
weakness. 
Again, the parallel with Vietnam is obvious. Remember the 
domino theory? 
And there's one more parallel: Nixonian politics is back. 
What we remember now is Watergate. But equally serious were 
Nixon's efforts to suppress dissent, like the "Tell It to 
Hanoi" rallies, where critics of the Vietnam War were 
accused of undermining the soldiers and encouraging the 
enemy. On Tuesday George Bush did a meta-Nixon: he declared 
that anyone who draws analogies between Iraq and Vietnam 
undermines the soldiers and encourages the enemy. 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/16/opinion/16KRUG.html?ex=1083117934&ei=1&en=baed8c0e130163a6 
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