setanta wrote
Quote:Those holding religious beliefs with an expressed intent of changing society's laws to make others adhere to their beliefs are potentially a threat to my civil liberties, and bear watching.
I agree with this statement. I would also add, by way of further clarification "...changing society's laws to make other adhere to their beliefs
or values..." (e.g., 'oral/genital contact is perverse').
Would setanta's sentence be coherent if one were to replace 'religious beliefs' with 'secular beliefs'?
Quote:Those holding secular beliefs with an expressed intent of changing society's laws to make others adhere to their beliefs or values are potentially a threat to my civil liberties, and bear watching.
This is, after all, a not uncommon formulation in such a discussion, that a 'secular' stance is not qualitatively different from a 'religious' stance - both are equally and merely belief systems.
I don't think that second sentence is coherent. Where such a claim is made (hi george) it ignores a fundamental difference, and it is on that difference that the liberty issue hinges.
"Secular" is defined as:
Quote:1) Religious skepticism or indifference.
2) The view that religious considerations should be excluded from civil affairs or public education.
"Secularism" is defined as:
Quote:1) Worldly rather than spiritual.
2) Not specifically relating to religion or to a religious body: secular music.
3) Relating to or advocating secularism.
4) Not bound by monastic restrictions, especially not belonging to a religious order. Used of the clergy.
5) Occurring or observed once in an age or century.
6) Lasting from century to century.
The etymology is:
Quote:[Middle English, from Old French seculer, from Late Latin saeculris, from Latin, of an age, from saeculum, generation, age.]
We should probably note two aspects in these terms - the philosophical position of 'skepticism or indifference', and the political/constitutional position of 'religious considerations excluded from civil affairs or education.'
This first aspect, skepticism/indifference, presents no problem within the context of a free state. Nor does the fact of holding a particular religious belief present any problem in a free state.
The second aspect, exclusion from civil affairs and education, presents the trickier question - to what degree ought we to safeguard against even the appearance that the state is forwarding/favoring a particular religious view. I'm sure we each, like each SC justice, have our notions on this question, but that's not really what I wish to get into here.
Rather, I would like to concentrate on the first aspect above, and argue that such a conception as 'forcing' secularism is intrinsically incoherent.
What makes this charge incoherent - and this is where the liberty difference sits - is that a secular view is non-discriminating, or non-exclusionary. It stands outside of any singular truth-claim. To argue that 'scepticism' or 'indifference' or 'pluralism' is forceable is as nonsensical as to claim that 'freedom' is forceable.
A fallacious argument that gets slipped in here commonly is the false implication that 'secularism' equals 'atheism'. Of course, they are clearly different (which is why we find many religious groups joining with the ACLU in speaking against the representation of the symbols of a
particular faith in the operations of the state). Atheism is forceable, or at least it's attemptable as in the USSR, so the fallacious identification of atheism and secularism is often slipped in.
On the other hand, it is entirely coherent to claim that a singular belief system IS enforceable.