@oralloy,
Quote:So the scientists were correct to fear that Japan could have intercepted an A-bomb demonstration if given early notification.
You miss the point. The departure of the plane carrying the Nagasaki bomb was delayed thirty minutes, which allowed for weather to become an issue. And they were circling for forty-five minutes over the area, which was thirty minutes over the allotted time that was planned, which allowed for further deterioration of weather conditions, which caused a wasted bombing run.
You are proposing that the above proves that the scientists were correct to fear an interception. But that flight was rife with malfunctions and delays. A nonlethal demonstration would need only a few minutes warning, after which a team would arrive at the scene and report that it was an atom bomb. Remember this:
The team that went to Hiroshima was led by Dr. Yoshio Nishina, who had been a leader on the Japanese fission research program. He and a general arrived at Hiroshima on the morning of August 8th and began examining both the characteristics of the damage (e.g., by examining knocked-down grass and trees, he could discern from what direction a uniform blast wave had traveled, for example) and the human remains (many of which showed signs of immediate high-temperature burns, and were measurably radioactive). From that he concluded very quickly that the weapon was an atomic bomb. On the evening of August 8th sent back to Tokyo the message:
What I've seen so far is unspeakable. Tens of thousands dead. Bodies piled up everywhere. Sick, wounded, naked people wandering around in a daze... Almost no buildings left standing. It's all true then? Hiroshima is completely wiped out? Completely. ... I'm very sorry to tell you this... the so-called new-type bomb is actually an atomic bomb.
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So the scientists were not correct in their thinking that a nonlethal demonstration was impossible.
Quote:Did this factor into their decision over whether a demonstration was possible?
That's not the point. You said that you were sure that the scientists didn't consider the issue of invasion at all. And so I showed you this:
Compton:
"We thought of the fighting men who were set for an invasion which would be so very costly in both American and Japanese lives."
Quote:Well technically it took the threat of American invasion.
Actually, they surrendered after the Soviets declared war and invaded.
Quote:Those who hoped that the A-bombs would shock Japan into surrendering were entirely reasonable to do so.
No. The fact is that sixty-eight major cities in Japan had already been firebombed to complete, or near complete, destruction. The idea that the destruction of another city would accomplish what the destruction of sixty-eight cities had not is not realistic. In fact, when Truman threatened to visit a “rain of ruin” on Japanese cities if Japan did not surrender, few people in the United States realized just how little there was left to destroy.
Quote:Correct. The scientists were giving advice on whether a demonstration was technically feasible.
And they were incorrect in their assessment. The bomb could have been dropped in a nonlethal demonstration. Nothing you've said or provided has taken away from that point.
Quote:So your statement that they had said it before they were consulted, was incorrect.
I'm not clear on the point you are trying to make here. Here is the entire texts from the links you provided earlier. What did I say, and how is it incorrect based on the following?
June 16, 1945
You have asked us to comment on the initial use of the new weapon. This use, in our opinion, should be such as to promote a satisfactory adjustment of our international relations. At the same time, we recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war.
(1) To accomplish these ends we recommend that before the weapons are used not only Britain, but also Russia, France, and China be advised that we have made considerable progress in our work on atomic weapons, that these may be ready to use during the present war, and that we would welcome suggestions as to how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations.
(2) The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.
(3) With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power.
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Throughout the morning's discussions [31 May, 1945] it seemed to be a foregone conclusion that the bomb would be used. It was regarding only the details of strategy and tactics that differing views were expressed. At the luncheon following the morning meeting, I was seated at Mr. Stimson's left. In the course of the conversation I asked the Secretary whether it might not be possible to arrange a nonmilitary demonstration of the bomb in such a manner that the Japanese would be so impressed that they would see the uselessness of continuing the war. The Secretary opened this question for general discussion by those at the table. Various possibilities were brought forward. One after the other it seemed necessary that they should be discarded.
It was evident that everyone would suspect trickery. If a bomb were exploded in Japan with previous notice, the Japanese air power was still adequate to give serious interference. An atomic bomb was an intricate device, still in the developmental stage. Its operation would be far from routine. If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure. Such an end to an advertised demonstration of power would be much worse that if the attempt had not been made. It was now evident that when the time came for the bombs to be used we should have only one of them available, followed afterwards by others at all-too-long intervals. We could not afford the chance that one of them might be a dud. If the test were made on some neutral territory, it was hard to believe that Japan's determined and fanatical military men would be impressed. If such an open test were made first and failed to bring surrender, the chance would be gone to give the shock of surprise that proved so effective. On the contrary, it would make the Japanese ready to interfere with an atomic attack if they could. Though the possibility of a demonstration that would not destroy human lives was attractive, no one could suggest a way in which it could be made so convincing that it would be likely to stop the war.
After luncheon, the Interim Committee went into executive session. Our Scientific Panel was then again invited in. We were asked to prepare a report as to whether we could devise any kind of demonstration that would seem likely to bring the war to an end without using the bomb against a live target.
Ten days later, at Oppenheimer's invitation, Lawrence, Fermi, and I spend a long week end at Los Alamos. We were keenly aware of our responsibility as the scientific advisers to the Interim Committee. Among our colleagues were the scientists who supported Franck in suggesting a nonmilitary demonstration only . We thought of the fighting men who were set for an invasion which would be so very costly in both American and Japanese lives. We were determined to find, if we could, some effective way of demonstrating the power of an atomic bomb without loss of life that would impress Japan's warlords. If only this could be done!
Ernest Lawrence was the last one of our group to give up hope for finding such a solution. The difficulties of making a purely technical demonstration that would carry its impact effectively into Japan's controlling councils were indeed great. We had to count on every possible effort to distort even obvious facts. Experience with the determination of Japan's fight men made it evident that the war would not be stopped unless these men themselves were convinced of its futility.
Our hearts were heavy as on 16 June we turned in this report to the Interim Committee . We were glad and proud to have had a part in making the power of the atom available for the use of man. What a tragedy it was that this power should become available first in time of war and that it must first be used for human destruction. If, however, it would result in the shortening of the war and the saving of lives--if it would mean bringing us closer to the time when war would be abandoned as a means of setting international disputes--here must be our hope and our basis for courage.
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