You want to dismiss the fact that that flight was delayed, that weather conditions were no longer conducive to visual targeting, and that contrary to plans, they circled the area for forty-five minutes--thirty minutes longer than planned.
Unless all of these contingencies were part of the scientists' calculations, then your argument doesn't hold up.
You are the one who has determined that without a warning, only a few farmers would have been aware of the event . . . despite a nine-mile high mushroom cloud.
That's a strange response coming from someone whose argument against a nonlethal demonstration is based on the opinion of those scientists.
Compton: "We thought of the fighting men who were set for an invasion which would be so very costly in both American and Japanese lives."
That flies in the face of your statement.
It kind of does.
They surrendered after the Soviets declared war and invaded Manchuria.
Not according to postwar interviews with Japanese officials.
And as I have already pointed out, sixty-eight major cities were destroyed prior to the atomic bombs being dropped, and yet surrender came only after the Soviets decared war and invaded.
You must have believed that it mattered. Otherwise you wouldn't have used it help make the point that a nonlethal demonstration would be impossible.
Direct me to that post.
Also provide those scientists' statements both before and after they were consulted.
I don't see how any of that has any bearing on the question of whether the Japanese could attack a non-lethal demonstration if they knew about it.
I don't see how any of those things change the fact that Japan was able to chase our plane away from its primary target.
That would not change if Japan were only given a few minutes advance warning. There would still only be a handful of farmers to witness the event.
(that the A-bombs were dropped because somebody had to do something to end Japan's reign of terror) seems to have trailed off.
Your second proposal was much stronger, but I really don't see how it matters whether a non-lethal demonstration was possible or not.
How did their concern over the death toll if we had launched a bloody invasion impact their calculations over whether a demonstration was possible to carry out?
But the reason they surrendered was their fear of US invasion.
I doubt that any interviews contradict the fact that the A-bombs were a dramatic escalation in the attacks against Japan.
This does not change the fact that the A-bombs were a dramatic escalation in the attacks against Japan.
it doesn't make much sense why you are giving the Japanese a few minutes warning when the plan is for their scientists to only examine the scene after the fact.
"It is odd that the U.S. military would seek the counsel of scientists on this matter who had already said:"
I am not aware of them making statements on the matter before being consulted.
Your dismissal of the the fact that the Bockscar's mission was fraught with problems and time delays that were detrimental to its success does not prove that a nonlethal demonstration was impossible. You're just refusing to acknowledge it.
Actually, that it took forty-five minutes before Japanese planes were able to respond proves that a ten minute warning of a nonlethal demonstration would suffice.
Yeah, until a team arrived to witness the aftermath and the nine-mile high mushroom cloud, as they did at Hiroshima. But I've already told you that twice now.
There is little doubt that having their whole country set ablaze severely diminished Japan's capacity to subject others to its "reign of terror."
It is the difference between burning people alive along with subjecting the rest to radiation poisoning, and not doing that.
You brought them into the discussion, claiming that their recommendation somehow proved that a nonlethal demonstration was impossible.
I pointed out that they were under the mistaken impression that a ground invasion was inevitable unless the bombs were used. Then you said that he possibility of invasion certainly played no part in that recommendation.
So I showed you this:
Compton: "We thought of the fighting men who were set for an invasion which would be so very costly in both American and Japanese lives."
You keep repeating this despite the fact that it was after the Soviets declared war and invaded that they surrendered.
The destruction of Hiroshima had done nothing to reduce the preparedness of the troops dug in on the beaches of Japan’s home islands. There was now one fewer city behind them, but they were still dug in, they still had ammunition, and their military strength had not been diminished in any important way. Bombing Hiroshima did not foreclose either of Japan’s strategic options.
The Soviet declaration of war also changed the calculation of how much time was left for maneuver. Japanese intelligence was predicting that U.S. forces might not invade for months. Soviet forces, on the other hand, could be in Japan proper in as little as 10 days. The Soviet invasion made a decision on ending the war extremely time sensitive.”
And Japan’s leaders had reached this conclusion some months earlier. In a meeting of the Supreme Council in June 1945, they said that Soviet entry into the war “would determine the fate of the Empire.” Army Deputy Chief of Staff Kawabe said, in that same meeting, “The absolute maintenance of peace in our relations with the Soviet Union is imperative for the continuation of the war.”
That was my response to your insistence that only a few farmers would be witness. So I offered the condition of a few minutes warning so that they would send their team to validate the bombing.
I don't see your point here.
You said that the military took the recommendation of the scientists who said that a nonlethal demonstration was impossible. I said that that is odd since those scientists had declared that "We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power."
If that is so, then what they said when they were consulted is what stands.
I'm not even arguing that a non-lethal demonstration was impossible, so it doesn't really matter.
They were considering a proposal where Japan would have been notified of a demonstration well in advance.
They were considering a proposal where Japan would have been notified of a demonstration well in advance.
The scientists would be able to arrive after the fact just as easily if Japan were given no advance warning at all.
Things still remained dire for the people who were already under Japanese occupation. And the invasion of Japan would still have been nightmarishly bloody for both sides.
Yes, but how does that matter at this point?
I'm pretty sure that if we were to conclusively establish that a demonstration was indeed possible, you aren't going to be able to go back in time and save any lives.
I have not made any claims that a nonlethal demonstration was actually impossible. I can't see how that even matters at this point.
And how does this concern over the death toll from a possible invasion have any bearing on the question of whether a demonstration is possible?
Japan also surrendered only after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed.
The timing of their surrender does not change the reality that their reason for surrendering was their fear of US invasion.
I've already said as much. Japan retained the capability to make our invasion of Japan a horribly bloody affair. If they'd kept refusing to surrender (as they were still doing when the A-bombs were dropped on them), the invasion would have been truly horrible. It would have been one massive "Okinawa battle" down the entire length of Honshu.
Gar Alperovitz is deliberately omitting the fact that by the time the Soviets declared war, Japan had long ago decided to get out of the war in any way possible due to their fear of American invasion.
Your few minutes warning does nothing to help this team. It is not enough time for them to be able to witness the bombing live, and they were already able to examine the bombing after the fact even if there hadn't been a warning.
It isn't odd that no one would have knowledge of a statement that hadn't been made yet.
Yes. But people only knew of their statement after they made the statement.
I said that a nonlethal demonstration was not impossible. You pointed out that it was,
and you used the recommendation of certain scientists to prove your point.
You even provided two links to support your claim.
It seems to me that you were arguing that a nonlethal demonstration was impossible.
Sure, if you discount the naval sea blockade that military leaders have said would bring them to surrender by November.
They were already looking to the Soviets to negotiate a peace settlement, until the Soviets declared war and invaded, after which they surrendered.
It was illogical to believe that after setting sixty-six major cities on fire with napalm and other things, that another one would bring about surrender.
"The Soviet entry into the war played a much greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender because it dashed any hope that Japan could terminate the war through Moscow's mediation," said Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, whose recently published "Racing the Enemy" examines the conclusion of the Pacific war and is based on recently declassified Soviet archives as well as U.S. and Japanese documents.
"The emperor and the peace party (within the government) hastened to end the war expecting that the Americans would deal with Japan more generously than the Soviets," Hasegawa, a Russian-speaking American scholar, said in an interview.
Despite the death toll from the atomic bombings — 140,000 in Hiroshima, 80,000 in Nagasaki the Imperial Military Command believed it could hold out against an Allied invasion if it retained control of Manchuria and Korea, which provided Japan with the resources for war, according to Hasegawa and Terry Charman, a historian of World War II at London's Imperial War Museum.
"The Soviet attack changed all that," Charman said. "The leadership in Tokyo realized they had no hope now, and in that sense August Storm did have a greater effect on the Japanese decision to surrender than the dropping of the A-bombs."
Well yeah, you can't undo the incineration of all those people and the radiation poisoning of a whole bunch of others. But it doesn't hurt to talk about the fact that it wasn't really necessary.
An invasion wasn't necessary according to military leaders of that time.
They've given reasons why that is true, and I have put their statements in front of your eyes.
And yet these scientists used the consequences of an (unnecessary) invasion as a reason to drop atomic bombs on cities full of human beings.
They surrendered only when they learned that the Soviets were not going to be a peace broker, and that the Soviets had declared war and invaded.
Well it's a good thing the Soviets declared war on Japan and invaded cuz that sure produced good results.
And yet it was when the Soviets removed the hope of negotiated peace, and instead declared war and invaded, that surrender was brought about.
You seem to be saying that after a demonstration in a large forested area, the aftermath would not be impressive.
Did you ever stop to think about how the distance a person was from ground zero would determine the degree of burn they would experience? It's something to think about.
Actually, what is odd--and a little annoying--is that you mention that the U.S. military accepted the recommendation from those scientists that a nonlethal demonstration would be impossible. But when I mention anything from the links you provided about what they said, you start talking about how such statements were not made yet.
I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask you what recommendations from those scientists are the ones that the military accepted from them, and when were those recommendations offered.
Uh huh . . .
Manchuria was not Japanese territory, no more than was Korea, China, Malaya or Burma.
To attempt to suggest that the Japanese military junta, in power from 1923 onward, had a rational view of the world
No I didn't. Not unless I misspoke (which is possible but unlikely).
I never offered any commentary on whether their recommendation was good or bad.
Yes. Linking to their recommendation is a good way of proving that they made that recommendation.
No. I only argued that top scientists had advised the government that it was impossible.
No military leaders were giving such advice at the time the A-bombs were being dropped.
That is incorrect. It is perfectly logical to hope that a dramatic increase in your attacks will result in your enemy surrendering.
Glennn wrote:
"The Soviet entry into the war played a much greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender because it dashed any hope that Japan could terminate the war through Moscow's mediation . . ."
Actually it was the previous statement that was correct. Japan surrendered because they realized that the Soviets were not going to help them with their mediation gambit.
What do these post-war statements possibly have to do with the technical question of whether a non-lethal demonstration is possible?
It is very unlikely that the consequences of an invasion had any impact at all on the technical question of whether a demonstration was possible.
No. I didn't say anything like that. What I did was point out that your proposed 10 minute warning notice serves no practical purpose.
But what good is proving that they made a recommendation if you are unwilling to say whether it was good or bad?
Decisions concerning the dropping of the atom bomb came from above these military leaders. As such, they were obligated to follow orders without question. But you already know that.
Tokyo had already been firebombed to destruction, and there was no surrender. It is illogical to think that another city would make any difference.
Actually, it was the following statements that were also correct.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Despite the death toll from the atomic bombings — 140,000 in Hiroshima, 80,000 in Nagasaki the Imperial Military Command believed it could hold out against an Allied invasion if it retained control of Manchuria and Korea, which provided Japan with the resources for war, according to Hasegawa and Terry Charman, a historian of World War II at London's Imperial War Museum.
"The Soviet attack changed all that," Charman said. "The leadership in Tokyo realized they had no hope now, and in that sense August Storm did have a greater effect on the Japanese decision to surrender than the dropping of the A-bombs."
They show that both a lethal and nonlethal demonstration were not necessary.
You're simply treating this issue as if it were a game in which any opinions not expressed during the bombings can be regarded as nonexistent,
even though you understand that the decision to drop the bomb was made at a level above the military leaders who stated that they weren't necessary, and that those military leaders were obligated to follow orders without question.
From your link:
"At the same time, we recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war[/b]."
And here, ten days later, their thoughts are clarified when they said the following:
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
"We thought of the fighting men who were set for an invasion which would be so very costly in both American and Japanese lives. We were determined to find, if we could, some effective way of demonstrating the power of an atomic bomb without loss of life that would impress Japan's warlords. If only this could be done!"
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Of course, it was obvious that the sea blockade was going to starve them out.
And the destruction of every major city was a reality. But the Soviet invasion brought about surrender. So those scientists were basing their recommendation on an absence of facts.
The mere fact that the US government received an expert recommendation that a nonlethal demonstration was impossible fully explains why the US government didn't bother with a nonlethal demonstration.
That confirms that I was correct when I stated that none of them advised against using the A-bombs against a live target.
Not when the attack against the city represented a huge escalation in the attacks against Japan.
It was only when the Emperor directly ordered them to surrender that they were willing to surrender.
The scientists were not deciding whether anything was necessary. They were only deciding whether a demonstration was possible
If the opinions were not expressed to the government, the government certainly didn't know about them.
That confirms that those opinions were not expressed to the government.
How did that have any impact on the technical question of whether a demonstration was possible?
I'm not sure that starving millions of civilians to death is morally superior to killing 200,000 with A-bombs.
None of those facts seem to have any bearing on the technical question of whether a nonlethal demonstration was possible.
leave me out of your tourettes syndrome-like outburst's
