Snares and Delusions
April 13, 2004
By PAUL KRUGMAN
In his Saturday radio address, George Bush described Iraqi
insurgents as a "small faction." Meanwhile, people actually
on the scene described a rebellion with widespread support.
Isn't it amazing? A year after the occupation of Iraq
began, Mr. Bush and his inner circle seem more divorced
from reality than ever.
Events should have cured the Bush team of its illusions.
After all, before the invasion Tim Russert asked Dick
Cheney about the possibility that we would be seen as
conquerors, not liberators, and would be faced with "a
long, costly and bloody battle." Mr. Cheney replied, "Well,
I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim, because
I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators."
Uh-huh.
But Bush officials seem to have learned nothing. Consider,
for example, the continuing favor shown to Ahmad Chalabi.
Last year the neocons tried to install Mr. Chalabi in
power, even ferrying his private army into Iraq just behind
our advancing troops. It turned out that he had no popular
support, and by now it's obvious that suspicions that we're
trying to put Mr. Chalabi on the throne are fueling Iraqi
distrust. According to Arnaud de Borchgrave of U.P.I.,
however, administration officials gave him control of
Saddam's secret files - a fine tool for blackmail - and are
letting him influence the allocation of reconstruction
contracts, a major source of kickbacks.
And we keep repeating the same mistakes. The story behind
last week's uprising by followers of Moktada al-Sadr bears
a striking resemblance to the story of the wave of looting
a year ago, after Baghdad fell.
In both cases, officials were unprepared for an obvious
risk. According to The Washington Post: "One U.S. official
said there was not even a fully developed backup plan for
military action in case Sadr opted to react violently. The
official noted that when the decision [to close Sadr's
newspaper] was made, there were very few U.S. troops in
Sadr's strongholds south of Baghdad."
If we're lucky, the Sadrist uprising will eventually fade
out, just as the postwar looting did; but the occupation's
dwindling credibility has taken another huge blow.
Meanwhile, Mr. Bush, who once challenged his own father to
go mano a mano, is still addicted to tough talk, and still
personalizes everything.
Again and again, administration officials have insisted
that some particular evildoer is causing all our problems.
Last July they confidently predicted an end to the
insurgency after Saddam's sons were killed. In December,
they predicted an end to the insurgency after capturing
Saddam himself. Six weeks ago - was it only six weeks? - Al
Qaeda was orchestrating the insurgency, and Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi was the root of all evil. The obvious point that
we're facing widespread religious and nationalist
resentment in Iraq, which is exploited but not caused by
the bad guy du jour, never seems to sink in.
The situation in Falluja seems to have been greatly
exacerbated by tough-guy posturing and wishful thinking.
According to The Jerusalem Post, after the murder and
mutilation of American contractors, Mr. Bush told officials
that "I want heads to roll." Didn't someone warn him of the
likely consequences of attempting to carry out a manhunt in
a hostile, densely populated urban area?
And now we have a new villain. Yesterday Lt. Gen. Ricardo
Sanchez declared that "the mission of the U.S. forces is to
kill or capture Moktada al-Sadr." If and when they do,
we'll hear once again that we've turned the corner. Does
anyone believe it?
When will we learn that we're not going to end the mess in
Iraq by getting bad guys? There are always new bad guys to
take their place. And let's can the rhetoric about staying
the course. In fact, we desperately need a change in
course.
The best we can realistically hope for now is to turn power
over to relatively moderate Iraqis with a real base of
popular support. Yes, that mainly means Islamic clerics.
The architects of the war will complain bitterly, and claim
that we could have achieved far more. But they've been
wrong about everything so far - and if we keep following
their advice, Iraq really will turn into another Vietnam.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/13/opinion/13KRUG.html?ex=1082858073&ei=1&en=4ef9b186af09bc0b
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company